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2018 Georgia Code 15-11-304 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 4 TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

15-11-304. Applicability of Title 24; privileges.

Except as provided in this Code section, hearings to terminate parental rights shall be conducted in accordance with Title 24. Testimony or other evidence relevant to determining whether a statutory ground for termination of parental rights exists may not be excluded on any ground of privilege, except in the case of:

  1. Communications between a party and his or her attorney; and
  2. Confessions or communications between a priest, rabbi, or duly ordained minister or similar functionary and his or her confidential communicant.

(Code 1981, §15-11-304, enacted by Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-22/SB 364.)

Effective date.

- This Code section became effective April 28, 2014.

PART 5 G ROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

15-11-310. Grounds for determining termination of parental rights.

  1. In considering the termination of parental rights, the court shall first determine whether one of the following statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been met:
    1. The parent has given written consent to termination which has been acknowledged by the court or has voluntarily surrendered his or her child for adoption;
    2. The parent has subjected his or her child to aggravated circumstances;
    3. The parent has wantonly and willfully failed to comply for a period of 12 months or longer with a decree to support his or her child that has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction of this or any other state;
    4. A child is abandoned by his or her parent; or
    5. A child is a dependent child due to lack of proper parental care or control by his or her parent, reasonable efforts to remedy the circumstances have been unsuccessful or were not required, such cause of dependency is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied in the reasonably foreseeable future, and:
      1. Returning such child to his or her parent is likely to cause serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm to such child or threaten the physical safety or well-being of such child; or
      2. Continuation of the parent and child relationship will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm to such child.
  2. If any of the statutory grounds for termination has been met, the court shall then consider whether termination is in a child's best interests after considering the following factors:
    1. Such child's sense of attachments, including his or her sense of security and familiarity, and the continuity of affection for such child;
    2. Such child's wishes and long-term goals;
    3. Such child's need for permanence, including his or her need for stability and continuity of relationships with a parent, siblings, and other relatives;
    4. Any benefit to such child of being integrated into a stable and permanent home and the likely effect of delaying such integration into such stable and permanent home environment;
    5. The detrimental impact of the lack of a stable and permanent home environment on such child's safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health;
    6. Such child's future physical, mental, moral, or emotional well-being; and
    7. Any other factors, including the factors set forth in Code Section 15-11-26, considered by the court to be relevant and proper to its determination.
  3. If the court determines that a parent has subjected his or her child to aggravated circumstances because such parent has committed the murder of the other parent of such child, the court shall presume that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.

(Code 1981, §15-11-310, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2018, p. 935, § 3/SB 131.)

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, substituted the present provisions of paragraph (a)(5) for the former provisions, which read: "A child is a dependent child due to lack of proper parental care or control by his or her parent, reasonable efforts to remedy the circumstances have been unsuccessful or were not required, such cause of dependency is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied, and the continued dependency will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to such child."; deleted "and" at the end of paragraph (b)(3); added paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(6); and redesignated former paragraph (b)(4) as present paragraph (b)(7).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-51 and 15-11-81, and pre-2014 Code Section 15-11-94, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Former O.C.G.A.

§ 15-11-70 not applicable. - Provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-41 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-443 and15-11-607) as to orders of disposition and recommendations regarding unification were not applicable in proceedings under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310,15-11-311, and15-11-320). In re V.S., 230 Ga. App. 26, 495 S.E.2d 142 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Primary consideration in proceeding to terminate parental rights was welfare of child. In re Creech, 139 Ga. App. 210, 228 S.E.2d 198 (1976); Avera v. Rainwater, 150 Ga. App. 39, 256 S.E.2d 648 (1979) (decided under former law).

Parental misconduct or incapability must be shown.

- For the termination of parental rights, there must be a showing of parental unfitness caused either by intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in abuse or neglect of the child, or by what is tantamount to a physical or mental incapability to care for the child. Howard v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 306, 277 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (decided under former law).

Petition to terminate own rights not authorized.

- Statutory authority of the juvenile court to entertain petitions to terminate parental rights does not extend to petitions by parents seeking judicial imprimatur of their own voluntary abandonment of parental responsibility. In re K.L.S., 180 Ga. App. 688, 350 S.E.2d 50 (1986) (decided under former law).

Responsibility cannot be terminated by contract.

- Father could not voluntarily abandon his parental responsibility by contract. Diegel v. Diegel, 261 Ga. App. 660, 583 S.E.2d 520 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Agency custody does not oust judicial jurisdiction.

- That a "deprived child" may be in agency custody at the time of the hearing on termination of parental rights does not oust the juvenile court from jurisdiction to determine the ultimate issue of custody. In re K.C.O., 142 Ga. App. 216, 235 S.E.2d 602 (1977) (decided under former law).

Exercise of custody by county department suspends, but does not terminate, parental rights.

- Removal of custody of the child from the parents is a determination that, for whatever length of time custody is exercised by the department of family and children services, this right has been suspended, although not finally terminated. Rodgers v. Department of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 235, 276 S.E.2d 902 (1981) (decided under former law).

Time limitation in subparagraph (b)(4)(C) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310(a)(3)) is designed to give the parent whose rights are subject to termination sufficient time and opportunity to demonstrate his or her ability to comply with the terms of the court's order. In re B.L., 196 Ga. App. 807, 397 S.E.2d 156 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Legitimation rights of putative father must first be determined.

- Within the context of a parental rights termination proceeding, a juvenile court had the discretion to determine whether to grant an extension of time for a putative father to serve his legitimation petition on the mother, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(b) former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-96(i) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-283), and Georgia case law that allowed application of the procedural rules set out in the Civil Practice Act, including O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) relating to service and extensions thereto; accordingly, the juvenile court's refusal to hear the legitimation petition was error as was the decision to terminate the putative father's parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-320) without first determining whether he had standing or not under the legitimation action. In the Interest of A.H., 279 Ga. App. 77, 630 S.E.2d 587 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Biological father who fails to seek to legitimate his child following receipt of proper notice of termination proceedings may not thereafter object to the termination of his parental rights. In the Interest of A.W., 242 Ga. App. 26, 528 S.E.2d 819 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Father lacked standing to challenge termination order.

- Given a biological father's failure to legitimate the child at issue, the father lacked standing to challenge the juvenile court's termination of parental rights order. In the Interest of L.S.T., 286 Ga. App. 638, 649 S.E.2d 841 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Determination whether needs met by temporary custody.

- Although sufficient evidence was presented to authorize termination of parental rights, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the child's needs could be met by temporary custody to some agency or individual as opposed to a complete severance of all parental rights. Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 168 Ga. App. 915, 310 S.E.2d 753 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

In a hearing on parental custody in a divorce action, the trial court erred in awarding custody of the parties' minor children to the Department of Family and Children Services based upon findings that the children were deprived and the parents unfit because the mother had no notice that the superior court judge might award custody of the children to a third party based upon standards of deprivation. Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269, 466 S.E.2d 860 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination petition was not a disguised adoption matter.

- Contrary to a father's contention, the termination petition filed by the child's mother was not actually a disguised adoption matter that could be properly heard only in superior court. The stepfather's mere expression of a desire to adopt the child at some time in the future was not sufficient for the court to conclude that the petition was filed in connection with an adoption proceeding; there was no evidence that an adoption petition was pending at the time that the petition was filed; and the petition, which stated that the father failed to provide for the support of the child and failed to have any contact with the child, alleged grounds sufficient for termination. In the Interest of A.R.K.L., 314 Ga. App. 847, 726 S.E.2d 77 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Consent to termination not procured by duress.

- Mother's written consent pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) to termination of her parental rights to her child, who was suspected of having autism, was not procured by fraud or duress, although it was later determined that the child did not have autism. The pressure the mother felt to try to keep one of her children did not constitute legal duress. In re A.B., 311 Ga. App. 629, 716 S.E.2d 755 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Criteria for Termination

Criteria justifying termination.

- Affirmative evidence of moral unfitness, physical abuse, abandonment, refusal to support, or similar misconduct by a parent or the likelihood of substantial threat to a child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional well-being justifiably warrants the termination of a parent's right to a child. Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975) (decided under former law).

Thread running through parental right termination cases manifests moral unfitness, physical abuse, and abandonment. Patty v. Department of Human Resources, 154 Ga. App. 455, 269 S.E.2d 30 (1980) (decided under former law).

Court in arriving at the court's decision in terminating parental rights should use, among other criteria, moral unfitness, physical abuse, and abandonment by a parent. Gardner v. Lenon, 154 Ga. App. 748, 270 S.E.2d 36 (1980) (decided under former law).

Custody may be lost if a child is found to be destitute or suffering, if the child is being reared under immoral influences, or if the child is found to be deprived and likely to be harmed thereby. In re M.M.A., 166 Ga. App. 620, 305 S.E.2d 139 (1983) (decided under former law).

Parental rights may be terminated when the child is deprived and the court finds that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. The last two statutorily required findings are necessary only in cases of termination of parental rights. In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App. 572, 307 S.E.2d 1 (1983); but see In re A.W., 240 Ga. App. 259, 523 S.E.2d 88 (1999) (decided under former law).

Determining the propriety of termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the court shall determine if there exists clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability; secondly, if such evidence exists, the court then considers whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, given the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child, including the need for a stable home. In re G.L.H., 209 Ga. App. 146, 433 S.E.2d 357 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re B.C., 235 Ga. App. 152, 508 S.E.2d 774 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Juvenile court employed a two-prong analysis for determining whether parental rights should be terminated under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-10-310 and15-10-320) first, the court determined whether there was clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or that the parent was unable to care for and control the child; and, second, the court determined whether termination was in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Detailed findings for termination.

