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24 California opinions name it 4 courts 1951–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vineberggreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou 2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou | 2 | 2 |
Fenton v. Board of Directorsgreen2 sentences2002With respect to the residence requirement of section 21100 , we note that Government Code section 244 describes the factors to be considered when examining a person's "residence" for various purposes: "In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: "(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. "(b) There can only be one residence. "(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1999(See Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 7 ; Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235, 239 ; DeMiglio v. Mashore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268 ; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 ; 79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 21 , 25-26 (1996); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197 , 208-209 (1990); 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8 , 11 (1989).)” 4 99-104 It is readily apparent that substantial questions of fact and law exist as to whether relator’s place of residence complies with the requirements of Water Code section 30508. | 1 | 3 |
DeMiglio v. Mashoregreen2 sentences2002With respect to the residence requirement of section 21100 , we note that Government Code section 244 describes the factors to be considered when examining a person's "residence" for various purposes: "In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: "(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. "(b) There can only be one residence. "(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2002With respect to the residence requirement of section 21100 , we note that Government Code section 244 describes the factors to be considered when examining a person's "residence" for various purposes: "In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: "(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. "(b) There can only be one residence. "(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Parkergreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou 2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou | 1 | 2 |
Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary Sch. Dist.green1 sentence2024(Sweetwater Union High School District v. Julian Union Elementary School District (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 986, fn. 6 .) They are also not necessary for our disposition of this appeal. 3 needed. [¶] B. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Velezgreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou 2015(See People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821-823 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief burglarized building was not a residence was no defense because knowledge of its residential character was not required for first degree burglary]; People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565-566 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 686 ] (Velez) [mistake of fact defense not permissible for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant had mistaken belief gun could not be fired]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [the defendants, who were bailees of stored silver and gold, cou | 1 | 1 |
In Re Jenningsgreen2 sentences2010Supp. 10.) A mistake of fact, by itself, is not a defense unless the mistake disproves an element of the crime. ( In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 277 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; see People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [defendants, bailees of stored silver, sold it in speculative transactions under mistaken belief that they had enough silver on hand to cover bailors' claims; mistake was no defense because defendants had no right to sell the silver]; People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief that burglari 2010Supp. 10.) A mistake of fact, by itself, is not a defense unless the mistake disproves an element of the crime. ( In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 277 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; see People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [defendants, bailees of stored silver, sold it in speculative transactions under mistaken belief that they had enough silver on hand to cover bailors' claims; mistake was no defense because defendants had no right to sell the silver]; People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief that burglari | 1 | 1 |
People v. Osbornegreen2 sentences2010Supp. 10.) A mistake of fact, by itself, is not a defense unless the mistake disproves an element of the crime. ( In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 277 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; see People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [defendants, bailees of stored silver, sold it in speculative transactions under mistaken belief that they had enough silver on hand to cover bailors' claims; mistake was no defense because defendants had no right to sell the silver]; People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief that burglari 2010Supp. 10.) A mistake of fact, by itself, is not a defense unless the mistake disproves an element of the crime. ( In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 277 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; see People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 135 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 819 ] [defendants, bailees of stored silver, sold it in speculative transactions under mistaken belief that they had enough silver on hand to cover bailors' claims; mistake was no defense because defendants had no right to sell the silver]; People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 284 ] [mistaken belief that burglari | 1 | 1 |
Burt v. Scarboroughgreen1 sentence2002With respect to the residence requirement of section 21100 , we note that Government Code section 244 describes the factors to be considered when examining a person's "residence" for various purposes: "In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: "(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. "(b) There can only be one residence. "(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Mosby v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992(Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 219, 224 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 588 ].) Wife presents an argument in these writ proceedings not raised in the trial court. 1992(Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 219, 224 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 588 ].) Wife presents an argument in these writ proceedings not raised in the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992(Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 219, 224 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 588 ].) Wife presents an argument in these writ proceedings not raised in the trial court. 