investigation claim in California

2026While [the plaintiff] will no doubt need to use speech by [u]niversity employees as evidence to support his claims, the speech is not—by itself—the basis of the claim”].) Whereas an investigation claim is subject to the anti‑SLAPP statute if “the speech at issue is explicitly alleged to be the injury-producing conduct.” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 593 , disapproved on other grounds in Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012, fn. 2.) But defendant does not analyze whether the speech or the nonspeech investigatory acts serve as a basis of the claim, incorre

2026While [the plaintiff] will no doubt need to use speech by [u]niversity employees as evidence to support his claims, the speech is not—by itself—the basis of the claim”].) Whereas an investigation claim is subject to the anti‑SLAPP statute if “the speech at issue is explicitly alleged to be the injury-producing conduct.” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 593 , disapproved on other grounds in Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012, fn. 2.) But defendant does not analyze whether the speech or the nonspeech investigatory acts serve as a basis of the claim, incorre

2025We have held, however, that the ‘fact of investigation alone’ is not enough, [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1529 )].

2025We have held, however, that the ‘fact of investigation alone’ is not enough, [(Fuller, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 1529 )].

2022(Rogers, supra, 139 F.Supp.3d at p. 142 ; Doe v. Leavitt, supra, 552 F.3d at pp. 82-85.) 12 We note that the NPDB Guidebook’s interpretation also is consistent with the ordinary definition of an investigation as an inquiry or examination of a person or thing.

2022(Rogers, supra, 139 F.Supp.3d at p. 142 ; Doe v. Leavitt, supra, 552 F.3d at pp. 82-85.) 12 We note that the NPDB Guidebook’s interpretation also is consistent with the ordinary definition of an investigation as an inquiry or examination of a person or thing.

1985Fund, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 15 .) However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], our Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the Appeals Board’s exclusive jurisdiction in workers’ compensation claims in those instances when the employer’s insurance carrier intentionally commits outrageous and extreme conduct totally unnecessary to the normal investigation and defense of a claim.

1985Fund, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 15 .) However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], our Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the Appeals Board’s exclusive jurisdiction in workers’ compensation claims in those instances when the employer’s insurance carrier intentionally commits outrageous and extreme conduct totally unnecessary to the normal investigation and defense of a claim.

1985Fund, supra, 115 Cal. App.3d 15 .) However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], our Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the Appeals Board's exclusive jurisdiction in workers' compensation claims in those instances when the employer's insurance carrier intentionally commits outrageous and extreme conduct totally unnecessary to the normal investigation and defense of a claim. ( Id., at p. 630.) [2] The court held that these affirmative acts outside the scope of a customary insurance investigation caused the carrier to step out

1985Fund, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 15 .) However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], our Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the Appeals Board’s exclusive jurisdiction in workers’ compensation claims in those instances when the employer’s insurance carrier intentionally commits outrageous and extreme conduct totally unnecessary to the normal investigation and defense of a claim.

2026(See, e.g., Haidak v. University of Massachusetts- 8 Doe’s brief asserts at the investigation hearing he presented at his closing statement “and also listed some of the questions he would have asked the complainants if they had made themselves available for questioning at the University hearing.” 21 Amherst (1st Cir. 2019) 933 F.3d 56 , 69–70; Doe v. Haas (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 427 F.Supp.3d 336 , 351 [citing Haidak].) The Delay Was Not Error, Let Alone Prejudicial Error Doe’s second argument reads as follows: “The delay in this case was unreasonable.

2025(Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1120 ; see id. at p. 1118 [“Trial courts are equipped to weigh the various considerations” associated with the possible addition of a claim, “e.g., whether the claims are sufficiently related, whether the interests of judicial economy will be served, and whether the employer will be prejudiced”].) The Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the Paid Sick Leave law turned on its interpretation of section 248.5, subdivision (a)’s list of procedures by which the Legislature contemplated “a full investigation or hearing” of a Paid Sick Leave law claim may be conducted.

2025(Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 121 .) Read in context, section 248.5, subdivision (a)’s reference to section 98 clearly indicates the Legislature’s understanding that employees would raise Paid Sick Leave claims before the Labor Commissioner in the Berman process.

2020This presents four sub-issues: (a) when a public agency must make a section 21166 finding; (b) the investigation and analysis required by a public agency in making a section 21166 finding; (c) whether the court is permitted or required to enlarge the scope of fair argument if the agency fails to undertake the required investigation and analysis (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296 ); and (d) application of these principles to the facts of this case.

