Chapman standard in Nevada

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008But see Harris v. State, 90 Nev. 172, 173 , 521 P.2d 367, 367-68 (1974) (applying the Chapman standard to alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding presenting testimony and displaying evidence with an insufficient foundation). [39] See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that because both standards require the application of judgment, "the difference is less significant than it might seem"). [40] See Harlow, 444 F.3d at 1266 (noting that improper vouching for witnesses constitutes an error of nonconstitutional

2008We note that in Clark v. State, this court held that even if the defendant objects to prosecutorial misconduct, "the failure to move to strike, move for a mistrial, assign misconduct or request an instruction, will preclude appellate consideration [of prosecutorial misconduct]." 89 Nev. 392, 393 , 513 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (1973).

2008We note that in Clark v. State, this court held that even if the defendant objects to prosecutorial misconduct, "the failure to move to strike, move for a mistrial, assign misconduct or request an instruction, will preclude appellate consideration [of prosecutorial misconduct]." 89 Nev. 392, 393 , 513 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (1973).

2001Under the Chapman standard, we ask whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (discussing Chapman and the United States Supreme Court cases decided under Chapman). 15 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 16 See Fed.

2001Under the Chapman standard, we ask whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (discussing Chapman and the United States Supreme Court cases decided under Chapman). 15 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 16 See Fed.

1999In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority of the court, distinguished between “trial error” and “structural error” in determining whether a federal constitutional violation could be analyzed under the Chapman test or required automatic reversal.

1999In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority of the court, distinguished between “trial error” and “structural error” in determining whether a federal constitutional violation could be analyzed under the Chapman test or required automatic reversal.

1983“Assessing the strength of the prosecutor’s evidence is, of course, one step in applying a harmless error standard.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).

1983“Assessing the strength of the prosecutor’s evidence is, of course, one step in applying a harmless error standard.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).