Distinction between legislative and judicial roles.

- Legislative power is that which declares what the law shall be; judicial is that which declares what law is, and applies it to past transactions and existing cases; the one makes the law, the other expounds and judicially administers it; the one prescribes a rule of civil conduct, the other interprets and enforces it in a case in litigation. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).

Delegation of powers.

- Delegation of the power to tax, and the laying of a tax, are two things. The constitutional provision requiring revenue bills to originate in the House applies to an Act which lays a tax, and does not apply to an Act which merely delegates the power to tax. Harper v. Commonwealth of the Town of Elberton, 23 Ga. 566 (1857).

Legislature has power to serve as check upon executive and judicial departments, and this function is properly performed by enactment of laws; if the legislature wishes to have the law other than what the judiciary construes it to be, it has the power and duty to so write it within the limits of the Constitution. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Acts void if beyond authority of department.

- If any department of the government, including the judiciary, acts beyond the bounds of its authority, such action is without jurisdiction, is unconstitutional, and is void. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).

Power to create crimes and to prescribe punishment therefor is legislative. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930).

Legislature determines whether crime a felony.

- A crime is a felony or not, according to the penalty fixed by the legislature; and it is not within the province of the courts to help out the legislature. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930).

Legislature can fix determinate term of punishment for infraction of a criminal law; and the judiciary is without authority to exercise any discretion in imposing such penalty. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930).

Power of legislature as to determinate or indeterminate sentences.

- All legislation is exclusively within the power of the legislature. This being so, it can prescribe determinate or indeterminate sentences for crime. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930).

Judge imposing indeterminate sentence acts in pursuance of legislative power.

- The legislature can authorize the judiciary to impose an indeterminate sentence, and clothe the judge with discretion in fixing the quantum of punishment within the minimum and maximum limits of punishment prescribed by the Act creating the crime. In exercising such power and discretion, the judge acts, not upon any inherent power residing in the judicial department, but in pursuance of power conferred upon the judge by the legislature. Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S.E. 76 (1930).

Authority to create and alter municipal systems of government is vested in legislature. Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S. Ct. 1307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1967).

Legislature retains power to adopt entirely new charter.

- The power to adopt an entirely new charter cannot be found in either or both of the home rule statutes (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I [see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II] and § 36-35-6). Consequently, this legislative power still resides in the General Assembly. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974).

Power of Secretary of State to confer with charter applicants.

- The Secretary of State could not confer alone or concurrently with the individuals who might apply for a charter. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Thornton, 134 Ga. 405, 67 S.E. 849 (1910).

Rule of Public Service Commission prescribing penalty valid.

- A rule of the Railroad Commission (now Public Service Commission) prescribing a penalty where a carrier fails to furnish cars does not violate the provisions of this paragraph. Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909).

City charter delegating to mayor and council power to extend city limits within given range not unconstitutional. Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275, 99 S.E. 864 (1919).

Adoption of a code, not compilation, is legislative act. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Young, 83 Ga. 512, 10 S.E. 197 (1889).

Failure of legislature to observe internal procedure no grounds for review.

- If in the exercise of power to enact laws, the General Assembly merely fails to observe certain rules of internal procedure, the judiciary would not be authorized to review such action, and the same would be true as to any action of the officers of that body within the sphere of their jurisdiction. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).

Operation of presumption of proper enactment.

- A duly enrolled Act, properly authenticated by the regular presiding officers of both houses of the General Assembly, approved by the Governor, and deposited with the Secretary of State as an existing law, will be conclusively presumed to have been enacted in accordance with constitutional requirements; and it is not permissible to show, by the legislative journals or other records, that it did not receive on its passage a majority vote of all the members elected to each House, or that there was any irregularity in its enactment. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).

Legislative journal and photostatic copies of bill not permissible to impeach Act.

