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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 22a — Environmental ProtectionChapter 439 — Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. State Policy

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-16 (2025)

Action for declaratory and equitable relief against unreasonable pollution

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laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1974–2025 103citing cases
The Attorney General, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is located, resides or conducts business, except that where the state is the defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district of Hartford, for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction provided no such action shall be maintained against the state for pollution of real property acquired by the state under subsection (e) of section 22a-133m, where the spill or discharge which caused the pollution occurred prior to the acquisition of the property by the state.

(1971, P.A. 96, S. 3; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 6, 127; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; 93-428, S. 31, 39; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county” and “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” for “Hartford county”; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 93-428 provided that no action could be maintained under this section for certain properties acquired by the state pursuant to Sec. 22a-133m, the urban sites remediation program, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.

Cited. 170 C. 47; 175 C. 483; 179 C. 541; 184 C. 51; 192 C. 247. Section did not provide plaintiffs with standing under any statute other than the Environmental Protection Act itself. Id., 591. Cited. 197 C. 134; 204 C. 38; Id., 212; 212 C. 710; Id., 727; 215 C. 474; 218 C. 580; 220 C. 54; 222 C. 98; Id., 280; 226 C. 205; Id., 579; 227 C. 175; 229 C. 479; 234 C. 488; 237 C. 135; 239 C. 786. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring action pursuant to section and litigate permitting claims that are governed by Sec. 22a-430 and are within exclusive domain of department. 254 C. 21. All that is required to invoke jurisdiction of Superior Court under section is a colorable claim by “any person” against “any person” of conduct resulting in harm to one or more natural resources of this state and in this case, plaintiff has standing under section but has not alleged factual allegations sufficient to support plaintiff's claims against defendant because section does not expand jurisdiction of the town agency to consider environmental matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction; plaintiff's claim against city based on a statutory duty is within scope of statute; plaintiff also has standing against permit applicant on grounds that its proposed demolition activities will result in unreasonable harm to state's natural resources. 262 C. 480. Plaintiff failed to establish statutory standing under section because plaintiff's complaint fell short of articulating a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment. 265 C. 423. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring action pursuant to section where the area in question is expressly placed within exclusive domain of commissioner. 267 C. 116. Trial court properly determined airport defendants should not be required to restore land to its original condition and properly determined amount of monetary penalties. 275 C. 105. Commissioner had standing to make claim that clear-cutting of trees by airport defendant constituted unreasonable pollution. Id., 161. Plaintiff made a colorable claim of unreasonable harm to the environment sufficient to establish standing to seek relief; action should have been brought in judicial district of Hartford, but plaintiff's failure to do so did not implicate trial court's subject matter jurisdiction; the case should be transferred to judicial district of Hartford. 282 C. 791. Section authorizes “any person” to bring an action for enforcement of provisions and plaintiffs had standing to bring action upon allegation that development had resulted in destruction of wetlands and was likely to cause irreparable harm to surrounding ecosystem and watercourses. 284 C. 268. Plaintiff has standing under section to claim that existing permit renewal process is inadequate to protect rights recognized by Environmental Protection Act. 291 C. 789. Plaintiff failed to establish standing under section because complaint re increased power generation at nuclear power station did not allege substantive violations giving rise to unreasonable pollution. 300 C. 542. Issuance of a renewal permit did not render present action moot because it did not resolve or terminate the controversies because the trial court could determine that the permit renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect against unreasonable pollution. 323 C. 668.

Cited. 4 CA 621; 30 CA 204; 40 CA 75; 41 CA 89; Id., 120. Wetlands constitute a natural resource of this state and the purpose for enacting section was to prevent their unreasonable “pollution, impairment or destruction”; plaintiff had standing to bring action pursuant to section where complaint alleged defendant developer's construction activities were unlawfully impairing or destroying wetlands because of failure to follow procedures established by Sec. 22a-42a(b) and inland wetland regulations. 49 CA 684. Section imposed a standard of care on defendants, the violation of which constituted negligence per se, because plaintiff, who alleged damage to his pond caused by erosion, turbidity and siltation from nonfunctioning erosion and sediment control measures, was within the class of persons protected by section and the alleged injury is of the type section intended to prevent. 122 CA 555. Plaintiff could not prevail on claim that trial court improperly relied on Sec. 26-92 governing wild birds as the standard for determining whether defendant's conduct was an unreasonable impairment because Sec. 26-92 addresses the parakeets by name, identifies when they are exempt from protections, governs the conduct in question and provides the standard by which the court is to judge the evidence. 124 CA 823. Although plaintiff does not facially challenge the validity of permit to run cooling system for nuclear power plant on environmental grounds, that is the essence of her claim, and the court properly concluded that plaintiff did not have standing to pursue her claim under the act. 129 CA 203. The mere allegation that defendant has failed to comply with a certain technical or procedural requirement of a statute imposing environmental standards does not, in and of itself, give rise to a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution under section. 140 CA 155.

