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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-293a (2025)

No right against fellow employee; exception

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laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1973–2020 77citing cases
If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1. For purposes of this section, contractors' mobile equipment such as bulldozers, powershovels, rollers, graders or scrapers, farm machinery, cranes, diggers, forklifts, pumps, generators, air compressors, drills or other similar equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” if the claimed injury involving such equipment occurred at the worksite on or after October 1, 1983. No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles required by chapter 246 if it excludes from coverage under such policy or contract any agent, representative or employee of such owner from such policy or contract. Any provision of such an insurance policy or contract effected after July 1, 1969, which excludes from coverage thereunder any agent, representative or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident with a fellow employee shall be null and void.

(1967, P.A. 842, S. 5; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 4; P.A. 83-297; P.A. 84-22, S. 1, 2.)

History: 1969 act clarified provisions re actions against fellow employees and added provisions re insurance policies and contracts; P.A. 83-297 provided that contractor's mobile equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” for purposes of this section if the injuries involving the equipment occur at the worksite; P.A. 84-22 made clear that the exclusions from the definition of “motor vehicle” established in P.A. 83-297 apply only to injuries which occur on or after October 1, 1983.

Cited. 167 C. 499; 169 C. 630. Fact that employer worked with plaintiff did not change his status to “fellow employee” to come within statute provisions. 178 C. 371. Employee has no right of action against fellow employee who directed operation of truck's hydraulic hoist since actions did not constitute “the operation of a motor vehicle”. 180 C. 469. Cited. 182 C. 24; 183 C. 508. Specific language of Sec. 4-165 prevails over general language of this statute as applied to fellow state employees. 185 C. 616. Section, which permits an action against a fellow employee for injuries arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, does not supersede the more specific provisions of Sec. 7-308. 187 C. 53. Term “operation of a motor vehicle” construed as not including activities unrelated to movement of the vehicle. 189 C. 354. Cited. Id., 550; 193 C. 59; 196 C. 91; 203 C. 34; 206 C. 495; 208 C. 589. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 215 C. 55. Cited. 220 C. 721; 221 C. 356; 222 C. 744; 237 C. 1; 242 C. 375. Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. 259 C. 729. When read in conjunction with Sec. 31-275, statute plainly states that emotional distress not arising from physical injury is not compensable through workers' compensation. 265 C. 21. Trial court improperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because legislature did not intend to create a special hazard exception to the liability created under statute for injuries sustained by employee as a result of another employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle; discussion of legislative intent of statute; overruled 65 CA 771. 279 C. 177. Unicover insurance policy did not provide umbrella coverage. 285 C. 342.

Cited. 2 CA 174; 3 CA 40. Exception under statute is concerned only with those engaged in any activity related to driving or moving a vehicle or related to a circumstance resulting from the movement of a vehicle. Id., 246. Cited. 7 CA 296; Id., 575; 9 CA 290; 10 CA 18; Id., 618; 20 CA 619; 22 CA 88. Definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the exception in section is controlled by Sec. 14-1(a)(47) definition as further refined by Sec. 14-165(i). 30 CA 263. Cited. 41 CA 664. Golf cart not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the “motor vehicle” exception to exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act. 54 CA 479. Statute does not authorize plaintiff's action against his employer arising out of a fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 56 CA 325. Defendant's operation of a payloader to jump start plaintiff's dump truck did not constitute “operation of a motor vehicle” so as to bring the incident within the exception contained in section. 64 CA 409. Injuries caused by operation of external controls of garbage truck are not caused by operation of motor vehicle and do not fall within exception of exclusive remedy of worker's compensation. 99 CA 464. Container and chassis together constituted a trailer, and because the trailer was a vehicle suitable for transportation of property, was drawn by nonmuscular power, and was suitable for operation on a highway, it constituted a motor vehicle. 126 CA 860. A payloader is the same type of equipment as a bucket loader, as defined in Sec. 14-165, and not a motor vehicle under this section, therefore the motor vehicle exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act does not apply. 156 CA 727.