- Where a copy of an enrolled Act levying excise taxes on malt beer and wine and purporting to contain the signatures of the Speaker of the House, Clerk of the House, President of the Senate, Secretary of the Senate, and the Governor, is set out and made a part of the amended petition, which seeks to show invalidity upon the contention that a portion of the title was composed and inserted by some method or agency in an irregular manner during the process of its passage, neither the legislative journals nor photostatic copies of the bill are permissible to impeach the Act, because of the conclusive presumption against any irregularity in its enactment; and, accordingly, this court cannot consider violations of the state constitution that are dependent on being so shown. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).

Delegation of power to adopt name after merger of corporations valid.

- An Act authorizing a board of directors of a consolidated railroad to adopt for its name "Selma, Rome & Dalton Railroad Company," and to adopt as its charter that of the Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad Company is valid. Southern Ry. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, 100 S.E. 380 (1910).

Cited in Central Ga. Land & Lumber Co. v. Exchange Bank, 101 Ga. 345, 28 S.E. 863 (1897); Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930); Maner v. Dykes, 52 Ga. App. 715, 184 S.E. 438 (1936); State Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Educ., 190 Ga. 588, 10 S.E.2d 369 (1940); Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743 (1943); Reliable Transf. Co. v. May, 70 Ga. App. 613, 29 S.E.2d 187 (1944); Bibb County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. 817, 51 S.E.2d 658 (1949); Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949); State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); Spence v. Rowell, 213 Ga. 145, 97 S.E.2d 350 (1957); Russell v. Venable, 216 Ga. 137, 115 S.E.2d 103 (1960); Jamison v. City of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 165 S.E.2d 647 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Gainer v. Ellis, 226 Ga. 79, 172 S.E.2d 608 (1970); Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Renfroe, 130 Ga. App. 621, 204 S.E.2d 317 (1974); Harrell v. Courson, 234 Ga. 350, 216 S.E.2d 105 (1975); Harmon v. State, 235 Ga. 329, 219 S.E.2d 441 (1975); Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976); Department of Natural Resources v. Padgett, 146 Ga. App. 121, 245 S.E.2d 480 (1978); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).

Two types of delegation not unconstitutional.

- Two types of legislation are not repugnant to the Constitution. First is in cases where after a legislative enactment has plainly set forth the purpose of the legislation and marked its limits, it then provided that designated administrative officers should have power to promulgate rules within the scope of the legislation, designed to fully administer and give effect to that law. The second is in legislation to which a referendum is attached which provided that it would become a law only after having received a favorable vote of the people to be affected. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953).

The delegation of the setting of compensation is constitutional where the Constitution is silent as to how compensation is set. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

The former Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Compensation Act of 1982, Ga. L. 1982, p. 1737, repealed in its entirety by Ga. L. 1983, pp. 884, 928, did not unlawfully delegate the duty to set the compensation for justices of the peace to a lesser body, in giving this power to the governing authority of each county, since there was no provision in the 1976 Georgia Constitution that the legislature itself must fix the salary for the judicial office in question. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

Police officer's probable cause determination.

- By acting on a determination of probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, a law enforcement officer was not called upon to exercise the legislative function of defining what constituted a crime, but the executive branch function of enforcing the law; accordingly, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395(a) was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 631 S.E.2d 351 (2006).

Determination of local operation of statute.

- This paragraph does not prevent the legislature from delegating to local authorities the determination of the question whether or not particular legislation should be operative in given counties or localities. Haney v. Comm'rs of Bartow County, 91 Ga. 770, 18 S.E. 28 (1893).

Creation of state courts is sovereign state function, and they can be created only by General Assembly; the creation of such courts involves the appointment or the selection of the judges and of the necessary court officers, and this phase of the creation of the court is likewise a function of the state and cannot be delegated by the General Assembly to a lesser governmental unit, and certainly not to municipal corporations. City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 90 S.E.2d 583 (1955).

Attempt to grant municipality power to try state offenses invalid.