1992(Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 483 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 691 P.2d 272 ]; Mosby v. Superior Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 219, 224 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 588 ].) Wife presents an argument in these writ proceedings not raised in the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences1985In People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 754 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 528 P.2d 1 ], the Supreme Court held: “A warrantless entry of a dwelling is constitutionally permissible where the officers’ conduct is prompted by the motive of preserving life and reasonably appears to be necessary for that purpose. [Citations.] And in determining whether an officer acted reasonably we must consider only reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience.” Exigent circumstances have been extended to include a search for persons who might be hiding in a residence. 1985In People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 754 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 528 P.2d 1 ], the Supreme Court held: “A warrantless entry of a dwelling is constitutionally permissible where the officers’ conduct is prompted by the motive of preserving life and reasonably appears to be necessary for that purpose. [Citations.] And in determining whether an officer acted reasonably we must consider only reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience.” Exigent circumstances have been extended to include a search for persons who might be hiding in a residence. | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Blumsteingreen2 sentences1975(Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 352 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 289-290].) If the state wishes to determine the competence of its teachers, it cannot do so by requiring them to list all organizations to which they belong, since investigation of their competence in the classroom would be a more direct and less intrusive method of reaching the same end. 1975If the purpose of a year's residence requirement for voting is to assure that the voter has an interest in the election outcome, that requirement is also too drastic since the state may ascertain in other ways that the voter is a bona fide member of the community. ( Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 352 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 289-290].) If the state wishes to determine the competence of its teachers, it cannot do so by requiring them to list all organizations to which they belong, since investigation of their competence in the classroom would be a more direct and less intrusive method of re | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zeilenga v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bullock v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samson Market Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Westbrook v. Mihalygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ector v. City of Torrance
green
2 sentences2020Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 ; Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 135, 140; Professional Fire Fighters, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 289-295.) The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. 2020Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 ; Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 135, 140; Professional Fire Fighters, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 289-295.) The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. | 4 | 1977–2020 |
Walters v. Weed
green
2 sentences2002With respect to the residence requirement of section 21100 , we note that Government Code section 244 describes the factors to be considered when examining a person's "residence" for various purposes: "In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: "(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. "(b) There can only be one residence. "(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained. ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1999(See Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 7 ; Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235, 239 ; DeMiglio v. Mashore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268 ; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 ; 79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 21 , 25-26 (1996); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197 , 208-209 (1990); 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8 , 11 (1989).)” 4 99-104 It is readily apparent that substantial questions of fact and law exist as to whether relator’s place of residence complies with the requirements of Water Code section 30508. | 3 | 1999–2002 |
Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences1999(See Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1 , 7 ; Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235 , 239 ; DeMiglio v. Mashore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1268 ; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107 , 1113 ; 79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 21 , 25-26 (1996); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197 , 208-209 (1990); 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8 , 11 (1989).)" It is readily apparent that substantial questions of fact and law exist as to whether relator's place of residence complies with the requirements of Water Code section 30508 . 1999(See Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 7 ; Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235, 239 ; DeMiglio v. Mashore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268 ; Fenton v. Board of Directors (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 ; 79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 21 , 25-26 (1996); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197 , 208-209 (1990); 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8 , 11 (1989).)” 4 99-104 It is readily apparent that substantial questions of fact and law exist as to whether relator’s place of residence complies with the requirements of Water Code section 30508. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999That requirement cuts down the number of message carriers in the ballot-access arena without impelling cause." ( 119 S.Ct. at 642 -645 , fns. omitted.) Similarly, here, we believe that the number of registered voters falls significantly short of the number of potential voters in any given city in California. 1999That requirement cuts down the number of message carriers in the ballot-access arena without impelling cause." ( 119 S.Ct. at 642-645 , fns. omitted.) 4 99-712 Similarly, here, we believe that the number of registered voters falls significantly short of the number of potential voters in any given city in California. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Garcia v. McCutchen
green
1 sentence2022Additionally, we see no reason, and Huang has not provided us with any, why we should construe tenant protections to extend to individuals in Huang’s circumstances, given that “[w]e must presume that the Legislature intended ‘every word, phrase and provision . . . in a 1 Huang does not contend that the trial court’s refusal to allow her exclusive use of the residence was in error. 5 statute . . . to have meaning and to perform a useful function’” (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma
green