Cited. 30 CS 233; 36 CS 101; 39 CS 102; 40 CS 165. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 41 CS 326. Cited. 41 CS 391; 44 CS 148. Legislature did not treat or intend to treat golf carts differently from any other non-highway-type mechanism for purposes of section. 46 CS 24. Injury occurring from use of motor vehicle at service station did not fall under the motor vehicle exception but rather is attributable to “the special hazards of the work place”. 49 CS 351. Rules of statutory construction did not permit court to extend umbrella coverage based on facts of case. 50 CS 486.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-293a most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENColangelo v. Heckelman, 900 A.2d 1266 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 31-293a 60×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee .”
Later courts cite it for
“citing rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alteráis, or 'the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENFerreira v. Pisaturo, 574 A.2d 1324 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
cites § 31-293a 40×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The defendant claims that the action is barred by the so-called “fellow employee bar” rule of General Statutes § 31-293a. That is, if an employee is injured on a worksite as a result of a fellow employee’s negligence, and if the injured worker or his dependent is entitled to…”
3
GREENMingachos v. CBS, Inc., 491 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 31-293a 7×cited by 1,640 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The act provides the exclusive remedy to employees sustaining work related injuries or death from such injuries “caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee .”
The case’s holding
An employee may sue an employer in court for intentional injuries (allowing an employee to sue his employer in a court of law for an intentional injury).
Later courts cite it for
“admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” · 309 citing courts
4
GREENJaiguay v. Vasquez, 948 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 31-293a 15×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The plaintiff claimed that Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, which has such an exception; see General Statutes § 31-293a; is applicable.”
The case’s holding
Tort actions brought under exceptions to workers' compensation exclusivity provisions are governed by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
Later courts cite it for
“we have moved away from the place of the injury rule for tort actions and adopted the most significant relationship test found in 6 and 145 of the restatement (second) of conflict of laws.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENNolan v. Borkowski, 538 A.2d 1031 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 31-293a 7×cited by 627 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“In Connecticut the exclusive remedy for an employee injured in the course of employment is provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act and, with limited exceptions, suits against fellow employees are barred by General Statutes § 31-293a. Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must present evidence of actual intent to injure that is more than speculative or conjectural to bypass the exclusivity of workers' compensation.
Later courts cite it for
“in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.” · 234 citing courts
6
GREENMcKinley v. Musshorn, 441 A.2d 600 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 31-293a 14×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“He claims specifically that when injuries are caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, General Statutes §§ 31-293a and 52-556 supersede the immunity of a state employee from personal liability for injury “caused in the performance of his duties and within the scope…”
The case’s holding
Specific statutes control over general statutes in cases of conflict unless there is a manifest intent to repeal the earlier statute.
Later courts cite it for
“absent manifest intent to repeal an earlier statute, when general and specific statutes conflict they should be harmoniously construed so the more specific statute controls” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENKeogh v. City of Bridgeport, 444 A.2d 225 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 31-293a 12×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“Because the statute is capable of a reasonable interpretation, it is not vague, despite its imprecision.”
The case’s holding
A statutory classification is constitutional if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective.
Later courts cite it for
“the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and limitations.” · 7 citing courts
8
GREENPanaro v. Electrolux Corp., 545 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 31-293a 13×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“After the institution of this action, the defendants Electrolux and Sheehan pleaded a special defense that the suit was barred by General Statutes § 31-284 (a) 2 and General Statutes § 31-293a, 3 the exclusivity provisions of *593 the Workers’ Compensation Act.”
The case’s holding
The dual capacity doctrine does not permit a tort action against a company nurse for professional negligence when the nurse is a fellow employee under workers compensation laws.
Later courts cite it for
“possesses a second persona so completely independently from and unrelated to his status as employer that by established standard the law recognizes it as a separate legal person.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENSullivan v. State, 457 A.2d 304 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 31-293a 8×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“In her capacity as administratrix, the plaintiff has brought this action against the defendant under the motor vehicle exception of the Workers’ Compensation Act; General Statutes §31-293a; 3 which provides that “no action may be brought against such fellow employee except for…”
The case’s holding
State employees acting within the scope of their employment are immune from personal liability for injuries not caused by wantonly or willful conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“since we are not aware of any legal barrier to the presentation of the plaintiffs claim to the claims commissioner or to his favorable action upon it, we cannot assume that recourse to that procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENMelanson v. Town of West Hartford, 767 A.2d 764 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 31-293a 6×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“Further, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293a, 2 a covered employee may not bring such an action against a fellow employee unless that employee’s wrongful conduct was “wilful or malicious.”
