7 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Chapman v. State, 556 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ind. 1990) (rejecting Chapman’s claim of cumulative prosecutorial misconduct). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1999Brady holds that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 . 4 The evidence at issue in this case is neither exculpatory nor material to Chapman’s case. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chapman v. Skinner
green
1 sentence1994In re Chapman (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 777 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rabadi v. State
green
2 sentences1994This court explicitly adopted the Chapman standard in Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271, 276 . 1994This court explicitly adopted the Chapman standard in Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271, 276 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1989Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . 1989Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 710 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dickerson v. State
green
2 sentences1985It acknowledged Chapman in Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562 , 276 N.E.2d 845 stating that when a constitutional error has been committed a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises and the burden is on the state to demonstrate that the accused was in no way prejudiced thereby. 276 N.E.2d at 851 . 1985It acknowledged Chapman in Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562 , 276 N.E.2d 845 stating that when a constitutional error has been committed a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises and the burden is on the state to demonstrate that the accused was in no way prejudiced thereby. 276 N.E.2d at 851 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Greer v. State
green
2 sentences1985In Greer v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 20 , 245 N.E.2d 158 Indiana applied the Chapman test to federal constitutional errors. 1985In Greer v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 20 , 245 N.E.2d 158 Indiana applied the Chapman test to federal constitutional errors. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
DeVillez v. State
green
2 sentences1985In DeVillez v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 263 , 416 N.E.2d 846 , 848 our Supreme Court considered IC 85-4.1-1-8(e) [repealed] under which Pharms appeals and concluded, "The objective of subsection (e) is fairness to the accused. 1985In DeVillez v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 263 , 416 N.E.2d 846 , 848 our Supreme Court considered IC 85-4.1-1-8(e) [repealed] under which Pharms appeals and concluded, "The objective of subsection (e) is fairness to the accused. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences1985Assuming that Chapman still accurately represents the federal rule (compare, eg. Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223 , 93 S.Ct. 1565 , 36 L.Ed.2d 208 ); assuming that Indiana would elect the strictness of the Chapman standard in viewing questions of state constitutional error; and assuming that advisement of the court's status in a plea agreement is of constitutional dimension, it seems clear that under the circumstances of the given case such error may nevertheless be harmless. 1985Assuming that Chapman still accurately represents the federal rule (compare, eg. Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223 , 93 S.Ct. 1565 , 36 L.Ed.2d 208 ); assuming that Indiana would elect the strictness of the Chapman standard in viewing questions of state constitutional error; and assuming that advisement of the court's status in a plea agreement is of constitutional dimension, it seems clear that under the circumstances of the given case such error may nevertheless be harmless. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Harrington v. California
red
2 sentences1975We believe that it was in response to such an argument that the United States Supreme Court diluted the Chapman standard by adopting a more pragmatic approach to harmless-constitutional-error in Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 . 4 In Harrington, supra, “the Court seems to have adopted the ‘overwhelming evidence’ standard”, McCormick, supra, at 432, which renders the error harmless if the amount and probative value of the other evidence in the record tending to sustain the finding of guilt is, when compared with the probative value of the inadmissa 1975We believe that it was in response to such an argument that the United States Supreme Court diluted the Chapman standard by adopting a more pragmatic approach to harmless-constitutional-error in Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 . 4 In Harrington, supra, “the Court seems to have adopted the ‘overwhelming evidence’ standard”, McCormick, supra, at 432, which renders the error harmless if the amount and probative value of the other evidence in the record tending to sustain the finding of guilt is, when compared with the probative value of the inadmissa | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.