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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 796 (7) ( 714 SE2d 584 ) (2011). 2015See Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 796 (7) ( 714 SE2d 584 ) (2011). | 2 | 2 |
Schneble v. Floridagreen2 sentences1995The United States Supreme Court applied the Chapman test in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427, 430-432 (92 SC 1056, 31 LE2d 340) (1972), and considered the overwhelming evidence of guilt in reaching the conclusion that the constitutional error “was at most harmless.” Id. at 432 . *589 We cannot conclude, putting the burden on the State, that had the choices which appellant now complains of been followed, the integrity of the conviction would be in doubt. 1995The United States Supreme Court applied the Chapman test in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427, 430-432 (92 SC 1056, 31 LE2d 340) (1972), and considered the overwhelming evidence of guilt in reaching the conclusion that the constitutional error “was at most harmless.” Id. at 432 . *589 We cannot conclude, putting the burden on the State, that had the choices which appellant now complains of been followed, the integrity of the conviction would be in doubt. | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Accordingly, this claim fails. (b) Second, Chapman argues that the trial court abused its 9 discretion by admitting Watson’s cell phone download. 5 Because Chapman’s objection to the admission of the cell phone download was untimely, we review this enumeration for plain error only.6 To show plain error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “(1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute, (3) likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. 2025Accordingly, this claim fails. (b) Second, Chapman argues that the trial court abused its 9 discretion by admitting Watson’s cell phone download. 5 Because Chapman’s objection to the admission of the cell phone download was untimely, we review this enumeration for plain error only.6 To show plain error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “(1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute, (3) likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. | 1 | 1 |
Tuggle v. Stategreen1 sentence2023The law recognizes that, because even an ordinary traffic stop curtails the motorist’s freedom of action and imposes some pressure on him to answer questions, the fact that a motorist has been detained does not necessarily mean Miranda has been triggered.26 [T]o determine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. 25 Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849 (1) (c). 26 See State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 885 ( 723 SE2d 89 ) (2012); Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The law recognizes that, because even an ordinary traffic stop curtails the motorist’s freedom of action and imposes some pressure on him to answer questions, the fact that a motorist has been detained does not necessarily mean Miranda has been triggered.26 [T]o determine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. 25 Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849 (1) (c). 26 See State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 885 ( 723 SE2d 89 ) (2012); Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App 2023The law recognizes that, because even an ordinary traffic stop curtails the motorist’s freedom of action and imposes some pressure on him to answer questions, the fact that a motorist has been detained does not necessarily mean Miranda has been triggered.26 [T]o determine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. 25 Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849 (1) (c). 26 See State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 885 ( 723 SE2d 89 ) (2012); Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hammondgreen2 sentences2023The law recognizes that, because even an ordinary traffic stop curtails the motorist’s freedom of action and imposes some pressure on him to answer questions, the fact that a motorist has been detained does not necessarily mean Miranda has been triggered.26 [T]o determine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. 25 Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849 (1) (c). 26 See State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 885 ( 723 SE2d 89 ) (2012); Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App 2023The law recognizes that, because even an ordinary traffic stop curtails the motorist’s freedom of action and imposes some pressure on him to answer questions, the fact that a motorist has been detained does not necessarily mean Miranda has been triggered.26 [T]o determine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. 25 Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849 (1) (c). 26 See State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 885 ( 723 SE2d 89 ) (2012); Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App | 1 | 1 |
Hazlip v. Morrisgreen2 sentences1997See Hazlip v. Morris, 242 Ga. 7, 8 ( 247 SE2d 747 ) (1978); Outdoor Systems v. Woodson, *367 221 Ga. App. 901 (1) ( 473 SE2d 204 ) (1996). 2. 1997See Hazlip v. Morris, 242 Ga. 7, 8 ( 247 SE2d 747 ) (1978); Outdoor Systems v. Woodson, *367 221 Ga. App. 901 (1) ( 473 SE2d 204 ) (1996). 2. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hightowergreen2 sentences1976Schneble v. Florida, supra; see State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58 ( 222 SE2d 333 ) (1976). 1976Schneble v. Florida, supra; see State v. Hightower, 236 Ga. 58 ( 222 SE2d 333 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Perkins v. Hall
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Woodson
green
2 sentences1997See Hazlip v. Morris, 242 Ga. 7, 8 ( 247 SE2d 747 ) (1978); Outdoor Systems v. Woodson, *367 221 Ga. App. 901 (1) ( 473 SE2d 204 ) (1996). 2. 1997See Hazlip v. Morris, 242 Ga. 7, 8 ( 247 SE2d 747 ) (1978); Outdoor Systems v. Woodson, *367 221 Ga. App. 901 (1) ( 473 SE2d 204 ) (1996). 2. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.