Inherent authority of state official.

- A duly elected, constitutional officer must have the inherent authority to implement certain public safety policies. One such public safety policy is the random drug screening of personnel who are authorized to carry weapons. The state has a compelling reason for randomly drug testing law enforcement employees because drug use by them undermines public confidence in the integrity of law enforcement and poses a danger to fellow employees, prison inmates, and the public at large. Mayo v. Fulton County, 220 Ga. App. 825, 470 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

Cited in Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S.E. 457 (1913); Culbreth v. Cannady, 168 Ga. 444, 148 S.E. 102 (1929); Overton v. Gandy, 170 Ga. 562, 153 S.E. 520 (1930); McGill v. Simmons, 172 Ga. 127, 157 S.E. 273 (1931); McBrien v. Starkweather, 43 Ga. App. 818, 160 S.E. 548 (1931); Gay v. Laurens County, 213 Ga. 518, 100 S.E.2d 271 (1957); Best v. State, 109 Ga. App. 553, 136 S.E.2d 496 (1964); Gruber v. Fulton County, 111 Ga. App. 71, 140 S.E.2d 552 (1965); Daniel v. Yow, 226 Ga. 544, 176 S.E.2d 67 (1970); Pitts v. Cates, 536 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976); Barbour v. Democratic Executive Comm., 246 Ga. 193, 269 S.E.2d 433 (1980); In re Irvin, 171 Ga. App. 794, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984); Clark v. State, 255 Ga. 370, 338 S.E.2d 269 (1986); Hart v. Madden, 256 Ga. 497, 349 S.E.2d 737 (1986); Thompson v. Carter, 905 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Ga. 1995); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which used the phrase "county officers" without setting out specific examples, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph defines a county officer. Andrews v. Butts County, 29 Ga. App. 302, 114 S.E. 912 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

This paragraph refers only to such county offices as were in existence at the time of its adoption, and does not apply to offices thereafter created by statute. Marshall v. Walker, 183 Ga. 44, 187 S.E. 81 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Members of board of county tax assessors are not county officers within this paragraph. Barnes v. Watson, 148 Ga. 822, 98 S.E. 500 (1919) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Office of county commissioner is a county office governed by constitutional provisions of this paragraph. Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

An incumbent in office as a member of the board of county commissioners as provided for in Ga. L. 1929, p. 568, is a county officer. Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294, 155 S.E. 18 (1930).

An incumbent in office as ordinary (now judge of probate court) is a county officer within the meaning of this paragraph. Lee v. Byrd, 169 Ga. 622, 151 S.E. 28 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Office of county school superintendent is a constitutional office.

- Thus, the superintendent is to be elected by the voters of the superintendent's district, the superintendent's district being the county of the superintendent's residence exclusive of any independent school system in existence in such county. Kemp v. Mitchell County Democratic Executive Comm., 216 Ga. 276, 116 S.E.2d 321 (1960).

Deputy sheriffs are not "county officers" within the meaning of this paragraph. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 476, 136 S.E.2d 518 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Sheriff is a county officer.

- Sheriff, pursuant to the state constitution, was a county officer and was not an employee of the county commission; however, as a county officer, the sheriff's budget and accounts were subject to the authority of the county commission, which could cut the sheriff's budget, but the trial court erred in granting the sheriff's petition for writ of mandamus and injunctive relief after concluding that the county commission's adopted budget that delineated specific functions within the sheriff's department improperly dictated to the sheriff how to operate the sheriff's office, as the real issue was whether the budget it adopted reasonably and adequately allowed the sheriff to perform the sheriff's duties. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Saba, 278 Ga. 176, 598 S.E.2d 437 (2004).

Trial court's determination that a county sheriff was not also a State of Georgia employee for workers compensation purposes under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), the exclusive remedy provision, was proper, as sheriffs were only authorized to act within their county, they were defined as county officers under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III, and sheriffs' salaries were subject to change. Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

The Georgia Tort Claims Act did not apply to a wrongful death suit brought against a county, a sheriff, and a deputy; under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), sheriffs are county officers and O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(5) excludes counties from the Act, and moreover the county paid the salaries and employee benefits of the sheriff and the sheriff's employees and funded the sheriff's department. Nichols v. Prather, 286 Ga. App. 889, 650 S.E.2d 380 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 766 (Ga. 2007).

