Chapman standard in California

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2026Prejudice Defendant argues that the instruction was prejudicial as to count 1 under both the Chapman standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ), and the Watson test for state law error (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ).

2026Prejudice Defendant argues that the instruction was prejudicial as to count 1 under both the Chapman standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ), and the Watson test for state law error (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ).

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2024(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) Accordingly, prejudice is not present even under the more stringent Chapman standard.

2024(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) Accordingly, prejudice is not present even under the more stringent Chapman standard.

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2023While acknowledging some courts had applied the Chapman standard to a trial court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense (see People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 ; People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630 ), the court found that our prior decisions in Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142 , and People v. Gonzalez (2018) 12 PEOPLE v. SCHULLER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 5 Cal.5th 186 (Gonzalez), compelled Watson review.

2023While acknowledging some courts had applied the Chapman standard to a trial court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense (see People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163 ; People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630 ), the court found that our prior decisions in Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142 , and People v. Gonzalez (2018) 12 PEOPLE v. SCHULLER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 5 Cal.5th 186 (Gonzalez), compelled Watson review.

2024(People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185-188 ; accord, People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576-577 ; see People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 199 [finding failure to instruct on unanimity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.].) Absent a compelling reason to depart from that precedent, we will continue to apply the Chapman standard.

2024(People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185-188 ; accord, People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576-577 ; see People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 199 [finding failure to instruct on unanimity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.].) Absent a compelling reason to depart from that precedent, we will continue to apply the Chapman standard.

2025(See Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 [Chapman standard is applicable to “erroneous admission of involuntary statements”], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 .) The Chapman standard requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2025(See Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 [Chapman standard is applicable to “erroneous admission of involuntary statements”], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 .) The Chapman standard requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2021The Supreme Court “ha[s] not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the failure to instruct on an affirmative defense.” (Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 984 .) Even assuming the more rigorous Chapman test applies (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [state must prove error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]), the trial court’s failure to instruct on self- defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2021Harmless Error 16 “ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 (Beltran), italics added.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (Beltran, at p. 955.) Our high court has “not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the fail

2023The act required is explained in the instruction for that crime.” 25 (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666 , 668–669 [applying Chapman standard to giving of contradictory and partially inaccurate instructions regarding intent-to-kill element of attempted murder]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [‘ “reasonable likelihood” ’ standard employed for ambiguous instruction inappropriate where disputed instruction erroneous on face].)” (People v. Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615 (Saavedra).) As in Saavedra, we decline to choose a side, concluding “the error was harmless even under Chapman’s more s

2022(Id. at pp. 669-670.) The appellate court held: “[C]onflicting instructions, which appear to require a specific intent to kill but which eliminate that requirement where implied malice is found, are closely akin to instructions which completely remove the intent issue from the jury’s consideration: If the implied malice instructions are followed, the issue of intent may indeed be removed from the case.” (Id. at p. 674.) In such a case, conflicting instructions regarding intent may implicate due process and require a harmless error analysis under the of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17

2025(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424–425 [general rule re omitted and mis-described elements]; Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 [specific rule re alternative-theory error].) Under the Chapman standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aleldamat, at p. 13.) Explained another way, we must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have

2025(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424–425 [general rule re omitted and mis-described elements]; Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 [specific rule re alternative-theory error].) Under the Chapman standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aleldamat, at p. 13.) Explained another way, we must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have

2021(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 64 .) In our 2003 denial of Rogers’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we applied the Chapman standard and acknowledged the Garcia standard was no longer applicable. 6 On January 9, 2003, this court issued an order denying the habeas petition.

2021(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 64 .) In our 2003 denial of Rogers’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we applied the Chapman standard and acknowledged the Garcia standard was no longer applicable. 6 On January 9, 2003, this court issued an order denying the habeas petition.

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2018He argues the pertinent inquiry for this confusing instruction is "whether it is reasonably likely the jury *332 interpreted the challenged instruction to authorize a conviction on the charged offenses based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence" (citing *121 Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 ), and suggests we apply the Chapman standard to determine whether the instruction was prejudicial.

2018He argues the pertinent inquiry for this confusing instruction is "whether it is reasonably likely the jury *332 interpreted the challenged instruction to authorize a conviction on the charged offenses based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence" (citing *121 Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 ), and suggests we apply the Chapman standard to determine whether the instruction was prejudicial.

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2026That test requires the People . . . ‘to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542 .) Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 19 jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?’ ” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 827 .) Here, the answer is yes.

2025(People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 .) If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense, the applicable standard of review for prejudice is the Chapman standard.

2025(People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 .) If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense, the applicable standard of review for prejudice is the Chapman standard.

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 768.) Lynch further stated that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence” ’ ” how “ ‘ “the jury would have assessed the facts,” ’ ” because “ “ ‘[m]any of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the fact

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 768.) Lynch further stated that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence” ’ ” how “ ‘ “the jury would have assessed the facts,” ’ ” because “ “ ‘[m]any of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the fact

2023(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].)11 11 A violation of the confrontation clause would trigger the application of the Chapman standard, but, as we have determined ante, Duangputra has not in fact presented a confrontation clause claim.

2023(See, e.g., People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363 [federal constitutional errors subject to review for harmlessness under Chapman].)11 11 A violation of the confrontation clause would trigger the application of the Chapman standard, but, as we have determined ante, Duangputra has not in fact presented a confrontation clause claim.

2015(People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 562 [applying Watson standard]; cf. People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576-577 [applying Chapman standard].) Failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless “if the record indicate[s] the jury resolved the basic credibility dispute against the defendant and would have convicted the defendant of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence to have been committed.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 .) “Where the record provides no rational basis, by way of argument or evidence, for the jury to distinguish between the var

2013We adhere to the majority rule that the Chapman test is 10. 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 ; People v. Metheney (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 555, 563-564, fn. 5 .) Under Chapman, “[w]here the record provides no rational basis, by way of argument or evidence, for the jury to distinguish between the various acts, and the jury must have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed all acts if he committed any, the failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless.” (People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 843, 853 (Thompson).) For instance, “where the defendant offered the same defense to a

2026If the error is one that violated Williams’s federal constitutional rights, then harm is assessed under the Chapman standard,10 which asks whether the error was “ ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942 ).

2026If the error is one that violated Williams’s federal constitutional rights, then harm is assessed under the Chapman standard,10 which asks whether the error was “ ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942 ).

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17