- Termination of parental rights was allowed when the trial judge made detailed findings regarding the criteria to meet the two-step test, specifically, the court found that within the 18 months preceding the court's order, the defendant made no attempt to contact or communicate with the child, and the child was readily adoptable. In re H.M.T., 203 Ga. App. 247, 416 S.E.2d 567 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Considerations for the court.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11- 94(b)(4)(C)(ii)-(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), in cases when the child was not in the custody of the parent who was the subject of the termination of parental rights proceedings and in determining whether the child was without proper parental care and control, the court should consider, without being limited to, whether the parent without justifiable cause failed significantly for a period of one year or longer prior to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights: (1) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree; and (2) to comply with a court ordered plan designed to reunite the child with the parent or parents. In the Interest of J.J., 259 Ga. App. 159, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Judgments terminating the parental rights of a mother and father to their three children pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310 were affirmed because of their excessive use of and history of chronic substance abuse, which caused their inability to maintain consistency in employment and the children to be dependent, their failure to comply with the court ordered plan designed to reunite the family, no due process violations occurred, and the children had bonded well with their foster families. In the Interest of E. G. M., 341 Ga. App. 33, 798 S.E.2d 639 (2017).

Court's failure to make clear court's basis for termination decision.

- Termination of the mother's parental rights had to be vacated because it was unclear whether the juvenile court intended to rely on dependency or abandonment to support the court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights given that the juvenile court appeared to have addressed the two concepts interchangeably. In the Interest of J. A. B., 336 Ga. App. 367, 785 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

Egregious conduct was one factor in termination proceedings.

- Egregious conduct or evidence of past egregious conduct of a parent toward the parent's child or another child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or abusive nature was one factor a court may consider in determining whether the child was without proper parental care and control under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-318). In the Interest of J.P., 253 Ga. App. 732, 560 S.E.2d 318 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Because a mother's children had been found to be deprived, as defined in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), because her persistent failure to adequately supervise the children supported a finding that the deprivation was likely to continue, and because continued deprivation was likely to seriously harm the children, the mother's parental rights were properly terminated. In the Interest of T. A. H., 310 Ga. App. 93, 712 S.E.2d 115 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Abandonment by parent.

- Termination of the mother's parental rights based on abandonment was proper because O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310 did not require the juvenile court to make a finding that the child would suffer harm if the child remained in foster care in order for parental rights to be terminated; and the mother waived the mother's right to challenge the juvenile court's finding on appeal as the mother failed to enumerate as error and challenge on appeal the juvenile court's determination that the evidence supported a finding of abandonment by the mother as a statutory ground for terminating the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of I. H. H., 345 Ga. App. 808, 815 S.E.2d 133 (2018).

Proof of abandonment.

- Record supported a finding of abandonment as the evidence showed that the father paid no child support, as required by the Department of Children and Family Services (DFCS) case plan, had not seen the child for over a year leading up to the termination proceedings, failed to legitimate the child, moved to Florida (and later Tennessee) without notifying DFCS, and failed to attend the vast majority of scheduled visits with the child arranged by DFCS. In the Interest of B. D. O., 343 Ga. App. 587, 807 S.E.2d 507 (2017).

Evidence

Present situation must be considered prior to termination.

- Juvenile court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights after the child was beaten by the mother's husband so severely that she had to be placed on life support since the Department of Family and Children Services failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was presently unfit and that the deprivation would continue unless her parental rights were terminated; there was no evidence that the child had been deprived while in her mother's care prior to the mother's marriage and as the husband had been removed from the child and the mother's life, the primary cause of the child's deprivation had been remedied. In addition, the mother acted entirely on her own to improve her abilities to care for her child so that a similar situation did not recur. In the Interest of V.E.H., 262 Ga. App. 192, 585 S.E.2d 154 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Evidence requirements showing parental misconduct or inability.

- Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) and (b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), construing the evidence most favorably to the findings of the court, the question on appeal of a termination of parental rights was whether a rational trier of fact could have found clear and convincing evidence: (1) of parental misconduct or inability; and (2) that terminating parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Parental misconduct or inability was shown by evidence: (1) that the child was deprived; (2) lack of parental care caused the deprivation; (3) such was likely to continue; and (4) the continued deprivation was likely to cause serious harm to the child. In the Interest of M.L., 259 Ga. App. 534, 578 S.E.2d 190 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Inability to properly rear children.

- Same factors that show a parent's inability to properly rear her children also may provide proof that termination of parental rights would be in the children's best interests. In re S.J.C., 234 Ga. App. 491, 507 S.E.2d 226 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Same factors showing parental misconduct used for termination.

- Same factors that show parental misconduct or inability can support a juvenile court's finding that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests. In the Interest of N.L., 260 Ga. App. 830, 581 S.E.2d 643 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence of dependency supported termination.

- There was sufficient evidence that the children were dependent at the time of the termination hearing due to a lack of proper parental care and control, including evidence of repeated instances of inadequate food, clothing, and shelter, inadequate supervision, the mother's resistance towards acquiring recommended therapy for a child, and injuries sustained by the children. In the Interest of D. M. et al., 339 Ga. App. 46, 793 S.E.2d 422 (2016).

In a case terminating the mother's parental rights, the child was currently dependent at the time of the hearing because the mother failed to maintain visitation with the child from May 2015 to March 2016, with only sporadic visitation prior to May 2015; the mother failed to provide child support, refused to provide proof of income, and was currently living in a two-bedroom home with four other individuals, none of whom had been screened by the Department of Family and Children Services or ever met the child; and the mother suffered from serious mental health issues, which the mother denied, even though the mother was taking some medication and receiving some counseling. In the Interest of R. S. T., 345 Ga. App. 300, 812 S.E.2d 614 (2018).

Same evidence showing parental misconduct used for termination.

- Same evidence showing parental misconduct or inability may establish the requirement to show that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest. In the Interest of A.B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 617 S.E.2d 189 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence sufficient to support termination.

- Order terminating the mother's parental rights was supported by evidence that any strides the mother made pertaining to the case plan were temporary, the mother only made two child support payments, the mother failed to secure stable housing, and the mother returned the children 12 hours after regaining custody and suggested the children live with the foster parents. In the Interest of C. J. V., 333 Ga. App. 844, 777 S.E.2d 692 (2015).

Actions of Parents

Improper to terminate rights of illegal alien.

- When a father, an illegal alien, cooperated with the court and the Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS), participated in mediation, was trying to obtain legal residency, worked full time, paid child support, consistently visited his daughter, and had a positive relationship with her, the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights on grounds that he might someday be deported and the child be sent to Mexico or returned to the care of DFCS. In the Interest of M.M., 263 Ga. App. 353, 587 S.E.2d 825 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination appropriate when children living in filth.

- To determine the best interests of the children, the juvenile court may consider the same factors that supported its finding of parental inability; hence, when the children were raised in filth and the mother did nothing to demonstrate that she could maintain a stable, sanitary home, the juvenile court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of A.B., 251 Ga. App. 827, 555 S.E.2d 159 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Children living in squalor.

- An order terminating parental rights is amply supported by evidence, inter alia, that the parents failed to provide a stable home environment, the children were generally filthy, they resided in a house with human and animal waste in the living area, the family did not use proper hygiene and they had a strong, offensive odor, the parents provided no routine health care for the children, and the children did not have adequate clothing for cold weather. Cain v. Department of Human Resources, 166 Ga. App. 801, 305 S.E.2d 492 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence of the mother's lack of motivation in the past and her present very squalid living conditions, which the homemaker testified showed very little improvement, formed a valid basis for the court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights. In re L.A., 166 Ga. App. 857, 305 S.E.2d 636 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parents' children were deprived within the meaning of subsection (b) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) and, thus, termination of parental rights was appropriate when the children continued to live in deplorable conditions even after a case plan was developed and there was no reason to expect that the conditions would improve. In re K.L., 234 Ga. App. 719, 507 S.E.2d 542 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of parents' parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence which showed that after the children were placed in foster care due to unsanitary living conditions and abandonment, the parents continued to live in squalor and did not comply with the court's reunification plan. In the Interest of H.H., 257 Ga. App. 173, 570 S.E.2d 623 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of parental rights for killing other parent.

- Mere fact that one parent kills another does not in and of itself cause the forfeiture of the killer's parental rights as a matter of law. In re H.L.T., 164 Ga. App. 517, 298 S.E.2d 33 (1982) (decided under former law).

Requisite malice necessarily shown by a finding of guilty to the murder of one's spouse, as opposed to voluntary manslaughter, is sufficient to imply a moral unfitness such as to terminate the parental relationship, an unfitness which is likely to continue with resultant harm to the innocent child. Heath v. McGuire, 167 Ga. App. 489, 306 S.E.2d 741 (1983) (decided under former law).

Father's parental rights were terminated after he pled guilty to the murder of the children's mother and her companion in the children's hearing, had repeatedly neglected the physical and emotional needs of the children, had a history of violent and abusive behavior toward the children and their mother, and the murders had a demonstrable negative effect on his relationship with the children. In re J.L.M., 204 Ga. App. 46, 418 S.E.2d 415 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of parental rights for father's murder of the mother of the child while on bond for aggravated assault based on his having shot a friend of the mother was proper. In re A.M.S., 208 Ga. App. 328, 430 S.E.2d 626 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1128, 114 S. Ct. 1095, 127 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

When the biological father was serving a lengthy prison sentence for the murder of the mother of his children, termination of his parental rights was warranted. In re C.M.S., 218 Ga. App. 487, 462 S.E.2d 398 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Despite the fact that a father had not yet been tried, his parental rights were properly terminated for moral unfitness because the father admitted that the father fatally shot the wife in front of the child and that he left his child, who had cerebral palsy and was unable to care for himself, alone with the child's mother's body. In the Interest of J.R., 274 Ga. App. 653, 618 S.E.2d 688 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent threatening harm to other parent.

