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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sollars v. Cullygreen2 sentences2011Discussion “We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion, unless the matter involves the application of a legal principle, in which case our review is de novo.” Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148, 1157 (D.C.2010) (citing Sollars v. Cully, 904 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.2006)). 2010Sollars v. Cully, 904 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.2006). | 2 | 2 |
Upson v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2011Discussion “We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion, unless the matter involves the application of a legal principle, in which case our review is de novo.” Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148, 1157 (D.C.2010) (citing Sollars v. Cully, 904 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Slaughter v. Slaughtergreen1 sentence2006Although we generally review child support orders for abuse of discretion, see Slaughter v. Slaughter, 867 A.2d 976, 977 (D.C.2005), this case involves the application of a legal principle and so our review is de novo. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Townsend v. Sain
red
2 sentences1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. 1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Felder
green
2 sentences1989There is no one standard of review that is uniformly applied to “mixed ques *36 tions.” Rather, mixed questions are “assigned, sometimes clumsily, either to the ‘clearly erroneous’ or to the ‘de novo’ category, depending, ostensibly, on whether the reviewing court regards the matter as more closely resembling a question of fact or a question of law.” Felder, supra, 548 A.2d at 61 . 1989There is no one standard of review that is uniformly applied to “mixed ques *36 tions.” Rather, mixed questions are “assigned, sometimes clumsily, either to the ‘clearly erroneous’ or to the ‘de novo’ category, depending, ostensibly, on whether the reviewing court regards the matter as more closely resembling a question of fact or a question of law.” Felder, supra, 548 A.2d at 61 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Pullman-Standard v. Swint
green
2 sentences1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. 1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. 1989A “mixed question” of law and fact exists where “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard ... [or] whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1790 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (analysis applied to mixed questions of law and fact require the “application of legal principles to the historical facts. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Donald Kenneth Currens
green
1 sentence1976Cf. United States v. Currens, supra, 290 F.2d at 772-74 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.