Effect on existing independent school systems.

- This paragraph does not give county school districts constitutional status superior to existing independent school systems. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Section 20-2-52 superseded by this paragraph before amendment of 1965.

- The provision of former Code 1933, § 32-903 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-52) which declared that the grand jury in selecting the members of the county board of education could not select any two of them from the same militia district or locality was unquestionably superseded by this paragraph. Under the plain and unambiguous provisions of the amendment, the people could elect one, any, or all of the members of the county board of education from any portion of the county which was not embraced within the territory of an independent school district. Garmon v. Crawford, 211 Ga. 682, 87 S.E.2d 844 (1955) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Construction of paragraph.

- The provision in this paragraph providing that authority was granted to counties to establish and maintain public schools within their limits, and that each county, exclusive of any independent school system now in existence in a county would be confined to the control and management of a county board of education amounted to complete constitutional vesting of authority to manage and control county schools in the county board of education. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Effect of Ga. Const., 1945 on school laws.

- The Ga. Const., 1945 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. III) did not purport to disturb the state's comprehensive code of statutory school laws other than to make the offices of county school superintendent and county boards of education constitutional offices rather than statutory offices. A member of the board of education, whose term had not expired at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, was entitled to hold office until the member's successor was elected and qualified. Powell v. Price, 201 Ga. 833, 41 S.E.2d 539 (1947).

This paragraph and Art. 3, Ch. 2, T. 20 not conflicting.

- This paragraph created a constitutional board of education for each county and also made provision for the number, method of appointment, and terms of the members of such board; but since it made no provision as to the qualification of such members, there was therefore, no conflict between the statutory requirements already in existence when the Constitution was adopted, and former Code 1933, § 32-901 et seq., (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 2, T. 20), insofar as they pertain to qualifications of board members and provisions of this Constitution. Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686, 48 S.E.2d 99 (1948).

Constitutional provisions evidence no intent for repeal of statutory requirements on qualifications of board members.

- Construing this paragraph and former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. XI, Sec. I, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. II) together, there is no evident intent that the statutory requirements as to qualifications of members of county boards of education be repealed by the Constitution. McCollum v. Bass, 201 Ga. 537, 40 S.E.2d 650 (1946) (decided under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. XI, Sec. I, Para. III; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Court intervened in school affairs improperly.

- The trial court ordered the school board to repair the schools slated for closure, construct any new buildings needed at those sites, and apply for and take all appropriate measures to receive and utilize state outlay capital funds to so renovate, modernize, and replace the schools; in entering such an order, the trial court made decisions involving the management and control of the county schools, matters that the Georgia Constitution has delegated to the local board of education, not the courts. In the absence of evidence that the board of education's decisions violated law or were such a gross abuse of discretion as to be a violation of law, the trial court erred when it intervened in the affairs of the school system by ordering the local board to take specified action. Powell v. Studstill, 264 Ga. 109, 441 S.E.2d 52 (1994).

Trial court's order requiring a student's reinstatement as a student and a member of a university's varsity football team was reversed due to a lack of a justiciable controversy as: (1) Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II clearly manifested an intent to entrust the schools to supervising authorities rather than the courts; (2) the student admitted that the suspension arose from a telephone call the student made to facilitate a drug sale and it was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious for lack of evidence; (3) the student suffered no deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights as there was no right to participate in extracurricular sports; and (4) the suspension did not prejudice the student's substantial rights as the suspension was tailored to permit the student's eventual re-enrollment to complete the student's degree requirements, did not render the student ineligible for a scholarship, and was not a deprivation of major proportion warranting judicial intervention. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Houston, 282 Ga. App. 412, 638 S.E.2d 750 (2006).

Persons eligible for board election by grand jury.

- As electors and in exercise of their constitutional power as such, the members of a grand jury could elect any person, except one who was a member of the electing grand jury, who possessed the qualifications prescribed by former Code 1933, § 32-903 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-52). Hobbs v. Peavy, 210 Ga. 671, 82 S.E.2d 224 (1954).

Annexation by municipality also extends city school system limits.

