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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c (2025)

Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel: Class C felony

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1975–2026 220citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 220 opinions since 1975, 30 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (12 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer, firefighter or employee of an emergency medical service organization, as defined in section 53a-3, emergency room physician or nurse, health care employee as defined in section 19a-490q, employee of the Department of Correction, member or employee of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, probation officer, employee of the Judicial Branch assigned to provide pretrial or post-conviction secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act, liquor control agent, state or municipal animal control officer, security officer, employee of the Department of Children and Families assigned to provide direct services to children and youths in the care or custody of the department, employee of a municipal police department assigned to provide security at the police department's lockup and holding facility, active individual member of a volunteer canine search and rescue team, as defined in section 5-249, or public transit employee from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, health care employee, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member is acting in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (2) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any rock, bottle, can or other article, object or missile of any kind capable of causing physical harm, damage or injury, at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (3) such person uses or causes to be used any mace, tear gas or any like or similar deleterious agent against such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (4) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any paint, dye or other like or similar staining, discoloring or coloring agent or any type of offensive or noxious liquid, agent or substance at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member, or (5) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any bodily fluid including, but not limited to, urine, feces, blood or saliva at such peace officer, firefighter, employee, physician, nurse, member, liquor control agent, animal control officer, security officer, probation officer or active individual member. For the purposes of this section, “public transit employee” means a person employed by the state, a political subdivision of the state, a transit district formed under chapter 103a or a person with whom the Commissioner of Transportation has contracted in accordance with section 13b-34 to provide transportation services who operates a vehicle or vessel providing public ferry service or fixed route bus service or performs duties directly related to the operation of such vehicle or vessel, or who, as part of the provision of public rail service, is a train operator, conductor, inspector, signal person or station agent and “security officer” has the same meaning as provided in section 29-152u.

(b) Assault of public safety, emergency medical, public transit or health care personnel is a class C felony. If any person who is confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for assault of an employee of the Department of Correction under this section, such term shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.

(c) In any prosecution under this section involving assault of a health care employee, as defined in section 19a-490q, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant is a person with a disability as described in subdivision (13), (15) or (20) of section 46a-51 and the defendant's conduct was a clear and direct manifestation of the disability, except that for the purposes of this subsection, “mental disability”, as defined in subdivision (20) of section 46a-51, does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct.

(P.A. 73-639, S. 19; P.A. 90-157, S. 2; 90-250, S. 2; P.A. 93-246, S. 1; P.A. 94-62; P.A. 98-41; P.A. 99-26, S. 28; 99-204; P.A. 01-84, S. 13, 26; P.A. 03-6, S. 1; 03-19, S. 126; P.A. 04-234, S. 2; 04-241, S. 3; 04-257, S. 120; P.A. 05-108, S. 7; 05-180, S. 6; P.A. 06-196, S. 185; P.A. 08-150, S. 54; P.A. 09-191, S. 2; P.A. 10-36, S. 24; P.A. 11-175, S. 4; P.A. 13-111, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 15; P.A. 17-216, S. 3; P.A. 19-108, S. 8; P.A. 22-117, S. 14; P.A. 23-46, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 90-157 applied provisions to assaults of employees of an emergency medical service organization; P.A. 90-250 applied provisions to employees of the department of correction, specified that assault must occur while peace officer, fireman or correction department employee is acting in performance of his duties and added provision re consecutive sentences for persons sentenced for assault of correction department employees; P.A. 93-246 applied provisions to assault of an employee or member of the board of parole or probation officer; P.A. 94-62 applied the provisions to emergency room physicians and emergency room nurses; P.A. 98-41 applied provisions to an assault of an employee of the Judicial Branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act or an assault of an employee of the Department of Children and Families performing duties at Long Lane School; P.A. 99-26 revised the category of employees of the Department of Children and Families to which provisions apply by replacing an employee “performing duties at Long Lane School” with an employee “assigned to provide direct services to children and youth in the care or custody of the department”; P.A. 99-204 added Subsec. (a)(5) re throwing or hurling any bodily fluid at specified personnel and changed the name of the offense to “assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel” where appearing; P.A. 01-84 replaced “fireman” with “firefighter” in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 03-6 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of an employee of a municipal police department assigned to provide security at the police department's lockup and holding facility and make a technical change for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 03-19 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 04-241 applied provisions to assaults of active individual members of volunteer canine search and rescue teams; P.A. 04-257 amended Subsec. (a) to delete reference to an employee of the Board of Parole, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 05-108 amended Subsec. (a) to restore reference to an employee of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective June 7, 2005; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b; P.A. 06-196 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d; P.A. 09-191 amended Subsec. (a) to define and apply provisions to a “public transit employee”, and changed name of the offense to “assault of public safety, emergency medical or public transit personnel”; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 11-175 amended Subsec. (a) to apply provisions to assault of a “health care employee as defined in section 19a-490q” and added Subsec. (c) re disability defense for defendant being prosecuted for assault of a health care employee; P.A. 13-111 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to liquor control agent; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to state or municipal animal control officer and security officer, redefine “public transit employee” by adding provision re public rail service and add definition of “security officer”; P.A. 17-216 amended Subsec. (c) by replacing “a defense” with “an affirmative defense” and defining “mental disability”; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to motor vehicle inspector; P.A. 22-117 amended Subsec. (a) to delete references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022; P.A. 23-46 amended Subsec. (a) to include Judicial Branch employee assigned to provide post-conviction secure detention, effective July 1, 2023.

