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Call Now: 904-383-7448(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles; to commute penalties; to remove disabilities imposed by law; and to remit any part of a sentence for any offense against the state after conviction.
(b) (1) When a sentence of death is commuted to life imprisonment, the board shall not have the authority to grant a pardon to the convicted person until such person has served at least 25 years in the penitentiary; and such person shall not become eligible for parole at any time prior to serving at least 25 years in the penitentiary.
(2) The General Assembly may by general law approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote provide for minimum mandatory sentences and for sentences which are required to be served in their entirety for persons convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual battery and, when so provided by such Act, the board shall not have the authority to consider such persons for pardon, parole, or commutation during that portion of the sentence.
(3) The General Assembly may by general law approved by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote provide for the imposition of sentences of life without parole for persons convicted of murder and for persons who having been previously convicted of murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual battery or having been previously convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States of a crime which if committed in this state would be one of those offenses and who after such previous conviction subsequently commits and is convicted of one of those offenses and, when so provided by such Act, the board shall not have the authority to consider such persons for pardon, parole, or commutation from any portion of such sentence.
(4) Any general law previously enacted by the General Assembly providing for life without parole or for mandatory service of sentences without suspension, probation, or parole is hereby ratified and approved but such provisions shall be subject to amendment or repeal by general law.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Paragraph, the General Assembly, by law, may prohibit the board from granting and may prescribe the terms and conditions for the board's granting a pardon or parole to:
(1) Any person incarcerated for a second or subsequent time for any offense for which such person could have been sentenced to life imprisonment; and
(2) Any person who has received consecutive life sentences as the result of offenses occurring during the same series of acts.
(d) The chairman of the board, or any other member designated by the board, may suspend the execution of a sentence of death until the full board shall have an opportunity to hear the application of the convicted person for any relief within the power of the board.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall have the authority to pardon any person convicted of a crime who is subsequently determined to be innocent of said crime or to issue a medical reprieve to an entirely incapacitated person suffering a progressively debilitating terminal illness or parole any person who is age 62 or older.
(Ga. Const. 1983, Art 4, § 2, Para. 2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 2015, § 1.)
- Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. I; Art. V, Sec. II, Para. II.
- Power of judges to suspend or probate sentences, § 17-10-1.
State Board of Pardons and Paroles generally, Ch. 9, T. 42.
Powers of State Board of Pardons and Paroles, § 42-9-20.
Governor without power as to pardons or paroles, § 42-9-56.
Restrictions on relief for person serving a second life sentence, § 42-9-39.
- The constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1994, p. 2015, § 1) which revised subparagraphs (b) and (e) to authorize the General Assembly to provide by two-thirds vote for mandatory service of sentences for persons convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual battery without possibility of pardon, parole, or commutation during that portion of the sentence, to provide in the same manner for sentences of life without parole for persons convicted of murder and those who have been convicted a second time of any of the above offenses, and to provide exceptions as to persons convicted of a crime and subsequently determined to be innocent of that crime or determined to be medically incapacitated, and as to certain elderly persons was approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting at the general election held on November 8, 1994.
- Pardons and paroles, Official Compilation of Rules and Regulations of State of Georgia, Rules of State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Chs. 475-1 through 475-3.
- For article discussing areas in which attorneys may represent clients before the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 46 (1976). For note on the 1994 amendment of this paragraph, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 37 (1994).
Effect of pardon is to release the punishment and blot out the guilt. United States v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1868).
- A reprieve by the executive is nothing but a temporary suspension for the period named in the respite of the execution of the sentence imposed by the court. Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.E. 481 (1926).
- The contention that only the Governor can stay the execution of a sentence in a case where such sentence has been suspended by the Governor in the exercise of the Governor's right to suspend the sentence by reprieve is untenable under Ga. L. 1924, p. 195, § 7 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-10-40). Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.E. 481 (1926) (decided under Ga. Const. 1877, Art. V, Sec. I, Para. XII, relating to the Governor's power to suspend execution of sentences).
Conditional pardon may be granted. Carmichael v. Banks, 102 Ga. 217, 29 S.E. 211 (1897).
Paragraph will not be given retroactive application. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94 (1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 829, 65 S. Ct. 915, 89 L. Ed. 1396 (1945) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
- Decision of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to eliminate plaintiff's parole eligibility which constituted a change in the policy of the Board to grant parole to persons convicted under the recidivist statute did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1196, 121 S. Ct. 1200, 149 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2001), vacating and remanding Metheny v. Hammonds, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
Court will not rule on validity of paragraph where prior provision would have same effect. Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 32 S.E.2d 94 (1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 829, 65 S. Ct. 915, 89 L. Ed. 1396 (1945) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-16, the life-without-parole statute, does not violate separation of powers doctrine because it imposes legislative restrictions on the Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant parole. Freeman v. State, 264 Ga. 27, 440 S.E.2d 181 (1994).
- Where O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(d) provides that the adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence not be suspended, probated, deferred or withheld, and where the term "paroled" is not expressly included, it does not conflict with the parole authority given the State Board of Pardons and Paroles under the Georgia Constitution. Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).