2019Accordingly, Cox cannot establish malicious prosecution as a matter of law on undisputed facts, and thus we cannot consider her new theory for the first time on appeal. ( Tanguilig v. NeimanMarcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 , 330, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 ["an appellant may not raise a new theory on appeal when the theory rests on facts that were either controverted or not fully developed in the trial court"].) Additionally, where, "as here, the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively

2019Accordingly, Cox cannot establish malicious prosecution as a matter of law on undisputed facts, and thus we cannot consider her new theory for the first time on appeal. ( Tanguilig v. NeimanMarcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 , 330, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 ["an appellant may not raise a new theory on appeal when the theory rests on facts that were either controverted or not fully developed in the trial court"].) Additionally, where, "as here, the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively

2019Accordingly, Cox cannot establish malicious prosecution as a matter of law on undisputed facts, and thus we cannot consider her new theory for the first time on appeal. ( Tanguilig v. NeimanMarcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 , 330, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 ["an appellant may not raise a new theory on appeal when the theory rests on facts that were either controverted or not fully developed in the trial court"].) Additionally, where, "as here, the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively

2019Accordingly, Cox cannot establish malicious prosecution as a matter of law on undisputed facts, and thus we cannot consider her new theory for the first time on appeal. ( Tanguilig v. NeimanMarcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 , 330, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 ["an appellant may not raise a new theory on appeal when the theory rests on facts that were either controverted or not fully developed in the trial court"].) Additionally, where, "as here, the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively

2018It simply mentioned the statute in discussing an earlier judgment against the Board. ( Marina , at p. 136, 209 Cal.Rptr. 212 .) It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions that are not considered. ( Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 , 1160, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) In adopting the fee schedule, the Board did not delegate to a single member the authority to conduct an investigation or hold a hearing.

2018It simply mentioned the statute in discussing an earlier judgment against the Board. ( Marina , at p. 136, 209 Cal.Rptr. 212 .) It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions that are not considered. ( Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 , 1160, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) In adopting the fee schedule, the Board did not delegate to a single member the authority to conduct an investigation or hold a hearing.

2015The dissenting opinion in Pereira stated that section 132 should not extend to the “mere delivery of documents to a state functionary conducting a preliminary investigation and to an attorney seeking discovery to enforce a civil judgment.” (Pereira, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1069 (dis. opn. of Sparks, J.).) The dissent’s view was that section 132 “contemplates that whatever the nature of the investigation or inquiry it be sufficiently formal to permit the introduction of evidence.” ( 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1075 (dis. opn. of Sparks, J.).) Accordingly, the dissent concluded that “offers in evid

2015The dissenting opinion in Pereira stated that section 132 should not extend to the “mere delivery of documents to a state functionary conducting a preliminary investigation and to an attorney seeking discovery to enforce a civil judgment.” (Pereira, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1069 (dis. opn. of Sparks, J.).) The dissent’s view was that section 132 “contemplates that whatever the nature of the investigation or inquiry it be sufficiently formal to permit the introduction of evidence.” ( 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1075 (dis. opn. of Sparks, J.).) Accordingly, the dissent concluded that “offers in evid

2015In Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405 (Heap), an ex-employee, after discharge, sought an investigation and hearing by the civil service commission.

2015He refused to admit important documented facts, failed to answer direct questions, and made affirmative misrepresentations.” The Supreme Court has said there are few actions that “provide greater justification for removal from office than . . . deliberately providing false information to the Commission in the course of its investigation . . . .” (Adams II, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 914 .) We take particularly seriously a judge’s willingness to lie under oath to the three special masters appointed by the Supreme Court to make factual findings critical to our decision.

2014People v. Superior Court (Gremminger) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 397 (Gremminger), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary.

2014Code, § 995, subd. (a)(2)(A).) 14 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 15 In U.S. v. Balzano, supra, 916 F.2d at page 1293 , the trial court was aware before the trial that the defendant’s attorney was under investigation for federal criminal activities, and had conducted an investigation and hearing to determine whether he should be discharged.

2013Code, § 832.5, subds. (b), (c).) The courts have found POBOR applies to citizen complaints, even when the complaint is not kept in the officer‟s personnel file, because the “very purpose” of the investigation requirement of Penal Code section 832.5 is “to assess the [officer‟s] qualifications for continued employment.” (County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th at p. 803 .) Culp‟s daily logs appear to have the same design, given they are kept for evaluation purposes.

2008Payment related to the investigation or defense for any loss, injury or damage, or any cost, fine or penalty, or for any expense or claim or suit related to 1) and 2) a. and b. above.’ ” (Ortega Rock, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 .) The policy defined pollutants as follows: “ ‘[A]ny solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.

2008Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.’ ” (Ortega Rock, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 .) 4 The Legarra pollution exclusion provided that the pollution exclusion did not apply: “ ‘(1) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants: [I] (a) at or from premises owned, rented or occupied by the named insured; [f] (b) at or from any site or location used by or for the named insured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste; HD (c) which

2006In Murray , the Court of Appeal noted, "[T]he insurance company might be liable if it unreasonably delayed in performing an investigation of a claim before concluding there was no coverage and the insured suffered consequential loss as a result of the delay." ( Ibid. ) Further, in Brizuela v. CalFarm Ins.

2006The purpose of these notices is to enable “meaningful investigation” by those public authorities “prior to citizen intervention.” (Yeroushalmi v. Miramar Sheraton, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 740 .) As the Attorney General pointed out in oral argument, it does not serve the public interest to have almost the entirety of the state of California “swamped in a sea of generic warning signs.” Thus, if the insufficiency of the notice cannot be a reason for the trial court to reject a settlement, then the investigation requirement could easily be circumvented.