See Sec. 53a-59b re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree.

Cited. 214 C. 195; 231 C. 545; 234 C. 78; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 454; Id., 633.

Cited. 3 CA 353; 10 CA 486; 12 CA 364; 14 CA 10; 27 CA 103; 32 CA 224; 37 CA 338; 40 CA 601; 43 CA 61; Id., 76; 46 CA 118. Under Sec. 53a-23, the illegality of an arrest is not a defense to charges under this section which was intended to require an arrestee to submit to an arrest, even though he believes, and may ultimately establish, that the arrest was without probable cause or was otherwise unlawful; it was not intended to require an arrestee to submit to egregiously unlawful conduct–such as an unprovoked assault–by the police in the course of an arrest, whether the arrest was legal or illegal. 79 CA 667. Interfering with an officer is lesser offense included in greater offense of assault of public safety personnel and thus conviction of both offenses for same act constituted double jeopardy violation. 86 CA 607.

Cited. 33 CS 4; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 201 C. 605; 205 C. 370; 228 C. 910; 233 C. 502. Judgment of Appellate Court in 37 CA 500 reversed in part to affirm judgment of trial court with respect to charges under section. 237 C. 633. Trial court improperly prevented defendant from offering evidence re first element of the crime, namely, whether the officer was performing his assigned duties when defendant struck him. 255 C. 581. In order to sustain conviction under statute, there must be a finding that police officers had been acting in the performance of their duties. 261 C. 553.

Cited. 1 CA 709; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; Id., 447; Id., 663; 28 CA 469; 30 CA 606; 31 CA 178; 33 CA 509; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 431; Id., 699; 37 CA 500; Id., 635; 38 CA 306; 39 CA 333; Id., 657; Id., 789; 43 CA 480; Id., 578; 44 CA 264. In determining whether an assault has been committed, defendant's act does not have to be wholly or partially successful, nor must the act defeat or delay the performance of a duty in which the officer is then engaged, but instead, defendant must only have intended to prevent the officer from performing his or her duties. 112 CA 324. Conviction of both assault of peace officer under Subdiv. (1) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a(a) constitutes double jeopardy; Subdiv. (1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness re defendant's conduct because it provides fair warning that a specific intent to injure officer is not an element of the offense. 119 CA 556. Under facts presented, conviction under Subdiv. (5) and interfering with officer under Sec. 53a-167a does not violate double jeopardy because each crime required proof of different facts. 124 CA 294. Subdiv. (1): Conviction of both interfering with a peace officer under Sec. 53a-167a and assault of public safety personnel under this section does not constitute double jeopardy when evidence demonstrates that the two crimes did not stem from the same conduct. 167 CA 281; judgment affirmed, see 328 C. 648.

Subsec. (b):

