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10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tardiff v. State Bargreen2 sentences2016See Tardiff v. State Bar, 27 Cal.3d 395 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 612 P.2d 919, 923 (1980) (considering a petitioner's character in light of the moral shortcomings that resulted in the imposition of discipline). . 2016See Tardiff v. State Bar, 27 Cal.3d 395 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 612 P.2d 919, 923 (1980) (considering a petitioner's character in light of the moral shortcomings that resulted in the imposition of discipline). . | 1 | 1 |
Application of Churchgreen1 sentence2012The general rule provides that "[a] separate cause of action arises on each installment, and the statute of limitations runs separately against each." 31 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79:17 (4th ed. updated 2011); see also In re Church, 833 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Colo App.1992); Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 208-09 , 118 S.Ct 542 , 189 LEd.2d 553 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Lunsford v. Western States Life Insurancegreen1 sentence2004Highlighting the existence of statutory premises Hability exceptions for baseball park owners, 16 the court of appeals further declared: "it is apparent that, had the General Assembly wished to provide an exemption from civil liability for other spectator sports or activities, it could have done so." Id.; see also Lunsford, 908 P.2d at 84 ; cf. Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1219-21 (General Assembly did not intend to include common law "exclusive possession" requirement within premises lability statute's definition of "landowner"). 17 IV. | 1 | 1 |
Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc.green1 sentence2004Highlighting the existence of statutory premises Hability exceptions for baseball park owners, 16 the court of appeals further declared: "it is apparent that, had the General Assembly wished to provide an exemption from civil liability for other spectator sports or activities, it could have done so." Id.; see also Lunsford, 908 P.2d at 84 ; cf. Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1219-21 (General Assembly did not intend to include common law "exclusive possession" requirement within premises lability statute's definition of "landowner"). 17 IV. | 1 | 1 |
Wimberly v. Ettenberggreen2 sentences1997See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977) (setting forth Colorado’s general standing criteria). 1997See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977) (setting forth Colorado’s general standing criteria). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of California, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012The general rule provides that "[a] separate cause of action arises on each installment, and the statute of limitations runs separately against each." 31 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79:17 (4th ed. updated 2011); see also In re Church, 833 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Colo App.1992); Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 208-09 , 118 S.Ct 542 , 189 LEd.2d 553 (1997). 2012The general rule provides that "[a] separate cause of action arises on each installment, and the statute of limitations runs separately against each." 31 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 79:17 (4th ed. updated 2011); see also In re Church, 833 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Colo App.1992); Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 208-09 , 118 S.Ct 542 , 189 LEd.2d 553 (1997). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000Cf. Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70 (Colo.1998) (abrogation of a common law right of action will not be inferred absent clear legislative intent). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
City of Northglenn v. Eltrich
neutral
1 sentence1998City of Northglenn v. Eltrich, 908 P.2d 139 (Colo.App.1995), aff'd sub nom. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Perreira v. State
green
1 sentence1993In Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.1989), our supreme court recognized that this statutory scheme for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons is calculated (1) to provide care and treatment adequately suited to the needs of patients in a dignified and least restrictive manner and (2) to ensure against premature release of patients when that release would pose a likely risk of serious bodily harm to the patient or others as result of the patient’s mental condition. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v. Tosco Corp.
green
1 sentence1992To conclude the framework for our analysis, we note that whether the relevant act or acts were sufficiently overt is a “mixed question of law and fact, the resolution of which must be made by the court through the application of a legal standard to the particular facts of the case.” Bar 70, 703 P.2d at 1306 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Dement
red
1 sentence1991II, § 16, confrontation challenges in People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
City of Aurora ex rel. People v. Rhodes
green
1 sentence1988In adopting this construction, the decision stressed the “somewhat unique characteristics of municipal court jurisdiction.” Id. 9 Viewed in the framework of our analysis today, the creation of municipal courts with jurisdiction over territory in more than one county implicitly included the intention that juries be selected from the entire area within the municipal boundaries, i.e., that area was designated a “district” as that term is used in Article II, Section 16. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.