Chapman standard in California

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768 citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) The California Supreme Court has cautioned that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did t

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768 citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) The California Supreme Court has cautioned that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did t

2026In Hall, the trial court informed the jury that the defendant was a “convicted person” for 10 The “Chapman standard” refers to the harm standard announced in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . 11 The “Watson standard” refers to the harm standard announced in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . 22. purposes of establishing an element of Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a)(1).

2026Prejudice Defendant argues that the instruction was prejudicial as to count 1 under both the Chapman standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ), and the Watson test for state law error (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ).

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768 citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) The California Supreme Court has cautioned that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did t

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768 citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) The California Supreme Court has cautioned that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did t

2025(Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. at p. 312 ; see People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 47 [“express waiver” is required “even in cases in which the circumstances make it apparent that all involved—the trial court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant— assumed that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right to a jury trial”].) Accordingly, a Sixth Amendment violation occurred.3 “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of revi

2025(Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. at p. 312 ; see People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 47 [“express waiver” is required “even in cases in which the circumstances make it apparent that all involved—the trial court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant— assumed that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right to a jury trial”].) Accordingly, a Sixth Amendment violation occurred.3 “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of revi

2026(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Under the Chapman standard, “ ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170(b) must be 9 reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ ” (Wiley, at p. 1087; see also People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 761 (Lynch) [“When the trial court actually relies on improperly p

2026(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Under the Chapman standard, “ ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170(b) must be 9 reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ ” (Wiley, at p. 1087; see also People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 761 (Lynch) [“When the trial court actually relies on improperly p

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2020(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 .) “Since Chapman, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) This court has described the test for the Chapman standard as follows: “To find the error harmless we must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict, that it was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 8 the issue in question.”

2026(See, e.g., People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735 , 746 (Cooper).) Harmless Error Standard “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears 8 beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207, quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) To prove harmless error under the Chapman standard, “it

2026(See, e.g., People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735 , 746 (Cooper).) Harmless Error Standard “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears 8 beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207, quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) To prove harmless error under the Chapman standard, “it

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570-581, overruled on other grounds in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 637 .) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (In re Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction with omitted required elements.

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570-581, overruled on other grounds in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 637 .) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (In re Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction with omitted required elements.

2024(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) Accordingly, prejudice is not present even under the more stringent Chapman standard.

2024(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) Accordingly, prejudice is not present even under the more stringent Chapman standard.

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026(See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475 [a trial court’s failure 21. to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions”].) We agree that the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘ “[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense ... is amenable to review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions ....” [Citation.] ‘A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential elements of the charged o

2026(Id. at pp. 1165-1666; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; accord, People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 257 (Schuller) [Chapman standard applies to instructional errors “that omit an element of the offense, but also to instructions that provide an incomplete or misleading description of what is necessary to establish an element of the offense”].) As a preliminary matter, although defense counsel did not object to the conflicting instructions on motive, the People concede that Carrillo did not forfeit the challenge.

2026(Id. at pp. 1165-1666; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; accord, People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 , 257 (Schuller) [Chapman standard applies to instructional errors “that omit an element of the offense, but also to instructions that provide an incomplete or misleading description of what is necessary to establish an element of the offense”].) As a preliminary matter, although defense counsel did not object to the conflicting instructions on motive, the People concede that Carrillo did not forfeit the challenge.

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2026(See, e.g., Quach, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt 4 Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia, who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening. 14 (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) We must reverse

2021(See Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 633 ; but see also Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 168-169 [doubting whether the lesser included offenses implication the federal Constitution despite being derived from state law].) Assuming without deciding that the Chapman standard applies, we would find the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2021(See Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 633 ; but see also Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 168-169 [doubting whether the lesser included offenses implication the federal Constitution despite being derived from state law].) Assuming without deciding that the Chapman standard applies, we would find the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024(People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185-188 ; accord, People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576-577 ; see People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 199 [finding failure to instruct on unanimity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.].) Absent a compelling reason to depart from that precedent, we will continue to apply the Chapman standard.

2024(People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185-188 ; accord, People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 576-577 ; see People v. Lueth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, 199 [finding failure to instruct on unanimity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.].) Absent a compelling reason to depart from that precedent, we will continue to apply the Chapman standard.

