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32 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re IWgreen2 sentences2026A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the qu 2026A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the q | 5 | 13 |
Lacy v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences2011Appeals Bd. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1134 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 566 ] [‘In the allocation of adjudicative functions the application of a legal principle or rule to undisputed facts is said to be a question of law for the appellate courts’].)” (Stermer v. Board of Dental Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 ].) The City counters that the substantial evidence standard, not independent review, applies to the trial court’s determination that Ferguson’s former attorney, Sergi, was authorized to repudiate the separation agreement on behalf of Ferguson. 2011Appeals Bd. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1134 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 566 ] [‘In the allocation of adjudicative functions the application of a legal principle or rule to undisputed facts is said to be a question of law for the appellate courts’].)” (Stermer v. Board of Dental Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 ].) The City counters that the substantial evidence standard, not independent review, applies to the trial court’s determination that Ferguson’s former attorney, Sergi, was authorized to repudiate the separation agreement on behalf of Ferguson. | 2 | 3 |
cluster 441648green2 sentences2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w 2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w | 2 | 2 |
Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co.green2 sentences2015(Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 ; accord, De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952) 39 Cal.2d 858, 863 [“in contract law a material breach excuses further performance by the innocent party”]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1602 [same].) “Normally the question of whether a breach of an obligation is a material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party, is a question of fact.” (Brown, at p. 277; see Plotnik, at pp. 1602-1603; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [“Ordinarily the issue of materia 2011Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 601 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 ] [“Whether a breach is so material as to constitute cause for the injured party to terminate a contract is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.”]; Wyler v. Feuer, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 404 ; BAJI No. 10.82 (Spring 2010 ed.) p. 685; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 449 ] [“Ordinarily the issue of materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, involving the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts. | 2 | 2 |
Townsend v. Sainred2 sentences2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L 2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L | 2 | 2 |
Pullman-Standard v. Swintgreen2 sentences2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L 2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L | 2 | 2 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L 2001Mixed questions are those in which the "`historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'" ( Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 , quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint (1982) 456 U.S. 273, 289, fn. 19 , 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 ; see also Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 309, fn. 6 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L | 1 | 2 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Lydia O.green1 sentence2024A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) Since mother bears the burden of establishing that the beneficial parent-child exception applies, a juvenile court’s findings that visitation has not been regular or that the relationship is not beneficial may be reversed only if the juvenile court applied the 12. wrong legal standard and the evidence would support a finding for the parent (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 , 865; In re J.R. (20 | 1 | 1 |
De Burgh v. De Burghgreen1 sentence2015(Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 ; accord, De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952) 39 Cal.2d 858, 863 [“in contract law a material breach excuses further performance by the innocent party”]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1602 [same].) “Normally the question of whether a breach of an obligation is a material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party, is a question of fact.” (Brown, at p. 277; see Plotnik, at pp. 1602-1603; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [“Ordinarily the issue of materia | 1 | 1 |
Plotnik v. Meihausgreen1 sentence2015(Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 ; accord, De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952) 39 Cal.2d 858, 863 [“in contract law a material breach excuses further performance by the innocent party”]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1602 [same].) “Normally the question of whether a breach of an obligation is a material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party, is a question of fact.” (Brown, at p. 277; see Plotnik, at pp. 1602-1603; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [“Ordinarily the issue of materia | 1 | 1 |
Quiroz v. Seventh Avenue Centergreen1 sentence2015Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1282 (Quiroz).) However, the question whether the allegations in the amended pleading relate back to the original pleading requires the application of a legal doctrine to undisputed facts, rather than the exercise of discretionary judgment by the trial court, and we therefore review the trial court’s decision de novo. | 1 | 1 |
| Whitney Investment Co. v. Westview Development Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Kazensky v. City of Mercedgreen2 sentences2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. 2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. | 1 | 1 |
Stermer v. Board of Dental Examinersgreen2 sentences2011Appeals Bd. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1134 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 566 ] [‘In the allocation of adjudicative functions the application of a legal principle or rule to undisputed facts is said to be a question of law for the appellate courts’].)” (Stermer v. Board of Dental Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 ].) The City counters that the substantial evidence standard, not independent review, applies to the trial court’s determination that Ferguson’s former attorney, Sergi, was authorized to repudiate the separation agreement on behalf of Ferguson. 2011Appeals Bd. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1134 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 566 ] [‘In the allocation of adjudicative functions the application of a legal principle or rule to undisputed facts is said to be a question of law for the appellate courts’].)” (Stermer v. Board of Dental Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 294 ].) The City counters that the substantial evidence standard, not independent review, applies to the trial court’s determination that Ferguson’s former attorney, Sergi, was authorized to repudiate the separation agreement on behalf of Ferguson. | 1 | 1 |
Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakesgreen2 sentences2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. 2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. | 1 | 1 |
County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agencygreen2 sentences2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. 2011(Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435, 462-463 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ]; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 ]; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 356 ].) The City also disputes that Ferguson can introduce a new issue on appeal regarding whether he could successfully retract Sergi’s repudiation of the separation agreement, made on Ferguson’s behalf. | 1 | 1 |
Sackett v. Spindlergreen2 sentences2011However, if reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of materiality, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.”]; 23 Williston, supra, § 63:3, p. 440 [“The determination whether a material breach has occurred is generally a question of fact.” (fn. omitted)].) Whether a partial breach of a contract is material depends on “the importance or seriousness thereof and the probability of the injured party getting substantial performance.” (1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 852, pp. 938-940; see also Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1051 ; Sackett v. Spi 2011However, if reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of materiality, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.”]; 23 Williston, supra, § 63:3, p. 440 [“The determination whether a material breach has occurred is generally a question of fact.” (fn. omitted)].) Whether a partial breach of a contract is material depends on “the importance or seriousness thereof and the probability of the injured party getting substantial performance.” (1 Witkin, supra, Contracts, § 852, pp. 938-940; see also Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1051 ; Sackett v. Spi | 1 | 1 |
| Lynch v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Parsons v. Bristol Development Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Yakov v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brumley v. FDCC CALIFORNIA, INC.
