specified factors in California

2026As long as the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision.” (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 .) 13 III.

2021As noted, a parole release decision is subjective and predictive. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 654-655.) “[T]here is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual.” (Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 10 .) A parole release decision “may be made ‘for a variety of reasons and often involve[s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole 41 suitability are considered and balanced lies withi

2021As noted, a parole release decision is subjective and predictive. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 654-655.) “[T]here is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual.” (Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 10 .) A parole release decision “may be made ‘for a variety of reasons and often involve[s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole 41 suitability are considered and balanced lies withi

2021As long as the . . . decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the . . . decision.’ ” (Id. at p. 210.) But the Board’s decision must be supported by “some evidence, not merely by a hunch or intuition.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213 .) With these principles in mind, we turn to Bettencourt’s claim that the Board’s decision was unsupported by any evidence and therefore violated his

2023(Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 210 .) “Only when the evidence reflecting the inmate’s present risk to public safety leads to but one conclusion may a court overturn a contrary decision by . . . the Governor.” (Id. at p. 211.) In applying the “some evidence” standard, “[t]he court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence.” (Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 221 .) “ ‘Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the authority of . . . the Governor,” and it is left to the Governor’s discretion how “ ‘the specified factors relevant to p

2023(Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 210 .) “Only when the evidence reflecting the inmate’s present risk to public safety leads to but one conclusion may a court overturn a contrary decision by . . . the Governor.” (Id. at p. 211.) In applying the “some evidence” standard, “[t]he court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence.” (Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 221 .) “ ‘Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the authority of . . . the Governor,” and it is left to the Governor’s discretion how “ ‘the specified factors relevant to p

2018The court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence." ( Ibid . ) At the same time ... the Board's decision must " 'reflect[ ] due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards.' " ( Shaputis II , at p. 210, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 , quoting [ In re ] Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 , and citing Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204 , 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 , and [ In re Shaputis (2008) ] 44 Cal.4th [1241,] 1260-1261, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 , 190 P.3d 573 [

2018The court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence." ( Ibid . ) At the same time ... the Board's decision must " 'reflect[ ] due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards.' " ( Shaputis II , at p. 210, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 , quoting [ In re ] Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 , and citing Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204 , 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 , and [ In re Shaputis (2008) ] 44 Cal.4th [1241,] 1260-1261, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 , 190 P.3d 573 [

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2017Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The plaintiff's burden to establish the "minimal merit" prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) ( Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95, fn. 11, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ) has been likened to that in opposing a motion for nonsuit or a motion for summary judgment. ( 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568 , 584-585, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 .) A plaintiff is not required "to prove the specified claim to the trial court[;]" rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate in

2017Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The plaintiff's burden to establish the "minimal merit" prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) ( Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95, fn. 11, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ) has been likened to that in opposing a motion for nonsuit or a motion for summary judgment. ( 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568 , 584-585, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 .) A plaintiff is not required "to prove the specified claim to the trial court[;]" rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate in

2007(Id. at pp. 626, 677.) “As long as [the Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” 3 (Id. at p. 677.) Further, “the precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the [Board],” and “[Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are

2007(Id. at pp. 626, 677.) “As long as [the Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” 3 (Id. at p. 677.) Further, “the precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the [Board],” and “[Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2009As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.) However, the deferential review accorded the Board’s decision does not mean that courts simply mbber-stamp its determination as long as there is *1504 some evidence to support any of the unsuitability factors; the “standard is unquestionably deferential,

2010As to this standard, the court in Lawrence further explained that although it was “unquestionably deferential, [it was] certainly . . . not toothless, and ‘due consideration’ of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision—the determination of current dangerousness.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) In other words, the exceedingly deferential nature of the “some evidence” standard does not convert a reviewing court “ ‘into a potte

2010As to this standard, the court in Lawrence further explained that although it was “unquestionably deferential, [it was] certainly . . . not toothless, and ‘due consideration’ of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision—the determination of current dangerousness.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) In other words, the exceedingly deferential nature of the “some evidence” standard does not convert a reviewing court “ ‘into a potte

2009(See In re Burdan, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 ; In re Gaul, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 39-40.) In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 658 , explained that if the BPH “decision’s consideration of the specified factors is not supported by some evidence in the record and thus is devoid of a factual basis, the court should grant the prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law.” Rosenkrantz cited In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 572 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.

2009(See In re Burdan, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 ; In re Gaul, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 39-40.) In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 658 , explained that if the BPH “decision’s consideration of the specified factors is not supported by some evidence in the record and thus is devoid of a factual basis, the court should grant the prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law.” Rosenkrantz cited In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 572 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.

