specified defense in New York

2025Petitioner further argues that appellate authority does not permit counterclaims to be added after dismissal of the main claim, citing to First Northern Mortgagee Corp v Yatrakis (154 AD2d 433, 546 NYS2d 9 [2nd Dep't 1989])(finding appellant waived its right to assert a specified defense as it was raised for the first time on appeal, not in their answer or in a motion to amend the answer or in opposition to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion), and Lighting Horizons, Inc v E A Kahn & Co (120 AD2d 648, 649, 502 NYS2d 398, 399 [2nd Dep't [*3]1986])(denying defendant's cross-motion to answer

2025Petitioner further argues that appellate authority does not permit counterclaims to be added after dismissal of the main claim, citing to First Northern Mortgagee Corp v Yatrakis (154 AD2d 433, 546 NYS2d 9 [2nd Dep't 1989])(finding appellant waived its right to assert a specified defense as it was raised for the first time on appeal, not in their answer or in a motion to amend the answer or in opposition to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion), and Lighting Horizons, Inc v E A Kahn & Co (120 AD2d 648, 649, 502 NYS2d 398, 399 [2nd Dep't [*3]1986])(denying defendant's cross-motion to answer

2025Petitioner also cites to Trans World Maint Servs, Inc v Luna Park Hous Corp (157 AD2d 586, 550 NYS2d 332 [1st Dept 1990])(reversing lower court's denial of defendant's cross-motion to amend its answer where only partial summary judgment had been granted to plaintiff on its motion).

2025Petitioner also cites to Trans World Maint Servs, Inc v Luna Park Hous Corp (157 AD2d 586, 550 NYS2d 332 [1st Dept 1990])(reversing lower court's denial of defendant's cross-motion to amend its answer where only partial summary judgment had been granted to plaintiff on its motion).

2009As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Quinones ( 12 NY3d at 128 ), “[t]he statutory language requiring the sentencing court to consider the specified factors and to articulate the reason for the chosen sentence grants defendants a right to an airing and an explanation, not a result.” Accordingly, a defendant adjudicated as a persistent felony offender has a statutory right to present evidence that might influence the court to exercise its discretion to hand down a sentence as if no recidivism finding existed, while the People retain the burden to show that the defendant deserves the hi

2008Defendant is a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (see 28 USC § 1602 et seq.), and is entitled to presumptive sovereign immunity from suit in the United States, unless a specified exception to such immunity applies (see City of New York v Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 446 F3d 365 , 369 [2006], affd 551 US —, 127 S Ct 2352 [2007]).

2008Defendant is a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (see 28 USC § 1602 et seq.), and is entitled to presumptive sovereign immunity from suit in the United States, unless a specified exception to such immunity applies (see City of New York v Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 446 F3d 365 , 369 [2006], affd 551 US —, 127 S Ct 2352 [2007]).

1935(Town of Ulysses v. Ingersoll, 182 N. Y. 369, 372 .) The charter, after using the general and comprehensive expression, “ no member of the police or fire department,” makes a specified exception.

1932Co. v. Crosby ( 222 U. S. 473, 478 ) Justice Holmes pointed out that a specified doctrine relating to the case of a collision between two vessels was properly limited to that class of cases, and stated: “ The language of Mr. Justice Bradley in The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 , with regard to the application of the lex fori to a case of collision between vessels belonging to different nations and so subject to no common law, referred to that class of cases and no others, and was used only in coming to the conclusion that foreign vessels might take advantage of our Limited Liability Act.

1932Co. v. Crosby ( 222 U. S. 473, 478 ) Justice Holmes pointed out that a specified doctrine relating to the case of a collision between two vessels was properly limited to that class of cases, and stated: “ The language of Mr. Justice Bradley in The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 , with regard to the application of the lex fori to a case of collision between vessels belonging to different nations and so subject to no common law, referred to that class of cases and no others, and was used only in coming to the conclusion that foreign vessels might take advantage of our Limited Liability Act.

1911Co., 156 N. Y. 628—633; Goodwin v. Massachusetts Mut.

1876A regular notice of Ms pendens, duly filed in a proper action, can, therefore, only be cancelled when the action shall be settled, discontinued, or abated (Mills v. Bliss, 55 N. Y. 139 ).