green
2 sentences2023(Brumley v. FDCC California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 312, 318 .) We conclude the proposed addition of appellant to the previously filed claim for breach of contract relates back to the original cross-complaint. 2021(See e.g., Brumley v. FDCC California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 312, 318 .) We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusions as reflected in its rulings. | 3 | 2015–2023 |
People v. George T.
green
2 sentences2022A court abuses its discretion only when “‘“the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” [Citation.] But “‘“[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court”’” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination 15. under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.’ ([In re] Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “Revie 2022A court abuses its discretion only when “‘“the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” [Citation.] But “ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court”’” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.’ ([In re] Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “Review of | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Vivar
green
2 sentences2022A court abuses its discretion only when “‘“the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” [Citation.] But “‘“[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court”’” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination 15. under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.’ ([In re] Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “Revie 2022A court abuses its discretion only when “‘“the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” [Citation.] But “ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court”’” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.’ ([In re] Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) “Review of | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Henry James HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee
green
2 sentences2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w 2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w | 2 | 2022–2022 |
cluster 475237
green
2 sentences2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w 2022(Ibid.; accord Holsey v. Armour & Co. (4th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2d 199 , 211; Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc. (11th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1529 , 1532‒1534.) “ ‘The conclusion that a delay is “inexcusable” comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case.’ ” (Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 69 , 77.) While “plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings w | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Timeless Investments, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Cal. 2010) 734 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1067 .) Ross argues laches does not apply here because under California law, laches is a defense only to equitable, not legal, claims, and in this lawsuit, she is seeking only monetary damages. 2022Cal. 2010) 734 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1067 .) Ross argues laches does not apply here because under California law, laches is a defense only to equitable, not legal, claims, and in this lawsuit, she is seeking only monetary damages. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Thompson v. Keohane
green
2 sentences2001In its 1995-1996 term, the United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard for review of mixed question determinations in two cases in which the mixed question went to the heart of a federal constitutional right: Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 ( Thompson ) (involving the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination), and Ornelas v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 ( Ornelas ) (involving the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures). 2001In its 1995-1996 term, the United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard for review of mixed question determinations in two cases in which the mixed question went to the heart of a federal constitutional right: Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 ( Thompson ) (involving the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination), and Ornelas v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 ( Ornelas ) (involving the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Amber G.
green
1 sentence2025(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636, 639‒641; In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 .) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if … supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Caden C., at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Christina N.
green
1 sentence2024(Ibid.) When reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 .)” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
1 sentence2023Though leave to amend a complaint is “ ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242 ), the situation here calls for the application of a legal doctrine to undisputed facts, so we will undertake a de novo review. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Stephanie M.
green
1 sentence2022“Review for abuse of discretion is . . . focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) A court abuses its discretion when it makes an “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination,’ ” i.e., where it “ ‘exceed[s] the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 .) 17 To base a finding on an irrelevant factor exceeds the bounds of reason. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2015(See, e.g., Brumley v. FDCC California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 312, 318 ; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1549 ; Tamburina v. Combined Ins. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Grimes
green
1 sentence2015(Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 ; accord, De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952) 39 Cal.2d 858, 863 [“in contract law a material breach excuses further performance by the innocent party”]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1602 [same].) “Normally the question of whether a breach of an obligation is a material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party, is a question of fact.” (Brown, at p. 277; see Plotnik, at pp. 1602-1603; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [“Ordinarily the issue of materia | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wyler v. Feuer
green
1 sentence2011Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 601 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 ] [“Whether a breach is so material as to constitute cause for the injured party to terminate a contract is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.”]; Wyler v. Feuer, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 404 ; BAJI No. 10.82 (Spring 2010 ed.) p. 685; see also Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1526-1527 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 449 ] [“Ordinarily the issue of materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, involving the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.