Commissioner does not have right to act directly under statute to seek declaratory or equitable relief; he is limited under Inland Wetlands and Water Courses Act to promulgating regulations and appealing decisions of municipal commissions. 35 CS 145. Section is example of a legislative enactment of what has been described as expanding doctrine of “private attorney generals”, who are empowered to institute proceedings to vindicate the public interest; by utilizing this procedure, legislature expanded the number of potential guardians of the public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on limited resources of a particular agency. 48 CS 594. Plaintiff cannot claim standing under section on the basis that there are now and will be mandatory plans for the development of the property when the complaint sets forth no allegations of proposed or adopted plans for such future development. 51 CS 590.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-16 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENFort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 22a-16 97×cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC, has standing under General Statutes § 22a-16 1 to bring an action against the defendants to enjoin the demolition of thirty-nine buildings.”
The case’s holding
A person has standing under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act by alleging a colorable claim of harm to natural resources.
Later courts cite it for
“the primary difference between the granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the granting of a motion to strike is that only in the latter case does the plaintiff have the opportunity to amend its complaint” · 1 citing court
2
GREENConnecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque, 836 A.2d 414 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 22a-16 60×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“General Statutes § 22a-16. Second, any person or other entity, without first having to establish aggrievement, may intervene in any administrative proceeding challenging conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or…”
The case’s holding
Plaintiffs lack standing under the environmental protection act to bring claims directly in superior court when the alleged conduct involves a permitting claim governed by licensing statutes.
Later courts cite it for
“when the alleged conduct involves a permitting claim . . . there is no standing pursuant to 22a-16 to bring the claim directly in the superior court” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENCity of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 22a-16 32×cited by 132 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“*511 Waterbury brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that: (1) it has not breached a certain 1921 agreement between it and Washington; (2) it had not unreasonably polluted, impaired or destroyed the public trust, as provided in General Statutes § 22a-16; and (3)…”
The case’s holding
Whether conduct constitutes an unreasonable impairment under the environmental protection act depends on whether that conduct complies with the specific regulatory scheme governing it.
Later courts cite it for
“when there is an environmental legislative and regulatory scheme in place that specifically governs the conduct that the plaintiff claims constitutes an unreasonable impairment under the act, whether the conduct is unreasonable under the act will depend on whether it complies with that scheme” · 8 citing courts
4
GREENNizzardo v. State Traffic Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 22a-16 36×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“Writing for a unanimous court in Middletown , then Chief Justice Peters reasoned: “The [plaintiffs’] alternate claim of standing rests on [their] statutory claim under the [act], General Statutes § 22a-16. This statute permits any private party, including a municipality, to seek…”
The case’s holding
A party seeking to intervene in an administrative proceeding may only raise environmental concerns that fall within the specific jurisdictional authority of that agency.
Later courts cite it for
“only those environmental concerns that are within the jurisdiction of the particular administrative agency conducting the proceeding into which the party seeks to intervene.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENBurton v. Com'r of Env. Prot., 970 A.2d 640 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 22a-16 51×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The trial court treated the complaint as if it had been brought under General Statutes § 22a-16 2 and concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action under that provision.”
The case’s holding
The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act does not implicitly provide a private right of action independent of existing administrative and regulatory procedures.
6
GREENWindels v. Env't Prot. Comm'n, 933 A.2d 256 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 22a-16 33×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claim under General Statutes § 22a-16, 4 (2) there is no private cause of action under General Statutes § 22a-44 (b), 5 and…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's voluntary cessation of challenged activity does not render a case moot unless the defendant establishes that it does not intend to resume that activity.
Later courts cite it for
“a complaint does not sufficiently allege standing however by merely reciting the provisions of 22a-19, but must set forth facts to support an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource will probably result from the challenged activities unless remedial measures are taken.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 22a-16 39×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the implementation of a municipal development plan in the Fort Trumbull area of New London on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish standing to seek…”
The case’s holding
Statutory venue provisions are procedural rather than jurisdictional, and improper venue does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction but requires transfer of the case.
8
GREENVentres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 22a-16 23×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“1 The land trust defendants filed a cross claim against the airport defendants claiming, inter alia, that they had: (1) trespassed on their land and converted their trees; (2) violated General Statutes § 22a-16 of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act; 2 and (3) violated…”