Trial court properly denied a sheriff's motion to dismiss the negligence suit brought against the sheriff and eight other employees of the sheriff's department arising from the death of a court reporter as the sheriff was an elected official and was not a county employee; therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), did not bar the suit. Freeman v. Brandau, 292 Ga. App. 300, 664 S.E.2d 299 (2008).

County sheriff's office was not a proper defendant in plaintiff's injury action because the sheriff's office was not an entity capable of being sued under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 in that the sheriff was a constitutionally created office under both Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), and Fla. Const. Art. 8, Sec. 1, and employees acted in the name of the sheriff and not as an employee of the sheriff's office under O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23 and Fla. Stat. § 30.07. Harris v. Lawson, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a sheriff's deputy's widow's claims against the sheriff and the deputy's fellow deputies on the basis that the Worker's Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., provided her exclusive remedy under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). The sheriff was the deputy's "employer" under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), and O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3). Teasley v. Freeman, 305 Ga. App. 1, 699 S.E.2d 39 (2010).

Sheriff has no authority over commissions generated by use of county jail.

- County sheriff was not entitled to keep commissions received from a company that provided telephone services to county jail inmates as revenue generated using county property or facilities - such as the jail - was itself county property and therefore subject to county authority under O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22.1. Although a sheriff could collect certain fees, such as fees for attending court, O.C.G.A. § 15-16-21 provided that such fees had to be turned over to the county's treasurer or fiscal officer. Lawson v. Lincoln County, 292 Ga. App. 527, 664 S.E.2d 900 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 899 (Ga. 2008).

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 45-2-2, a deputy sheriff could not serve as a school board member for the same county. Black v. Catoosa County Sch. Dist., 213 Ga. App. 534, 445 S.E.2d 340 (1994).

Sovereign immunity to deputy.

- Deputy sheriff in the deputy's official capacity was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to a former inmate's claims arising from denial of a dietary request; the sheriff's powers were derived from the state, and provision of food to county jail inmates was a state function. Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016).

Emphasis of the Constitution dealing with membership of newly created county offices is upon election, and appointments to fill such offices are authorized only when there is a vacancy in an existing office. Lance v. Stepp, 232 Ga. 675, 208 S.E.2d 559 (1974).

To be termed and classified as a county officer within the provisions of this paragraph, a person must be: (1) elected by qualified voters of the county; (2) hold office for four years; (3) be a resident of the county for two years; and (4) be a qualified voter. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949); Employees Retirement Sys. v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 476, 136 S.E.2d 518 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Office of school superintendent.

- Although a county school superintendent is a "county officer" for several purposes, the office of school superintendent is not always a county office. Bradfield v. Wells, 262 Ga. 198, 415 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

A local constitutional amendment which prohibits "county officers" from succeeding themselves after two successive terms in office does not govern the qualifications or eligibility for the office of superintendent of the Telfair County School District. Bradfield v. Wells, 262 Ga. 198, 415 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

Authority of officers over expenditures.

- Since county commissioners approved a budget for the office of the superior court clerk that included a miscellaneous line item for a specified amount of money for certain years, the item had already been budgeted to the clerk by the commission in the exercise of its authority over the clerk's budget; thus, the decision of how to spend this money fell solely to the clerk in the exercise of the clerk's duties, and not to the commission. Griffies v. Coweta County, 272 Ga. 506, 530 S.E.2d 718 (2000).

Tax commissioner's personnel decisions not state functions.

- Madison County Tax Commissioner was not acting as an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution when making the decision to terminate an employee; although the Tax Commissioner was an elected state constitutional officer pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III, and the Tax Commissioner's Office was not a division of Madison County or its governing authority pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I, since the Tax Commissioner's duties included both state functions and county functions to be performed within Madison County and, with regard to personnel administration, the state distinguished between employees of the county and employees of elected county officials, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I(c)(1), and so the Tax Commissioner, and not the county, defined certain work regulations for the Tax Commissioner's employees, a fact that did not transform the Tax Commissioner's administration of personnel into a state function, however, because, although state law provided the Tax Commissioner with the authority to manage office personnel, the state exercised little control over the use of that authority. Epps v. Watson, U.S. (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2007).

