Chapman standard in District of Columbia

2018Wilson-Bey , 903 A.2d at 822, 844-45 (applying Chapman standard (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) to preserved instructional error where jury instructions eliminated mens rea element from jury's consideration as to whether appellants intended to aid and abet the principal in killing the victim or simply had the intent to join others in assaulting the victim); see Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying Chapman standard of review to appeal in which trial court's instructions to the jury omitted an element of the offense).

2018Wilson-Bey , 903 A.2d at 822, 844-45 (applying Chapman standard (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) to preserved instructional error where jury instructions eliminated mens rea element from jury's consideration as to whether appellants intended to aid and abet the principal in killing the victim or simply had the intent to join others in assaulting the victim); see Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying Chapman standard of review to appeal in which trial court's instructions to the jury omitted an element of the offense).

2010We apply the Kottea-kos standard of review, rather than the Chapman standard that appellant urges us to apply, because the Chapman standard applies “[w]here ... the trial court’s evi-dentiary ruling wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to ... present evidence concerning ... a central issue in the case.... ” (Richard) Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C.1993) (emphasis added).

2010We apply the Kottea-kos standard of review, rather than the Chapman standard that appellant urges us to apply, because the Chapman standard applies “[w]here ... the trial court’s evi-dentiary ruling wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to ... present evidence concerning ... a central issue in the case.... ” (Richard) Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C.1993) (emphasis added).

2009See Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 126-28 (D.C.2003) (exclusion of affidavit and defense witness deprived defendant of only corroborating evidence creating reversible error under Kotteakos); cf. Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1117-19 (D.C.1995) (trial court committed Chapman error in excluding defendant’s testimony of complaining witness’ prior assaults against him).

2006See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1118 (D.C.1995) (holding that the defendant’s “one cryptic reference” to the fact that the government witness had once shot at him was an insufficient opportunity to prove this fact and thus present the defendant’s theory that the witness was biased). 1 Given both the centrality of McDonald’s injuries to his bias defense and the less than overwhelming strength of the prosecution’s one-witness case, the erroneous exclusion of McDonald’s testimony was not harmless under a Chapman standard of review.

1993Compare Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (applying Chapman test in assessing denial of any opportunity to cross-examine key government witnesses for bias) and Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716-17 (applying Chapman test to exclusion of all defense testimony as to bad reputation of government witness for truth and veracity) with Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315 , 328 & 329 n. 34 (D.C.1990) (applying Kotteakos test to ruling excluding as irrelevant evidence concerning condition of alleged rape victim’s genitalia) and Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591 , 610 & n. 37 (D.C.1982) (applying Kotteakos test to e

1993Compare Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (applying Chapman test in assessing denial of any opportunity to cross-examine key government witnesses for bias) and Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716-17 (applying Chapman test to exclusion of all defense testimony as to bad reputation of government witness for truth and veracity) with Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315 , 328 & 329 n. 34 (D.C. 1990) (applying Kotteakos test to ruling excluding as irrelevant evidence concerning condition of alleged rape victim's genitalia) and Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591 , 610 & n. 37 (D.C.1982) (applying Kotteakos test to

2012Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (stating harmless error standard for constitutional error); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying Chapman standard where jury instructions omitted an element of the offense); Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 843-44 (D.C.2006) (applying Chapman standard where instruction omitted essential mens rea elements).

2012Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (stating harmless error standard for constitutional error); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying Chapman standard where jury instructions omitted an element of the offense); Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 843-44 (D.C.2006) (applying Chapman standard where instruction omitted essential mens rea elements).

2018Wilson-Bey , 903 A.2d at 822, 844-45 (applying Chapman standard (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) to preserved instructional error where jury instructions eliminated mens rea element from jury's consideration as to whether appellants intended to aid and abet the principal in killing the victim or simply had the intent to join others in assaulting the victim); see Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying Chapman standard of review to appeal in which trial court's instructions to the jury omitted an element of the offense).

2017Citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), and Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 843 (D.C. 2006) (en banc), the government argues (in the alternative to its plain error argument) that we must assess whether the trial court’s error was harmless under the Chapman standard, 32 just as we would when a jury has been misinstructed as to the elements of a crime. 33 The government further argues that the trial court’s failure to consider whether Mr. Carrell acted with knowledge or purpose was harmless.