- Absent an expression of legislative intent clearly to the contrary or a valid agreement between the school systems involved, annexation of territory into the corporate limits of a municipality operating an independent school system also extends the limits of the city school system, so that the limits of the city school district remain coterminous with the city's corporate limits. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Cited in Boatright v. Copeland, 336 Ga. App. 107, 783 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

County-wide school districts as successors to local school districts can incur bonded indebtedness independently of county indebtedness.

- Upon the merger by the General Assembly of local school districts, in harmony with the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I), into county-wide school districts, the new county-wide district would likewise constitute a separate political entity and could do as a unit that which its previous component parts could have done separately, and could therefore incur a bonded indebtedness independent of any indebtedness for general authorized county purposes. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

A consolidated county school district is a separate political division of this state such as is authorized to incur a bonded indebtedness up to seven percent of the assessed valuation of its taxable property, independent of and in addition to any outstanding bonded indebtedness incurred by any of its component former local school districts prior to their merger into a county-wide school district. Pinion v. Walker County Sch. Dist., 203 Ga. 99, 45 S.E.2d 405 (1947).

Contract for continuance of school cannot arise by implication.

- In the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision authorizing contracts for the continuance of a school, as opposed to consolidation with another school, for an indefinite period of time, a contract for continuance may not arise by implication because citizens and patrons of the school have been generous and have donated good facilities for the use and benefit of the children of the school district. Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8 (1954).

Paragraph does not take away power.

- This paragraph did not operate to take away from the county school district powers as were exercised by the former local school districts such as those powers enumerated in former Code 1933, §§ 32-113, 32-115, and 32-1104 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-437 and20-3-51). Nelms v. Stephens County Sch. Dist., 201 Ga. 274, 39 S.E.2d 651 (1946) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Effect of merger of the local school districts into one county school district is to transfer the basis for the authorized debt from a percentage of the assessed valuation of the taxable property located within the separate local school districts to a percentage of the assessed valuation of the taxable property within the consolidated county school district as a whole. No larger debt is rendered possible by the merger of the local school districts into one county school district. Nelms v. Stephens County Sch. Dist., 201 Ga. 274, 39 S.E.2d 651 (1946).

Action involving parents organization and school authorities regarding the reassignment of high schools in a county to another region for purposes of interscholastic athletic competition did not present a justiciable controversy. Parents Against Realignment v. Georgia High School Association, 271 Ga. 114, 515 S.E.2d 528 (1999).

Right to determine what is best for school pupils is vested in the board of education. Deriso v. Cooper, 246 Ga. 540, 272 S.E.2d 274 (1980).

Courts should not determine what is best for pupils.

- Authority to manage and control county schools is vested by this paragraph in the county board of education, and any challenge of acts of county board relating to control and operation of schools must be weighed in the light of this sweeping power, which clearly manifests an intent to entrust the schools to the boards of education rather than the courts. Deriso v. Cooper, 246 Ga. 540, 272 S.E.2d 274 (1980) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Exclusive control by county board of education.

- By the Constitution, the control and management of the public schools, other than independent school systems existing in 1945, is placed under the exclusive control and management of the county boards of education. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Limited judicial interference.

- Control and management of public schools will not be interfered with by the courts except where that control and management is contrary to law. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Funding for start-up charter schools.

- Pursuant to the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2068.1(c), a school system and school board had no authority or discretion to deduct the system's unfunded pension expense of $ 38.6 million from their calculation of local revenue to be distributed to start-up charter schools; the start-up charter schools were entitled to mandamus relief. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. v. Atlanta Neighborhood Charter Sch., 293 Ga. 629, 748 S.E.2d 884 (2013).

County residents' challenge to a school board candidate's residency qualification under O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(1) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II, was barred by res judicata because another challenger had raised the same challenge, and the challenge had been resolved against the challenger by the county's board of elections. Lilly v. Heard, 295 Ga. 399, 761 S.E.2d 46 (2014).

Failure of official to give notice of election not sufficient to invalidate election.

- A constitutional amendment, duly ratified by the people (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 711, 714), creating election of the six members of the Board of Education of Wheeler County by militia districts, having provided by law for the time of regular election, the notice of election to be given by the judge of the probate court is directory, and the judge's failure to perform this duty does not invalidate the election thus held on that date. McNair v. Achord, 215 Ga. 540, 111 S.E.2d 236 (1959).

