Uniform jurisdiction of magistrate courts.

- The requirement of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I that "magistrate . . . courts shall have uniform jurisdiction as provided by law" relates to jurisdiction rather than to the method of selection and terms of office of magistrates. State v. Boatright, 256 Ga. 23, 342 S.E.2d 674 (1986).

Jurisdiction over foreign plaintiff's contract action.

- When an out-of-state seller sued an in-state buyer in Georgia, despite a provision in the parties' contract for the jurisdiction of the courts of Texas, and the seller did not respond, the courts of Georgia had subject matter jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 15-7-4(a)(2); Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I; Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I; and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. I; the parties waived the forum selection clause by either filing suit in Georgia or not responding. Euler-Siac S.P.A. (Creamar Spa) v. Drama Marble Co., 274 Ga. App. 252, 617 S.E.2d 203 (2005).

Termination of parental rights.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C), the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the husband's parental rights because the biological father's petition to legitimate a child who was born in wedlock was a petition to terminate the parental rights of the legal father; after the superior court determined that the biological father had not abandoned his opportunity interest, the issue became whether the superior court could grant the petition to legitimate the child, and to grant the legitimation petition required the superior court to first terminate the parental rights of the husband, who was the legal father. Brine v. Shipp, 291 Ga. 376, 729 S.E.2d 393 (2012).

Cited in Schroeder v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 897, 324 S.E.2d 746 (1984); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905, 392 S.E.2d 330 (1990); EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006); Mauldin v. Mauldin, 322 Ga. App. 507, 745 S.E.2d 754 (2013).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II and antecedent provisions, relating to specific powers of the probate courts, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Purpose of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. 6, Sec. 6, Para. II(b) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III) is to provide for speedy trials for persons charged with misdemeanor violations upon highways. It was not the purpose of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. 6, Sec. 6, Para. II(b) to divest existing courts of jurisdiction in such cases, or to transfer jurisdiction from existing courts to another court not having such jurisdiction prior to the enactment of II(b). Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714, 51 S.E.2d 664 (1949).

Intent of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. 6, Sec. 6, Para. II(b) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I and Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III) is to confer jurisdiction as to subject matter upon police courts with the same restrictions as are imposed upon courts of ordinary (now probate courts). Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 33 S.E.2d 425 (1945).

Limited authority as to county matters.

- This paragraph must be construed in connection with the other provisions of the Constitution, and carries the implication that the courts of ordinary (now probate courts) have no authority as to county matters except such "as may be conferred on them by law." Harrison v. Southern Ry., 44 Ga. App. 49, 160 S.E. 656 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I).

Legislative authority.

- Authority of General Assembly to prescribe powers of ordinary (now probate judge) over county affairs necessarily includes authority to increase or diminish such powers. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Where probate judge sits for county purposes.

- The ordinary (now probate judge) sits for county purposes only in those counties where jurisdiction over county matters and county affairs has not been granted by legislative Act to a county commissioner or board of county commissioners. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Local Act creating board of county commissioners does not unconstitutionally infringe upon authority of ordinary (now probate judge). Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Judgments subject to revision and vacation.

- Courts of record retain full control over their orders and judgments during the term at which they are rendered, and in the exercise of sound discretion may revise or vacate them, as the ends of justice may require; the court of ordinary (now probate court) is a court of record, and its judgments are subject to this same rule and may be set aside during the term when entered, in the sound discretion of the ordinary (now probate judge). Hall v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 Ga. App. 142, 73 S.E.2d 252 (1952), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896, 75 S. Ct. 215, 99 L. Ed. 704 (1954).

Probate court did not have jurisdiction to remove a trustee. Moring v. Moring, 228 Ga. App. 662, 492 S.E.2d 558 (1997).

Probate court has no authority to appoint another as guardian of the person of a child who has a living natural guardian unless the loss of that status has been ascertained and declared in some regular proceeding authorized by law, after due notice is given. Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 279 S.E.2d 244 (1981).

Range of appointment limited where minor has natural guardian.

- For a minor having no guardian, the judge of the probate court may appoint a guardian of the person and property, or of either, but if the minor has a natural guardian, it certainly cannot be said in a broad sense that he or she has no guardian; in such case the range of appointment is limited to guardianship of the property, for it is only as to property that there is no guardian. Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 279 S.E.2d 244 (1981).

Compromise of claim.

- The probate court's plenary jurisdiction does not cease upon the guardian's compromise of a contested or doubtful claim. Gnann v. Woodall, 270 Ga. 516, 511 S.E.2d 188 (1999).

No jurisdiction to try title claims on application for year's support.

- The probate court has no jurisdiction to try conflicting claims of title to real property on an application for a year's support. Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Ga. App. 549, 405 S.E.2d 544 (1991).