The case’s holding
Failure to take affirmative remedial action does not demonstrate an affirmative intent to create a situation that causes personal injury.
Later courts cite it for
“failure to take affirmative remedial action, even if wrongful, does not demonstrate an affirmative intent to create a situation that causes persons injury.” · 8 citing courts
11
GREENSzczapa v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 743 A.2d 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
cites § 31-293a 11×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“General Statutes § 31-293a provides: “If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the…”
Later courts cite it for
“the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the words themselves . . . .” · 6 citing courts
12
GREENPerodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 31-293a 3×cited by 182 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“General Statutes § 31-293a provides in relevant part: “If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right…”
The case’s holding
Individual employees are not liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from conduct occurring within a continuing employment relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“may not be found liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of conduct occurring within a continuing employment context, as distinguished from conduct occurring in the termination of employment.” · 17 citing courts
13
GREENGoodwin v. Pratt, 524 A.2d 1168 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 31-293a 10×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dissolve the attachment (1) because the plaintiffs complaint failed, as a matter of law, to allege facts that would bring it within the intentional injury exception to the exclusive remedy rule of the…”
The case’s holding
A complaint alleging a coemployee's willful or malicious wrong falls within the statutory exception to workers' compensation exclusivity, without separately pleading intent to injure.
14
GREENDias v. Adams, 456 A.2d 309 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 31-293a 9×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“In a special defense the defendant pleaded the applicability of General Statutes § 31-293a, 1 which generally bars suits against fellow employees where workers’ compensation is available to the injured employee.”
The case’s holding
The statutory exception for motor vehicle negligence applies only to the driving or movement of a vehicle and not to the operation of attached machinery while stationary.
Later courts cite it for
“the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or circumstances resulting from the movement of the vehicle.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENClaps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141 (D. Conn. 1993).
cites § 31-293a 8×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The CWCA does not bar the plaintiffs claim against Castellueei for intentional *153 ly failing to prevent the injuries inflicted on the plaintiff by the other defendants.”
The case’s holding
A Title VII claim is not barred by the employee's failure to exhaust contractual grievance procedures under a collective-bargaining agreement, because the statutory claim is independent of the agreement's arbitration remedy.
Later courts cite it for
“has been careful to note that section 301 does not preempt state law claims that simply require courts to consider the same factual issues that would be raised by claims under a collective bargaining agreement.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENBlancato v. Feldspar Corp., 522 A.2d 1235 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 31-293a 3×cited by 493 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“laintiffs have also brought this action against certain employees of the named defendant, we note that General Statutes § 31-293a, similarly an exclusive remedy provision, states in part: “If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or…”
The case’s holding
An illegally employed minor maintains a cause of action against an employer for labor violations (allowing illegally employed minor to state cause of action against his employer).
Later courts cite it for
“will not uphold the granting of a motion to strike on a ground not alleged in the motion nor relied upon by the trial court.” · 18 citing courts
17
GREENKegel v. McNeely, 476 A.2d 641 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984).
cites § 31-293a 10×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“2 The determination of the issue rests (1) on whether the plaintiff complied with General Statutes § 52-228b 3 and with Practice Book *176 § 3000, 4 and (2) on whether the plaintiffs action was barred by General Statutes § 31-293a. 5 At the time of the death of the plaintiffs…”
The case’s holding
A lawsuit against a coemployee is barred by the workers' compensation statute if the coemployee is not engaged in driving or moving a vehicle at the time of injury.
Later courts cite it for
“if a coemployee is not engaged at the time of the fellow employee's injury in any activity related to driving or moving a vehicle or related to a circumstance resulting from movement of a vehicle, the law suit does not fall within the exception of general ct page 4013 statutes 31-293a .” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENEast v. Labbe, 735 A.2d 371 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
cites § 31-293a 25×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“General Statutes § 31-293a provides in relevant part: “No right against fellow employee; exception.”
19
GREENConti v. Rose Hill Poultry Co., 486 A.2d 1145 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 31-293a 12×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 31-293a
“The trial court concluded that since neither defendant was the operator of the truck under General Statutes § 31-293a, 2 the plaintiff was limited to his workers’ *248 compensation remedies and rendered summary judgment for the defendants.”
20
REDJohnson v. Atkinson, 926 A.2d 656 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 31-293a 7×cited by 15 cases
Overruled by Jaiguay v. Vasquez on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 31-293a
“Another provision of the act, General Statutes § 31-293a, creates an exception, however, to the otherwise applicable exclusivity bar.”
Later courts cite it for
“because application of the law of the case doctrine involves a question of law, our review is plenary” · 1 citing court

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