- The trial court erred by requiring defendant to waive the defendant's fourth amendment right as a condition of parole, since any attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant by the State Board of Pardons and Parole would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive. Stephens v. State, 207 Ga. App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993).
- The power of the board to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles, to commute penalties, to remove disabilities imposed by law, and to remit parts of sentences is discretionary. Justice v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 234 Ga. 749, 218 S.E.2d 45 (1975).
- An "Order of Restoration of Civil and Political Rights" issued by the Board of Pardons and Paroles did not constitute a pardon of an applicant to become a professional bondsperson, since the Board's authority to grant pardons is an entirely separate and distinct power from its authority to remove disabilities imposed by law. Harrison v. Wigington, 269 Ga. 388, 497 S.E.2d 568 (1998).
- This paragraph and Ga. L. 1943, p. 185 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 42) provide that a person sentenced to the extreme penalty of the law may make application for commutation of that person's sentence. It is the clear intent of this paragraph and the law that consideration and action upon one application for commutation by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles is all that the prisoner may demand as a matter of right. Whether or not a second application would be considered and acted upon by the board would be a matter for their discretion. McLendon v. Everett, 205 Ga. 713, 55 S.E.2d 119 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
- Habeas court erred by revoking the petitioner's remaining portion of the original sentence while the petitioner was in the legal custody of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles as such action was in violation of the separation of powers provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III. Hayward v. Danforth, 299 Ga. 261, 787 S.E.2d 709 (2016).
Confidentiality provisions of Ga. L. 1975, p. 786, § 4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 42-9-53) apply to information, documents, memoranda, and records of State Board of Pardons and Paroles except those required to be made available to the General Assembly under this paragraph (requirement now deleted), and except the transcripts of any hearing conducted by the board in any matter. Morris v. State, 246 Ga. 510, 272 S.E.2d 254 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-53 is constitutional under this paragraph. Morris v. State, 246 Ga. 510, 272 S.E.2d 254 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
Remitted fine is recoverable. Parrott v. Wilson, 51 Ga. 255 (1874).
Contract to obtain a pardon legitimately is valid. Formby v. Pryor, 15 Ga. 258 (1854); Bird v. Meadows, 25 Ga. 251 (1858).
- Trial court erred in granting the state's motion to revoke defendant's probation for a probation violation as the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles had terminated the probationary portion of defendant's sentences and had restored defendant's civil and political rights; the state could not meet its initial burden to show a sentence of probation. White v. State, 274 Ga. App. 805, 619 S.E.2d 333 (2005).
- Death row inmate's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of a warden's forbidding prison staff to testify for the inmate in a clemency hearing was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because the Due Process Clause did not guarantee state prisoners a right to acquire such testimony, nor did it bar state officials from limiting prisoners' access to such testimony, despite a Georgia statute allowing the Board of Pardons and Paroles to collect all available information. Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, stay denied, 136 S. Ct. 25, 192 L. Ed. 2d 996 (U.S. 2015).
- Inclusion on the sex offender registry pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 was a legal consequence of the underlying criminal offense and a disability imposed by law and the defendant's pardon by the pardon's express terms removed all disabilities under Georgia law resulting from the defendant's conviction and relieved all the legal consequences thereof, and restored all of the defendant's civil and political rights, excepting only the defendant's firearm rights. State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).
Cited in Muckle v. Clarke, 191 Ga. 202, 12 S.E.2d 339 (1940); Matthews v. Everett, 201 Ga. 730, 41 S.E.2d 148 (1947); Turner v. Wilburn, 206 Ga. 149, 56 S.E.2d 285 (1949); Parks v. State, 206 Ga. 675, 58 S.E.2d 142 (1950); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Green v. State, 244 Ga. 755, 262 S.E.2d 68 (1979); Johns v. State, 160 Ga. App. 535, 287 S.E.2d 617 (1981); Charron v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 253 Ga. 274, 319 S.E.2d 453 (1984); Guyton v. State, 272 Ga. 529, 531 S.E.2d 94 (2000); Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (2010).
- O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, providing that a habitual criminal shall not be eligible for parole, is unconstitutional and may be ignored. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 519. Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1196, 121 S. Ct. 1200, 149 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2001).
- Responsibility of releasing prisoners who have served their minimum terms with perfect conduct records rests on State Board of Pardons and Paroles, and not on the State Board of Corrections (now Department of Offender Rehabilitation) or the director thereof. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 193.
Language of this paragraph covers misdemeanors, and therefore it would be necessary to change the Constitution in order to eliminate, as a matter of law, misdemeanor prisoners from consideration for parole. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 3 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
- The right to operate a motor vehicle, to practice a profession, and other extraordinary rights granted and regulated by the state under its police power are not affected by a pardon. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 506.
One pardoned for traffic offense not entitled to reinstatement of driver's license. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 506.
- It was not the intent of the law that the records of the board be kept secret from the Governor; files relating to a parole action should be made available to the Governor at the Governor's request. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-51.
