framework analysis in Connecticut

2014The framework for our analysis of this appeal is found in Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381 , 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). ‘‘[W]e conclude that the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the two actions are: (1) exactly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction; (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudi- cate the same underlying rights of the parties, but per- haps seeking different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine’s application.

2014The framework for our analysis of this appeal is found in Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381 , 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). ‘‘[W]e conclude that the trial court must determine in the first instance whether the two actions are: (1) exactly alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction; (2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudi- cate the same underlying rights of the parties, but per- haps seeking different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to warrant the doctrine’s application.

2015In Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 819 , 59 P.3d 463 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the general framework of Teague but reserved its prerogative ‘‘to define and determine within this framework whether a rule is new and whether it falls within the two exceptions to nonretroactivity . . . .’’ The court defined the criteria for determining whether a rule is new as whether the rule ‘‘[1] overrules precedent, or [2] disapprove[s] a practice [the] [c]ourt had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or [3] overturns a longstanding practice that lower courts had uniformly approved.’’ (Footnote o

2015In Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 819 , 59 P.3d 463 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the general framework of Teague but reserved its prerogative ‘‘to define and determine within this framework whether a rule is new and whether it falls within the two exceptions to nonretroactivity . . . .’’ The court defined the criteria for determining whether a rule is new as whether the rule ‘‘[1] overrules precedent, or [2] disapprove[s] a practice [the] [c]ourt had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or [3] overturns a longstanding practice that lower courts had uniformly approved.’’ (Footnote o

2006Our Supreme Court’s decision in Tedesco v. Stamford, supra, 222 Conn. 233 , provides the framework for our analysis.

2003Applying the framework for the analysis of state constitutional claims set forth in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), the majority then rejects the defendant’s constitutional claim, largely on the basis of its conclusion that, as a general jurisprudential principle, “the reasonable doubt standard focuses on the jury’s subjective sense of certitude in arriving at the critical finding or judgment, not on the quantum or degree by which one factor out weighs another.” Rephrasing this conclusion, the majority states that the reasonable doubt standard “is simply inapt t

2003Applying the framework for the analysis of state constitutional claims set forth in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86 , 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), the majority then rejects the defendant’s constitutional claim, largely on the basis of its conclusion that, as a general jurisprudential principle, “the reasonable doubt standard focuses on the jury’s subjective sense of certitude in arriving at the critical finding or judgment, not on the quantum or degree by which one factor out weighs another.” Rephrasing this conclusion, the majority states that the reasonable doubt standard “is simply inapt t

1985Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984). 14 In searching for an appropriate and workable standard that is consistent with the mandate of Horton I, we may fruitfully borrow a framework of analysis that federal courts have devised to assess the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment plans.

1985Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984). 14 In searching for an appropriate and workable standard that is consistent with the mandate of Horton I, we may fruitfully borrow a framework of analysis that federal courts have devised to assess the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment plans.

1985The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that the equal protection clause, in that context, although it requires “strict scrutiny [of] classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections”; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 , 102 S. Ct. 2382 , 72 L.

1985The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged that the equal protection clause, in that context, although it requires “strict scrutiny [of] classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections”; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 , 102 S. Ct. 2382 , 72 L.

1982The trial court, inter alia, charged in substance that the jury must find that all or part of a surgical needle was left in the plaintiff during surgery at the hospital on May 18, 1967 and that the defendants had actual knowledge of this fact on or before May 21, 1970 and that the defendants having such knowledge did not inform the plaintiff of such information for the purpose of keeping her ignorant so that she would not sue them. 3 “The true test for the admissibility of expert testimony is ‘whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the

1982The trial court, inter alia, charged in substance that the jury must find that all or part of a surgical needle was left in the plaintiff during surgery at the hospital on May 18, 1967 and that the defendants had actual knowledge of this fact on or before May 21, 1970 and that the defendants having such knowledge did not inform the plaintiff of such information for the purpose of keeping her ignorant so that she would not sue them. 3 “The true test for the admissibility of expert testimony is ‘whether the witnesses offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not common to the