Construction and interpretation of local election amendment.

- Where a local amendment to the Constitution provided that Ware County "Elections for members of the board of education shall be held and conducted in the same manner as elections for other county officials are held," there was a clearly disclosed legislative intent to provide for removal from office of members of the board and replacement by the procedure stated in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III), which applied to county officials in general, and not by the procedure stated in former Code 1933, § 32-905 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-53) and this paragraph, which applied to boards of education specifically. Thigpen v. State, 229 Ga. 820, 194 S.E.2d 423 (1972).

Terms of school board members.

- Term limitations of Telfair County Tenure Law, 1963 Ga. Laws 705, do not apply to school board members because the Tenure Law amends Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX and not Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII; thus, a member who was serving a third consecutive term was not subject to the Tenure Law. Dyal v. Pope, 283 Ga. 463, 660 S.E.2d 725 (2008).

O.C.G.A. § 20-2-52 did not limit terms school board member could serve under the Telfair County Tenure Law, 1963 Ga. Laws 705; although the Telfair County Tenure Law is a constitutional amendment, it is not a constitutional amendment that applies to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII and school board members. Dyal v. Pope, 283 Ga. 463, 660 S.E.2d 725 (2008).

Use of quo warranto to oust board members.

- Where the plaintiff contends the defendants are illegally holding office because of the alleged unconstitutionality of this paragraph of the Georgia Constitution providing for the means of their selection, quo warranto would be an adequate remedy. Boatright v. Brown, 222 Ga. 497, 150 S.E.2d 680 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Removal of county board of education members.

- Superior court erred in denying the county board of education members' request to reverse the governor's order removing the members from office under O.C.G.A. § 45-10-4 for violating O.C.G.A. § 45-10-3; O.C.G.A. § 45-10-3 does not embrace entities created by the Constitution of Georgia, and county school boards are creations of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II. Roberts v. Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 723 S.E.2d 901 (2012).

Whether characterized as setting a qualification for continued service on the local board in the extraordinary circumstance of an imminent loss of accreditation, or whether characterized as providing for removal for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-73 was held by the Georgia Supreme Court to be a permissible exercise of the legislative power to provide for the removal for cause of members of local boards. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013).

Georgia Supreme Court held that the removal of local school board members under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-73 was not an unconstitutional infringement upon the governing authority of local school boards, nor was it a violation of any other constitutional provision or right. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013).

Scheme for selecting board members not unfair.

- The state's constitutional and statutory scheme for selecting its grand juries and boards of education is not inherently unfair, or necessarily incapable of administration without regard to race; the federal courts are not powerless to remedy unconstitutional departures from Georgia law by declaratory and injunctive relief. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S. Ct. 532, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1970).

Employment by other school boards of different method to control quality of education evince no denial of equal protection.

- Since the Georgia Constitution and Code provide local school boards with sweeping authority in the governing of local school systems, the fact that other school boards may choose to employ other methods to control the quality of education in their systems does not evince a denial of equal protection. Wells v. Banks, 153 Ga. App. 581, 266 S.E.2d 270 (1980).

Termination of teachers for exercise of constitutional rights.

- Constitutional guarantees of free speech, free association, and free exercise of religion do not mean that a school board has no control over activities or actions of its teachers. A school board may fire, refuse to rehire, or refuse to hire a teacher who has exercised constitutionally protected rights in such a manner as to seriously impair or destroy the teacher's effectiveness as a teacher. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

Balance between constitutional rights and school order.

- A court must balance the individual's interest in the free exercise of the individual's rights with the government's need to maintain appropriate order and effectiveness in operation of schools. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

In an action against State Board of Education for discriminatory hiring practices the burden of proof is on the state to prove justification of its actions once a plaintiff has shown that the state action stemmed from the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

Degree of discretionary abuse needed to justify interference by court.

- Unless the act of a board violates some law, or is such a gross abuse of discretion as amounts to a violation of law, courts should not and cannot interfere. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Abuse of discretion must violate law to justify judicial intervention.