1993Compare Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (applying Chapman test in assessing denial of any opportunity to cross-examine key government witnesses for bias) and Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716-17 (applying Chapman test to exclusion of all defense testimony as to bad reputation of government witness for truth and veracity) with Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315 , 328 & 329 n. 34 (D.C.1990) (applying Kotteakos test to ruling excluding as irrelevant evidence concerning condition of alleged rape victim’s genitalia) and Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591 , 610 & n. 37 (D.C.1982) (applying Kotteakos test to e

1993Compare Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (applying Chapman test in assessing denial of any opportunity to cross-examine key government witnesses for bias) and Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716-17 (applying Chapman test to exclusion of all defense testimony as to bad reputation of government witness for truth and veracity) with Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315 , 328 & 329 n. 34 (D.C. 1990) (applying Kotteakos test to ruling excluding as irrelevant evidence concerning condition of alleged rape victim's genitalia) and Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591 , 610 & n. 37 (D.C.1982) (applying Kotteakos test to

2023Waters argues that the more stringent Chapman standard for constitutional violations should apply because his Confrontation Clause rights were violated. “[T]he Confrontation Clause bars the government from introducing testimonial statements at trial against a criminal defendant without calling the declarant to testify in person.” Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 2006) (emphasis added).

2023Waters argues that the more stringent Chapman standard for constitutional violations should apply because his Confrontation Clause rights were violated. “[T]he Confrontation Clause bars the government from introducing testimonial statements at trial against a criminal defendant without calling the declarant to testify in person.” Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 2006) (emphasis added).

2017Code § 11-721 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); see also United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) (“When a district court in a bench trial has made a legal error regarding the elements of an offense, the error is reviewed using the same harmless error standard that would apply to an erroneous jury instruction,” i.e., the Chapman standard.); 34 Uni

2017Code § 11-721 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); see also United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) (“When a district court in a bench trial has made a legal error regarding the elements of an offense, the error is reviewed using the same harmless error standard that would apply to an erroneous jury instruction,” i.e., the Chapman standard.); 34 Uni

2017Code § 11-721 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); see also United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) (“When a district court in a bench trial has made a legal error regarding the elements of an offense, the error is reviewed using the same harmless error standard that would apply to an erroneous jury instruction,” i.e., the Chapman standard.); 34 Uni

2017Code § 11-721 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”); see also United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2016) (“When a district court in a bench trial has made a legal error regarding the elements of an offense, the error is reviewed using the same harmless error standard that would apply to an erroneous jury instruction,” i.e., the Chapman standard.); 34 Uni

2017See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

2017See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

2017Cir. 2008) (determining that the trial court made the legal error of “eliminat[ing] the prosecutor’s burden of proving mens rea,” and applying the Chapman standard for harmless error); Douglas v. United States, 859 A.2d 641, 642 (D.C. 2004) (effectively applying Chapman harmless error where the trial court “arguably” erred in determining that the defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of self-defense but then made the same credibility findings it would have made had the court properly placed the burden to disprove self-defense on the government).

2017Cir. 2008) (determining that the trial court made the legal error of “eliminat[ing] the prosecutor’s burden of proving mens rea,” and applying the Chapman standard for harmless error); Douglas v. United States, 859 A.2d 641, 642 (D.C. 2004) (effectively applying Chapman harmless error where the trial court “arguably” erred in determining that the defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of self-defense but then made the same credibility findings it would have made had the court properly placed the burden to disprove self-defense on the government).

2015See Fields v. United States, 952 A.2d 859, 866 (D.C.2008) (reversing where the court could not say that the constitutional error did not "contribute” to the verdict because of the materiality of the error and where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming); McDonald v. United States, 904 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C.2006) (examining both the "centrality” of the error and the "less than overwhelming strength” of the government’s case when performing a Chapman analysis). .

2015See Fields v. United States, 952 A.2d 859, 866 (D.C.2008) (reversing where the court could not say that the constitutional error did not "contribute” to the verdict because of the materiality of the error and where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming); McDonald v. United States, 904 A.2d 377, 382 (D.C.2006) (examining both the "centrality” of the error and the "less than overwhelming strength” of the government’s case when performing a Chapman analysis). .

2013Thus, even though it is in general “well settled that instructional error is subject to harmless error analysis,” Brooks v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1101 (D.C. 1991), we conclude that the Chapman standard applies. 32 We view this as a close case in which the standard of review makes all the difference.

2013Thus, even though it is in general “well settled that instructional error is subject to harmless error analysis,” Brooks v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1101 (D.C. 1991), we conclude that the Chapman standard applies. 32 We view this as a close case in which the standard of review makes all the difference.

2011For example, in McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 212 (D.C.2006) (quoting Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 447 (D.C.2004)), we reversed upon a finding of Chapman error that characterized the standard as "whether `overwhelming evidence' existed to support the conviction, independent of the tainted [evidentiary ruling]." The majority's proposed standard strikes me as stricter than our prior characterizations of the Chapman standard.

2011For example, in McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 212 (D.C.2006) (quoting Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 447 (D.C.2004)), we reversed upon a finding of Chapman error that characterized the standard as "whether `overwhelming evidence' existed to support the conviction, independent of the tainted [evidentiary ruling]." The majority's proposed standard strikes me as stricter than our prior characterizations of the Chapman standard.