- Evidence that a father had emotionally abused and neglected a child by repeatedly beating and threatening to kill the child's mother in the child's presence, along with evidence that the father also repeatedly beat his first wife, was relevant to whether the cause of the child's deprivation was likely to continue under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) and was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405). Davis v. Rathel, 273 Ga. App. 183, 614 S.E.2d 823 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent convicted of conspiracy to murder spouse.

- In a proceeding to terminate a mother's parental rights, after the mother had been convicted of conspiracy in the murder of her husband, the juvenile court committed harmful error in distinguishing the mother from the person who did the killing and concluding that the mother's role in the conspiracy did not support a finding of parental unfitness. In re J.M.R., 218 Ga. App. 490, 462 S.E.2d 173 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Failure to protect child from others.

- Evidence supported termination of a mother's parental rights, since her two-year old child was discovered by police in a filthy motel room with the mother's third husband, and the child was without clothes, was crying profusely, and exhibited multiple bruises and cigarette burns on the child's body. In re B.R.S., 198 Ga. App. 561, 402 S.E.2d 281 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of mother's parental rights was warranted by evidence that she permitted her child to spend the night with a neighbor who was suspected of sexually abusing the child. In re B.J., 220 Ga. App. 144, 469 S.E.2d 313 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

When a mother's boyfriend was charged with murdering one of her three children, she was charged with complicity, and the state took custody of the child at issue within days of the child's birth and apparently made no plans for the reunification of mother and child, the record lacked clear and convincing evidence of the existence of the factors set out in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (b)(4)(A)(ii)-(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); therefore, the juvenile court erred in finding the child was "deprived" and that the deprivation was ongoing due to maternal inability to properly care for and protect the child. In the Interest of A.B., 263 Ga. App. 697, 589 S.E.2d 264 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

For purposes of the termination of parental rights, the evidence was sufficient to support a trial court's finding that a lack of proper parental care by a mother caused her children's deprivation including that: (1) the mother did not protect her daughter from her husband after the first incident of sexual abuse; (2) the mother continued to have contact with her husband after an order prohibited her from doing so, which violated the reunification plan; (3) the mother was slow to recognize the threat to the child; (4) the mother did not provide any support for the children while they were in the family services department's care; and (5) the mother failed to maintain any contact with the trial court, her attorney, or the family services department for 18 months. In the Interest of J.H., 267 Ga. App. 541, 600 S.E.2d 650 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Failure to protect child from other parent.

- Judgment of termination of a mother's parental rights was sustained by clear and convincing evidence when, in the period following the placement of the children in foster care, the mother made no progress toward establishing a stable home and removing herself for her children's sake from financial and domestic dependence upon the father of one of the children, who was determined to have sexually abused the other; and, moreover, she offered no plan or course of endeavor suggesting she could in any manner establish a home for the children away from that person and away from her mother's house in which it was found by the trial court to have a history of child molestation. In re S.G., 182 Ga. App. 95, 354 S.E.2d 640 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Evidence showing that the father did not protect the child from the physical and emotional abuse of the mother even though he knew she was prone to violence and had harmed the child in the past warranted termination of his parental rights. In re M.C.A.B., 207 Ga. App. 325, 427 S.E.2d 824 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

When a father's almost total lack of involvement in his child's welfare left the child vulnerable to the neglect and abuse her mother inflicted upon her, his lack of proper care and control was the cause of her deprivation. In re D.N.M., 235 Ga. App. 712, 510 S.E.2d 366 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was affirmed; evidence that the mother failed to take steps to prevent the father's abuse of the children, as well as the mother's active assistance in spanking them with belts on at least one occasion, counseled in favor of a finding that the deprivation was likely to continue. In the Interest of N.S.E., 287 Ga. App. 186, 651 S.E.2d 123 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Although the parental rights of the other parent had also been terminated based on the other parent's criminal history, mental illness, prior poor parenting, anger management issues, lack of income and employment, and alcohol abuse, the parent expressed no intention of altering the relationship with the other parent in light of the other parent's parental unfitness and the parent's statement that that the parent would use the other parent as a caregiver; thus, termination of the parent's rights was necessary to protect the best interests of the child, whose primary caregiver would be the other parent. In the Interest of A.D.M., 288 Ga. App. 757, 655 S.E.2d 336 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 402 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent's solicitation of someone to murder child.

- Partial denial of a father's motion for a continuance in proceedings to terminate the father's parental rights was not an abuse of discretion as the father did not object to the trial court's proposal and the decision to allow a mother to testify without delay, and the father failed to show that additional time would have benefitted him; the termination of the father's parental rights was based on: (1) a divorce decree permanently prohibiting the father from all contact with his child; and (2) the father's conviction of soliciting someone to murder his child. In the Interest of M.H.W., 275 Ga. App. 586, 621 S.E.2d 779 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent threatening to kill children.

- In a parental rights termination case, the father argued unsuccessfully that there was no competent evidence that the children would suffer harm if the father was permitted to maintain the father's parental rights under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311); the father's incarceration was to continue for years, and the father had held the children hostage and threatened to kill them. In the Interest of B.D., 281 Ga. App. 725, 637 S.E.2d 123 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Exposing children to domestic violence.

- It was clear that the juvenile court had not erred in finding that the children's best interests were served by terminating the mother's parental rights when the mother's exposure of her children to incidents of domestic violence demonstrated an indifference to their safety and particularly disturbing were the unexplained injuries one of the children suffered, both the serious burns to the child's mouth and what appeared to have been sexual abuse, while in the care of the mother. In the Interest of N.L., 260 Ga. App. 830, 581 S.E.2d 643 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Domestic violence in home justified termination of parental rights.

- Mother's parental rights were properly terminated given an environment of unrelenting domestic violence and drug abuse and her failure to stabilize the home according to a prior court-ordered plan. In re S.M.S., 207 Ga. App. 248, 427 S.E.2d 598 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Refusal to allow child to attend school.

- There was sufficient evidence of present unfitness, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), to support termination of a mother's parental rights because each time the child was returned to the mother, the pattern of deprivation continued in which the mother refused to allow the child to attend school due to the child's mild to moderate eczema, two doctors testified that eczema would not interfere with the child's ability to attend school, and the mother refused to obtain psychiatric counseling or to take medication in order to regain custody. In the Interest of R.H.L., 272 Ga. App. 10, 611 S.E.2d 700 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Wanton and willful failure to comply with support order not shown.

- See In re H.B., 174 Ga. App. 435, 330 S.E.2d 173 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Financial inability to support authorized termination.

- When the evidence supported the trial court's finding that a parent did not have the financial means to support her children and had, despite court orders requiring her to do so, failed to pay child support sufficient to provide for even the bare necessities, that she had consistently failed to comply with court-ordered reunification plans, i.e. maintain stable employment or adequate housing, visit the children regularly, or to attend counseling consistently, the court properly concluded that such failure established grounds for termination. In re M.L.P., 236 Ga. App. 504, 512 S.E.2d 652 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Failure to support.

- When the father admitted that he had failed to pay child support for over a year and offered no satisfactory explanation for his failure to provide financial support for his children, and the father was an admitted unrehabilitated alcohol abuser who lived in a two-bedroom trailer with his girlfriend and her two children by a former relationship, termination of the father's parental rights was justified. In re C.G.A., 204 Ga. App. 174, 418 S.E.2d 779 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Trial court did not err by considering a mother's failure to provide the children with monetary support as one of the grounds for termination, notwithstanding her assertion that a court had never issued an order requiring such support, as a parent has a statutory duty to support her children with or without a court order. In the Interest of R.W., 248 Ga. App. 522, 546 S.E.2d 882 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Father's failure to support his child, even in the absence of an order directing the father to pay a specific amount for the child's support, was compelling evidence that the father was not an able parent under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11- 94(b)(4)(B)(v) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311). In the Interest of S.E.L., 251 Ga. App. 728, 555 S.E.2d 115 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Trial court's determination that the children's deprivation for purposes of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311) resulted from the lack of proper parental care or control was supported by evidence that the mother did not pay any child support for her five children during the two years preceding the termination hearing, leaving the Department of Children and Families to support her children; the mother had a statutory duty under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2 to support her children, with or without a court order. In the Interest of J.J., 259 Ga. App. 159, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Father's parental rights were properly terminated because evidence that the children would be in danger if reunited with him and that he had repeatedly failed to pay child support or to comply with case plan goals clearly and convincingly supported the juvenile court's determination that the deprivation was likely to continue and to cause the children serious harm. In the Interest of B.L., 278 Ga. App. 388, 629 S.E.2d 89 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a parent's parental rights was affirmed pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311) as the totality of the evidence supported a finding that the parent had not voluntarily fulfilled the parent's support obligations to the parent's child; the evidence showed that the only child support the parent paid had been that which was garnished from the parent's wages, and even with such an arrangement the parent somehow fell behind in the payments. In the Interest of K.D., 285 Ga. App. 673, 647 S.E.2d 360 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent's parental rights to a child were properly terminated because the cause of the child's dependency was likely to continue and not likely to be remedied, satisfying O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310(a)(5); the parent's psychological issues, incarcerations, and refusal to follow the parent's case plan had worsened, not improved. In the Interest of S. P., 336 Ga. App. 488, 784 S.E.2d 846 (2016)(decided prior to 2018 amendment of paragraph (a)(5)).

Parent's inability to find work insufficient for termination.

- While a young mother failed to obtain employment while her child was in foster care, she applied for numerous jobs without success and completed an eight-month program to become a medical assistant; the trial court failed to address whether her lack of employment was "without justifiable cause," as required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(C). In the Interest of D. P., 326 Ga. App. 101, 756 S.E.2d 207 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Physical abuse of caseworker by parent.

- Termination order was supported by clear and convincing evidence of "parental misconduct or inability," since the mother had been uncooperative with and physically abusive to caseworkers, had failed to comply with a court-ordered plan requiring her to pay child support and to attend parenting classes, and had made little effort either to create a stable home environment or to remain employed. In re S.L., 189 Ga. App. 361, 375 S.E.2d 484 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Sexual Abuse

Sexual abuse sufficient for termination of parental rights.

