residence requirement in Ohio

1992Schenck v. Shattuck (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 272, 274 , 1 OBR 382, 383, 439 N.E.2d 891, 893 , we stated: “ ‘Words limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified.’ ” (Quoting from Gazan v. Heery [1936], 183 Ga. 30 , 187 S.E. 371 .) In this case, respondent created a residence requirement where none exists.

1992Schenck v. Shattuck (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 272, 274 , 1 OBR 382, 383, 439 N.E.2d 891, 893 , we stated: “ ‘Words limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified.’ ” (Quoting from Gazan v. Heery [1936], 183 Ga. 30 , 187 S.E. 371 .) In this case, respondent created a residence requirement where none exists.

1992Schenck v. Shattuck (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 272, 274 , 1 OBR 382, 383, 439 N.E.2d 891, 893 , we stated: “ ‘Words limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified.’ ” (Quoting from Gazan v. Heery [1936], 183 Ga. 30 , 187 S.E. 371 .) In this case, respondent created a residence requirement where none exists.

1992Schenck v. Shattuck (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 272, 274 , 1 OBR 382, 383, 439 N.E.2d 891, 893 , we stated: “ ‘Words limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified.’ ” (Quoting from Gazan v. Heery [1936], 183 Ga. 30 , 187 S.E. 371 .) In this case, respondent created a residence requirement where none exists.

2025Summary Judgment Standard and Standard of Review {¶ 51} "Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor." Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4470, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), citing BAC Home Loans Servicing,

2025Summary Judgment Standard and Standard of Review {¶ 51} "Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor." Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4470, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), citing BAC Home Loans Servicing,

2025Summary Judgment Standard and Standard of Review {¶ 51} "Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor." Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4470, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), citing BAC Home Loans Servicing,

2025Summary Judgment Standard and Standard of Review {¶ 51} "Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor." Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, England v. Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4470, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.), citing BAC Home Loans Servicing,

2024No. 22AP-583, 2023-Ohio-3226, ¶ 13 , citing R.C. 3105.171(B).

2015More importantly, the court’s reliance on Smith requires the “parsing” of conduct that State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 criticized.

2015More importantly, the court’s reliance on Smith requires the “parsing” of conduct that State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 criticized.

1975Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit (1971), 385 Mich. 519 , 190 N. W. 2d 97 , appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in 405 U. S. 950 (1972); Ahern v. Murphy (C.

1975Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit (1971), 385 Mich. 519 , 190 N. W. 2d 97 , appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in 405 U. S. 950 (1972); Ahern v. Murphy (C.

1975Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit (1971), 385 Mich. 519 , 190 N. W. 2d 97 , appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in 405 U. S. 950 (1972); Ahern v. Murphy (C.

1975Krsewinski imposed upon the municipality the burden of demonstrating a ‘compelling’ state interest to justify the impairment but found such an interest to exist (where the residence requirement was as to police officers); Donnelly did not in terms impose the compelling state interest test but rather weighed the ‘reasonableness of a restriction upon private rights’ against the ‘importance of the public benefit’ ( 274 A. 2d, at 791 ), and found the restriction invalid.