- The legislature has no power to establish a municipal court, or police court, and make it subordinate to the will of the municipal authorities, and at the same time to confer upon it jurisdiction to try offenses against the state when committed within the limits of the municipal corporation. City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, 90 S.E.2d 583 (1955).

Power must be granted by general Act.

- The power of a municipality to punish as a municipal offense that which is by general law of the state also a state offense must be conferred by a general rather than a special Act of the legislature and the grant of such power must be clearly expressed. The mere authority granted in a municipal charter to enact ordinances for the general welfare is not a sufficient delegation of this authority. Furthermore, the act which the municipality seeks to punish as a municipal offense must be such as affects the peace and good order of the municipality and contain some characterizing ingredient not contained in the state offense. Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972).

Distinction between cases dealing with municipal authority to punish for state offenses.

- There is a distinction between an attempt by the legislature to confer upon a municipal court power and authority to punish for a state offense and the delegation in a general Act of authority to the municipality to enact an ordinance making an act which is a criminal offense under the state law a crime under the municipal ordinance and to punish for a violation of the municipal ordinance. Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972).

Delegation of power to pay obligations under Municipal Electric Authority Act not unconstitutional.

- Ga. L. 1975, p. 107, § 17 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-3-129), conferring power on the fiscal authorities to appropriate funds to pay the obligations under the contracts and to make payments of such funds, does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Delegation of power to set interest rates not unconstitutional.

- Ga. L. 1975, p. 107, § 30 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-3-146), limiting the power of the state to adversely affect the interests of the owners of the Municipal Electric Authority's bonds and notes, does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers in violation of this paragraph, because it does not limit the right of the General Assembly to legislate except to prevent legislation which will impair the contracts with the bond owners. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Validity of delegation of power in housing law.

- Neither Ga. L. 1937, p. 210, § 1 et seq. nor Ga. L. 1937, p. 697, § 1 (see now T. 8, Ch. 3, Art. 1, nor T. 8, Ch. 3, Art. 2), delegate to cities and counties powers which are nondelegable legislative powers, in violation of this paragraph. Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938).

Completion of details of county line change delegable.

- This paragraph does not prevent the legislature from delegating completion of details in changing a county line to grand juries, county commissioners, local boards, and the like. Aultman v. Hodge, 150 Ga. 370, 104 S.E. 1 (1920).

Attempt to delegate power to alter corporate limits invalid.

- The matter of fixing municipal corporate limits is strictly legislative, and it was beyond the power of the General Assembly to delegate its exclusive power to alter the corporate limits of a city in the manner provided by the Act (Ga. L. 1946, p. 130) and pursued in reference to the land involved. The statute is therefore unconstitutional and void. Du Pre v. City of Marietta, 213 Ga. 403, 99 S.E.2d 156 (1957).

Section authorizing annexation by ordinance unconstitutional.

- The 1946 Act (Ga. L. 1946, p. 130; former Code 1933, § 69-901), purporting to authorize annexation of property within corporate limits of cities by ordinance, is an unconstitutional attempt to delegate legislative powers, and is void. Proceedings under that void Act, undertaking to incorporate the lands within the city, were void and without effect. Du Pre v. City of Marietta, 213 Ga. 403, 99 S.E.2d 156 (1957).

Municipality prohibited from annexation during referendum process.

- Trial court properly held that a municipality did not have the authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-36-21 to annex land that the Georgia General Assembly designated for annexation to another municipality, subject to a referendum, before the referendum took place; thus, a city was prohibited from attempting to annex property during the referendum process. City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

Section granting municipalities power to approve amusement places not unconstitutional.

- Act approved March 29, 1937, Ga. L. 1937, p. 624 (now repealed), providing that no person should establish a public dance hall, boxing, or wrestling arena, or amusement place, tourist camps, and barbecue stands, for money or profit, outside the limits of incorporated towns or cities of a certain minimum population without first obtaining the permission of the commissioners or other authority in charge of such counties, was not violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the state (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III [see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I]) and federal (U.S. Const., amend. 14) Constitutions, nor of this paragraph. Ingram v. State, 193 Ga. 565, 19 S.E.2d 493 (1942).