- Finding that the father had sexually molested his youngest daughter in the presence of his eldest child along with expert testimony that the father was not responding to therapy provided clear and convincing evidence that the children were deprived due to parental misconduct and that the cause of that deprivation was likely to continue, warranting termination of the father's parental rights. In re R.E., 207 Ga. App. 178, 427 S.E.2d 512 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Sexual abuse was properly considered as to its detrimental effect on the parent's relationship with the parent's children, regardless of whether the conviction was "final". In re J.E.L., 223 Ga. App. 269, 477 S.E.2d 412 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support a finding by the juvenile court of parental misconduct or inability pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) based upon the statutory factors; the juvenile court found that the father had molested one of the children and that the mother had failed to protect the children from the father; there was also evidence that the father had abused more than one child. In the Interest of A.B., 283 Ga. App. 131, 640 S.E.2d 702 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Appeals court found that the evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that a parent's six children were deprived, and that the unexplained abuse was the result of the parent's inability to protect the children as the evidence showed that: (1) one child suffered unexplained sexual abuse while in the parent's care, and sustained a head injury while allegedly in the parent's aunt's care; and (2) another child was molested while the parent was asleep. In the Interest of S.Y., 284 Ga. App. 218, 644 S.E.2d 145 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Sexual abuse of half-sister and grandmother.

- Termination of parental rights was appropriate when the court's findings that the child's deprivation would continue and that termination of the father's rights would be in the best interest of the child were supported by evidence that the father sexually molested the child's half-sister as well as his own grandmother, and that he failed to address his moral and psychological problems. In re A.C., 234 Ga. App. 717, 507 S.E.2d 549 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Sexual abuse of children with special needs.

- Trial court properly terminated the parental rights of parents to their two daughters pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311). Since the parents failed to support their enumerated errors with specific reference to the record or transcript as required by Ga. Ct. App. R. 27(c)(3)(i), the appellate court did not need to search for or consider those enumerations, but, out of an abundance of caution, the appellate court reviewed the record and determined that the termination was proper as the juvenile court heard evidence that the father had sexually abused one daughter, and that the other daughter had also been exposed to sexual activity while in the parents' custody, and there was also evidence that both children had special needs that the parents were not able to meet. In the Interest of K.M., 260 Ga. App. 635, 580 S.E.2d 636 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent allowing sexual abuse by another.

- Even though the mother contended that she was willing to take steps to be a proper parent, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the children's deprivation was likely to continue for purposes of terminating the mother's parental rights since: (1) the mother continued to allow the abuser into her home after she learned that he had fathered her older, minor daughter's child and had at least some contact with him after she learned that he had sexual relations with another daughter; (2) the mother failed to appreciate that such relations were inappropriate and could be harmful to the children; and (3) the mother failed to comply with the Department of Families and Children Services' requirements that she get a job to help support the children, and get counseling to help meet her children's emotional and psychological needs. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court properly considered a mother's past conduct in determining that the deprivation of five children would likely continue, including her passivity with regard to her husband sexually abusing the children and the mother doing nothing; therefore, the termination of the mother's parental rights was upheld on appeal. In the Interest of J.B.M., 284 Ga. App. 480, 644 S.E.2d 317 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Sexual molestation by parent justified termination.

- Because the evidence indicated that the father had molested the children, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's findings that the pattern of deprivation was likely to continue and that such deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A.15-11-310); the evidence showed that the children had suffered emotional and sexual harm during the time that their father was responsible for their care, and this caused their emotional distress and behavioral problems. In the Interest of I.M.G., 276 Ga. App. 598, 624 S.E.2d 236 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Alleged sexual abuse and denial.

- History of alleged sexual abuse taken together with a current denial of any alleged abuse, failure to complete a sexual offender treatment program, failure to pay child support, and failure to complete the goals set forth by the state clearly established present conduct from which a factfinder could infer that the parents were not equipped to support the child in the future. In the Interest of J.B., 248 Ga. App. 64, 545 S.E.2d 609 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Imprisoned parent for sexual abuse of child.

- There was clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability to parent justifying termination of the father's parental rights; the father did not dispute that there was sufficient evidence showing the child was deprived and, even if challenged, the child's deprivation was established by the juvenile court's unappealed order finding the child deprived as the father pled guilty and was imprisoned for molesting the child, the father had absolutely no contact with the child from the time the child was removed from the home, and the father provided only minimal financial support before being incarcerated. In the Interest of C.B., 258 Ga. App. 143, 574 S.E.2d 339 (2002), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent seeking medical exams for sexual abuse.

- When the evidence in the record showed that the child had been subjected to numerous medical examinations for sexual abuse at the mother's behest, in an apparent effort to frustrate or foreclose the father's right of visitation, and she persisted in having the child examined for possible sexual abuse, the juvenile court properly found that said conduct was egregious and was properly considered by the juvenile court in reaching the court's deprivation finding. In the Interest of M.E., 265 Ga. App. 412, 593 S.E.2d 924 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Imprisonment

Imprisonment alone does not always compel a termination of parental rights but when the parent has not visited regularly with the children or established a parental bond, has failed to contact the department of family and children services or refrain from criminal activity as required by the case plan, and has no present prospects for employment, income, or a stable home, those circumstances combine with the fact of incarceration to support a finding of parental unfitness sufficient to terminate a parent's rights. In re R.L.H., 188 Ga. App. 596, 373 S.E.2d 666 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Although imprisonment alone does not always compel a termination of parental rights, imprisonment will support such a ruling when adequate aggravating circumstances are shown to exist. In re S.K.L., 199 Ga. App. 731, 405 S.E.2d 903 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re L.F., 203 Ga. App. 522, 417 S.E.2d 344; 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 344 (1992), cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

When an incarcerated parent has a criminal history of repetitive incarcerations for the commission of criminal offenses or parole violations, this constitutes an additional factor which may be considered in determining whether the child presently is without the proper parental care and control of the offending parent, and that such is likely to continue. In re L.F., 203 Ga. App. 522, 417 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 344 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re A.M.N., 234 Ga. App. 365, 506 S.E.2d 693 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Imprisoned parents.

- Defendant's convictions and incarcerations had a demonstrable negative effect on the quality of the parent-child relationship sufficiently explicit to support termination. In re K.M.H., 209 Ga. App. 194, 433 S.E.2d 117 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Evidence showing a total lack of effort by the father to contact or provide parental support over the entire life of his two-year-old child and that the father was incarcerated for, among other things, enticing a child for indecent purposes was sufficient to support the court's conclusion that termination was in the child's best interest. In re S.B.H., 216 Ga. App. 861, 456 S.E.2d 620 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Father's failure to comply with department of family and children services plan, requiring him to maintain contact with his children, was properly considered by the trial court even though the father was incarcerated; his incarceration did not prevent him from writing to or calling the children. In re R.J.P., 222 Ga. App. 771, 476 S.E.2d 268 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Evidence supported termination of parental rights since the parent was serving a 20-year prison sentence, had not maintained contact with the child, and had provided no significant financial support. In the Interest of S.H., 251 Ga. App. 555, 553 S.E.2d 849 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Trial court properly terminated a parent's parental rights to the child pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311); there was sufficient evidence to establish that the child's deprivation was caused by a lack of proper parental care or control based on the parent's incarceration, that the pattern of deprivation was likely to continue, that continued deprivation would likely cause the child harm, and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child. In the Interest of B.L.H., 259 Ga. App. 482, 578 S.E.2d 143 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

When the father confessed to a premeditated rape and attendant crimes, staged highly publicized hunger strikes in the community where the child resided and was without the possibility of parole, the court properly terminated the father's parental rights despite the father's visitation, calling, and child support payments prior to incarceration. In the Interest of M.H.S., 261 Ga. App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Trial court properly terminated a father's parental rights to his children; there was sufficient evidence that the father had committed parental misconduct pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), based on the fact that the father was in prison on a felony drug charge and had failed to communicate with the children, and that the termination of rights was in the best interests of the children. In the Interest of K.W., 262 Ga. App. 744, 586 S.E.2d 423 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Trial court properly terminated a putative father's parental rights to a child because the termination of the putative father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child as the putative father was serving a prison sentence; had been convicted of multiple criminal offenses, particularly selling cocaine; and the child spent all but two days of the child's life in foster care, was doing well, and bonded with the foster parents, who wanted to adopt the child. In the Interest of A.L.S.S., 264 Ga. App. 318, 590 S.E.2d 763 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence supported a trial court's findings terminating a parent's parental rights when the parent was serving a 10-year prison sentence for kidnapping and robbery, had failed to complete any of the goals of the case plans, did not make an effort to actually communicate directly with the child after removal from the grandparent's custody, did not support the child financially, and failed to comply with the case plan. In the Interest of D.M.W., 266 Ga. App. 456, 597 S.E.2d 531 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a father's parental rights was proper because the evidence showed, inter alia, that the father was unable to forego criminal activity and stay out of prison so that he could provide a stable home for his child; the lack of structure, even for the short periods of time that the child was visiting with the father, had a noticeable negative effect on the child's behavior. In the Interest of T.B., 274 Ga. App. 147, 616 S.E.2d 896 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a father's parental rights, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), was error because there were no aggravating circumstances and the father, although incarcerated, made an effort during the incarceration to complete a case plan not designed for the father, including writing over 40 letters to the children, attempting to arrange for the children to visit him in prison, and completing treatment programs. In the Interest of J.D.F., 277 Ga. App. 424, 626 S.E.2d 616 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), the evidence was sufficient to show that continued deprivation of the parent's child was likely; at the time that the parent would be released from prison, the child would have been in foster care for about 75 percent of the child's life, and the evidence also showed that the parent had failed to support the parent's child which demonstrated that the parent was not an able parent. In the Interest of T.G.Y., 279 Ga. App. 449, 631 S.E.2d 467 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Father's parental rights were terminated with clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children's best interest under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311); the children had been exposed to drug use and violence, the father was to remain in prison for the foreseeable future, and there was no evidence that, upon release, the father, who had held the children hostage and had threatened to kill the children, would be able to provide the children a safe, stable home. In the Interest of B.D., 281 Ga. App. 725, 637 S.E.2d 123 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parent's rights to a child were properly terminated because evidence of the parent's neglect of other children, substance abuse, and failure to support the child permitted a rational trier of fact to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child's deprivation was likely to continue under former O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 94(b)(4)(A)(iii); the parent's failure to support the child while in prison and the lack of a relationship between the parent and the child could be considered as aggravating circumstances which showed that the parent's incarceration had a negative effect on the child. In the Interest of T.C., 282 Ga. App. 659, 639 S.E.2d 601 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld on appeal since the evidence showed that the mother had never bonded with the child, was repeatedly incarcerated, and never attempted to contact the child's caregiver, the mother's aunt, to whom guardianship had been granted; the juvenile court's determination that the child was deprived and that such deprivation was likely to continue based on the mother's continuous criminal activity was supported by the evidence. In the Interest of S.R.M., 283 Ga. App. 463, 641 S.E.2d 666 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Parental rights were properly terminated based on clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) because while the subject child was in the agency's custody, the parent was unemployed, was released from prison, and then arrested on new charges and incarcerated again, no child support was paid, and the parent only complied with a case plan to the extent of legitimating the child. In the Interest of A.J., 288 Ga. App. 579, 654 S.E.2d 465 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence was insufficient to establish that the children's dependent state was likely to continue or unlikely to be remedied in the foreseeable future as the Division of Family and Children Services offered no competent proof of the father's crimes or how long he would actually be incarcerated and the record did not contain any evidence indicating that the father had a history of repeated incarcerations. In the Interest of E. G. L. B., 342 Ga. App. 839, 805 S.E.2d 285 (2017).