As for funding, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-183 provided that the county, not the state, funded the Tax Commissioner's office expenses, including personnel expenses, and gave the Tax Commissioner the authority to set employee salaries, limited to the budget provided by the county; based on these considerations, the court found that the Madison County Tax Commissioner did not wear a "state hat" when making personnel decisions for the Tax Commissioner's office. Epps v. Watson, U.S. (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2007).

Tax Commissioner's Office separate entity from county.

- Plaintiff could not dispute that the Tax Commissioner's Office (TCO) was a separate entity from Madison County. Plaintiff did not submit evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff was an employee of the county, not the TCO. Epps v. Watson, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008).

Modification of requirement of uniformity by allowing different salaries for county officers.

- The provision, "County officers may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law," which was not contained in the Constitution of 1877, could have no other purpose than to modify the requirement as to uniformity of laws to the extent of allowing the General Assembly to fix different salaries for officers in the counties of this state. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

Georgia Laws, 1958, p. 2362, abolishing the fee system and placing county sheriff on a salary, is not violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. IV (no comparable provision in Ga. Const. 1983), since that provision of the Constitution refers only to salaries set forth in the Constitution, and does not refer to county officers, who, under this paragraph of the Constitution "may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law," which may be changed by the General Assembly to apply to county officers then in commission. Barnett v. Boling, 214 Ga. 401, 105 S.E.2d 312 (1958). (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. IV; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Grand jury initially authorized to recommend county officers' salaries.

- It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to authorize fiscal authorities of counties to increase or diminish salary of all county officers, at any time on recommendation of two successive grand juries, whenever the circumstances required such change, and to authorize such change without respect to their terms of office. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

Prior to the amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1945, county officers' salaries were subject to change in the discretion of the General Assembly, and it was the intent of the amendments to the Constitution, adopted in 1945 - since they did not require a referendum of the people of the locality to change compensation of county officers, and because the amendment of 1945 stated that the compensation of county officers may be fixed as may be directed by law - that the compensation of county officers would be left solely to the discretion of legislative control and enactment without restriction, except that they would be placed on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary as deemed proper by the General Assembly. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

General Assembly intended for compensation of county officers to be fixed from time to time by legislative enactment as circumstances might in its discretion require. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

Counties responsible for salaries or fee of county officers.

- As such county officer, a person is not an executive officer of the state as specifically named in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. III). While county officers have been referred to as constitutional officers, nevertheless, they are not "elective officers" within the meaning of the Constitution of 1945 where it is declared that no change in salary "shall affect the officers then in commission." This is true for reason that the Constitution merely prescribes manner of election of county officers and the term of office, and then requires that county offices shall be uniform in name throughout the state. The compensation of county officers is not provided for in the Constitution, and the state makes no contribution thereto. The county officers are paid solely and exclusively from funds out of the treasury of the county. Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

Counties are not subject to grand jury recommendation.

- The General Assembly, while recognizing desirability of providing for either increasing or diminishing salary of county officers without regard to their terms of office, deemed it wise not to subject compensation of such officers to recommendation of grand juries, and instead took upon itself right to prescribe compensation for county officers when it declared in its recommendation, which was ratified by the people of this state, that "county officers may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law." Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949).

Calhoun County probate judge's compensation.

- Pursuant to constitutional authority, the General Assembly enacted a special law placing the probate judge of Calhoun County on a salary. This law, Georgia Laws 1971, p. 2914, provides that the probate judge of Calhoun County shall collect "all fees . . . formerly allowed as compensation in any capacity in his office . . ., and pay the same into the county treasury . . .," but fees collected by a probate judge for services rendered as a local custodian of vital records cannot be said to be fees collected "in his office" as probate judge. Porter v. Calhoun County, 250 Ga. 566, 300 S.E.2d 143 (1983).

Supplementation of compensation for Madison County officials.

- An act of the General Assembly in 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, 2667 et seq.) creating the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of Madison County, and giving the board "complete power, authority, and control relative to county matters," constituted a legislative delegation to the county commission of the power to supplement the minimum compensation of the four elected county officials by paying from county funds premiums on group health and life insurance. Hart v. Madden, 256 Ga. 497, 349 S.E.2d 737 (1986).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which provided that a person was eligible to be a county officer only if the person was a qualified voter and resident of the county for two years, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Pardoned felon may be barred from running for office of sheriff.