Acts empowering county board of commissioners to fix salary of clerk of municipal court were not violative of this section. Truesdel v. Freeney, 186 Ga. 288, 197 S.E. 783 (1938).

Attempt to delegate power to fix salary of district attorney invalid.

- Local Act that delegates to a grand jury and an ordinary (now judge of the probate court) authority to fix the salary to be paid the solicitor general (now district attorney) is violative of the state Constitution (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XII, Para. II [see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VIII, Para. I]) which vests in the General Assembly power to prescribe such salaries, and is violative of this paragraph. Mosley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810, 187 S.E. 20 (1936).

Removal of local school board members.

- Whether characterized as setting a qualification for continued service on the local board in the extraordinary circumstance of an imminent loss of accreditation, or whether characterized as providing for removal for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-73 was held by the Georgia Supreme Court to be a permissible exercise of the legislative power to provide for the removal for cause of members of local boards. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013).

No authority to delegate essentially legislative functions to administrative body.

- Legislature has no power to delegate to board, or bureau or other administrative body authority to make rules or regulations which are essentially legislative in character. Southern Coop. Foundry Co. v. Drummond, 76 Ga. App. 222, 45 S.E.2d 687 (1947).

This paragraph does not prevent legislature from conferring quasi-legislative powers on administrative bodies. Zuber v. Southern Ry., 9 Ga. App. 539, 71 S.E. 937 (1911).

The legislative department of the state will not be permitted to relieve itself by delegation of its powers. It cannot confer on any person or body the power to determine what the law shall be. But this constitutional inhibition does not prevent the grant of legislative authority to some administrative board or other tribunal to adopt rules, by-laws, or ordinances for its government, or to carry out a particular purpose. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

This paragraph does not prevent the grant of legislative authority to some ministerial officer, board or other tribunal to adopt rules, by-laws, or other ordinances for its government, or to carry out a particular purpose. Thus, while it is necessary that a law, when it comes from the lawmaking power, shall be complete, still there are many matters as to methods or details which the legislature may refer to some designated ministerial officer or board. Scoggins v. Whitfield Fin. Co., 242 Ga. 416, 249 S.E.2d 222 (1978).

The General Assembly is empowered to enact laws of general application and then delegate to administrative officers or agencies authority to make rules and regulations necessary to effectuate such laws. DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734, 285 S.E.2d 913 (1982).

General Assembly may delegate certain powers to executive branch of government in order to carry out law as enacted by General Assembly. Sundberg v. State, 234 Ga. 482, 216 S.E.2d 332 (1975).

Delegation must be made with sufficient guidelines.

- Where a delegation of power to an executive official is made with sufficient guidelines, the official's exercise of the delegated power does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).

Ministerial officer shall not have power to define application of statute.

- A statute will be held unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legislative power if it is incomplete as legislation and authorizes an executive board to decide what shall and what shall not be an infringement of the law, because any statute which leaves the authority to a ministerial officer to define the thing to which the statute is to be applied is invalid. Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).

When administrative officers may promulgate rules and regulations.

- After a legislative enactment has plainly set forth its provisions and marked its limits, it may then authorize designated administrative officers to promulgate rules and regulations within the scope of the legislation to administer fully and give effect to it. Crawley v. Seignious, 213 Ga. 810, 102 S.E.2d 38 (1958); Gartrell v. McGahee, 216 Ga. 125, 114 S.E.2d 871 (1960).

Legislature may refer matters of methods or details in carrying out statutory duty.

- While it is necessary that a law, when it comes from the lawmaking power, shall be complete, still there are many matters as to methods or details which the legislature may refer to some designated ministerial officer or board. This paragraph, therefore, does not deny to the lawmaking body the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

Validity of regulations made in conformity with statute.

