45 C.F.R. § 84.3

Relationship to other laws

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This part does not invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any other Federal laws, or State or local laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities, or individuals associated with them.

[89 FR 40180, May 9, 2024]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 414 cases (28 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case: Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).

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Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). · cites it 10× “" 45 CFR § 84.3 (j)(2)(i) (1997). *633 In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive.”

Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). · cites it 8× “" 45 CFR § 84.3 (j)(2)(i) (1985). In addition, the regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”

Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). · cites it 6× “The plaintiff has not cross-appealed from this determination, so we leave to one side eases which, unlike this one, arguably come within the purview of 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(iv)(B). It is noteworthy that section 504’s perceived disability model can be satisfied whether or not…”

Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2008). · cites it 4× “Thus, although "record of" disability claims will often involve tangible documents of some kind, such as medical reports or employment forms detailing a previous medical condition, plaintiffs may satisfy the "record of" definition simply by showing that they "ha[ve] a history…”

Lyle S. Chandler & Adolphus A. Maddox, on Behalf of Themselves & Others Similarly Situated v. The City of Dallas, the City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993). · cites it 3× “45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i) (1992). 14 . 45 C.”

John A. Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997). · cites it 4× “See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i). 2 In *284 addition, according to EEOC interpretive guidance to the ADA regulations, [i]t is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic characteristics that are…”

Donna Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994). · cites it 3× “” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(ii) (1989); see also 28 C.”

Paul A. Wojewski, M.D., Sara Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l Hosp., Inc. Charles Hart, M.D. Robert Glenn Allen, Jr., M.D., 450 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “2d at 771 (citing 45 CFR § 84.3 (1)). 3 The district court interpreted Beauford as defining “a qualified individual with a disability” as an “employee.”

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “2 remains unclear, we give weight to the federal regulations defining “disability” under the pre-ADA Rehabilitation Act of 1973 such as 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 . Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.”

Kelly v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378 (E.D.N.Y 2016). · cites it 2× “emotional or mental illness” qualifies as a physical or mental impairment, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i)(B); see also 29 C.”

United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, Parents of Baby Jane Doe, Intervenors-Defendants-Appellees, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). · cites it 4× “While there can be no question that Baby Jane Doe currently suffers from “physical or mental impairments”, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i), it is less clear whether these impairments substantially limit “major life activities”.”

Marilie Hileman v. City of Dallas, Texas, 115 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 1997). · cites it 5× “” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(iii) (1992). 3 An individual is “regarded” as having an impairment if he (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity, but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (2) has a…”

Show all 414 citing cases →

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) — 1 case

Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) — 3 cases

Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1990).

Peter N. Tolliver, Leon A. Wiater, Helen A. Fordham, Donald Schaefer, Walter L. Pidek, James Carroll, Lawrence L. Travis, William Brant, James Dammen, Charles Dolcimascolo, John L. Bennett, Joseph G. Golossi, Harold Siebert, Alfred E. Rizzari, Alfonse Oliveri, Paul J. Mittak, & Richard B. Van Maaren v. Xerox Corp., a New York Corp., Paul F. Braun v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1990).

Mills v. v. Indiana Medicaid (S.D. Ind. 2022).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) — 4 cases

Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978).

Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc., 432 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. 1982).

Schultz v. YMCA of USA (1st Cir. 1998).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) — 2 cases

Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “Thus, although "record of" disability claims will often involve tangible documents of some kind, such as medical reports or employment forms detailing a previous medical condition, plaintiffs may satisfy the "record of" definition simply by showing that they "ha[ve] a history…”

Rodgers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) — 11 cases

David W. Mahon v. Craven Crowell Johnny H. Hayes William H. Kennoy Skila Harris Glenn L. McCullough Jr., 295 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2002).

Barnes v. Nw. Iowa Health Ctr., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Iowa 2002).

State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Hennepin Cnty., 441 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 1989).

Misek-Falkoff v. Int'l Bus. MacHines Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

Maglietti v. Nicholson, 517 F. Supp. 2d 624 (D. Conn. 2007).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) — 3 cases

Walker v. Aberdeen-Monroe Cnty. Hosp., 838 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Miss. 1993).

Mendez v. Gearan, 956 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

Cook v. State of RI (1st Cir. 1993).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(A) — 1 case

Cook v. State of RI (1st Cir. 1993).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv)(B) — 2 cases

Cook v. State of RI (1st Cir. 1993).

Application of Section 504 of the Rehab. Act to HIV-Infected Individuals (OLC 1988).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) — 4 cases

United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, Parents of Baby Jane Doe, Intervenors-Defendants-Appellees, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). “While there can be no question that Baby Jane Doe currently suffers from “physical or mental impairments”, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i), it is less clear whether these impairments substantially limit “major life activities”.”

Coffman v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1988).

Misek-Falkoff v. Int'l Bus. MacHines Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

Bissell v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 521 (D. Maryland 1999).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) — 1 case

Crawford v. Univ. of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).

— 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(l) — 1 case

Carr v. Gen. Motors Corp., 389 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1986).

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