Chapman standard in Texas

42 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1876–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (44)

Case	Followed	Cited
Clay v. Stategreen texcrimapp · 2007 · cited in 8 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2008–2013 2 sentences 2011See Davis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 489 , 491 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no pet.). [13] "The Chapman test is codified in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), which provides that constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment `unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.'" Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting TEX. 2011See Davis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 489 , 491 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no pet.). [13] "The Chapman test is codified in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), which provides that constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment `unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.'" Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting TEX.	4	8
Ex Parte Carmonagreen texcrimapp · 2006 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). . 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). .	3	3
Chavez, Ex Parte Adriangreen texcrimapp · 2012 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). . 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). .	3	3
Davis v. Stategreen texapp · 1995 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2008–2011 2 sentences 2011See Davis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 489 , 491 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no pet.). [13] "The Chapman test is codified in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), which provides that constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment `unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.'" Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting TEX. 2011See Davis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 489 , 491 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, no pet.). [13] "The Chapman test is codified in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), which provides that constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment `unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.'" Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (quoting TEX.	3	3
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen scotus · 1993 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . 2005See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 .	3	3
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen scotus · 1986 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2021 2 sentences 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error. 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error.	2	2
State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in United States Currency ($90,235)green tex · 2013 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013). 2017Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013).	2	2
Kachina Pipeline Company, Inc. v. Michael D. Lillisgreen tex · 2015 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013). 2017Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013).	2	2
Neal v. Stategreen texcrimapp · 2008 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015App. 2001) (harmless error review under Rule 44.2(a)); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2001) (harmless error review under Rule 44.2(a)); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. Crim.	2	2
Hernandez v. Stategreen texcrimapp · 2001 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015App. 2007) (Chapman test codified in Rule 44.2(a)); see also Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2007) {Chapman test codified in Rule 44.2(a)); see also Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim.	2	2
Chapman v. Californiared scotus · 1967 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1998–2014 2 sentences 2014See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 n.10 (1982) (citing Giglio and Napue as applying in cases of “egregious prosecutorial misconduct”). 5 934 S.W.2d at 372 , 374-75 & n.10. 6 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 7 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n.9 (1985) (emphasis added). 8 Id. 9 Id. 1998See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 , 66 S.Ct. at 1248 ; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 (the standard for determining whether a conviction must be set aside because of federal *866 constitutional error is whether the error “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).	2	2
Harrington v. Californiared scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2007 2 sentences 2006See Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 ; Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 ; Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) ("To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record”); see also People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407 , 299 Ill.Dec. 157 , 841 N.E.2d 889, 906 (2005) (applying Chapman analysis to Crawford error and finding it harmless); People v. Houston, 130 Cal.App.4th 279, 301 , 29 Cal.Rptr 2006See Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 ; Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 ; Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) ("To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record”); see also People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407 , 299 Ill.Dec. 157 , 841 N.E.2d 889, 906 (2005) (applying Chapman analysis to Crawford error and finding it harmless); People v. Houston, 130 Cal.App.4th 279, 301 , 29 Cal.Rptr	2	2
Xenos Yuen v. Fishergreen texapp · 2007 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007See Xenos Yuen v. Fisher , 227 S.W.3d 193 , 204—05 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial because appellant failed to demonstrate that it was not through want of diligence that he did not obtain new evidence sooner); Mayhew v. Dealey , 143 S.W.3d 356 , 367 ( Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (same); GJR Mgmt. 2007See Xenos Yuen v. Fisher, 227 S.W.3d 193, 204-05 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial because appellant failed to demonstrate that it was not through want of diligence that he did not obtain new evidence sooner); Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tex.App.Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (same); GJR Mgmt.	2	2
Ex Parte Fierrogreen texcrimapp · 1996 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1998–2014 2 sentences 2014See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 n.10 (1982) (citing Giglio and Napue as applying in cases of “egregious prosecutorial misconduct”). 5 934 S.W.2d at 372 , 374-75 & n.10. 6 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 7 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n.9 (1985) (emphasis added). 8 Id. 9 Id. 1998See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630 , 113 S.Ct. at 1717 ; Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372 .	1	2