- Where the Constitution expressly gives to the legislature the power to delegate its lawmaking authority (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II (15) [see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IV]), regulations of administrative bodies in conformity with the statute enacted under such express constitutional sanction are valid. Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

State revenue department's regulation regarding malt beverage distribution in Georgia did not violate the Georgia Constitution, as the regulation did not conflict with the constitutional provision empowering the General Assembly to exercise legislative power by creating laws; the regulation was not a new law, but was merely an administrative rule authorized by and consistent with a duly-passed statute. Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).

Rules promulgated by administrative boards must be within framework of the Act creating them and must be designed to accomplish the purpose of the Act. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

Rule of judicial noninterference.

- Boards and commissions may be either legislative or constitutional, and if their powers are set out in the Constitution the courts should not and cannot interfere. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Invenchek, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 798, 204 S.E.2d 457 (1974).

Public Service Commission has power to regulate motortruck freight transportation.

- The legislature having given to the Public Service Commission regulatory supervision, as provided in the Acts relating thereto, over motortruck freight transportation for hire by common carriers, and the legislature having power to regulate the operation of motortrucks over the highways of this state, it can enact such laws regulating speed, size, brakes, lights, etc., of such vehicles as tended to promote the general safety of the public in the use of the highways of this state by such vehicles. Maner v. Dykes, 55 Ga. App. 436, 190 S.E. 189 (1937).

Courts not to interfere with ratemaking function of Public Service Commission.

- Ratemaking is a legislative function which the Constitution has authorized and required the legislature to delegate to the Public Service Commission. To this extent, and to this extent only, the Commission is constitutionally charged as a lawmaking body, and so long as it does not itself act in an unconstitutional manner the courts do not have any right to interfere. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Invenchek, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 798, 204 S.E.2d 457 (1974).

Authorization of examining board to adopt professional examination valid.

- It is not an improper delegation of legislative power to authorize an examining board to determine the nature and character of an examination which will determine the knowledge and competency of persons desiring to follow an occupation which affects the public welfare, or to prescribe what is satisfactory evidence that a person has skillfully engaged in the occupation for a period of five years prior to the person's application. Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538, 118 S.E.2d 91 (1961).

O.C.G.A. § 43-4-2, providing for examination of architects, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981).

Grant of power to fix milk prices valid.

- Under the state Milk Control Act (Ga. L. 1937, p. 247, now repealed), which sufficiently fixed the policy, general rules, and methods by which the milk control board should exercise its functions, the mere vesting of power in the board to find facts after investigation and to fix maximum and minimum prices based thereon did not render the Act violative of this paragraph on the ground that the Act transferred such power to the board. Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840, 196 S.E. 897 (1938).

Sections granting power to board of education valid.

- Section 14 of Ga. L. 1951, p. 241 and section 11 of Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1406, 1412 (now repealed), are not void upon the ground that they attempt to vest legislative powers in the State Board of Education and offend this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III). Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952).

Adoption of federal method of income calculation no delegation of taxing power.

- Where the State Revenue Commission (now Department of Revenue), in assessing the tax against the defendant, merely adopted the federal method of calculating the defendant's net income under the federal statute as the state's method of accomplishing that result, and properly assessed the tax due to the state as part of the amount which the defendant had paid to the United States, such adoption was not a delegation to the federal authorities of the state's power to tax. Head v. McKenney, 61 Ga. App. 552, 6 S.E.2d 405 (1939).

Delegation of power to levy taxes in Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act invalid.

- Former Code 1933, Ch. 5-29, which attempted to delegate the power of the General Assembly to levy taxes, was in conflict with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III) and this paragraph and for that reason was unconstitutional. Campbell v. Farmer, 223 Ga. 605, 157 S.E.2d 276 (1967).

Authorizing commission to contract for new code not unconstitutional.

