framework analysis in Maryland

2026In Moran, 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d at 20 , a products liability case alleging a negligent failure to warn claim, we described the framework for the analysis of negligent failure to warn cases: Based on this negligence law we think that in the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when the manufacturer’s product comes near to or in contact with the elements which are present no

2026In Moran, 273 Md. at 552 , 332 A.2d at 20 , a products liability case alleging a negligent failure to warn claim, we described the framework for the analysis of negligent failure to warn cases: Based on this negligence law we think that in the products liability domain a duty to warn is imposed on a manufacturer if the item it produces has an inherent and hidden danger about which the producer knows, or should know, could be a substantial factor in bringing injury to an individual or his property when the manufacturer’s product comes near to or in contact with the elements which are present no

2020In establishing the framework for its analysis, the Court in Potts explained that in Sawyer it had set forth “a two-pronged ‘general test’ for whether an employee acted within the scope of employment.” Potts, 468 Md. at 271 .

2020“The first prong of the Sawyer test is whether the employee’s actions ‘were in furtherance of the employer’s business[,]’ and the second prong is whether the employer ‘authorized’ the employee’s actions.” Id. (quoting Sawyer, 322 Md. at 255 ). “[A]n employee’s actions are outside the scope of employment where they are ‘personal, [ ] where they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the employer’s business, or where the employee is acting to protect [the employee’s] own interests, even if during normal duty hours and at an authorized locality.’”19 Id. at 290 (quoting Sawyer, 322 M

2020“The first prong of the Sawyer test is whether the employee’s actions ‘were in furtherance of the employer’s business[,]’ and the second prong is whether the employer ‘authorized’ the employee’s actions.” Id. (quoting Sawyer, 322 Md. at 255 ). “[A]n employee’s actions are outside the scope of employment where they are ‘personal, [ ] where they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the employer’s business, or where the employee is acting to protect [the employee’s] own interests, even if during normal duty hours and at an authorized locality.’”19 Id. at 290 (quoting Sawyer, 322 M

2020“The first prong of the Sawyer test is whether the employee’s actions ‘were in furtherance of the employer’s business[,]’ and the second prong is whether the employer ‘authorized’ the employee’s actions.” Id. (quoting Sawyer, 322 Md. at 255 ). “[A]n employee’s actions are outside the scope of employment where they are ‘personal, [ ] where they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the employer’s business, or where the employee is acting to protect [the employee’s] own interests, even if during normal duty hours and at an authorized locality.’”19 Id. at 290 (quoting Sawyer, 322 M

2015Id. 6 May died in April 2014. 4 DISCUSSION In Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476 , 491–94, 158 A.2d 110 , 118–19 (1960), we first recognized that a duty to warn can form the basis of a products liability action, and further developed the framework for this claim in Moran v. Fabergé, Inc., 273 Md. 538 , 332 A.2d 11 (1975).

2015Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739-40 , 955 A.2d at 779-80 ; 'see generally David G.

2015Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739-40 , 955 A.2d at 779-80 ; 'see generally David G.

2014In Bartholomee, supra, we stated “[w]here the conduct of a defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the suffering of an injury, such conduct will be deemed to have caused the injury.” 103 Md.App. at 56 , 651 A.2d 908 .

2014In Bartholomee, supra, we stated “[w]here the conduct of a defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the suffering of an injury, such conduct will be deemed to have caused the injury.” 103 Md.App. at 56 , 651 A.2d 908 .

2013In three of those decisions, Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466 , Knight v. Nottingham Farms, Inc., 207 Md. 65 , 113 A.2d 382 (1955), and Feldman v. Feldman, 234 Md. 173 , 198 A.2d 257 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that trustees or other fiduciaries had failed to act “prudently” in the sale of trust or estate property.

2013In three of those decisions, Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466 , Knight v. Nottingham Farms, Inc., 207 Md. 65 , 113 A.2d 382 (1955), and Feldman v. Feldman, 234 Md. 173 , 198 A.2d 257 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that trustees or other fiduciaries had failed to act “prudently” in the sale of trust or estate property.

2013In three of those decisions, Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466 , Knight v. Nottingham Farms, Inc., 207 Md. 65 , 113 A.2d 382 (1955), and Feldman v. Feldman, 234 Md. 173 , 198 A.2d 257 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that trustees or other fiduciaries had failed to act “prudently” in the sale of trust or estate property.

2013In three of those decisions, Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466 , Knight v. Nottingham Farms, Inc., 207 Md. 65 , 113 A.2d 382 (1955), and Feldman v. Feldman, 234 Md. 173 , 198 A.2d 257 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that trustees or other fiduciaries had failed to act “prudently” in the sale of trust or estate property.

2013In three of those decisions, Gould v. Chappell, 42 Md. 466 , Knight v. Nottingham Farms, Inc., 207 Md. 65 , 113 A.2d 382 (1955), and Feldman v. Feldman, 234 Md. 173 , 198 A.2d 257 (1964), the Court of Appeals held that trustees or other fiduciaries had failed to act “prudently” in the sale of trust or estate property.

2010Taylor was lying on the floor of a hotel room in Ocean City, Maryland, with his head turned away from the door (apparently asleep or feigning sleep) when police officers entered the hotel room that Taylor and several other individuals rented. 346 Md. at 454-55 , 697 A.2d at 463-64 .

2010Taylor was lying on the floor of a hotel room in Ocean City, Maryland, with his head turned away from the door (apparently asleep or feigning sleep) when police officers entered the hotel room that Taylor and several other individuals rented. 346 Md. at 454-55 , 697 A.2d at 463-64 .

2010Brye, 410 Md. 623 , 980 A.2d 435 , is useful in providing a framework for our analysis.

2010Brye, 410 Md. 623 , 980 A.2d 435 , is useful in providing a framework for our analysis.

1987We find nothing in Virginia Dare [Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287 , 1 A.2d 897 (1938)] or its *746 progeny to support such a sweeping assertion and we reject it.” The commercial or arm’s length nature of the transaction and negotiations is no doubt relevant to whether the plaintiff was justified in relying on the defendant’s statements, but it does not suffice to withdraw the transaction from the scope of the tort.

1987We find nothing in Virginia Dare [Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287 , 1 A.2d 897 (1938)] or its *746 progeny to support such a sweeping assertion and we reject it.” The commercial or arm’s length nature of the transaction and negotiations is no doubt relevant to whether the plaintiff was justified in relying on the defendant’s statements, but it does not suffice to withdraw the transaction from the scope of the tort.

1987One is based on a theory of law that was flatly rejected by the Court of Appeals. *745 The principal elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation were succinctly summarized in Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, supra, 292 Md. 328, 337 , 439 A.2d 534 , as follows: “(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false statement; (2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; (4) the plaintiff, j

1987One is based on a theory of law that was flatly rejected by the Court of Appeals. *745 The principal elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation were succinctly summarized in Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, supra, 292 Md. 328, 337 , 439 A.2d 534 , as follows: “(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false statement; (2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; (4) the plaintiff, j

1979As Judge Digges pointed out for the *685 Court in James, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have proved the essential elements of his action, including damages which must exist before the action accrues so as to trigger the running of the statute. 279 Md. at 44 . 3 Operative within this framework is the principle that courts strive to ascertain the legislative intention in adopting a limitations statute, and to apply the statute as the legislature intended that it be applied in determining the accrual date of the various causes of action.

1979See Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 93 , 253 A. 2d 904 (1969); McMahon v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155 , 40 A. 2d 313 (1945).

1979See Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 93 , 253 A. 2d 904 (1969); McMahon v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155 , 40 A. 2d 313 (1945).