Parents' history of incarcerations for repeated criminal offenses, failure to comply with reunification plans while incarcerated, and a determination that it was likely that such criminal history would continue upon release from incarceration supported a finding that the deprivation of their children was likely to continue under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310). In the Interest of M.C.L., 251 Ga. App. 132, 553 S.E.2d 647 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Mother's repeated incarceration and termination of rights to other children.

- Mother's repeated incarcerations were an aggravating circumstance that was properly considered in deciding whether her child's deprivation was likely to continue, and evidence that the mother had four other children who were not in her care indicated that she was unable to care for the child in this case; the trial court's termination of the mother's parental rights was proper. In the Interest of A.C., 272 Ga. App. 165, 611 S.E.2d 766 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination appropriate when mother pled guilty to deprivation.

- Termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children since the mother had severe mental problems, abused alcohol, did not comply with treatment programs, was hospitalized in psychiatric institutions often, and pled guilty to deprivation. In the Interest of A.L.E., 248 Ga. App. 213, 546 S.E.2d 319 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Consideration of prison sentence proper.

- Because the father's parental rights were terminated, the trial court did not err in considering the father's felony conviction and 15-year sentence in determining whether the children were without proper parental care and control pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311); this was a proper factor since aggravating factors existed. In the Interest of I.M.G., 276 Ga. App. 598, 624 S.E.2d 236 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Imprisonment delays opportunity to bond with child.

- Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-311), a juvenile court was authorized to find by clear and convincing evidence that a mother's imprisonment had a negative effect on the parent-child relationship in that the imprisonment further delayed the mother's overdue efforts to form a meaningful parent-child relationship. In the Interest of A.R.A.S., 278 Ga. App. 608, 629 S.E.2d 822 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

When the father was almost continuously incarcerated since the birth of his first child and the children had no contact with him while he was incarcerated, termination of his parental rights was appropriate. In re D.A.P., 234 Ga. App. 257, 506 S.E.2d 438 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Repetitive incarcerations.

- Parental misconduct was shown when the father was incarcerated as a habitual felon, and during periods of freedom he had shown little interest in or capacity for adequately caring for his child. In re B.C., 235 Ga. App. 152, 508 S.E.2d 774 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Child's petition for termination of rights of incarcerated parent.

- Trial court's denial of a child's petition for termination of the parental rights of the childs mother was vacated since the court had limited the court's finding to a deprivation arising solely from the mother's incarceration without considering present evidence of parental misconduct or inability. In re J.E.E., 228 Ga. App. 831, 493 S.E.2d 34 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of rights in child's best interest.

- Evidence that the child's current foster care served the child's interests by providing a sense of permanence and well-being and of the father's history of substance abuse, abandonment of the child, and failure to comply with key elements of the case plan supported a finding that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. In the Interest of B. D. O., 343 Ga. App. 587, 807 S.E.2d 507 (2017).

Children

Children need stability.

- When a child's behavior improved after being placed in state custody, but she continued to need regular counseling and a stable, consistent home environment, there was no error in the juvenile court's implicit conclusions that continued deprivation would seriously harm the child and that termination of parental rights was in her best interest. In re D.N.M., 235 Ga. App. 712, 510 S.E.2d 366 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in 12-year-old child's best interest because the child had been in foster care periodically and needed a stable home, the child was well-adjusted with the foster parents, the child's performance at school was vastly improved, the child rarely missed school, and the child wanted to stay with the foster family and go to school. In the Interest of R.H.L., 272 Ga. App. 10, 611 S.E.2d 700 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence of a mother's repeated failures to remain drug free and to take the steps necessary to reunite with her child was sufficient to prove that her children's continued deprivation would cause the children serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm, and it was well settled that the children needed permanence of home and emotional stability or they were likely to suffer serious emotional problems. In the Interest of A.B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 617 S.E.2d 189 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Clear and convincing evidence supported a trial court's determination that a mother's child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), due to lack of proper parental care, that such deprivation was likely to continue or not be remedied due to the mother's failure to take responsibility for the child and to work at succeeding at the goals of her case plan, and that such deprivation would cause serious harm to the child, who needed a stable family environment; accordingly, termination of the mother's parental rights was proper, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311). In the Interest of B.S., 274 Ga. App. 647, 618 S.E.2d 695 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's determination pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311) that, there being clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, termination of the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child, considering the child's physical, mental, emotional, and moral needs, and the child's need for a secure and stable home. In the Interest of B.J.F., 276 Ga. App. 437, 623 S.E.2d 547 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights case involving a mother who had mental health and substance abuse issues, continued deprivation was likely to cause harm to the child under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) as a psychologist testified that the child needed a stable environment or the child was likely to act out. In the Interest of D.A.B., 281 Ga. App. 702, 637 S.E.2d 102 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Children with special needs.

- When employing the two-step test before terminating a parent's rights, a juvenile court order that a child was deprived, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(8)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-107), which was not appealed, was binding on a mother and satisfied the first factor of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the juvenile court determined that due in part to a medical problem, the child had special needs and the mother lacked the ability to provide for the physical, mental, emotional, and moral conditions and needs of the child. In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga. App. 26, 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

"Continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional or moral harm to the child" factor for the termination of mother's parental rights was satisfied as: (1) the child required a stable routine with constant monitoring of the child's physical symptoms to maintain the child's emotional and physical health; and (2) a psychologist testified that the mother would be unable, given her limited cognitive abilities, to provide the care the child needed. In the Interest of K.N., 272 Ga. App. 45, 611 S.E.2d 713 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Best interest of the child factor for the termination of a mother's parental rights was satisfied because the mother failed to establish a parental bond with the child, failed to comply with her case plan, limited cognitive abilities and personality disorder impaired her ability to attend to the child's many special needs, child's visits with his parents were disturbing to the child, and the child was doing well in the custody of the Department of Family and Children's Services and would benefit by staying with the capable and caring foster parents. In the Interest of K.N., 272 Ga. App. 45, 611 S.E.2d 713 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to a child because the child had severe developmental delays when the child entered foster care and made tremendous improvements in a structured one-on-one learning environment; the mother failed to complete a reunification plan and her parenting skills were severely impaired by recurring psychological problems; the mother failed to obtain housing or employment; to improve her parenting skills specific to her child's special needs; to continue psychological counseling, to support the child; or to maintain any parental relationship with the child. In the Interest of A.K., 272 Ga. App. 429, 612 S.E.2d 581 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

There was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support a juvenile court's termination of a father's parental rights over his two children, each of whom was severely handicapped, as the father's limited cognitive abilities made it difficult for him to be the sole parent, he was unable to properly care for the children and to maintain a clean home, they had been deemed deprived, and termination was in their best interests; also, they had bonded with their foster families and did not have much of a bond with their father. In the Interest of M.W., 275 Ga. App. 849, 622 S.E.2d 68 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court's termination of a parent's parental rights was affirmed as sufficient evidence supported a finding that the children were likely to suffer serious harm if the parent's parental rights were not terminated since: (1) the children needed a very structured environment, without which it was likely that the children would lack basic social functioning; (2) the parent was mentally, emotionally, and financially unable to manage her own life without the substantial assistance of her parents; (3) the parent was either unwilling or unable to develop necessary parenting skills; (4) the children were in a stable foster home with nurturing foster parents where their special needs were met; (5) there was no parental bond between the biological parent and the children; and (6) the foster parent was interested in adopting the children. In the Interest of K.L., 280 Ga. App. 773, 634 S.E.2d 870 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Father's incarceration history, the father's failure to support the child, and the father's lack of interest in the child showed that the father could not be relied on to meet the needs of the child, who had special needs; termination of the father's parental rights, therefore, was in the child's best interest under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311). In the Interest of E.K., 280 Ga. App. 818, 635 S.E.2d 214 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was upheld on appeal since the mother stipulated to depriving the child, had a mental disability which prevented the mother from giving the child the proper care in light of the child's special needs, including failing to provide the child with prescription medication, and the mother continued a relationship with a boyfriend who had sexually abused the child; the reviewing court found clear and convincing evidence established that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. In the Interest of B.S., 283 Ga. App. 724, 642 S.E.2d 408 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