- A contract authorized by the General Assembly is not a law and where the General Assembly has retained complete control over the contract and its terms by making it contingent on approval by the General Assembly of an appropriation authorizing the commission to formulate the contract was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 244 Ga. 325, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979).

Grant of authority by legislature to State Board of Examiners in Optometry (now State Board of Optometry) to regulate practice of optometry does not violate constitutional standards. Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Exmrs. in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963).

Unconstitutionality of sections of Motor Vehicle, Farm Machinery and Construction Equipment Franchise Practices Act.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 84-6603(s), 84-6604(d), 84-6610(a)(3), and 84-6610(b)(3), enacted by Ga. L. 1976, p. 1440, were unconstitutional, null and void because each and all of said sections improperly and unlawfully delegate legislative responsibility to the Franchise Practices Commission in violation of this paragraph. Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979).

Power of revenue commissioner to punish for violations of alcoholic beverage laws.

- Unrestrained and unrestricted power by the state revenue commissioner to declare a violation of the commissioner's administrative and policing regulations to be a misdemeanor would offend the Constitution, but applying the limitation contained in former Code 1933, § 58-1069 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-3-27) that section was not subject to the attacks made upon it. Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 S.E.2d 534 (1950).

Delegation of power to make penal laws not authorized.

- Where the legislative power is by express constitutional provision placed in the legislature, such lawmaking body cannot delegate to an administrative body the power to make penal laws concerning conduct not made illegal by the enabling Act. Flynn v. State, 88 Ga. App. 52, 76 S.E.2d 38 (1953).

An Act which delegates to an agency the authority to make rules or regulations, the violation of any and all of them constituting a misdemeanor, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).

When regulations can be basis for prosecution.

- Agency regulations which can be made the basis of a criminal prosecution are those made in accord, or in harmony, with those things declared to be a crime by the terms and provisions of the Act involved. Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).

Approval of taking of municipal property.

- Statutes granting the Commission on the Condemnation of Public Property the power to approve the taking of municipal property do not amount to an improper delegation of legislative power and do not violate separation-of-powers principles. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 699, 398 S.E.2d 567 (1990).

Delegation of quasi-legislative matters.

- While the General Assembly cannot delegate powers, it may confer upon administrative bodies the power to deal in a somewhat legislative way with quasi-legislative matters. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 700.

Constitutionality of Junior College Act.

- Ga. L. 1958, p. 47, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 3, T. 20) does not violate this paragraph, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI), or Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. X). 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 100.

No duty or authority is conferred upon Commissioner of Agriculture by Constitution; to the contrary, the express authority is reserved in the General Assembly to prescribe the duties, authority, and salaries of the executive officers. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 4.

Authority of legislature to curtail activities of Commissioner of Agriculture.

- The General Assembly does not have the authority to abolish the office of the Commissioner of Agriculture, but it has the authority to curtail the activities of the Commissioner of Agriculture by creating autonomous agricultural services. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 4.

Legislature is only state authority with consent power over federal acquisitions.

- Only authority of the state which has power to consent to the acquisition of property within the state by the federal government so as to deprive the state of jurisdiction over the property is the General Assembly. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 49.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 284 et seq. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 38 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 5et seq., 283 et seq., 232. 16C C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 1875 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of legislative delegation of powers to prescribe or vary regulations concerning motor vehicles used on highways, 87 A.L.R. 546.

Power and duty of court where legislature renders constitutional mandate ineffectual by failing to enact statute necessary to make it effective or by repealing or amending statute previously passed for that purpose, 153 A.L.R. 522.

Validity of delegation to private persons or organizations of power to appoint or nominate to public office, 97 A.L.R.2d 361.

Validity of statute establishing or authorizing minimum price schedules for barbers, 54 A.L.R.3d 916.

What constitutes taking of property requiring compensation under takings clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution - Supreme Court cases, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231.

Construction and application of "public use" restriction in Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause - United States Supreme Court Cases, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 407.