Legislature intended to deter all prisoners being held in Connecticut facilities, whether there temporarily or for duration of a sentence, from assaulting employees of those facilities and therefore trial court lacked discretion to impose a sentence concurrent to defendant's federal sentence. 63 CA 386.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Nixon, 651 A.2d 1264 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 53a-167c 27×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“We granted the defendant’s petition for certification, limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s convictions, as an accessory, of assault in the second degree in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
Cumulative punishment for assault of a correctional officer and assault in the second degree does not violate double jeopardy because the statutes require proof of distinct intent elements.
Later courts cite it for
“although the connecticut, constitution does not include a double jeopardy provision, the due process guarantee of article first, 9, of our state constitution encompasses protection against double jeopardy.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Porter, 819 A.2d 909 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-167c 24×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant, Kenneth Porter, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (l), 1 interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes…”
The case’s holding
A conviction for a lesser included offense violates the double jeopardy clause when it is imposed alongside a conviction for a greater offense arising from the same act or transaction.
3
GREENState v. Flynn, 539 A.2d 1005 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 53a-167c 22×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of the crimes of assault on a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c, reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64, breach of the peace in…”
The case’s holding
Interfering with an officer is a lesser included offense of assault on a peace officer, prohibiting multiple punishments for both crimes absent explicit legislative authorization.
Later courts cite it for
“a person could not commit the greater offense of assault on a peace officer without having committed the lesser offense of interfering with a peace officer.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Davis, 804 A.2d 781 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 53a-167c 16×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“to 1997) § 53a-167c (a), 1 and interfering with a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a).”
The case’s holding
Jury instructions must clarify that the state must prove officers were acting in the performance of their duties because a person is not required to submit to unlawful force.
Later courts cite it for
“a detailed instruction that the state must establish that the police officer had been acting in the performance of his duty and that a person is not required to submit to the unlawful use of physical force during the course of an arrest . . . .” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-167c 7×cited by 250 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“Furthermore, our construction of the phrase “acting within the scope of his duties” contained in § 53a-54b (1) is guided by our interpretation of General Statutes § 53a-167c, 22 which categorizes an assault of a law enforcement officer “acting in the performance of his or her…”
The case’s holding
A seizure occurs without a federal constitutional requirement of physical force or submission to authority, and consent is voluntary if officers request permission without using threatening language.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a showing that the jury failed or declined to follow the court's instructions, we presume that it heeded them.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENVillanueva v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 3d 178 (D. Conn. 2016).
cites § 53a-167c 17×subsections: (a)(1) 8× (a)(3) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“No single subsection of the statute actually enumerates “the use of force” as an element of the crime, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c, and the courts of Connecticut have not included “the use of force” as an element of the crime when articulating the statute’s elements, see, e.”
Later courts cite it for
“shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the court had sentenced him under the residual clause, and not the elements clause,” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Nixon, 630 A.2d 74 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 53a-167c 19×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“In 1973, the legislature deleted subdivision (3) and incorporated its language into a new statute, General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1). See Public Acts 1973, No.”
The case’s holding
A person is guilty of assault on a peace officer if they intend to prevent the officer from performing their duty and cause injury in doing so.
Later courts cite it for
“the offense of rioting at a correctional institution does not expressly provide for any particular scienter requirement.” · 1 citing court
8
YELLOWState v. Casanova, 767 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-167c 10×cited by 42 cases
Abrogated by State v. Brocuglio on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“lowing three issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the behavior of [the] police officers was irrelevant to a prosecution under General Statutes § 53a-167c, and therefore preclusion of evidence of same did not violate the defendant’s state and federal…”
The case’s holding
Excluding defense evidence that provides a basis for cross-examining state witnesses may constitute a denial of the constitutional right to confrontation and to present a defense.
Later courts cite it for
“when the trial court excludes defense evidence that provides the defendant with a basis for cross-examination of the state's witnesses, however, such exclusion may give rise to a claim of denial of the right to confrontation and to present a defense.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Salters, 826 A.2d 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-167c 19×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“Furthermore, there exists a distinction between a peace officer and a correction officer as seen by the fact that General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) separately lists peace officer and employee of the department of correction.”
Later courts cite it for
“there exists a distinction between a peace officer and a correctional officer as seen by the fact that general statutes 53a-167c(a) separately lists peace officer and employee of the department of corrections.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Ayala, 153 A.3d 588 (Conn. 2017).
cites § 53a-167c 7×subsections: (a)(1) 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“) General Stat- utes § 53a-167c (a) (1). A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when ‘‘such person obstructs, resists .”
11
GREENCanada v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2006).
cites § 53a-167c 34×subsections: (a)(1) 31× (a) 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“Simply put, bribery could not be said to interfere with, or prevent, the performance of the police officer’s duties through the injurious conduct prohibited under Connecticut law, but rather, is more properly viewed as an effort to corruptly influence the officer to violate his…”
The case’s holding
The Second Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien removable for committing an aggravated felony, so such petitions are dismissed.
Later courts cite it for
“modified categorical approach.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Erickson, 997 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 53a-167c 14×subsections: (a)(1) 4× (a) 3×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant, Earl Martin Erickson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, 1 rendered after a jury trial, of assault of an elderly person in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61a (a) and assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes…”
13
GREENState v. Vilchel, 963 A.2d 658 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 53a-167c 16×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant, Ignacio Vilchel, was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempt to assault a peace officer in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-167c (a) (1) and 53a-49 (a) (2), attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (5) and…”
14
GREENState v. Kurzatkowski, 988 A.2d 393 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 53a-167c 17×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“, appeals from the judgment of conviction, 1 rendered after a jury trial, of assault of a peace officer in *558 violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (l)* 2 and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a).”
15
GREENState v. Outlaw, 179 A.3d 219 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 53a-167c 13×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“1 On appeal, the defendant asserts that the court committed plain error when it did not include detailed language on the use of unwarranted or excessive force as part of its instructions to the jury on the second element of § 53a-167c (a) (5), which pertains to whether the…”
16
GREENPetrillo v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 3d 9 (D. Conn. 2015).
cites § 53a-167c 19×subsections: (a) 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“contends that his counsel should have challenged one of the convictions that served as a predicate to his career offender designation — a 1996 conviction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c 4 —rather than acquiescing to the career offender designation.”
Later courts cite it for
“because the government acknowledges that the guidelines may be unconstitutionally vague and because the supreme court recently held that language identical to 4b1.2 is unconstitutionally vague, by the government's own admission, if the defendant were sentenced today, he would not be sentenced as a career offender.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState v. Wolff, 678 A.2d 1369 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-167c 8×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant, Scott Brian Wolff, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (l), 2 and one count of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (5).”
The case’s holding
The constitutional requirements for waiving the right to counsel and the requirements of the practice book are synonymous and demand the same level of inquiry.
Later courts cite it for
“practice book 961 now 44-3 and the constitutional requirements for permitting a defendant to waive his right to counsel and, thereby, assert his constitutional right to represent himself, are synonymous.” · 1 citing court
18
NEUTRALState v. Rose, 963 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 53a-167c 14×subsections: (a)(5) 3× (a) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“Also, it is irrelevant that Guerrera's duties as cover down officer were essentially complete at the time of the assault because under § 53a-167c, "[t]he [defendant's] act ... does not have to be wholly or partially successful .”
Later courts cite it for
“a claim of insufficient evidence implicates the constitutional right not to be convicted on inadequate proof ... a defendant convicted on insufficient evidence cannot be retried without violating the double jeopardy clause.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENState v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-167c 6×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant subsequently was charged in a substitute information with two counts of assault of a peace *784 officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (l) 7 and three counts of interfering with an officer 8 in violation of § 53a-167a.”
The case’s holding
The commission of a new crime in response to an unlawful police entry breaks the chain of causation from the illegal search and dissipates its taint.
Later courts cite it for
“the limited objective of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct-not to provide citizens with a shield so as to afford an unfettered right to threaten or harm police officers in response to the illegality.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Jones, 902 A.2d 17 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 53a-167c 10×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 53a-167c
“The defendant, Anthony Jones, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury *636 trial, of attempted assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-167c (a) (l) 1 and 53a-49 (a), and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197520002026