United States v. Bagleygreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1996–2014 2 sentences 1996From the caselaw in the Supreme Court it is not entirely certain whether this “materiality” requirement is part of the due process claim itself, or is just another way of saying that knowing use of perjured testimony is subject to the constitutional harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, supra. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80 , 105 S.Ct. at 3382 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 492 . 2 In any event, the Supreme Court has commented that the “reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury” .test is functionally equivalent to the Chapman test 1996From the caselaw in the Supreme Court it is not entirely certain whether this “materiality” requirement is part of the due process claim itself, or is just another way of saying that knowing use of perjured testimony is subject to the constitutional harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, supra. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80 , 105 S.Ct. at 3382 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 492 . 2 In any event, the Supreme Court has commented that the “reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury” .test is functionally equivalent to the Chapman test	1	2
Mayhew v. Dealeygreen texapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007See Xenos Yuen v. Fisher , 227 S.W.3d 193 , 204—05 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial because appellant failed to demonstrate that it was not through want of diligence that he did not obtain new evidence sooner); Mayhew v. Dealey , 143 S.W.3d 356 , 367 ( Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (same); GJR Mgmt. 2007See Xenos Yuen v. Fisher, 227 S.W.3d 193, 204-05 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial because appellant failed to demonstrate that it was not through want of diligence that he did not obtain new evidence sooner); Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tex.App.Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (same); GJR Mgmt.	1	2
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen scotus · 1993 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1996–1998 2 sentences 1998See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630 , 113 S.Ct. at 1717 ; Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372 . 1998See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630 , 113 S.Ct. at 1717 ; Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372 .	1	2
VSR Financial Services, Inc v. Gordon B. McLendongreen texapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 2 sentences 2025Appellees opened brokerage accounts and signed a “VSR New Account Form,” which identified VSR by name and was signed by one of the Chapman defendants in the capacity of a “Registered Rep.” Id. at 822. 2025Considering whether VSR and the Chapman defendants could enforce the arbitration provisions against the appellees, the Dallas court noted that VSR is not a named party to the Agreements, there is no definition in the Agreements or the Terms and Conditions of the term “Introducing Firm,” and neither the Agreements nor the Terms and Conditions declare VSR or any other entity to be the “Introducing Firm.” Id. at 828.	1	1
Van Arsdall v. Stategreen del · 1984 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 2 sentences 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error. 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error.	1	1
State v. Badergreen nh · 2002 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818 , 820 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1997) (because "the circumstances here do not present the compelling situation upon which the court grounded its ruling in Sanders , we conclude this is not the case to revisit” those prior precedents); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 285-86 , 808 A.2d 12, 32-33 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim while observing that Sanders and other cases imposed a more rigorous materiality requirement for unknowing use than for knowing use of false evidence). . 2014Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818 , 820 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1997) (because "the circumstances here do not present the compelling situation upon which the court grounded its ruling in Sanders , we conclude this is not the case to revisit” those prior precedents); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 285-86 , 808 A.2d 12, 32-33 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim while observing that Sanders and other cases imposed a more rigorous materiality requirement for unknowing use than for knowing use of false evidence). .	1	1
Ex Parte Nappergreen texcrimapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). . 2014See also Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 , 242 n. 151 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (recognizing that "[t]he Second Circuit has suggested that the unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process if a stronger showing of materiality or harm is made than is required by the Chapman standard.”); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 212-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (discussing Sanders); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Hervey, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders). .	1	1
Smith v. Phillipsgreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014See also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 n.10 (1982) (citing Giglio and Napue as applying in cases of “egregious prosecutorial misconduct”). 5 934 S.W.2d at 372 , 374-75 & n.10. 6 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 7 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 679 n.9 (1985) (emphasis added). 8 Id. 9 Id.	1	1
Pirtle v. Gregorygreen tex · 1982 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 1 sentence 2013Chapman cites Pirtle v. Gregory to support his position. 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (stating that fundamental error “survives today in those rare instances in which the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas.”).	1	1
Walter Sanders v. James E. Sullivan and Robert Abrams, the Attorney General of the State of New Yorkgreen ca2 · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 225-26 (2nd Cir.1988). 152 . 313 S.W.3d at 287 . 153 . 2010Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 225-26 (2nd Cir.1988). 152 . 313 S.W.3d at 287 . 153 .	1	1
Hale v. Stategreen texapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
Yates v. Evattgreen scotus · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
People v. Pattersongreen ill · 2005 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
Davis v. United Statesgreen dc · 2004 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
Wesbrook v. Stategreen texcrimapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
Scott v. Stategreen texapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
State v. Weedgreen wis · 2003 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
People v. Curtisgreen colo · 1984 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
LaVigne v. Stategreen alaska · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
Sanchez v. Stategreen wyo · 1992 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
State v. Orrgreen sc · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
State v. Hoffmangreen idahoctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1946 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	1
Fowler v. Stategreen texapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	1
Brown v. Stategreen texapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998	1	1
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (4)