Probate court erred by allowing the objections of a bank and a decedent's parents solely on the basis of adverse title and by denying a year's support to the widow when the widow failed to meet the resulting burden of proof because the probate court lacked the jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. 6, Sec. 3, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30 to determine that the relevant money-market account and real property were not part of the estate; despite the jurisdictional limitation and the lack of an appropriate objection, the probate court proceeded to conduct a hearing as to the amount necessary for the widow's support, thereby inappropriately placing upon the widow a burden of proof that was contrary to O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(a) and otherwise lacking in the absence of the jurisdictionally defective objections to the petition. In re Mahmoodzadeh, 314 Ga. App. 383, 724 S.E.2d 797 (2012).

No jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of title to property.

- Probate court does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate conflicting claims of title to property; thus, where decedent's widow asserted an ownership interest in property sought by the executor of the estate, and order of the probate court giving possession of such property to the executor was void, the widow could not be found in contempt for noncompliance with the order. In re Estate of Adamson, 215 Ga. App. 613, 451 S.E.2d 501 (1994).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. II and antecedent provisions, relating to jurisdiction of the former justice of the peace courts (now magistrate courts), are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph is not self-executing. Tibbs v. Williamson, 61 Ga. 74 (1878); Humphrey v. Johnson, 13 Ga. App. 557, 79 S.E. 530 (1913).

Right of appeals under Ch. 2, T. 5 is consistent with this paragraph. Helmly v. Davis, 100 Ga. 493, 28 S.E. 231 (1897).

Justice of the peace court has jurisdiction of action to recover debt less than $200.00.

- Where one is indebted to another on an open account in excess of $200.00, and gives two checks for a part thereof, which are credited on the account, an action against that person by the creditor for less than $200.00 to recover the full amount of the balance of the open account will lie, and is within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court even though another action has been filed to recover on the checks which had been dishonored. Parker v. Timberlake Grocery Co., 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 650 (1944).

Justice of the peace courts have jurisdiction of suits on distinct evidences of debt although they are given for one and the same debt or consideration. Parker v. Timberlake Grocery Co., 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 650 (1944).

Extent of criminal jurisdiction of justice court.

- While justice courts have jurisdiction with respect to certain matters in the administration of criminal law, such courts did not have jurisdiction in criminal actions as the word was defined in former Code 1933, §§ 3-101-3-103 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-1). Pate v. Taylor Chem. Co., 88 Ga. App. 127, 76 S.E.2d 131 (1953).

Effect of Act creating municipal court providing that criminal jurisdiction would not exceed that of justice court.

- Where Act creating municipal court provides that the criminal jurisdiction of the court would not exceed the jurisdiction by law in the justice courts, but would extend over the entire county, such municipal court is not thereby given jurisdiction of criminal actions, though it might have jurisdiction with respect to certain matters in connection with the administration of criminal law. Pate v. Taylor Chem. Co., 88 Ga. App. 127, 76 S.E.2d 131 (1953).

Section providing for abatement of nuisances unconstitutional.

- Jurisdiction to abate a nuisance as provided in former Code 1933, § 72-201 (see § 41-2-1) was expressly denied the justices of the peace courts under this paragraph. Because that section was in irreconcilable conflict with the Constitution, it was void. Sizemore v. Coker, 220 Ga. 773, 141 S.E.2d 891 (1965).

Court lacked jurisdiction.

- Under this paragraph, affidavits of illegality filed to levy of ordinary executions for amounts greater than $200.00 are returnable to other courts having jurisdiction. Scott v. Mayor of Mount Airy, 186 Ga. 652, 198 S.E. 693 (1938).

Conversion of personal property does not constitute injury to property within the meaning of this paragraph. Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 230, 34 S.E. 289 (1899); Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 459, 97 S.E. 78 (1918).

For definition of damages under this paragraph, see Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 644, 60 S.E. 353 (1908).

Insured in life insurance policy may not reduce amount of claim without consent so as to vest jurisdiction in justice of the peace court.

- Where an insured in a life insurance policy, in an action against the insurer to recover for an alleged breach of the contract, alleges the insured's damage as being in the amount of the premiums which had been paid on the policy, the amount of the damage was fixed and certain, and constituted a liquidated demand which, in a suit in a justice of the peace court, the insured cannot, without the consent of the insurer, reduce in order to bring the case within the monetary jurisdiction of the justice's court. Smith v. Atlanta Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ga. App. 254, 155 S.E. 535 (1930).

Jurisdiction of court in action in trover is determinable by allegations in petition and not by averment in affidavit for bail. Dorsey v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 46 Ga. App. 485, 167 S.E. 924 (1933).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II and antecedent provisions, relating to specific powers of the probate courts, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph does not contemplate creation of a court, but rather enlargement of the jurisdiction of the probate court. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-10 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I).

Probate judge calls special primary.

- While T. 21 does not specify the exact method of calling a special primary, the judge of the probate court is the officer generally having jurisdiction of primaries, and the judge is the proper person to call a special primary. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-128.

