6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pollardgreen1 sentence2016Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88 (Ind.2016). [18] Our Supreme Court addressed the retroactive application of a similar statute, the residency-restriction statute, in State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1152 (Ind.2009). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKune v. Lile
green
2 sentences2014Instead she believed that the text of the Fifth Amendment itself provided the framework for analysis: “whether the pressure imposed in such situations rises to a level where it is likely to ‘compe[l]’ a person ‘to be a witness against himself.’ ” Id. at 49 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. 2014Instead she believed that the text of the Fifth Amendment itself provided the framework for analysis: “whether the pressure imposed in such situations rises to a level where it is likely to ‘compe[l]’ a person ‘to be a witness against himself.’ ” Id. at 49 , 122 S.Ct. 2017 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2016Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . 2016Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sidney Lamour Tyson v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2016Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88 (Ind.2016). [18] Our Supreme Court addressed the retroactive application of a similar statute, the residency-restriction statute, in State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1152 (Ind.2009). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Curry v. Orwig
green
2 sentences2015In Curry , our Court of Appeals provided the framework for our analysis by recognizing a “spectrum” of claims that do (or don’t) permit a lis pendens filing. 429 N.E.2d at 273 . 2015On one end of the spectrum are pure, in rem property interests, and. on the other end, in personam interests: “[T]he clearest examples[ ] of a proper lis pendens notice occur in situations where the plaintiff is asserting a claim to the title of real estate under an unrecorded deed or attempting to foreclose an unrecorded mortgage.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Campbell Soup Co. v. Lojeski
green
1 sentence1982According to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, official comment 1: “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract ... the principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 , 3d Cir. 1948) and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.” *951 The two evils addressed in I.C. 2 | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.