The case’s holding
A prescriptive easement for trimming trees does not permit the clear-cutting of land, as such use exceeds the scope of the easement (affirming the trial court's holdings).
Later courts cite it for
“the burden is on the party claiming a prescriptive easement to prove all of the elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 22a-16 19×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss because the allegations of the complaint are adequate to establish both statutory aggrievement under General Statutes § 22a-16 1 and classical aggrievement.”
The case’s holding
To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege specific facts demonstrating either statutory aggrievement through environmental harm or classical aggrievement through a direct and personal injury.
10
GREENLewis v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 880 A.2d 865 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 22a-16 20×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“, has standing under General Statutes § 22a-16 1 to challenge: (1) the decision of the defendant inland wetlands and conserva *385 tion commission of the town of Clinton (commission) approving the application of the defendant Chelsea G.”
11
GREENFort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 943 A.2d 420 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 22a-16 22×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The trial court determined that the plaintiffs second amended complaint, which was filed in response to the court’s order to revise the original complaint, failed to allege a colorable claim under General Statutes § 22a-16 of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (act).”
12
GREENComm'r of Env't Prot. v. Mellon, 945 A.2d 464 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 22a-16 18×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“After a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment for the defendants on count one of the complaint alleging unreasonable impairment of wetlands and watercourses in violation of General Statutes § 22a-16, and for the commissioner on count three of the complaint alleging…”
13
YELLOWManchester Env't Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 22a-16 8×cited by 128 cases
Overruled by City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington on other grounds: 10 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 22a-16
“[6] General Statutes § 22a-16. [7] To the extent Belford v.”
The case’s holding
Standing is a rule of judicial administration based on whether the parties are injured or about to be injured rather than a determination of the merits of the action.
Later courts cite it for
“standing is not a matter of constitutional law in connecticut, but is rather a rule of judicial administration based upon the principle that the appropriate parties to litigate a dispute are those who are injured or about to be injured.” · 5 citing courts
14
REDFish Unlimited v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 755 A.2d 860 (Conn. 2000).
cites § 22a-16 17×cited by 21 cases
Overruled by City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says in part.
Where it cites § 22a-16
“” General Statutes § 22a-16. Second, any person or other entity, without first having to establish aggrievement, may intervene in any administrative proceeding challenging “conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing…”
cites § 22a-16 14×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“The complaint in the present case asserts jurisdiction ‘‘pursuant to [General Statutes] § 22a-16.’’ The defen- dants have conceded that this provision confers stand- ing on any person in a case brought under the policy act, irrespective of whether such person is classically…”
16
GREENBurton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 23 A.3d 1176 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 22a-16 10×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“First, any private party, including a municipality, without first having to establish aggrievement, may seek injunctive relief in court for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or…”
17
GREENCalabrese v. McHugh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Conn. 2001).
cites § 22a-16 9×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“Count VIII — Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-16 Plaintiffs eighth count is brought against Saltire and Scovill pursuant to Conn.”
18
GREENDurham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Conn. 2003).
cites § 22a-16 13×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“Durham has standing to bring an action for declaratory relief under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-16. See Bombero v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Trumbull, 40 Conn.”
19
GREENKeeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, 676 A.2d 795 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 22a-16 7×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“” General Statutes § 22a-16 provides in relevant part: “Action for declaratory and equitable relief against unreasonable pollution.”
The case’s holding
A municipality may be liable for a public nuisance that it intentionally creates through its prolonged and deliberate failure to abate that nuisance.
Later courts cite it for
“a public nuisance exists if: (1) the condition complained of has a natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property; (2) the danger created is a continuing one; (3) the use of the land is unreasonable or unlawful; and (4) the condition or conduct complained of interferes with a right common to the general public.” · 10 citing courts
20
GREENBurton v. Dept. of Env't Prot., 256 A.3d 655 (Conn. 2021).
cites § 22a-16 4×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 22a-16
“for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumen- tality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof . . . for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state…”
The case’s holding
Legal claims are abandoned when presented through abstract assertions lacking substantive analysis, sufficient legal authority, or adequate briefing.

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Conn.49Conn. App. Ct.31D. Conn.19Conn. Super. Ct.32d Cir.1
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