- A gross abuse of discretion by the county board of education which will authorize resort to courts must be such as of itself amounts to a violation of the law. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Provision for equitable relief construed.

- Statement that decisions of the boards of education will not be interfered with by courts of equity unless they amount to a violation of law or are a gross abuse of discretion must be read and considered along with the rule of law that remedies at law, if adequate, must be exhausted before resort to equity will be allowed; when thus construed they mean simply that, when the remedy by appeal has failed to eliminate the law violation or gross abuse of discretion which is its equivalent, equity will grant relief or, as is permissible in all cases to prevent irreparable injury, or where equity alone can grant adequate relief, exhaustion of the statutory remedy of appeal is not a prerequisite to relief in equity. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Equity will not interfere with management of a county board of education unless the board has acted without authority of law. Burton v. Kearse, 204 Ga. 765, 51 S.E.2d 796 (1949).

In absence of a showing of the inadequacy of appeal to State Board of Education, equity would not take jurisdiction and grant relief in a school matter contrary to former Code 1933, § 37-120 (see now O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4). Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Constitutional language required reorganization and rearrangement of board members' terms.

- It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to provide for a reorganization of all county boards of education, and the words "the first election of board members under this Constitution shall be for such terms that will provide for the expiration of the term of one member . . . each year" clearly imply that the grand juries of the counties were required to reorganize and rearrange the terms of the members in accordance with the scheme set out in this paragraph, at the first board election after the Constitution took effect. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 103 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Paragraph (c) construed on manner of election of board members.

- The first sentence of this paragraph permits the residence requirements to be changed by local legislation upon referendum, and the second sentence of this paragraph provides for "further qualifications as may be provided by law"; however, this provision as to general qualifications to be provided by law was construed to mean by general law, such as that contained in former Code 1933, §§ 32-907, 23-908, 32-909, 32-910, and 32-912 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-57,20-2-58,20-2-520, and20-2-1160); if an attempt were made to enlarge the qualification requirements, other than residence requirements, by local law, there would be a violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), which prohibits special legislation in cases where provision has been made by existing general law. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-103.

Applicable to local school board members.

- School board members selected by the local governing body are appointed boards within the meaning of the 1992 amendment to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II, which provided for elected boards of education. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-34.

"Hold office until."

- The words "hold office until" indicate that the individual elected by the board has no right to serve beyond the time of the appointment by the grand jury. Undoubtedly, the board is given such authority because of the fact that in many counties in Georgia there will be a considerable lapse of time between terms of court. For this reason, a grand jury is not bound to appoint the same successor elected by the board. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 104.

The grand jury may not select two members of the county board of education from the same militia district or locality. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 143.

If a county had less than five militia districts, the application of former Code 1933, § 32-903 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-52) was in conflict with this paragraph which provided for a five-member county board of education and when there was only four militia districts in a county, two members of the board of education may come from one district. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 176 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

When a county has only four militia districts, one member of the county board of education should be selected from the county at large. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 146.

Procedure for filling vacancies on school board.

- Since this paragraph superseded that portion of former Code § 32-905 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-53) giving judges of superior courts power to fill vacancies on a county board of education, the Constitution meant that the grand jury was the appointing power of the members of the county board of education and that if they were in session at the time a vacancy occurred, it would be the duty of the grand jury at that time to fill the vacancy; if a vacancy occurred at a time when the grand jury was not in session and when it cannot make the appointment, there should be no vacancy between that time and the convening of the grand jury and, therefore, in such a case this paragraph provided that members of the county board of education by secret ballot shall elect a person to hold office until the grand jury convened, so that the grand jury can make the appointment for the unexpired term as contemplated by the Constitution. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 502; 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 38 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

The "next grand jury" refers to the succeeding grand jury which convenes on the fourth Monday in October. Also, failure of the board of education to elect would in no way affect the right of the grand jury to appoint the successor. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 104.

County boards held county offices by appellate courts.

- County boards of education, even though appointive and created by statute prior to and existent at the time of adoption of the Constitution of 1877, have consistently been held by the appellate courts to be county offices. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 58.

Term of office of members elected by grand jury prescribed by law.