- Paragraph authorizes General Assembly to prohibit convicted felon from running for office of sheriff even if the felon obtained a full pardon. Georgia Peace Officer Stds. & Training Council v. Mullis, 248 Ga. 67, 281 S.E.2d 569 (1981) (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. IX; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Constitutional prescription in area preempts General Assembly action.

- Where the Constitution has prescribed the qualifications which allow and prevent eligibility to a public office, the General Assembly cannot by statute add to or take from those conditions of eligibility. Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978); Griggers v. Moye, 246 Ga. 578, 272 S.E.2d 262 (1980).

Residency requirement.

- Both this paragraph and paragraph (7) of former Code 1933, § 89-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1) require that candidates reside in the county for two years immediately preceding election to county office. Griggers v. Moye, 246 Ga. 578, 272 S.E.2d 262 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

County attorney is not a county elected official, but rather is a county employee, so the residency requirement of O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(1) does not apply to the county attorney under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III and O.C.G.A. § 45-2-5; a county attorney is entitled to sovereign immunity as a county employee. Wallace v. Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

This constitutional provision is reasonable and not a denial of equal protection under U.S. Const., amend. 14. Griggers v. Moye, 246 Ga. 578, 272 S.E.2d 262 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

It is a necessary requirement that a person be a qualified voter before a person is eligible to be a county officer.

- A commissioner of roads and revenues (now county commissioner), is a county officer. Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753, 55 S.E.2d 115 (1949).

Qualified voter.

- An ordinary (now judge of probate court), being a county officer, within meaning of requirement for holding office, is not eligible to office unless the officer is a "qualified voter." Lee v. Byrd, 169 Ga. 622, 151 S.E. 28 (1929); Cloud v. Maxey, 195 Ga. 90, 23 S.E.2d 668 (1942).

Nonpayment of taxes renders person ineligible for county office.

- A person who, at the time of election or appointment to a county office, has not paid that person's taxes as provided by the Constitution, is not a qualified voter and is not eligible to that office. Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294, 155 S.E. 18 (1930).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII and antecedent provisions, which provided for removal of county officers upon conviction for malpractice in office, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Removal provision of this paragraph is mandatory rather than limiting.

- It specifies that malpractice in office requires automatic removal of the officeholder. It does not otherwise deal with removal and does not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting otherwise valid removal statutes. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Malpractice provision of this paragraph is not deficient for vagueness and is self-executing. Beauchamp v. Smith, 250 Ga. 16, 295 S.E.2d 97 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Malpractice is not condition precedent to removal.

- Conviction in a criminal prosecution against county officer for malpractice in office is not a condition precedent to the officer's removal from office. A different ruling would render the removal provision of the Constitution meaningless since malpractice in office by the officer is not a penal offense. Cole v. Holland, 219 Ga. 227, 132 S.E.2d 657 (1963).

Procedure for removal of county officials applicable to local education board.

- Where a local amendment to the Constitution provided a county that, "elections for members of the board of education shall be held and conducted in the same manner as elections for other county officials are held," there is a disclosed legislative intent to provide for removal from office of members of the board and replacement by the procedure stated in this paragraph, which applies to county officials in general, and not by the procedure stated in former O.C.G.A. § 20-2-53 and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II), which apply to boards of education specifically. Thigpen v. State, 229 Ga. 820, 194 S.E.2d 423 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Ineligibility for office ab initio curable by constitutional amendment.

- Although a person may be ineligible to hold public office at the time of election, if the person is nevertheless elected and inducted into office, and while holding the office the person's ineligibility is removed by constitutional amendment, the courts will not thereafter remove the person solely on account of the person's ineligibility which existed at the time of the person's election. Cooper v. Lewis, 177 Ga. 229, 170 S.E. 68 (1933).

Applicability of other statutes regarding removal.

- The provision of this paragraph regarding removal of county officers for malpractice in office does not preempt O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, which prohibits use of county funds by county commissioners for purchases of goods or property in which they have an interest. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982).