- The State Board of Pardons and Paroles may entitle or refer to orders authorized to be entered by the Constitution or statutes by employing whatever caption it deems appropriate; it is not necessary for the board to employ such words as "reprieve," "pardon," "parole," "commutation," or "remission" in the caption of its orders. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-210.
- Georgia Laws 1976, p. 1865 is a limitation on the authority of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant pardons or paroles to persons whose death penalties are commuted by the board after January 1, 1977, or persons who are convicted of armed robbery after January 1, 1977. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-17.
- Under current Georgia law, the board may extend clemency only after conviction. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-101.
- The phrase "after conviction" as contained in this paragraph does not mean that the power to grant parole exists at any and all times following conviction. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-97 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
Board may not review original record of trial for purpose of determining guilt or innocence of defendant, but may consider it on the question of clemency. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 443.
- Neither the Attorney General nor the State Board of Corrections may release an inmate of the Georgia penal system into the custody of officials of another state in order for the inmate to be tried in the criminal courts of the foreign state. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-304.
One under 16 years of age who commits crime may be pardoned. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 626.
- A person convicted of a crime before reaching the age of 17 loses the person's right to vote if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude even though he is committed to the Department of Human Resources, rather than sentenced to the Board of Corrections; the right to vote and other civil and political rights, however, may be restored by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-17.
Board is not empowered to grant clemency where offense is criminal contempt of court. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-36.
- Where a prisoner is incarcerated in another state and is serving its and Georgia sentences concurrently, a provision for suspension of the Georgia sentence in the event of a parole by the other state authorities does not usurp the functions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-147.
- Under this paragraph and Ga. L. 1943, p. 185 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 42), the board may, if it deems it necessary and proper in the interest of the prisoner and the public, grant to such prisoner a conditional release providing therein that such release is conditioned upon the prisoner's remaining in a state hospital and continuing the treatment prescribed by the members of the staff until such time as the prisoner has been cured of an illness, or the illness reduced to such point where the physicians in charge of the prisoner's case deem it prudent and safe for the prisoner and the general public that the prisoner be dismissed from the hospital. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 504 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Para. II).
- Board has the power to commute a sentence of imprisonment to present service upon the condition that the prisoner pay a fine in the sum fixed within the law by the board, or upon such other conditions which are not illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 446.
Board has authority to commute sentence from six months in jail to six months in county correctional institution. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 137.
- A reprieve is the withdrawing of any sentence for an interval of time, it does no more than stay the execution of the sentence for a period of time. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 200.
- Board may, in its discretion, grant a reprieve of a sentence for a specified period of time to enable a prisoner to obtain medical treatments outside of the confines of a state penal institution. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-205.
- Board may not permit a prisoner to leave the state under a reprieve order so long as board's own rule prohibits such practice; however, there is no constitutional or statutory provision which would prevent the board from granting a reprieve, for medical purposes, when the members of the board know that the prisoner intends to leave the state for the purpose of securing medical treatment if the board changed its rule. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-205.
- Where a prisoner receives a reprieve of the prisoner's sentence for the purpose of receiving medical treatment, the prisoner's sentence does not run during the time the prisoner is outside the penitentiary. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 200.
- As of January 1, 1995, there are additional constitutional limitations on the power of the Board of Pardons and Paroles to parole which now are the clear prerogative of the General Assembly to proscribe. They include the inability to parole during the mandatory minimum sentence for the seven serious violent felonies set out in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, the inability to parole for sentences of life without parole as set out in O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-7(b)(2) and17-10-16, and the inability to parole for felony recidivists who are convicted for a fourth or subsequent such offense. Other felons and misdemeanants are required to serve the minimum time prescribed in O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45(b) subject to the authority reserved by statute to the board in O.C.G.A. § 42-9-46 to consider for clemency upon complying with certain notice procedures. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-4.
- 67A C.J.S., Pardon and Parole, § 1 et seq.
- Power of executive to pardon one committed for contempt, 23 A.L.R. 524; 26 A.L.R. 21; 38 A.L.R. 171; 63 A.L.R. 226.
Constitutionality of statute conferring on court power to suspend sentence, 26 A.L.R. 399; 101 A.L.R. 402; 109 A.L.R. 1048; 132 A.L.R. 819; 158 A.L.R. 1315.
Consent of convict as essential to a pardon, commutation or reprieve, 52 A.L.R. 835.
Pardon as affecting previous offenses or punishment therefor, 57 A.L.R. 443.
Power of executive to pardon one committed for contempt, 63 A.L.R. 226.
Pardon as defense to proceeding for suspension or cancellation of license of physician, surgeon, or dentist, 126 A.L.R. 257.
Pardon as preventing disbarment of attorney or removal of officer or as nullifying disbarment or removal, 143 A.L.R. 172; 70 A.L.R.2d 268.
Offenses and convictions covered by pardon, 35 A.L.R.2d 1261.
Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor, 58 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Validity, construction, application, and effect of statute requiring conditions, in addition to expiration of time, for reinstatement of suspended or revoked driver's license, 2 A.L.R.5th 725.
Judicial investigation of pardon by governor, 101 A.L.R.6th 431.