Case	Negative	Cited
Hines v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
Solimine v. Federal Bureau of Investigationgreen scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
State v. Fieldsgreen idaho · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1
McAlister v. Thomas & Howard Co.green sc · 1921 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005	1	1

Also cited on this issue (20)

Case	Cited	Years
Harris v. State green texcrimapp · 1989 2 sentences 2011In our original opinion in this case, we used the factors announced in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). 2011In our original opinion in this case, we used the factors announced in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).	5	1995–2011
Neder v. United States green scotus · 1999 2 sentences 2007Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. at 15-16 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 . 2007Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. at 15-16 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 .	2	2007–2007
United States v. Neder green ca11 · 1998 2 sentences 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error. 2021See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677 (1986) (“The [Delaware Supreme Court] rejected the State’s argument that since ‘Fleetwood’s basic testimony was cumulative in nature and unimportant,’ the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. 1984))); Neder v. United States, 136 F.3d 1459 , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he government must show that Neder was not prejudiced by the district court’s . . . error.	1	2021–2021
Napue v. Illinois green scotus · 1959 2 sentences 2014It is unclear to me whether the Court’s use of the “reasonable likelihood” language (and citations to Giglio and Fierro) is intended to signify the use of Napue/Chapman standard or whether the Court’s omission of the word “any” from the standard 3 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 4 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 . 2014It is unclear to me whether the Court’s use of the “reasonable likelihood” language (and citations to Giglio and Fierro) is intended to signify the use of Napue/Chapman standard or whether the Court’s omission of the word “any” from the standard 3 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 4 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 .	1	2014–2014
Ronald Dale Smith v. Raymond Roberts Attorney General green ca10 · 1997 2 sentences 2014Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818 , 820 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1997) (because "the circumstances here do not present the compelling situation upon which the court grounded its ruling in Sanders , we conclude this is not the case to revisit” those prior precedents); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 285-86 , 808 A.2d 12, 32-33 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim while observing that Sanders and other cases imposed a more rigorous materiality requirement for unknowing use than for knowing use of false evidence). . 2014Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818 , 820 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1997) (because "the circumstances here do not present the compelling situation upon which the court grounded its ruling in Sanders , we conclude this is not the case to revisit” those prior precedents); State v. Bader, 148 N.H. 265, 285-86 , 808 A.2d 12, 32-33 (2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim while observing that Sanders and other cases imposed a more rigorous materiality requirement for unknowing use than for knowing use of false evidence). .	1	2014–2014
Giglio v. United States green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 2014It is unclear to me whether the Court’s use of the “reasonable likelihood” language (and citations to Giglio and Fierro) is intended to signify the use of Napue/Chapman standard or whether the Court’s omission of the word “any” from the standard 3 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 4 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 . 2014It is unclear to me whether the Court’s use of the “reasonable likelihood” language (and citations to Giglio and Fierro) is intended to signify the use of Napue/Chapman standard or whether the Court’s omission of the word “any” from the standard 3 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 4 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 .	1	2014–2014
Estrada v. State green texcrimapp · 2010	1	2010–2010
People v. Houston green calctapp · 2005	1	2006–2006
Davis v. State green texapp · 2005	1	2006–2006
Schneble v. Florida green scotus · 1972	1	2006–2006
Johnson v. Zerbst green scotus · 1938	1	2005–2005
State v. Darbin green idahoctapp · 1985	1	2005–2005
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966	1	2001–2001
Arizona v. Fulminante green scotus · 1991	1	2000–2000
Rose v. Clark green scotus · 1986	1	1996–1996
Fahy v. Connecticut green scotus · 1963	1	1990–1990
Bruton v. United States green scotus · 1968	1	1989–1989
Pointer v. Texas green scotus · 1965	1	1989–1989
Cole v. State green texcrimapp · 1972	1	1988–1988
Blankenship v. Douglas green tex · 1862	1	1876–1876

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Penal Code § 22.01 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 874 (1967–2026) DC 51 (1978–2025) LA 43 (1982–2024) TX 42 (1876–2025) MS 26 (1991–2018) ID 24 (1981–2020) NY 15 (2013–2024) WY 14 (1981–2015) TN 13 (1993–2025) WI 13 (1977–2008) KS 13 (2001–2026) IL 13 (1970–2025) OH 10 (1968–2020) AK 10 (1969–2014) AR 9 (1987–2023) GA 8 (1976–2025) PA 8 (1967–2024) IN 7 (1975–2013) MI 7 (1980–2022) WA 7 (1980–2018) FL 7 (1987–2016) MD 7 (1974–2022) NV 6 (1970–2008) AL 5 (1992–2015) VA 5 (1991–2023) ND 5 (1975–1986) CO 4 (1972–2025) CT 4 (1988–2021) NJ 4 (1968–2005) UT 4 (2003–2025) MA 4 (1978–2018) NE 3 (1988–2020) KY 3 (1969–2008) MO 3 (1985–2011) OR 3 (1981–2020) IA 3 (1991–2016) NM 3 (2004–2009) AZ 2 (1970–1996) MT 2 (1980–1995) OK 2 (2025–2025) SC 2 (1969–1980) MN 2 (1951–2002) ME 2 (1973–1988) DE 2 (2000–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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