2011See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 127 (D.C.2003) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court refused to enforce a subpoena for a witness who would have corroborated a part of a defendant’s self-defense theory); Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 145 (D.C.2002) (Benn I) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court erroneously denied the defense’s request to recall an alibi witness).

2011See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 127 (D.C.2003) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court refused to enforce a subpoena for a witness who would have corroborated a part of a defendant’s self-defense theory); Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 145 (D.C.2002) (Benn I) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court erroneously denied the defense’s request to recall an alibi witness).

2004See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78 , 81 n. 7 (D.C.1998) (Chapman standard requires finding of harmlessness where “the guilty verdict actually rendered in [the] trial was surely unattributable to the [abeged] error”) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)).

2004See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78 , 81 n. 7 (D.C.1998) (Chapman standard requires finding of harmlessness where “the guilty verdict actually rendered in [the] trial was surely unattributable to the [abeged] error”) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)).

2011See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 127 (D.C.2003) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court refused to enforce a subpoena for a witness who would have corroborated a part of a defendant’s self-defense theory); Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 145 (D.C.2002) (Benn I) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court erroneously denied the defense’s request to recall an alibi witness).

2011See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 127 (D.C.2003) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court refused to enforce a subpoena for a witness who would have corroborated a part of a defendant’s self-defense theory); Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 145 (D.C.2002) (Benn I) (applying the Chapman standard where the trial court erroneously denied the defense’s request to recall an alibi witness).

2010On appeal, we held that the trial court’s error in precluding Smith from calling his former co-defendant as a witness was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard because the witness “was an eyewitness-participant in a criminal offense for which appellant was convicted,” and “was the only person who could refute the police officer’s testimony that appellant gave him drugs.” Id. at 1226 .

2010On appeal, we held that the trial court’s error in precluding Smith from calling his former co-defendant as a witness was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman standard because the witness “was an eyewitness-participant in a criminal offense for which appellant was convicted,” and “was the only person who could refute the police officer’s testimony that appellant gave him drugs.” Id. at 1226 .

2011United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (recognizing "reversible constitutional error only when the harm to the defendant [is] greater than the harm sufficient for reversal under Kotteakos ").

2011United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (recognizing "reversible constitutional error only when the harm to the defendant [is] greater than the harm sufficient for reversal under Kotteakos ").

2006See Pope, supra, 481 U.S. at 497, 499, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 (applying Chapman standard where trial court, in obscenity trial, instructed jury to judge the value of the allegedly obscene materials based on community standards rather than objective standards); Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at 574, 579-580 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 (applying Chapman standard to jury instruction that shifted burden of proof by applying rebuttable presumption of malice in homicide case).

2006See Pope, supra, 481 U.S. at 497, 499, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 (applying Chapman standard where trial court, in obscenity trial, instructed jury to judge the value of the allegedly obscene materials based on community standards rather than objective standards); Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at 574, 579-580 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 (applying Chapman standard to jury instruction that shifted burden of proof by applying rebuttable presumption of malice in homicide case).

2025See United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 , 1167 n.4 (D.C.

2025See United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162 , 1167 n.4 (D.C.

2025Cir. 2000) (applying the Chapman standard on a § 2255 motion “because the government argued only the Chapman standard below”); United States v. Green, 254 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C.

2025Cir. 2000) (applying the Chapman standard on a § 2255 motion “because the government argued only the Chapman standard below”); United States v. Green, 254 F.3d 167, 171 (D.C.

2023In Hagans v. United States, this court determined that “the strength of the government’s case and the innocuousness . . . of the few errors we have found or assumed arguendo convinces us that, even in combination, and even applying a Chapman standard across the board, there is no reasonable possibility the errors affected the outcome of appellants’ trial.” 96 A.3d 1, 43-44 (D.C. 2014).

2023In Hagans v. United States, this court determined that “the strength of the government’s case and the innocuousness . . . of the few errors we have found or assumed arguendo convinces us that, even in combination, and even applying a Chapman standard across the board, there is no reasonable possibility the errors affected the outcome of appellants’ trial.” 96 A.3d 1, 43-44 (D.C. 2014).

2019See, e.g. , Euceda , 66 A.3d at 1007 ; Winestock v. United States , 429 A.2d 519 , 529 (D.C. 1981).

2019See, e.g. , Euceda , 66 A.3d at 1007 ; Winestock v. United States , 429 A.2d 519 , 529 (D.C. 1981).

2018Cf., e.g., Longus, 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross- examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government‟s principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States, 36 A.3d 352, 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross- examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say “that the defendant would have been convicted without the

2018Cf., e.g. , Longus , 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross-examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government's principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States , 36 A.3d 352 , 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross-examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say "that the defendant would have been convicted without th