2012As long as the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision.” (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 677 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 ].) “In sum, the Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety [citations], and our discussion in both R

2012As long as the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision.” (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 677 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 ].) “In sum, the Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety [citations], and our discussion in both R

2010As to this standard, the court in Lawrence further explained that although it was “unquestionably deferential, [it was] certainly . . . not toothless, and ‘due consideration’ of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision—the determination of current dangerousness.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) In other words, the exceedingly deferential nature of the “some evidence” standard does not convert a reviewing court “ ‘into a potte

2010As to this standard, the court in Lawrence further explained that although it was “unquestionably deferential, [it was] certainly . . . not toothless, and ‘due consideration’ of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision—the determination of current dangerousness.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210 .) In other words, the exceedingly deferential nature of the “some evidence” standard does not convert a reviewing court “ ‘into a potte

2016(Ibid.) There is no requirement that the plaintiff “ ‘prove the specified claim to the trial court.’ ” (Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 105 .) Instead, “ ‘the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by 8 a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th 82 , 88– 89.) We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.

2014Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 .) This is because the anti-SLAPP statute does not require the plaintiff “ ‘to prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th

2013Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 ].) This is because the anti-SLAPP statute does not require the plaintiff “ ‘to prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.

2013Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 ].) This is because the anti-SLAPP statute does not require the plaintiff “ ‘to prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.

2024Code, § 664; City of Arcadia II, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 177 .) As noted above, Water Code “[s]ection 13241 does not specify how a water board must go about considering the specified factors.

2021(City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 156, 177 (Arcadia II) [“Section 13241 13 does not specify how a water board must go about considering the specified factors.

2019The law's central aim is "screening out meritless claims that arise from protected activity, before the defendant is required to undergo the expense and intrusion of discovery." ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 392 , 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) The Legislature "has provided, and California courts have recognized, substantive and procedural limitations *888 that protect plaintiffs against overbroad application of the anti-SLAPP mechanism.... 'This court and the Courts of Appeal, noting the potential deprivation of jury trial that might result were [ section 425.16 and similar] statutes

2019The law's central aim is "screening out meritless claims that arise from protected activity, before the defendant is required to undergo the expense and intrusion of discovery." ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 392 , 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) The Legislature "has provided, and California courts have recognized, substantive and procedural limitations *888 that protect plaintiffs against overbroad application of the anti-SLAPP mechanism.... 'This court and the Courts of Appeal, noting the potential deprivation of jury trial that might result were [ section 425.16 and similar] statutes

2017Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The plaintiff's burden to establish the "minimal merit" prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) ( Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95, fn. 11, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ) has been likened to that in opposing a motion for nonsuit or a motion for summary judgment. ( 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568 , 584-585, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 .) A plaintiff is not required "to prove the specified claim to the trial court[;]" rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate in

2017Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The plaintiff's burden to establish the "minimal merit" prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) ( Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95, fn. 11, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ) has been likened to that in opposing a motion for nonsuit or a motion for summary judgment. ( 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568 , 584-585, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 .) A plaintiff is not required "to prove the specified claim to the trial court[;]" rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate in

2014Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 .) This is because the anti-SLAPP statute does not require the plaintiff “ ‘to prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th

2013Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s submission as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 ].) This is because the anti-SLAPP statute does not require the plaintiff “ ‘to prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.

2015The “plaintiff’s burden of establishing a probability of prevailing is not high.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699 .) “The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. [Citation.]” (Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 735 , italics added.) There is no requirement that the plaintiff “ ‘prove the specified claim to the trial court’; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a lega

2015Rather, we accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and assess the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has defeated plaintiff's submission as a matter of law." (Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576 .) 17 "The plaintiff's burden on what the Supreme Court has referred to as the 'minimal merit' prong of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) (Navellier v. Sletten [(2002)] 29 Cal.4th [82,] 95, fn. 11) has been likened to that in opposing a motion for nonsuit or a motion for summary judgment. [Citation.] 'A plaintiff is not required "to prove the specified clai

2001(Kyle v. Carmon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907 .) As the California Supreme Court recently stated: “ ‘This court and the Courts of Appeal, noting the potential deprivation of *1444 jury trial that might result were [section 425.16 and similar] statutes construed to require the plaintiff first to prove the specified claim to the trial court, have instead read the statutes as requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim. [Citations.]’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 4

2001(Kyle v. Carmon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907 .) As the California Supreme Court recently stated: “ ‘This court and the Courts of Appeal, noting the potential deprivation of *1444 jury trial that might result were [section 425.16 and similar] statutes construed to require the plaintiff first to prove the specified claim to the trial court, have instead read the statutes as requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim. [Citations.]’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 4