investigation claim in Massachusetts

2010Co., 407 Mass. at 490 , the court held that where an insurer claims a breach of a provision that is designed primarily to protect that insurer’s interest, and when that interest has not been jeopardized by the insured’s breach, “in the sense that the insured’s infraction does not seriously impair the insurer’s investigation of defense of the action, there is no persuasive reason to permit the insurer to deny coverage under the policy.

2001Co., 407 Mass. 481, 490 (1990), Rymsha next argues that Trust failed to make any showing that it was prejudiced by her refusal to furnish documents pertinent to the investigation of her claim.

2012“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion).

2012Complaints before the commission must make “specific charges of misconduct to which the judge can reasonably make a response.” McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, 377 Mass. 790, 801 (1979), S.C., 380 Mass. 263 (1980) (McKenney).

2010We now . . . require[ ] a showing of prejudice by the insurer.” See also Hoechst, 43 Mass.App.Ct. at 481 (insured’s breach of voluntary payment provision, like breach of a notice provision, should not avail insurer unless insurer sustains burden of proving actual prejudice); Sarnafil, Inc. v. Peerless Ins.

2008See Mole v. University of Mass., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 47 (2003), S.C., 442 Mass. 582 (2004) (“[t]he scope of subsequent court proceedings is limited by the charge filed with the administrative agency and the investigation that can reasonably be expected as a result”); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464-465 (1st Cir. 1996) (same; referring to G.

2008See Mole v. University of Mass., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 47 (2003), S.C., 442 Mass. 582 (2004) (“[t]he scope of subsequent court proceedings is limited by the charge filed with the administrative agency and the investigation that can reasonably be expected as a result”); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464-465 (1st Cir. 1996) (same; referring to G.

2008See Mole v. University of Mass., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 47 (2003), S.C., 442 Mass. 582 (2004) (“[t]he scope of subsequent court proceedings is limited by the charge filed with the administrative agency and the investigation that can reasonably be expected as a result”); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464-465 (1st Cir. 1996) (same; referring to G.

2008Consistent with the scope of the investigation rule, the requisite degree of precision in the drafting of an MCAD complaint is satisfied if the core factual allegations underlying the claim are set forth such as to “fairly place[] [the issue] before the agency.” Mole v. University of Mass., 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 48 .

2006Except for scientific or medical reports, Rule 16 (b) (1) does not authorize discovery or inspection of: “(A) reports, memoranda, or other documents made by the defendant, or the defendant’s attorney or agent, during the case’s investigation or defense; or “(B) a statement made to the defendant, or the defendant’s attorney or agent, by: “(i) the defendant; “(ii) a government or defense witness; or “(iii) a prospective government or defense witness.” In support of his argument, the defendant relied on United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the United States Court of

2003In any event, “[w]hether the insurer eventually pays the claim and honors the contract, its method of conducting the claims settlement process, and the payment strategy it adopts, can implicate liability under c. 176D, and then under c. 93A.” Schwartz v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 676 (2001).

1984See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 169, 180 (1975); Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351 , 362 & n.13 (1974).