2 sentences2020In a passage relied on by the City, the California Supreme Court stated it was “not without guidance” in resolving whether the residence requirement involved a municipal affair because Section 5(b) is a specific directive that charter cities have plenary authority over the qualifications of their employees. ( Ector, supra, at p. 132 .) The court did not, however, reach the issue whether the state law violated Section 5(b) because, after examining the statutory language and legislative history, the court concluded the state law was limited by its terms to general law cities and did not apply to 2020In a passage relied on by the City, the California Supreme Court stated it was “not without guidance” in resolving whether the residence requirement involved a municipal affair because Section 5(b) is a specific directive that charter cities have plenary authority over the qualifications of their employees. ( Ector, supra, at p. 132 .) The court did not, however, reach the issue whether the state law violated Section 5(b) because, after examining the statutory language and legislative history, the court concluded the state law was limited by its terms to general law cities and did not apply to | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People Ex Rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach
green
1 sentence2020Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 ; Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 135, 140; Professional Fire Fighters, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 289-295.) The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2020Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 ; Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 135, 140; Professional Fire Fighters, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 289-295.) The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Baggett v. Gates
green
1 sentence2020Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 600 ; Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 135, 140; Professional Fire Fighters, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 289-295.) The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Lawson
green
1 sentence2015(Lawson, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) In contrast, an unreasonable mistake of fact may be asserted in a specific intent crime, or a crime involving knowledge, so long as the defendant had an actual mistaken belief. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Choudhry v. Free
green
1 sentence2002With respect to the requirement that each director be a landowner, the Supreme Court in Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660 ruled that applying section 21100 's requirement to a director of the Imperial Irrigation District, due to its unique characteristics, violated the federal Constitution. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Chaves
green
1 sentence2002Code, § 1770 , subd. (e) [an office becomes vacant on the failure to satisfy a residence requirement]; People v. Chaves (1898) 122 Cal. 134 , 138 ["An office is vacant, in the eye of the law, whenever it is unoccupied by a legally qualified incumbent who has a lawful right to continue therein . . . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
White v. County of Sacramento
green
1 sentence2001(Cf. White v. County of Sacramento, supra, 31 Cal.3d 676 [the qualifying phrase “for the purposes of punishment” was properly applied only to the last antecedent, “transfer,” because at least some of the other antecedents, including “reprimand” and “dismissal,” were necessarily already punitive and the qualifying phrase did not apply to them].) As we have explained, we also think that the “sense of the entire act” requires applying the residence requirement in the qualifying proviso both to single-family and multifamily dwellings. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Morse
green
2 sentences1982Her rationale for this assertion lies in People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467 [ 341 P.2d 679 ] (overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ]), which defendant cites for the proposition that Government Code section 71140 which imposes a residence requirement as a condition for holding the office of municipal court judge is unconstitutional. 1982Her rationale for this assertion lies in People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467 [ 341 P.2d 679 ] (overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ]), which defendant cites for the proposition that Government Code section 71140 which imposes a residence requirement as a condition for holding the office of municipal court judge is unconstitutional. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Chessman
green
2 sentences1982Her rationale for this assertion lies in People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467 [ 341 P.2d 679 ] (overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ]), which defendant cites for the proposition that Government Code section 71140 which imposes a residence requirement as a condition for holding the office of municipal court judge is unconstitutional. 1982Her rationale for this assertion lies in People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467 [ 341 P.2d 679 ] (overruled on other grounds, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ]), which defendant cites for the proposition that Government Code section 71140 which imposes a residence requirement as a condition for holding the office of municipal court judge is unconstitutional. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.
green
2 sentences1977For example, in Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action (1977) 430 U.S. 259 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 313 , 97 S.Ct. 1047 ], the United States Supreme Court upheld against an equal protection challenge certain New York constitutional and statutory provisions that required, for the approval of a new county charter, a separate majority of voters living in a city within the county, and voters living outside the cities in the county; in Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 ], the California Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny test (which requires a compelling gov 1977For example, in Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action (1977) 430 U.S. 259 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 313 , 97 S.Ct. 1047 ], the United States Supreme Court upheld against an equal protection challenge certain New York constitutional and statutory provisions that required, for the approval of a new county charter, a separate majority of voters living in a city within the county, and voters living outside the cities in the county; in Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 514 P.2d 433 ], the California Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny test (which requires a compelling gov | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Shelton v. Tucker
green
1 sentence1975If the purpose of a year's residence requirement for voting is to assure that the voter has an interest in the election outcome, that requirement is also too drastic since the state may ascertain in other ways that the voter is a bona fide member of the community. ( Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 352 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 289-290].) If the state wishes to determine the competence of its teachers, it cannot do so by requiring them to list all organizations to which they belong, since investigation of their competence in the classroom would be a more direct and less intrusive method of re | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Application of Park green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of NC green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Suffling v. Bondurant green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Camara v. Mellon neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| People v. Bradley green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Tesoriere v. District Court neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Latterner v. Latterner green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.