right to counsel rule in California

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

2024However, although appellate courts have discretion to review a forfeited claim, particularly when the claim involves an important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7 (Sheena K.)), the California Supreme Court has made clear that “there is no constitutional basis for a work product privilege.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 381, fn. 18 [“find[ing] untenable the proposition that the work product doctrine, created by the Supreme Court in a civil case, is in actuality founded in the right to counsel clause applicab

2024However, although appellate courts have discretion to review a forfeited claim, particularly when the claim involves an important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7 (Sheena K.)), the California Supreme Court has made clear that “there is no constitutional basis for a work product privilege.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 381, fn. 18 [“find[ing] untenable the proposition that the work product doctrine, created by the Supreme Court in a civil case, is in actuality founded in the right to counsel clause applicab

1991The doctrine developed in Hickman , and applied in the context of discovery in criminal cases in Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. 225 , is not based on the right to counsel clause; rather, it is "a form of federally created privilege" based on federal supervisory policy and federal statute. ( Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 399-401 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ] [ Greyhound; Hickman work product privilege did not exist in California].) There is no privilege for attorney work product in the California Constitution.

1991The doctrine developed in Hickman , and applied in the context of discovery in criminal cases in Nobles, supra, 422 U.S. 225 , is not based on the right to counsel clause; rather, it is "a form of federally created privilege" based on federal supervisory policy and federal statute. ( Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 399-401 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ] [ Greyhound; Hickman work product privilege did not exist in California].) There is no privilege for attorney work product in the California Constitution.

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

1974(See Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 16 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 ]; McCarthy v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 418 , 89 S.Ct. 1166 ]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In Halliday these criteria were summarized as follows: “(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice.” (Halliday v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 831, 832 [ 23 L.Ed.

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 199, fn. 2 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; People v. Douglas, 259 Cal.App.2d 694, 697 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 492 ] .) 4 Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293 , a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that although the petitioner could not avail himself of the right to counsel rule of United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218 , and Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. 263 , since the rule was not retroactive, he would nevertheless be entitled to relief if he could “allege and prove” that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepa

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.

1971(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 ]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ].) 4 As noted in People v. Douglas, supra, 259 CalApp.2d 694, 696-697, before Stovall the rule was that “The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility.” (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; in accord People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 804-805 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ].) 5 It appears that the bank teller also attended other lineups.