corresponding exception in Wisconsin

2020Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 422-23 , 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979) (noting the petitioner informed the respondent at the time of his resignation that litigation would be commenced if a corresponding hearing was not held). 13 No. 2019AP2054-OA § 144 (discussing types of prejudice including economic prejudice caused by a change in a responding party's position). ¶21 Broadly speaking, every new budget bill is created with an understanding that earlier budgets, including any provisions bearing marks of former vetoes, will serve as a foundation.

2020Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 422-23 , 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979) (noting the petitioner informed the respondent at the time of his resignation that litigation would be commenced if a corresponding hearing was not held). 13 No. 2019AP2054-OA § 144 (discussing types of prejudice including economic prejudice caused by a change in a responding party's position). ¶21 Broadly speaking, every new budget bill is created with an understanding that earlier budgets, including any provisions bearing marks of former vetoes, will serve as a foundation.

2017First, Stietz's claim that he was acting in self-defense was "so thoroughly discredited" by the close of evidence "that no reasonable jury could conclude that the state had not disproved it," State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶115 , 255 Wis. 2d 194 , 648 N.W.2d 413 ; consequently, he was not entitled to the corresponding instruction and the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in declining to so instruct the jury. ¶103 Second, even if the circuit court had erred in neglecting to instruct the jury on self-defense, that error was harmless.

2017First, Stietz's claim that he was acting in self-defense was "so thoroughly discredited" by the close of evidence "that no reasonable jury could conclude that the state had not disproved it," State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶115 , 255 Wis. 2d 194 , 648 N.W.2d 413 ; consequently, he was not entitled to the corresponding instruction and the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in declining to so instruct the jury. ¶103 Second, even if the circuit court had erred in neglecting to instruct the jury on self-defense, that error was harmless.

2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39.

2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39.

2012Collectively, these cases provide that an unambiguous initial grant of third-party coverage will not be undone by an exclusion, see Jaderborg, 239 Wis. 2d 533, ¶ 17 ; that an endorsement that includes both an exclusion and an exception to the exclusion will not be read to overcome the initial grant of coverage, see Muehlenbein, 175 Wis. 2d at 265-66 ; and that the requirement of maintaining underlying automobile liability insurance does not translate into a corresponding requirement that UM coverage be maintained, see Etter, 314 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 13-15 . ¶ 39.

2004These differences preclude us from granting a corresponding exception from the economic loss doctrine for strict liability misrepresentation. ¶32 The tort of strict liability misrepresentation arose from the judiciary's determination that in some situations, the accuracy of representations is so important that "intent to deceive and good-faith belief in the truth of the representation are immaterial." Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 25 , 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) (quoting Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70 , 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969)).

2004These differences preclude us from granting a corresponding exception from the economic loss doctrine for strict liability misrepresentation. ¶32 The tort of strict liability misrepresentation arose from the judiciary's determination that in some situations, the accuracy of representations is so important that "intent to deceive and good-faith belief in the truth of the representation are immaterial." Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 25 , 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) (quoting Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70 , 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969)).

2004These differences preclude us from granting a corresponding exception from the economic loss doctrine for strict liability misrepresentation. ¶32 The tort of strict liability misrepresentation arose from the judiciary's determination that in some situations, the accuracy of representations is so important that "intent to deceive and good-faith belief in the truth of the representation are immaterial." Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 25 , 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) (quoting Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70 , 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969)).

2004These differences preclude us from granting a corresponding exception from the economic loss doctrine for strict liability misrepresentation. ¶32 The tort of strict liability misrepresentation arose from the judiciary's determination that in some situations, the accuracy of representations is so important that "intent to deceive and good-faith belief in the truth of the representation are immaterial." Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 25 , 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) (quoting Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169-70 , 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969)).