There was sufficient evidence to support the termination of a mother's parental rights since the evidence showed that the mother lacked the intellectual and emotional capacity to care for her two children, particularly the younger child, who had special needs as the result of injuries inflicted by his father; the mother was in denial about the younger child's condition and about the injuries that had been inflicted upon the child, had not refrained from using physical discipline on the children, had not paid child support, had not created a meaningful bond with the children and the children had thrived in foster care. In the Interest of R.S., 287 Ga. App. 228, 651 S.E.2d 156 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

It was proper to terminate a father's parental rights to a special needs child since the father had failed to comply with case plan goals or to acknowledge or address his mental health problems, there was ample evidence of his low intellectual functioning and its negative impact on his parenting skills, doctors had testified that the child would not be safe with the father and the father would not be able to parent a special needs child, and the father had failed to maintain a parental bond with the child in a meaningful way. In the Interest of B.W., 287 Ga. App. 54, 651 S.E.2d 332 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

It was proper to terminate a mother's parental rights to a special needs child since the mother had not supported the child, had been repeatedly incarcerated, had not seen the child in three years or attempted to maintain contact with the child, had not completed a drug treatment program, had not remained drug free for more than eight or nine months, and had failed to comply with any of her case plan goals; considering the special needs of the child, the harmful effects of prolonged foster care, and the evidence of the mother's drug abuse and failure to comply with case plan goals, the trial court was authorized to conclude that terminating the mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of B.W., 287 Ga. App. 54, 651 S.E.2d 332 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Child with special needs and parent with limited intellectual abilities.

- Child was deprived, for purposes of terminating a mother's parental rights, because the mother had borderline intellectual functioning and was at high risk of engaging in physical child abuse of her special needs child; the child was not being properly supervised, the home was dirty, and there was little food, the mother needed long-term intensive psychological treatment but failed to obtain counseling and stopped taking her medications, and the mother failed to support the child or to comply with case plan goals. In the Interest of A.K., 272 Ga. App. 429, 612 S.E.2d 581 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Children developing behavioral problems after visiting with parent.

- In an action to terminate parental rights brought under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81, evidence that the mother's seven year old child was often out of control and physically violent at school, that the school could never contact the mother to discuss the child's problems, that the mother refused consent for recommended treatment for the child, that the child's behavior improved markedly after custody was obtained by the department of children and family services, and that the child's behavior would deteriorate after visits from the mother, was clear and convincing evidence that deprivation of the child was likely to continue and justified termination of the mother's parental rights; the juvenile court was not required to reunite the mother and the child to obtain evidence of current or future deprivation. In the Interest of C.M., 251 Ga. App. 374, 554 S.E.2d 510 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children as the children showed signs of distress after the mother's visits and as the children were thriving in the care of a foster parent who was willing to care for the children indefinitely. In the Interest of C.T.M., 273 Ga. App. 168, 614 S.E.2d 812 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was proper because the mother failed to achieve many of the goals of the reunification plan and because the children developed behavioral problems after the mother's visits. In the Interest of M.H.W., 277 Ga. App. 318, 626 S.E.2d 515 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Foster care.

- Juvenile court could consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that the children's continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(iv) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310). In the Interest of M.C.L., 251 Ga. App. 132, 553 S.E.2d 647 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the deprivation was likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children in a termination of parental rights proceeding since: (1) the children became upset when the mother made promises and representations that she did not keep, including promises that she would visit or that they could come home with her; (2) one child became upset when her mother urged her to lie about the abuser's sexual abuse; and (3) the juvenile court considered that the children needed a stable home situation, and that prolonged foster care was detrimental. In the Interest of A.M., 259 Ga. App. 537, 578 S.E.2d 226 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Child in foster care for extensive time.

- Termination of a parent's parental rights was affirmed as the children had been in the care of their foster parents since they were three months old and had not seen the parent in over 27 months; the parent's caseworker opined that the children were still deprived due to neglect. In the Interest of S.B., 287 Ga. App. 203, 651 S.E.2d 140 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Living conditions and economic circumstances of foster family.

- Evidence concerning the living conditions and economic circumstances of the child's foster parents who had expressed an interest in adopting the child was not relevant to the first portion of the test under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-310 and15-11-311), the determination of whether there was clear and convincing evidence showing parental misconduct or inability; however, such evidence was relevant to the second part of the statutory test, a determination of whether termination of the parental rights of the natural parents was in the best interest of the child, since it showed the merits of an alternative placement available to the child. In re J.M.G., 214 Ga. App. 738, 448 S.E.2d 785 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Deprivation

Deprivation of love and nurture, is equally as serious as mental or physical disability. In re Levi, 131 Ga. App. 348, 206 S.E.2d 82 (1974) (decided under former law); Elrod v. Hall County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975);(decided under former law).

Moral unfitness possible factor in proving deprivation.

- When the issue is termination of parental rights (without adoption by others), moral unfitness may be a factor in proving that a child is deprived and will suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. Johnson v. Edison, 235 Ga. 820, 221 S.E.2d 813 (1976) (decided under former law).

Failure to identify specific findings that support conclusion that cause of dependency was likely to continue.

- While the juvenile court's order reflected diligent and careful consideration and referred to the children's past dependency, the order did not identify specific factual findings that authorized the trial judge to conclude that the cause of the children's dependency was likely to continue and, thus, it was insufficient to enable appellate review. In the Interest of D. W., 340 Ga. App. 508, 798 S.E.2d 49 (2017).

Deprivation alone insufficient to authorize termination.

- Clear and convincing evidence of the child's deprivation at the parent's hand, standing alone, will not authorize the termination of parental rights. There must also be clear and convincing evidence that the child's deprivation is likely to continue or will not likely be remedied; and that the continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. In re M.H.F., 201 Ga. App. 56, 410 S.E.2d 167 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

No right to be present at deprivation hearing.

- Father was not denied due process on the ground that he was not present at the deprivation hearings in which the trial court declared the father's three children to be deprived because deprivation proceedings and parental rights termination proceedings are separate and distinct, and a termination proceeding is not the proper time to assert error in the deprivation proceedings; further, the father failed to show that he was harmed as a result of any alleged violation of due process since there was overwhelming evidence supporting the termination of the father's parental rights. In the Interest of M.S., 279 Ga. App. 254, 630 S.E.2d 856 (2006), overruled on other grounds, In re J.M.B., 296 Ga. App. 786, 676 S.E.2d 9 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Dispositional hearing unnecessary when only deprivation alleged.

- When a petition for the termination of parental rights alleged only that the children were deprived, not delinquent or unruly, it was not necessary for the juvenile judge to hold a dispositional hearing. In re J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2046, 60 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1979) (decided under former law).

Continued likelihood of deprivation.

- Four elements necessary to a finding of "parental misconduct or inability" as set forth in former subparagraph (b)(4)(A) of O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310) were met when: the child was deprived because of the mother's lack of stable employment or housing; the mother's prior drinking, criminal behavior, physical abuse, neglect, and repeated failure to comply with court-ordered plans authorized a finding that the deprivation resulted from her lack of care or control; the nature and severity of the child's emotional and neurological problems, were such to cause serious harm, and given the evidence of the mother's past behavior and the length of time that had elapsed with no improvement in the situation, the child's need for stability and constant supervision, and the mother's apparent inability to understand the child's problems or provide adequate care or supervision, the juvenile court had clear and convincing evidence that the conditions of deprivation were likely to continue. In re J.C.J., 207 Ga. App. 599, 428 S.E.2d 643 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Order terminating a parent's parental rights to the parent's three children was upheld on appeal as clear and convincing evidence was presented that the parent: (1) was bound by an order of deprivation entered against the parent based on a failure to appeal the order; (2) never fully complied with the case plan, nor had any intention of doing so in the future; and (3) had a history of poor relationship choices such that when this evidence was combined with other evidence supporting termination, the juvenile court was authorized to find that any deprivation was likely to continue. In the Interest of A.C., 280 Ga. App. 212, 633 S.E.2d 609 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

In a second termination of parental rights proceeding against a mother, clear and convincing evidence existed as to a continued deprivation finding, given the mother's ongoing failure to comply with multiple requirements of a case plan, specifically failing to: (1) voluntarily pay any child support; (2) take the necessary steps to prepare financially for the children; (3) obtain a GED; (4) secure new employment; and (4) line up child care. Furthermore, the fact that the mother's husband had an extensive criminal history reflecting substance abuse issues, particularly when considered in conjunction with a DUI incident involving the husband and the mother's current probation sentence for a drug-related offense, constituted evidence in favor of a finding of likely continued deprivation. In the Interest of T.J., 281 Ga. App. 308, 636 S.E.2d 54 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a parent's rights was proper as there was sufficient evidence that continued deprivation was likely to cause harm to the children since child one had suffered 10 separate bone fractures, and the parent failed to offer a reasonable explanation for those injuries. In the Interest of K.J.M., 282 Ga. App. 72, 637 S.E.2d 810 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence showed that continued deprivation would likely cause two children harm in light of the children's bonds formed with the foster parents, the lack of bonds formed with the parent, the "unemotional" state of child one upon arriving in foster care, and child two's reaction to the parent's failed visits. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court properly terminated a parent's rights; given the parent's history of unemployment, unstable housing arrangements, inability to stay in regular contact with social services or the children, and failure to complete substance abuse treatment. The juvenile court was authorized to find that the cause of the children's deprivation would likely continue. In the Interest of K.M., 284 Ga. App. 442, 644 S.E.2d 193 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a case terminating the mother's parental rights, the dependency was likely to continue as the mother's housing could not be considered stable because, at the time of the hearing, the mother had only very recently moved into a boyfriend's mother's home and refused to provide any information about their relationship or their intentions; the mother refused to provide proof of the mother's income or the mother's job, which the mother had only very recently obtained; and the mother continued to be aggressive with the case workers for Department of Family and Children Services, the mother refused to complete all portions of the required psychological evaluation, and the mother refused to provide answers to various questions at the hearing. In the Interest of R. S. T., 345 Ga. App. 300, 812 S.E.2d 614 (2018).