Probate judges continue to exercise jurisdiction over traffic cases. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-53.

Probate judges may issue arrest warrants only in certain traffic cases and for peace officers accused of any offense in the performance of their duties. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-13.

Ga. L. 1955, p. 736, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-371 and40-6-376), giving local authorities right to pass traffic regulations, was not in conflict with this paragraph. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-79 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I).

Jurisdiction to issue warrants and require bond.

- Because a probate court may hold a court of inquiry pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-20, it may also issue warrants and require bond pursuant to either O.C.G.A. § 17-6-90 or O.C.G.A. § 17-6-110. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.

Jurisdiction to set bail.

- Because a probate court may hold a court of inquiry pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-20, it may also set bail for any criminal offense not included in O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(a). 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.

Jurisdiction to hear case where offense occurs within city limits.

- Probate court has jurisdiction to hear traffic case involving violation of state law even where offense occurs within city limits of municipality which has recorder's court. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-47.

Jurisdiction over violations of county ordinances.

- A probate court has jurisdiction over violations of county ordinances in counties of 550,000, or more, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-1-17. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.

A probate court, having jurisdiction over traffic offenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-9-30(b)(8) and40-13-21, has jurisdiction over violations of county traffic ordinances. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.

No jurisdiction over violations of waste management or air pollution statutes.

- The probate court does not have jurisdiction to try or sentence an individual accused of violating the criminal provisions concerning waste management or air pollution. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-1.

A probate court may exercise state judicial power over misdemeanor traffic offenses occurring within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation where the charter of the municipal corporation authorizes a municipal court but no such court is in existence. The arresting officer in a misdemeanor traffic case is responsible for returning those charges to the proper court with jurisdiction to hear the matter, but, if the citation is erroneously returned to the incorrect court, that court should promptly act to transfer the matter to a court with jurisdiction to consider the charges. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-30.

O.C.G.A. § 40-13-29 does not prohibit the probate court from exercising state judicial power in any county simply because of the existence of a municipal court within the corporate limits of a municipal corporation within that county. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-30.

Section 40-13-20 is broader than this paragraph, for under the former, any recorder's court is authorized to try traffic offenses, while under this paragraph, only those recorder's courts situated in counties having no city or county court are given such jurisdiction. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 899 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I).

Probate court is not governed by Ga. L. 1971, p. 180, §§ 6 and 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-15-9), since a probate court does not have comparable powers to those of the superior court. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-119.

Drunkenness of person in automobile other than driver is not traffic offense and the probate court is without jurisdiction to try that offense. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 59.

Probate court has affirmative burden to obtain written waiver of a jury trial prior to proceeding to dispose of a pending traffic case on merits. However, the defendant has an affirmative burden to notify the court if the jury trial is desired. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-135.

Named probate court may issue warrant ordering apprehension of individual charged with violating traffic laws of this state who fails to appear in court on the date and at the time specified in the citation upon which he or she was arrested. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-58.

Probate court judges may not exercise jurisdiction over cases involving possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, either by virtue of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. XI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. X, Para. I) or by virtue of their undisputed authority over misdemeanor traffic cases. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-25.

Probate courts have jurisdiction to try violations of provisions regulating the size of loads and vehicles on public roads. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-14.

Probate court does not have jurisdiction to try violations of weight restrictions. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-14.

Probate court does not have jurisdiction over violations of motor vehicle licensing law.

- The provisions regulating motor vehicle licensing are not within the purview of this paragraph and Ga. L. 1962, p. 3146, § 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-21), and the provisions are not "traffic laws" contemplated by this paragraph and the Georgia law. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-18 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. III, Para. I).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. II and antecedent provisions, relating to jurisdiction of the former justice of the peace courts (now magistrate courts), are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Justice of the peace courts have jurisdiction in bail trover cases up to the amount of $200.00. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 77.

Justice of the peace may only honor applications for writs of possession as provided by former Code 1933, § 67-701 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. Part 4, Art. 7, Ch. 14, T. 44) when amount in controversy does not exceed $200.00. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-104.

Justice of the peace may not issue bill of peace.

- Since the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over equity matters and a bill of peace is an equitable remedy, justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for such relief; it follows that any such bill of peace issued by a justice of the peace would be void and of no effect. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 66.

Attendance at justice of the peace court commitment hearing does not entitle officer to fee. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-234.

Superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from justice of the peace/magistrate courts; such jurisdiction having a constitutional basis until July 1, 1983, and a statutory one thereafter. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-27.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 15, 107, 109.

ALR.

- Modern status of rule relating to jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 25 A.L.R.4th 157.

Jurisdiction or power of juvenile court to order parent of juvenile to make restitution for juvenile's offense, 66 A.L.R.4th 985.

Small claims: jurisdictional limits as binding on appellate court, 67 A.L.R.4th 1117.