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O.C.G.A.Title 34Chapter 9

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281 (2019)

Prerequisites to compensation for occupational disease

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2017 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1984–2018 13citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 13 opinions since 1984. The most litigated part is subsection (b)(2) (2 cases).

(a) Where the employer and employee are subject to this chapter, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as the occurrence of an injury by accident; and the employee or, in the case of his or her death, the employee's dependents shall be entitled to compensation as provided by this chapter. The practice and procedure prescribed in this chapter shall apply to all the proceedings under this article except as otherwise provided.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, an employer shall be liable for compensation under this article only where:

(1) The disease arose out of and in the course of the employment in which the employee was engaged under such employer, was contracted while the employee was so engaged, and has resulted from a hazard characteristic of the employment in excess of the hazards of such disease attending employment in general; and

(2) The claim for disablement is filed within one year after the date the employee knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the disablement and its relationship to the employment; but in no event shall the claim for disablement be filed in excess of seven years after the last injurious exposure to the hazard of such disease in such employment; provided, however, that an employee with asbestosis or mesothelioma related to exposure to asbestos shall have one year from the date of first disablement after diagnosis of such disease to file a claim for disablement. In cases of death where the cause of action was not barred during the employee's life, the claim must be filed within one year of the date of death.

History

(Code 1933, § 114-801, enacted by Ga. L. 1946, p. 103; Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, § 17; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 34; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2485, §§ 3, 9; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 25; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1586, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 631, § 34.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Time limitations for filing claims under chapter generally, § 34-9-82.

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, a comma was inserted following ‘‘provided’’ in the first sentence of paragraph (b)(2). Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1987, p. 1474, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would apply to

any occupational disease not previously diagnosed before July 1, 1987. Ga. L. 1991, p. 1586, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that this amendment shall not operate to revive any claim barred prior to July 1, 1991.

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Occupational Diseases Under the Georgia Workmen’s Compensation Act,’’ see 8 Mercer L. Rev. 333 (1957).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS General Consideration Occupational disease deemed injury by accident. - This section provided that the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident. Yates v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Ga. App. 583, 112 S.E.2d 182 (1959). Action for injury arising from employment barred. - Action for a current or future physical injury by accident due to occupational disease or otherwise (caused by ingestion of or exposure to asbestos fibers) and arising out of the scope of employment is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Johnson v. Hames Contracting, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 664, 431 S.E.2d 455 (1993). Cited in American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 80 Ga. App. 62, 55 S.E.2d 258 (1949); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 83 Ga. App. 863, 65 S.E.2d 59 (1951); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Spence, 122 Ga. App. 464, 177 S.E.2d 503 (1970); Hall v. Synalloy Corp., 540 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 998 F.2d 1092 (1st Cir. 1993); Antonio-Candelaria v. Gibbs

Farms, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-39 (WLS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16295 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2008). Statute of Limitations Retroactive operation of statute of limitations is constitutional. - Legislature may revive a workers’ compensation claim which would have been barred by a previous limitation period by enacting a new statute of limitation, without violating the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, § I, Par. X. Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 317 S.E.2d 189, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S. Ct. 296, 83 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1984). Section controls over § 34-9-82. - There was ample evidence to support the determination that the claimant’s pneumoconiosis was an occupational disease; therefore, the specific statute of limitation applicable to occupational diseases as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2) should control, instead of the statute generally applicable to compensable injuries found in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a). American Int’l Adjusting Co. v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 276, 414 S.E.2d 292 (1991). Date of accident in silicosis case is date that disablement commences. Patter-

Statute of Limitations (Cont’d) son v. Employer’s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 325, 108 S.E.2d 146 (1959). Limitations on actions for disablement from silicosis. - In order to be compensable, disablement from silicosis must occur within three years from the date of the last hazardous exposure of the employee in the course of employment and the employee has one year thereafter in which to file the employee’s claim. Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949); Patterson v. Employer’s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 325, 108 S.E.2d 146 (1959). Silicosis being a disease which develops slowly and which cannot be immediately detected, the General Assembly no doubt intended by the three-year clause in the statute not only to give the disease ample time from the last hazardous exposure in which to develop, but also to give the employee ample time in which to discover that the illness which renders the employee unable to work is silicosis. Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949). When the claimant was disabled when claimant quit work, but did not know of claimant’s disablement, nor if claimant’s disablement was the result of silicosis, claimant had three years after claimant’s last exposure to determine claimant’s disability, and 30 additional days to so notify claimant’s employer of the claim. Patterson v. Employer’s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 325, 108 S.E.2d 146 (1959). Since an employee has one year after disablement occurs in a silicosis case to file a claim, and since to be compensable disablement due to silicosis must result within three years after the last injurious

exposure to the hazard of such disease during employment, it necessarily follows that under no circumstances may a claim for workers’ compensation in a silicosis case be filed more than four years after the termination of employment. Vaughn v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 106 Ga. App. 129, 126 S.E.2d 428 (1962). Statute runs when employee had knowledge. - Focus of the statute is on the employee’s knowledge, not when the employer had notice. American Int’l Adjusting Co. v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 276, 414 S.E.2d 292 (1991). Byssinosis claims. - Employer and insurer had no vested right in the former statute of limitations defense for byssinosis claims regardless of whether the viability of that former defense was or was not previously adjudicated. Williams v. Crompton Highland Mills, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 621, 379 S.E.2d 622 (1989). Asbestosis claim was not time-barred. - Workers’ compensation claim for an employee’s total, permanent disability caused by pulmonary fibrosis and asbestosis was not time-barred by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2) although there was evidence that the employee’s doctors suspected a causal connection between asbestos exposure and the employee’s respiratory illness more than a decade before the claim was filed because evidence supported the finding that the employee did not learn of these suspicions until the asbestosis was diagnosed; the claim was timely whether the limitations period began to run when the employee first learned of the causal connection or when the employee was diagnosed with asbestosis because the claim was filed less than a year after both events. Putzel Elec. Contrs. v. Jones, 282 Ga. App. 539, 639 S.E.2d 540 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, § 290 et seq. C.J.S. - 100A C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, § 1158. ALR. - Constitutionality of statute requiring protection against occupational or industrial diseases and accidents with respect to definiteness and completeness, 99 ALR 613.