Deprivation continuing from parental drug abuse.

- Juvenile court's findings supported the conclusion that the children were dependent at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing due to a lack of proper parental care and control because the parent's continuing substance abuse was evidenced by the parent's prior positive drug screen and several refused screenings (which the Division of Family and Children Services treated as positive), and because the parent was unable to pay even a symbolic amount of child support or to provide stable housing. In the Interest of A. S., 339 Ga. App. 875, 794 S.E.2d 672 (2016).

Georgia Court of Appeals has long said that a finding that dependency is likely to continue does not necessarily justify a finding of harm, although dependency could support a finding of harm in particular circumstances; rather, in determining whether harm to the child exists, Georgia law requires a juvenile court to consider both the relationship between the parent and child at the time of the termination hearing and what might happen if the child were returned to the parent. In the Interest of L. P., J. P., & P. P., 339 Ga. App. 651, 794 S.E.2d 252 (Nov. 18, 2016).

Judgments terminating the parents' rights to three children under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310 were affirmed based on the mother's re-incarceration and continued pattern of drug use, the parents' failure to consistently visit the children and the behavior problems and mood shifts that occurred with the children after any visit. In the Interest of L. P., J. P., & P. P., 339 Ga. App. 651, 794 S.E.2d 252 (Nov. 18, 2016).

While there was sufficient evidence that the children were dependent due to lack of proper parental care and control, including evidence of inadequate food, clothing, shelter, and supervision, the juvenile court failed to provide specific findings that the dependency was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm. In the Interest of D. M. et al., 339 Ga. App. 46, 793 S.E.2d 422 (2016).

Deprivation likely to continue.

- Given the testimony of the psychologists and the social worker about the effect on the children of their parents' condition and behavior, the parents' continued incarceration and years of probation, their past behavior, and the likelihood of any significant and meaningful change, a rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation was likely to continue or would not likely be remedied. In re A.M.N., 234 Ga. App. 365, 506 S.E.2d 693 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Evidence of physical abuse, inability to provide a safe, sanitary home, and failure to comply with reunification plans authorized the juvenile court to determine that a child was deprived and that her deprivation was likely to continue, and was sufficient to provide clear and convincing evidentiary support that her continued deprivation would cause or was likely to cause her serious physical, mental, emotional, and moral harm. In re K.R.C., 235 Ga. App. 354, 510 S.E.2d 547 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

When the mother admitted that she could not care for her child and that it would be some time in the future before she could do so, and when neither she nor the father complied with a case plan set up for them, there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence from which the trial court could conclude deprivation was likely to continue. In re J.O.L., 235 Ga. App. 856, 510 S.E.2d 613 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Termination of parental rights was affirmed because there was ample evidence, including the family's history of instability, the fact that the children lived in filth for their entire lives, their developmental and emotional problems, and evidence of malnourishment and poor hygiene to support the juvenile court's finding that the deprivation of the children would continue in the future and that termination was in the children's best interest. In the Interest of T.D.B., 266 Ga. App. 434, 597 S.E.2d 537 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Although there was evidence of the father's efforts to improve himself, evidence that the father never accepted responsibility for the children's neglect or the abuse of their mother and utterly failed to demonstrate an ability to cope with the children's medical needs or provide any financial support supported the juvenile court's determination that the deprivation was likely to continue or would not likely be remedied. In the Interest of J.P., 268 Ga. App. 32, 601 S.E.2d 409 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Because a father failed to maintain a familial bond with his child, stopped visiting the child, and generally ignored the case plan requirements for reunification, clear and convincing evidence showed that, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), the child would likely suffer serious harm from continued deprivation. In the Interest of C.A.W., 272 Ga. App. 4, 611 S.E.2d 154 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence supported the finding that the children's deprivation was likely to continue because the mother abandoned the children and failed to maintain meaningful or consistent contact with either the Department of Family and Children Services or the children for over a year, she made no effort to support the children financially, made no effort to comply with the reunification plan, and she surrendered her parental rights in the children. In the Interest of M.E.M., 272 Ga. App. 451, 612 S.E.2d 612 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence that a parent failed to take advantage of offers to help the parent find housing, secure employment, and obtain treatment; missed many scheduled visits with the parent's children; and left the state, which prevented the parent from seeing them, supported the trial court's finding that the deprivation was likely to continue. In the Interest of J.H., 278 Ga. App. 32, 628 S.E.2d 140 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights case, clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that the deprivation was likely to continue pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310); the father showed an inability to keep the children away from the mother despite a court order requiring the father to do so, the father had a long period of noncompliance with the case plan, and the father did not pay child support until ordered to do so. In the Interest of M.R., 282 Ga. App. 91, 637 S.E.2d 743 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 56 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a parent's rights was proper as there was sufficient evidence that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue as: (1) child one suffered multiple bone fractures in at least two separate incidents, but the parent could not provide a plausible explanation for child one's injuries; (2) the parent never identified the source of the problem, so the abuse was unremedied; (3) the parent failed to find stable employment and did not provide financial support for the two children; and (4) the parent failed to complete either the domestic violence counseling or the additional anger management counseling recommended as part of the reunification plan, and failed to take measures to remedy the problems that more than likely contributed to child one's injuries. In the Interest of K.J.M., 282 Ga. App. 72, 637 S.E.2d 810 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence showed that two children's deprivation was likely to continue given the parent's failure to comply with the case plan for more than one year prior to the termination proceeding. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the evidence showed that the child's deprivation was likely to continue under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-94 (see now §§ 15-11-2,15-11-107,15-11-310,15-11-311,15-11-320,15-11-381, and15-11-471), as the mother's sobriety was recent, her compliance with the drug treatment was mandatory to avoid jail, she failed to adequately support the child, her testimony in the termination hearing was evasive, she relinquished and lost custody of her two other children, she made no efforts whatsoever to contact or visit the child until the child was nine months old, and she was willing to reconcile with the father, who was also addicted to methamphetamine and had not completed any type of drug treatment. In the Interest of Z. P., 314 Ga. App. 347, 724 S.E.2d 48 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights proceeding, clear and convincing evidence showed the cause of the deprivation of a father's children would likely continue, under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11- 94(b)(4)(A)(iii) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), because the father did not: (1) complete the father's case plan after getting a job and buying a car; (2) visit the children for five months before the termination hearing; or (3) support the children while the children were in foster care. In the Interest of E.G., 315 Ga. App. 35, 726 S.E.2d 510 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court's finding that continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children was supported by the record because the mother repeatedly failed to comply with the requirements of her case plan to reunite with her children. In the Interest of A. R., 315 Ga. App. 357, 726 S.E.2d 800 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence supported a finding that a mother's deprivation of her children was caused by a lack of proper parental care as the mother failed to sever contact with the father, that she defended the father, and that she diverted resources to the father instead of paying child support or securing appropriate housing. This deprivation was likely to continue. In the Interest of K.L.M., 316 Ga. App. 246, 729 S.E.2d 452 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Exposure of children to domestic violence.

- Termination of a father's parental rights to two minor sons was upheld on appeal because the father had a long history of domestic violence against the mother, regularly threatened her that he would make her watch him kill the children and then he would kill her, and he never established a parental bond or financially supported the children significantly; additional considerations included the father stabbing a male friend of the mother and the children seeing the man bleed on their kitchen floor, photographs found by the mother that appeared to have been close-up shots of one of the children's rectum, which the father explained were taken by a police officer investigating sexual abuse, and expert testimony concluding unanimously that further contact between the father and the children would cause serious harm to the children, who were emotionally fragile. In the Interest of G.W.R., 270 Ga. App. 194, 606 S.E.2d 281 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Past deprivation considered to determine likelihood of continuation.

- As a general rule, while past deprivation is not sufficient for termination without a showing of present deprivation, the past conduct of the parent is properly considered by the court in determining whether such conditions of deprivation are likely to continue. In re L.F., 203 Ga. App. 522, 417 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 344 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81); In re A.M.N., 234 Ga. App. 365, 506 S.E.2d 693 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Although past deprivation is not sufficient for termination without a showing of present deprivation, a juvenile court can consider a parent's past conduct in determining whether such conditions of deprivation are likely to continue. In the Interest of N.L., 260 Ga. App. 830, 581 S.E.2d 643 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Mother's past conduct indicated deprivation likely to continue.

- Based on the mother's past conduct as a recidivist, the juvenile court was authorized to find the deprivation of the children would not likely be remedied in the future and that it was in their best interest that her parental rights be terminated. In the Interest of C.N.S., 248 Ga. App. 84, 545 S.E.2d 633 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Medical and psychological conditions of parent causing deprivation.

- Clear and convincing evidence supported the order terminating a parent's rights to two minor children as the children's deprivation was due primarily to the parent's mental illness and failure to take prescribed medication to address that illness, and during more than 30 months the parent was given to work on a reunification case plan, the mother failed to comply with the requirements of the plan. In the Interest of O. B., 337 Ga. App. 401, 787 S.E.2d 344 (2016).

Sufficient evidence that continued deprivation likely to cause harm.

- Evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights as continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children in light of the children's distress before and during contact with the grandmother, the person the mother put forward as a surrogate parent; also, the children clung to their foster mother after visits with the grandmother. In the Interest of C.T.M., 273 Ga. App. 168, 614 S.E.2d 812 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Because the Department presented sufficient evidence of a father's neglect of two children, lack of any meaningful parental bond, repeated incarceration, and failure to pay child support, the juvenile court, when coupled with the father's acknowledgment that the children thrived in the current placement, was authorized to find that sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that deprivation of the two children by the father was likely to continue and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the childrens' best interest; furthermore, a claim that the father lacked knowledge of, and was not directed to pay child support, was irrelevant in light of the directive found in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2 that a parent had a statutory duty to pay child support with or without a court order. In the Interest of T.C., 281 Ga. App. 137, 635 S.E.2d 395 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Given evidence of a parent's drug addiction, lack of successful treatment and follow-up care, unstable living situation, failure to pay child support, and lack of a close bond with the child at issue, clear and convincing evidence supported a termination of that parent's parental rights based on the child's deprivation, and that the deprivation would likely continue; moreover, pretermitting whether sufficient evidence supported a finding that the parent suffered from a mental illness, this finding was not necessary to support termination of parental rights. In the Interest of D.D.B., 282 Ga. App. 416, 638 S.E.2d 843 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

In a termination of parental rights case, there was sufficient evidence that continued deprivation was likely to seriously harm the children. The deprivation involved, among other things, the mother repeatedly relapsing into drug abuse and her repeated incarceration for crimes and violations of probation, and there was testimony about the children's need for permanency. In the Interest of C.L., 315 Ga. App. 607, 727 S.E.2d 163 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Deprivation likely to cause harm to children.

- Evidence of the father's past neglect of the children's medical, physical, and emotional needs and the testimony of their foster mother which revealed that current contact with the father was upsetting and disruptive to the children, supported a conclusion that continued deprivation was likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children. In the Interest of J.P., 268 Ga. App. 32, 601 S.E.2d 409 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence of deprivation sufficient.

- Evidence was sufficient to show both deprivation and that the deprivation resulted from the mother's conduct. In the Interest of S.B., 242 Ga. App. 184, 528 S.E.2d 278 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence supported the finding that the children's deprivation was caused by the mother because the mother abandoned the children and left them with her mother and her mother's husband, who had been charged with sex crimes, she failed to maintain meaningful or consistent contact with either the Department of Family and Children Services or the children for over a year and made no effort to support the children financially, the mother made no effort to comply with the reunification plan, and she surrendered her parental rights in the children. In the Interest of M.E.M., 272 Ga. App. 451, 612 S.E.2d 612 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence supported the termination of a mother's parental rights as the mother was bound by a juvenile court's order finding that the children were deprived as a result of neglect, including inadequate housing and the mother's substance abuse; the mother did not appeal the juvenile court's finding. In the Interest of C.T.M., 273 Ga. App. 168, 614 S.E.2d 812 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Termination of a parent's rights was proper as there was sufficient evidence that the children would be deprived if returned to their parent's custody given the parent's lack of employment, the parent's inability to financially support the children, their failure to receive further anger management counseling, and failure to complete domestic violence counseling; also, child one's unexplained injuries were evidence of deprivation. In the Interest of K.J.M., 282 Ga. App. 72, 637 S.E.2d 810 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Evidence showed that two children were deprived for purposes of the termination of a parent's rights as: (1) the children had been found to be deprived and were not in the parent's custody, and the parent failed to maintain a parental bond as the parent did not visit the children once in nine months, failed to give the children birthday presents, and did not contact the foster parents; (2) the parent failed to complete the case plan, although the parent completed parenting classes and a substance abuse evaluation, the parent moved at least nine times in two years and did not maintain regular contact with a child services agency; and (3) the parent paid $60 of $900 owed in child support and failed to support the children. In the Interest of C.M., 282 Ga. App. 502, 639 S.E.2d 323 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Lack of evidence that deprivation likely to continue.

- Lack of evidence that the cause of a child's deprivation was likely to continue or that the child's continued deprivation was likely to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child, as required under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-310), required that the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of the child's father be reversed. In the Interest of B.F., 253 Ga. App. 887, 560 S.E.2d 738 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Although a mother was disabled from multiple sclerosis and other problems, took several medications, lived on limited means, was in a contentious relationship with the putative father, had accumulated trash around her home, and had never lived with her four-year-old child, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly show that she was presently unfit and that the deprivation was likely to continue and cause serious harm because the father had moved out and she had cleaned up the home. In the Interest of S. R. R., 330 Ga. App. 817, 769 S.E.2d 562 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A.15-11-94).

Trial court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights to the oldest child as the clear and convincing evidence did not show that the mother was presently unfit and that the child's deprivation was likely to continue and cause substantial harm because the mother had maintained stable housing with the youngest child and that child's father; the mother had sources of income; and the mother met or substantially completed most of the other case plan goals by completing parenting classes, attending counseling sessions, attending the majority of the scheduled visitations with the child, interacting well with the child during visitation, and meeting with the caseworkers. In the Interest of T. M., 329 Ga. App. 719, 766 S.E.2d 101 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights as the cause of the child's deprivation was unlikely to continue because the court ignored the mother's present and well-documented commitment to sobriety; the mother earned a high-school diploma, enrolled in college, completed a drug-rehabilitation program, and attended a 15-week parenting class; the mother never missed a scheduled supervised visit with the child; and the mother's cohabitation with a boyfriend was an insufficient basis for terminating the mother's parental rights as the boyfriend helped the mother maintain a stable home and there was no evidence that the boyfriend's potential drug use would negatively affect the child. In the Interest of J. V. J., 329 Ga. App. 421, 765 S.E.2d 389 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Juvenile court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights as to five of the eight children because the record was devoid of any evidence showing that the dependency was likely to continue or that continued dependency would cause harm to the children. In the Interest of A. B., 346 Ga. App. 2, 815 S.E.2d 561 (2018).

Evidence insufficient to show that deprivation likely to cause harm.

- Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper as a failure to terminate the mother's rights would not cause or was not likely to cause the children serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm because the children would not be harmed seriously were the children to remain in foster care, by virtue of either their relationship with their mother or the impermanency of that situation; the mother had positive visits with the children; the children were happy to see their mother; the children were not performing poorly in school or displaying significant age-inappropriate behavioral problems; and the lack of specific evidence regarding potential harm mandated reversal as the mother and children were bonded and emotionally close. In the Interest of E. M. D., 339 Ga. App. 189, 793 S.E.2d 489 (2016).

Evidence did not clearly and convincingly support terminating the mother's parental rights because the mother had adequate housing, stable income, clean drug screens, completed a substance abuse treatment program, underwent a mental health assessment, started counseling and treatment, and had completed an anger management program, and the record did not show that reasonable efforts to remedy the circumstances of dependency were unsuccessful. In the Interest of B. R. J., 344 Ga. App. 465, 810 S.E.2d 630 (2018).

Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper because, although the trial court was authorized to find that the mother's housing was not stable and that the dependency was likely to continue and would not likely be remedied, the evidence was insufficient to show that continued dependency would cause or was likely to cause the children serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm as the trial court did not assess the extent to which instability and impermanency were currently causing specific harms to the children, and whether, as a result of the dependency, the children would be harmed by remaining in foster care indefinitely; and there was no finding regarding how continuing the status quo would harm the children. In the Interest of A. F., 346 Ga. App. 538, 816 S.E.2d 496 (2018).

Lack of proper parental care by mother caused deprivation.

- Children's deprivation was caused by a lack of proper parental care by the mother since the mother: (1) did not pay child support; (2) failed to comply with the reunification goals: (3) did not resolve the criminal charges against her; (4) did not maintain contact with her children; and (5) did not establish a stable home. In the Interest of J.J., 259 Ga. App. 159, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Mental retardation of parent.

- Insufficient evidence supported the termination of a parent's rights because the record showed that while the parent had mental retardation, the parent functioned well despite the mental disability and had the skills necessary to provide for and raise a family, including two children, in Arkansas; thus, there was a lack of evidence that the deprivation was to continue. In the Interest of O. B., 337 Ga. App. 401, 787 S.E.2d 344 (2016).

Mother's history of child neglect was clearly relevant to the consideration of whether deprivation was likely to continue when, aware of her past failings, she continued to ignore her responsibility to financially support her children. In re M.L.P., 236 Ga. App. 504, 512 S.E.2d 652 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81).

Indication of future deprivation.

- While past acts of deprivation are stronger proof and more convincing evidence upon which to decide the issue, there is no reason why a determination of deprivation may not be made on proof that the conditions under which the child would be raised in the parent's home strongly indicate that deprivation will occur in the future. Roberts v. State, 141 Ga. App. 268, 233 S.E.2d 224 (1977) (decided under prior law); Jones v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 371, 271 S.E.2d 27 (1980);(decided under prior law).

In a termination of parental rights case, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the deprivation was likely to continue. The mother was arrested and jailed following the birth of her older child and violated her probation at least twice; furthermore, even if she left her first rehabilitation program for legitimate reasons, she left it without permission, relapsed into drug abuse, and failed to notify the Department of Family and Children Services of her whereabouts. In the Interest of C.L., 315 Ga. App. 607, 727 S.E.2d 163 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-94).

Insufficient evidence that continued deprivation likely to cause harm.

- Termination of the mother's parental rights was improper because, although the evidence supported the finding that the children's dependency was likely to continue and would not likely be remedied, the state did not sufficiently establish that the children were likely to suffer harm under the status quo as there was no evidence that their continued relationship with their mother was harmful; and the juvenile court's generalized findings that the children would experience doubt, uncertainty and hesitancy in life, and that foster care would not provide the kind of stability they needed, and would put them at risk of delinquency, other anti-social behavior, and "foster care drift" did not show how each child would be harmed by the status quo. In the Interest of A. S., 339 Ga. App. 875, 794 S.E.2d 672 (2016).

No results found for Georgia Code 15-11-304.