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 2001. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.154Conn.40D. Conn.20Conn. Super. Ct.22d Cir.14th Cir.1Fla.1Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)6 cases
State v. Erickson, 997 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2010).“The defendant, Earl Martin Erickson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, 1 rendered after a jury trial, of assault of an elderly person in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61a (a) and assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes…”
Petrillo v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 3d 9 (D. Conn. 2015).“contends that his counsel should have challenged one of the convictions that served as a predicate to his career offender designation — a 1996 conviction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c 4 —rather than acquiescing to the career offender designation.”
State v. Rose, 963 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).“Also, it is irrelevant that Guerrera's duties as cover down officer were essentially complete at the time of the assault because under § 53a-167c, "[t]he [defendant's] act ... does not have to be wholly or partially successful .”
Canada v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2006).“Simply put, bribery could not be said to interfere with, or prevent, the performance of the police officer’s duties through the injurious conduct prohibited under Connecticut law, but rather, is more properly viewed as an effort to corruptly influence the officer to violate his…”
State v. Baptiste, 970 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(1)12 cases
Canada v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2006).
Villanueva v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 3d 178 (D. Conn. 2016).“No single subsection of the statute actually enumerates “the use of force” as an element of the crime, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c, and the courts of Connecticut have not included “the use of force” as an element of the crime when articulating the statute’s elements, see, e.”
State v. Ayala, 153 A.3d 588 (Conn. 2017).“) General Stat- utes § 53a-167c (a) (1). A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when ‘‘such person obstructs, resists .”
State v. Erickson, 997 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2010).
United States v. Gerald Lynn Campbell, 259 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2001).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(3)1 case
Villanueva v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 3d 178 (D. Conn. 2016).
(a)(5)1 case
State v. Rose, 963 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
(b)1 case
Vargas, No. 3:22-cv-01075 (D. Conn. Mar. 1, 2026).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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