- There is no provision in the law whereby a county grand jury can elect a member to the county board of education, commencing with the expiration of a preceding member's term of office, for a period of time either greater or less than that prescribed by law. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 155.

Grand jury may fix first term.

- The grand jury of the county is clothed with power to fix beginning and ending of term of the first appointees made after adoption of the state Constitution and thereafter all subsequent terms are to conform with the beginning of the term of the first appointee. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 155.

Local school district trustees selected under statute remain in office under the Constitution. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 178.

Appointment of local school board members not controlled by

§ 15-12-67 regarding secrecy of meetings. - Responsibility of grand jury to appoint members of local school board under this paragraph was not controlled by former Code 1933, §§ 59-208 and 59-210 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-12-67) relating to secrecy of meetings of that body. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-44 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Changing methods of electing board members.

- Selection of a county board of education can be changed from an appointive method to an elective one by complying with this paragraph; where this is done, the "one-man, one-vote" principle of the U.S. Const., amend. 14, is not violated by requirement that members reside in particular militia districts, so long as their election is on a county-wide basis. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-14.1 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Requirements.

- Candidates for election to county boards of education must comply with the requirements of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I), and this paragraph concerning the qualification of candidates except that they must qualify within the time specified by former Code 1933, § 34-1904 (see now O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132). 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-128 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Residency requirements for the election of local school board members cannot be established by board bylaws. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-25.

Holding over in office.

- A member of a county board of education may hold over in office until the member's successor is elected and qualified. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U93-16.

Failure of a person elected as a member of the county board of education to accept the member's commission creates a vacancy in the office. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 144.

Chairman of a county board of education may vote to make or break a tie on some issue before the board. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 104.

Failure of United States Justice Department to approve change in election procedures leaves prior law in effect. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U76-14.

Members of the county board of education are public officers, and their election, term of office, and method of filling vacancies are determined by the state Constitution. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 144.

Effect of constitutional provisions on statutory school laws.

- This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. V (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Paras. III and IV) simply made constitutional Arts. 9 through 11 and 25, Ch. 2, T. 20, Part 3, Art. 16, Ch. 2, T. 20, Part 9, Art. 17, T. 20, and § 20-2-1074 thereby creating a constitutional board of education for the counties; they did not purport to disturb the comprehensive code of statutory school laws other than to make the offices of county school superintendent and county boards of education constitutional rather than statutory offices. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 143 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Independent school system not given right to vote for county school superintendent by contract with county board of education.

- Where the county board of education and the independent system contract with each other for the education, transportation, and care of pupils under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I), and this paragraph, this does not give residents of the independent system the right to vote in election held to select county school superintendent, nor may such right be given by contract; such a contract does not amount to merger. Where election requirements were set out by statute in former Code 1933, § 32-1002 (former § 20-2-101) neither individuals nor groups could alter such legislative intent by contract. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 216 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II).

Independent school district can participate in selection of board members.

- A citizen resident of an independent school district is not disqualified from participating in selection of a member of a county board of education by a grand jury of which the citizen is a member. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 151.

Residential qualifications.

- Where members of board resided in portion of county not embraced within territory of independent school district at the time of their selection, they met qualifications and acquired legal title to offices. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 101.

Quo warranto proceedings necessary for removal of board members serving unlawfully.

- Members of a county board of education who because of extension of corporate limits of a city, find themselves residing within territorial boundaries of an independent public school district, do not lose their membership on such board; they continue to hold office until removed by quo warranto proceedings. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 101.

Constitutional power to contract limited.

- The constitutional powers to contract in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. IV, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. V, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I) are limited by this constitutional provision which states that control and management of county schools shall be confined to the county board of education; the power to exercise judgment and discretion cannot be delegated by a county board of education. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 116.

Law vests full power and authority for the operation of schools in the county board of education. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 137.

Minimum and maximum ages of children who may be taught in public schools is a matter which addresses itself to the local boards of education. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-10.

Assignment of pupils.

- A local board of education has the authority to designate which school within its school district shall be attended by a particular pupil, i.e., assignment of pupils in the public schools. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 137.

Local boards cannot contract for joint management.