Workmen’s compensation as covering disease contracted by employee while on street or in traveling, 141 ALR 806. When limitations period begins to run as to claim for disability benefits for contracting of disease under Workers’ Compensation or Occupational Diseases Act, 86 ALR5th 295.

The 13 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSynalloy Corp. v. Newton, 326 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 1985).
cites § 34-9-281 16×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“[1] OCGA § 34-9-281 (b) (3) provides that workers' compensation claims for occupational diseases must be brought within one year after "the last injurious exposure" to the substance.”
The case’s holding
The Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for employees suffering from occupational diseases, even if the cause of action did not vest until after the enactment of the relevant statutory provisions.
2
GREENCanton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 317 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 34-9-281 10×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“The Act was further amended by adding at the end of OCGA § 34-9-281 a new subsection (d) which provides “In cases of disability or death resulting from byssinosis .”
The case’s holding
Workers' compensation statutes apply retroactively (recognizing retroactivity of provision of workers’ compensation statute).
3
GREENWilliams v. Crompton Highland Mills, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 34-9-281 16×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“As authority for this holding, the ALJ relied upon former OCGA § 34-9-281 (d), which provided, in relevant part, that, “with respect to cases of disability diagnosed as byssinosis prior to July 1, 1983, such claims shall be filed prior to July 1, 1984.”
4
GREENPutzel Elec. Contractors v. Jones, 639 S.E.2d 540 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 34-9-281 16×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“Because Jones’ right to compensation hinges upon when he first learned and/or was first diagnosed with asbestosis, OCGA§ 34-9-281 (b) (2), the AL J was presented with an expansive and detailed account of Jones’ medical history at the hearing.”
5
GREENAm. Int'l Adjusting Co. v. Davis, 414 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 34-9-281 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“In their first five enumerations of error, appellants contend the superior court committed legal error and acted in excess of its authority in reversing the ruling of the board that appellee’s claim was time-barred by OCGA § 34-9-281 (b) (2) and in determining that OCGA §…”
6
GREENSouthwire Co. v. Benefield, 361 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 34-9-281 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-281 (a), an occupational disease is considered to be a compensable, accidental injury.”
Later courts cite it for
“when an employee's injuries are compensable under the act, he is absolutely barred from pursuing a common law tort action to recover for such injuries, even if they resulted from intentional misconduct on the part of the employer. cits.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENKellogg Co. v. Pinkston, 558 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 34-9-281 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“See OCGA § 34-9-281 (b) (2) (“[A]n employee with asbestosis or mesothelioma related to exposure to asbestos shall have one year from the date of first disablement after diagnosis of such disease to file a claim for disablement.”
Later courts cite it for
“the rights and remedies of an employee against his or her employer for a work-related injury under the wca foreclose all other remedies at common law or otherwise for such injury, lost service, or death.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENJohnson v. Hames Contracting, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 34-9-281 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-281 (a), an occupational disease is considered to be a compensable, accidental injury.”
9
GREENFulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Bishop, 365 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 34-9-281 6×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“” Former OCGA § 34-9-281 (b) (2) (OCGA § 34-9-281 (b) (1)).”
10
GREENHarrison v. Digit. Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999).
cites § 34-9-281 1×subsections: (b)(2)cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“§ 34-9-82, and a specific statute of limitation applicable to occupational diseases, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2). Both statutes provide for only a one-year limitations period.”
The case’s holding
An ERISA claim for medical benefits is characterized as a breach of contract action for purposes of borrowing the most analogous state statute of limitations.
Later courts cite it for
“congress sought to protect the interests of participants in employee benefits plans by regulating the administration of such plans and by providing participants and beneficiaries with a variety of remedies to assure compliance with the statutory framework.” · 2 citing courts
11
NEUTRALJohn F. Davis v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 811 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 34-9-281 12×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“Appellant argues that dismissal was improper because, under Article 8 of the Act, specifically OCGA § 34-9-281, the Board has jurisdiction over all work-related injuries and deaths that occur in Georgia.”
12
GREENDugger v. North Bros., 323 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 34-9-281 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“OCGA § 34-9-281 (a). Thus, a disabled employee, or his representative, is required to give or cause to be given to the employer a notice of the disablement immediately on its occurrence or as soon thereafter as practicable.”
13
GREENHarrison v. Digit. Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999).
cites § 34-9-281 1×subsections: (b)(2)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 34-9-281
“§ 34-9-82, and a specific statute of limitation applicable to occupational diseases, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2). Both statutes provide for only a one-year limitations period.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420012018

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.911th Cir.2Ga.2
By subsection
(b)(2)2 cases
Harrison v. Digit. Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999).“§ 34-9-82, and a specific statute of limitation applicable to occupational diseases, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2). Both statutes provide for only a one-year limitations period.”
Harrison v. Digit. Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999).“§ 34-9-82, and a specific statute of limitation applicable to occupational diseases, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2). Both statutes provide for only a one-year limitations period.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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