residence requirement in Texas

2011See Horne v. Harwell, 533 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (issue waived where no special exception taken to appellee's failure to plead that the circumstances of the child had materially or substantially changed); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 484 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1972, no writ) (issue waived where no special exception or objection made to appellee's failure to plead the residence requirement in her divorce action).

2011See Horne v. Harwell, 533 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (issue waived where no special exception taken to appellee's failure to plead that the circumstances of the child had materially or substantially changed); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 484 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1972, no writ) (issue waived where no special exception or objection made to appellee's failure to plead the residence requirement in her divorce action).

2011See Horne v. Harwell, 533 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (issue waived where no special exception taken to appellee's failure to plead that the circumstances of the child had materially or substantially changed); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 484 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1972, no writ) (issue waived where no special exception or objection made to appellee's failure to plead the residence requirement in her divorce action).

2011See Horne v. Harwell, 533 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (issue waived where no special exception taken to appellee's failure to plead that the circumstances of the child had materially or substantially changed); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 484 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1972, no writ) (issue waived where no special exception or objection made to appellee's failure to plead the residence requirement in her divorce action).

2003See Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App.2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the “elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law”) and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an “authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge” which “encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument”); Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

2003See Fuller v. State , 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law") and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an "authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge" which "encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument"); Gollihar v. State , 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001); Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997).

2003See Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App.2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the “elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law”) and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an “authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge” which “encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument”); Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

2003See Fuller v. State , 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law") and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an "authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge" which "encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument"); Gollihar v. State , 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001); Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997).

2003See Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App.2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the “elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law”) and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an “authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge” which “encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument”); Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

2003See Fuller v. State , 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (federal constitutional law measures evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law") and at 254 (state law measures evidentiary sufficiency against an "authorized by the indictment ... hypothetically correct jury charge" which "encompasses [the] statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument"); Gollihar v. State , 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001); Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-40 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997).

2021“Although we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.” State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Fankell, 520 U.S. at 920 , 117 S. Ct. at 1805–06 (distinguishing Felder on a similar basis). 18 example based on the defendant’s residence when the claim accrued, if the defendant is a natural person, or based on the defendant’s principal office in Texas, if the defendant is not a natural person.

2015See Fankell, 520 U.S. at 920 , 117 S. Ct. at 1805–06 (distinguishing Felder on a similar basis). 18 example based on the defendant’s residence when the claim accrued, if the defendant is a natural person, or based on the defendant’s principal office in Texas, if the defendant is not a natural person.

2015In Re Green, 385 S.W. 3d 665, 671 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2012), the San Antonio Court of Appeals found the Petitioner failure to satisfy the residence requirement was appropriate for mandamus relief.

2015See id. §§ 15.002, 15.003(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).

2015See 675 F.3d 249 , 253–57 (3d Cir. 2012). 16 example based on the defendant’s residence when the claim accrued, if the defendant is a natural person, or based on the defendant’s principal office in Texas, if the defendant is not a natural person.

2009See In re Sanchez, 1 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding) (“[A] motion to transfer [under section 155.204] does not have to be verified nor must it be supported by an affidavit.”). 5 The Children’s Residence At the hearing on the motion to transfer, relator, James Nabors, testified that TDFPS placed the children with him and his wife on May 16, 2006, and the children resided with them in Fort Bend County for seventeen months.

2004See id. 7 4.

1981The court held that, although the residence requirement was not jurisdictional but rather pertained to qualification to maintain suit, citing Aucutt v. Aucutt, 122 Tex. 518 , 62 S.W.2d 77, 79 (1933), neither divorce nor any other relief could be granted until the qualifications for maintaining the main action were met.

1980Appellant also relies on Schrock v. Hylton, 133 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1939, no writ), in which this court held that the six-months’ residence requirement of former article 2927 was not applicable to an election controlled by the special statute governing fresh water supply districts.

1980Appellant relies on Luna v. Blanton, 478 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.1972) as supporting his contention that article 2783d prescribes qualifications in conflict with the six-months’ residence requirement of the Election Code.

1978Likewise, in Garcia v. Carpenter, 525 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex.1975), the supreme court held that a candidate for mayor could not be kept off the ballot on the ground that he had given testimony in a previous case indicating that he had not satisfied the residence requirement of the Code.

1972See Long v. Long, Tex.Civ.App., 365 S.W.2d 214 ; Har *613 ris v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 489 .