- Local boards of education may contract with each other for care, education, and transportation of pupils, but not for joint management, operation, and control of school facilities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-32.

County board of education and school superintendent official relationship.

- The power to manage and control county school systems in Georgia rests in the county board of education; the county school superintendent is obliged to comply with and carry out all rules, regulations, and instructions of the county board of education. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-65.

Superintendent's duty to run system upon recall of board.

- The county school superintendent is charged with the duty of continuing to effectuate and enforce the rules, regulations, and instructions of the county board of education and continuing to operate the county school system during the period of time between the successful recall of all or a majority of the county board of education and the filling of the vacancies on the county board of education by special election. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-43.

Contracts between neighboring boards of education for services.

- A contract between a local Board of Education and neighboring Board of Education to provide education and related services for all of its students is specifically contemplated in the Constitution of Georgia and would be authorized unless a particular provision of the contract or a related service was otherwise illegal. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-41.

Authority to employ counsel implied from board's management and responsibility power.

- It is inconceivable that the intent of the framers of the Constitution or the members of the General Assembly in giving these boards control, management, and responsibility as to local schools did not imply authority to employ adequate counsel to represent the board in litigation and give legal advice as to the administration of school laws. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 99.

County board of education has authority to expend public school funds for employing attorneys to represent members of a county board of education where the controversy involves the power of a local board of education (local school district) or an officer and the validity of the exercise of such power. The local board of education has no power to employ counsel for a purpose outside its proper function, nor may counsel be employed at public expense to prosecute or defend actions by or against such board members in their individual capacities. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 99.

Charges for lost or damaged books.

- Local school boards are authorized to assess charges against students for lost and unnecessarily damaged text books or library materials but local school boards may not withhold transferring a student's record to another school system when there are unpaid charges or student fees. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-29.

Private audit of funds unauthorized.

- County board of education cannot expend county education funds for private audit of funds derived from extracurricular school activities; such an expenditure of education funds is not an expenditure for an "educational purpose" within the meaning of such term. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 155.

Even though maintaining custody and control of funds in their custody is a proper matter for regulation by local boards of education, and regulation, supervision and control includes maintenance of records pertaining thereto and audit of funds derived therefrom; should a local board of education desire a private audit of such funds, the expense of obtaining such audit must be paid out of funds derived from such activities. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 155.

A county board of education may not pay insurance premiums for protection of school buildings owned by a municipality. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 144.

Incorporation by school boards or membership in nonprofit corporations prohibited.

- While county boards of education are vested with broad powers respecting management and control of the school systems they administer under former Code 1933, § 32-909 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-520), including the right to contract with each other under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. V), the general laws pertaining to creation of nonprofit corporations appear to exclude the possibility of school boards incorporating or being members of nonprofit corporations as a county board of education is not a corporation, partnership, association, or other "person." 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-4.

Authority of State Board of Education to preempt local education boards from promoting students invalid.

- Inasmuch as former Code 1933, §§ 32-901, 32-907, 32-912 and 32-1101 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-50,20-2-57, and20-2-59), this paragraph, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. I) have been judicially endorsed, and in consideration of the fact that State Board of Education had no express authority to preempt local boards in decisions concerning promotion of individual students, it would appear that the state board could not directly stop an individual student from passing to the next grade level should the county board feel the child was reading sufficiently. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-63.

Implementation of reading requirements as prerequisite to grade promotion permissible.

- Although the State Board of Education does not have explicit authority to directly preclude a student in a local school district from progressing from one grade level to another if the child is not capable of reading in the higher grade level, the board may, as a condition of continued state fiscal assistance, require local boards of education to implement state board established reading requirements to be imposed on public school students for passage to the next grade level. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-63.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, § 66 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, § 98 et seq.

ALR.

- Time as of which eligibility or ineligibility to office is to be determined, 143 A.L.R. 1026.

Legislative power to prescribe qualifications for or conditions of eligibility to constitutional office, 34 A.L.R.2d 155.

Power of school district or school board to employ counsel, 75 A.L.R.2d 1339.

Applicability and application of § 2 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 USCS § 1973) to members of school board, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 254.