2025(See Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 [Chapman standard is applicable to “erroneous admission of involuntary statements”], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 .) The Chapman standard requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2025(See Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86 [Chapman standard is applicable to “erroneous admission of involuntary statements”], citing Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 .) The Chapman standard requires the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

2021Harmless Error 16 “ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated” in [People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 (Beltran), italics added.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (Beltran, at p. 955.) Our high court has “not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the fail

2021The Supreme Court “ha[s] not yet determined what test of prejudice applies to the failure to instruct on an affirmative defense.” (Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 984 .) Even assuming the more rigorous Chapman test applies (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [state must prove error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]), the trial court’s failure to instruct on self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2023The act required is explained in the instruction for that crime.” 25 (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666 , 668-669 [applying Chapman standard to giving of contradictory and partially inaccurate instructions regarding intent-to-kill element of attempted murder]; Ho v. Carey (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592 [‘ “reasonable likelihood” ’ standard employed for ambiguous instruction inappropriate where disputed instruction erroneous on face].)” (People v. Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615 (Saavedra).) As in Saavedra, we decline to choose a side, concluding “the error was harmless even under Chapman’s more s

2022(Id. at pp. 669-670.) The appellate court held: “[C]onflicting instructions, which appear to require a specific intent to kill but which eliminate that requirement where implied malice is found, are closely akin to instructions which completely remove the intent issue from the jury’s consideration: If the implied malice instructions are followed, the issue of intent may indeed be removed from the case.” (Id. at p. 674.) In such a case, conflicting instructions regarding intent may implicate due process and require a harmless error analysis under the of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17

2025As held in Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 , “Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” (Id. at p. 222; accord, People v. French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 52, fn. 8 [distinguishing Ernst and following Recuenco where appellant was denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances].) “When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17

2025(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424–425 [general rule re omitted and mis-described elements]; Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 [specific rule re alternative-theory error].) Under the Chapman standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aleldamat, at p. 13.) Explained another way, we must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have

2025(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424–425 [general rule re omitted and mis-described elements]; Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 [specific rule re alternative-theory error].) Under the Chapman standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aleldamat, at p. 13.) Explained another way, we must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have

2018He argues the pertinent inquiry for this confusing instruction is "whether it is reasonably likely the jury *332 interpreted the challenged instruction to authorize a conviction on the charged offenses based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence" (citing *121 Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 ), and suggests we apply the Chapman standard to determine whether the instruction was prejudicial.

2018He argues the pertinent inquiry for this confusing instruction is "whether it is reasonably likely the jury *332 interpreted the challenged instruction to authorize a conviction on the charged offenses based only on proof by a preponderance of the evidence" (citing *121 Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 ), and suggests we apply the Chapman standard to determine whether the instruction was prejudicial.

2026(See, e.g., People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735 , 746 (Cooper).) Harmless Error Standard “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears 8 beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207, quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) To prove harmless error under the Chapman standard, “it

2026(See, e.g., People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735 , 746 (Cooper).) Harmless Error Standard “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears 8 beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207, quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504 .) To prove harmless error under the Chapman standard, “it

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2025That is to say, the issue is ‘whether the . . . verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” 6 (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 .) “Another way to phrase the Chapman test is this: ‘ “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1109 .) B.

2026If the error is one that violated Williams’s federal constitutional rights, then harm is assessed under the Chapman standard,10 which asks whether the error was “ ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942 ).

2026If the error is one that violated Williams’s federal constitutional rights, then harm is assessed under the Chapman standard,10 which asks whether the error was “ ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942 ).

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 768.) Lynch further stated that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence” ’ ” how “ ‘ “the jury would have assessed the facts,” ’ ” because “ “ ‘[m]any of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the fact

2026If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Id. at p. 768.) Lynch further stated that, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence” ’ ” how “ ‘ “the jury would have assessed the facts,” ’ ” because “ “ ‘[m]any of the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the fact

2023(Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 350 .) “[A] reviewing court applying the Chapman standard to determine the prejudicial effect of the erroneous omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction should evaluate the record as a whole—but not rely upon its view of the overwhelming weight of the evidence supporting the verdict—to assess how the trial court’s failure to satisfy its constitutional obligation to instruct on the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt affected the jury’s determination of guilt.

2023(Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 350 .) “[A] reviewing court applying the Chapman standard to determine the prejudicial effect of the erroneous omission of the standard reasonable doubt instruction should evaluate the record as a whole—but not rely upon its view of the overwhelming weight of the evidence supporting the verdict—to assess how the trial court’s failure to satisfy its constitutional obligation to instruct on the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt affected the jury’s determination of guilt.