Fact that there now exists a number of specific statutes authorizing removal for malpractice in office, one or more of which may cover facts of case, does not demand conclusion that such statutes are in exclusion of this general constitutional provision. Beauchamp v. Smith, 250 Ga. 16, 295 S.E.2d 97 (1982).

Definition of county officer expanded.

- The definition of "county officer", which ordinarily, would mean the clerk of superior court, judge of the probate court, sheriff, tax receiver, tax collector, or tax commissioner, has been expanded by case law. 1986 Op. Att'y. Gen. No. U86-2.

Member of a municipal or county planning commission would be a "public officer." 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-488.

County boards of education county offices.

- County boards of education, even though appointive and created by statute prior to and existent at the time of adoption of the Constitution of 1877 have consistently been held by the appellate courts to be county offices. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 58.

Members of a county board of education are subject to the two-year residence requirements of this paragraph. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-85 (decided under former § 2-7901; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

A sheriff is a constitutional county officer as contemplated by this paragraph. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-36 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Authority over chief deputy sheriff.

- The Baldwin County Board of Commissioners would not have the authority to set a mandatory retirement age for the chief deputy of the Baldwin County sheriff's department or to otherwise discharge the deputy from employment. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-76 (but see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-20).

Historically, judges serving in the state judicial system have not been considered county officers under this paragraph or former Code 1933, § 89-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1). 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-8 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

County attorney not county officer.

- The courts of this state would hold that a county attorney, although being a "public officer," did not hold a "county office" within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 92-6902 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-292) and that a member of a county board of tax assessors would not be ineligible simultaneously to occupy the position of county attorney. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-454.

Tax assessor cannot at the same time hold office of county commissioner. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 62.

Office of county treasurer can only be abolished by an Act of the General Assembly and such an Act would have the effect of abolishing this office as of the date so specified in the Act. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-94.

Election to fill county offices.

- The 1986 November general election, in which there will be an election to fill the offices of judge of Superior Court, judge of Magistrate Court, and members of county board of education, will be an election to fill county offices. 1986 Op. Att'y. Gen. No. U86-2.

Probate judge may not employ an attorney to prosecute criminal cases in probate court. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U99-6.

Payment of taxes.

- Construing Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. II, Para. IV), this paragraph, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), payment of taxes is not required of any candidate for a state office except that members of the General Assembly may not be seated if in default for taxes; whether candidates for county offices are eligible to run where they are behind with payment of taxes depends upon the office and the legislative Acts relating to that office or officer. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 311 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III).

Must be qualified voter.

- To be eligible to hold office of judge of probate court there must not only be full compliance with constitutional and statutory residency requirements but also the person must meet the requirements of a qualified voter. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-368.

Evidence sufficient proof of intent to maintain original domicile.

- Where an individual formally maintained the individual's home in one county and exhibited all other attributes of domicile in that county, subsequently moved to a second county to accept employment in that county and utilized on-premises living quarters furnished to that individual in connection with the individual's employment in that second county, where that individual retained the individual's home in the first county, continued to pay ad valorem taxes, purchase tags for the individual's automobile, and consequently pay ad valorem tax thereon, maintained the individual's voter registration, and voted in the first county, and further professes that the individual has continuously maintained an intent not to change the individual's domicile from the first county and the individual has repeatedly publicly avowed this intent, the trier of fact would unquestionably be authorized, and in the absence of any contrary evidence would probably be compelled, as a matter of law, to determine that the individual has been successful in preserving the first county as the individual's domicile for purposes of offering for election to the office of sheriff of that county. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-5.

Residency requirements for candidates for board of commissioners.

- The provisions of the local Act establishing a requirement that candidates for the Board of Commissioners of Clay County be residents of the commissioner districts from which they are seeking election for a period of at least five years immediately preceding the date of the election is unenforceable as being a local Act in derogation of general law. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-31.

Salary supplementation for employees paid on a fee basis.

- County commissioners, in the absence of statute, may not supplement with a salary the compensation of county officers who are on a fee basis. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 67.

Salary of a sheriff may be supplemented by the General Assembly through local law or by the board of commissioners when the board has been delegated that authority through local law enacted by the General Assembly. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-19.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 124 et seq.

ALR.

- Time as of which eligibility or ineligibility to office is to be determined, 143 A.L.R. 1026.