Syfert Injury Law Firm
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; - And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
- Organization and training of militia, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. II and §§ 38-2-24,38-2-27,38-2-132.
Weights and measures standards, §§ 10-2-2,10-2-3.
Appointment of militia officers, §§ 38-2-150,38-2-152,38-2-210.
State cession authority, §§ 50-2-22,50-2-25.
Limited concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over ceded territory, §§ 50-2-23,50-2-25 through50-2-27.
- U.S. Const., amend. 14, sec. IV, modifies clause 1 of this section by forbidding federal or state governments from assuming or paying certain debts.
- For article discussing fishing rights along maritime belt of the United States, in light of Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S. Ct. 1157, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948), see 11 Ga. B.J. 191 (1948). For article, "The Discriminatory Effect of Multiple State Taxation of Interstate Carriers," see 5 J. of Pub. L. 327 (1956). For article, "Georgia Water Law, Use and Control Factors," see 19 Ga. B.J. 119 (1956). For article, "Patterns of Social Legislation: Reflections on the Welfare State," see 6 J. of Pub. L. 3 (1957). For article, "The Law of the Land," focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 444 (1957). For article, "The Federal Loyalty Security Program - A Constitutional Dilemma," see 20 Ga. B.J. 473 (1958). For article, "Congress, the States and Commerce," see 8 J. of Pub. L. 47 (1959). For article criticizing statutory interpretation of Federal Power Act extending federal authority through the commerce clause, and proposing a balancing of interests test to protect state jurisdiction over production and gathering of natural gas and electricity when they are local activities, see 10 Mercer L. Rev. 226 (1959). For article, "The Subject-Matter Limitation Upon the Treaty-Making Power," see 11 J. of Pub. L. 122 (1962). For article discussing "Pre-Emption" Doctrine, in light of Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 82 S. Ct. 327, 7 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1961), see 11 J. of Pub. L. 341 (1962). For article, "Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and Drug Laws," see 14 J. of Pub. L. 276 (1965). For article discussing discrimination in public accommodations, see 17 Mercer L. Rev. 338 (1965). For article discussing congressional power to regulate the value of currency in the case of a change in the par value of the dollar, see 16 J. of Pub. L. 51 (1967). For article discussing functional broadening of Congress' delegated powers and its effect on civil liberties, see 18 J. of Pub. L. 103 (1969). For article discussing validity of "executive privilege" as defense to congressional demand for information, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 809 (1974). For article, "Constitutional Issues In Federal No-Fault," see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 273 (1975). For article discussing developing principles of state sovereignty limitations on Congress' exercise of its granted powers, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1976). For article discussing the constitutional parameters of state efforts to stimulate international trade, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 391 (1976). For article analyzing the relationship between the military and the First Amendment right of individuals to engage in political activities, see 28 Emory L.J. 3 (1979). For article, "In their own image: The reframing of the due process clause by the United States Supreme Court", see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 479 (1979). For article, "Trademark Protection: Judicial Inconsistency in the Fifth Circuit," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 1167 (1981). For article, "Federalism and State Taxation of Multistate Enterprises," see 32 Emory L.J. 89 (1983). For article, "Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930," see 35 Emory L.J. 59 (1986). For article, "Cable Copyright: The Role of the Copyright Office," see 35 Emory L.J. 621 (1986). For article, "Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power," 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1986). For article, "Congress As Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine," 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1986). For article, "State Taxation of Interstate Banking," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 283 (1986). For article, "Plying the Erie Waters: Choice of Law in the Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 653 (1987). For lecture, "Government, Society, and Anarchy," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 753 (1987). For article, "Georgia and the Development of Constitutional Principles: An Essay in Honor of the Bicentennial," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (1987). For article, "Georgia's Current Antitakeover Law: A Look at Management's New Shield," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 176 (1988). For article, "Biotechnology and the Law: Social Responsibility or Freedom of Scientific Inquiry?," see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 437 (1988). For article, "The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors," see 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1988). For article, "Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation," see 38 Emory L.J. 67 (1989). For article, "More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the Right to Shelter," see 38 Emory L.J. 615 (1989). For article, "Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860," see 39 Emory L.J. 65 (1990). For essay, "The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence," see 24 Ga. L. Rev. 629 (1990). For article on copyright law and the public domain, see 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990). For article, "Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions," see 39 Emory L.J. 1025 (1990). For annual eleventh circuit survey of bankruptcy law, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 1277 (1991). For article, "Rights as Trumps," see 27 Ga. L. Rev. 463 (1993). For article, "On-Line Computer Databases and CD-Roms Are Not the Electronic Equivalent of Microfilm: Tasini v. New York Times Co., Electronic Revisions, and Individual Contributions to Collective Works under the Copyright Act of 1976," see 15 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 521 (1998). For article, "The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine," see 35 Ga. L. Rev. 161 (2000). For article, "Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?," see 36 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (2002). For article, "Filburn's Legacy," see 52 Emory L.J. 1719 (2003). For article, "Patent Law for the General Practitioner," see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 10 (2003). For Eleventh Circuit survey article on intellectual property decisions in 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1327 (2004). For article, "An Information Theory of Copyright Law," see 61 Emory L.J. 71 (2014). For article, "Urban Decay, Austerity, and the Rule of Law," see 61 Emory L.J. 1 (2014). For article, "The Copymark Creep: How the Normative Standards of Fan Communities Can Rescue Copyright," see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 459 (2015). For article, "Putting the 'Public' Back in 'Public Use': Interpreting the 2011 Leahy Smith America Invents Act," see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 867 (2015). For annual survey of bankruptcy law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 819 (2016). For article, "Untangling the Market and the State," see 67 Emory L.J. 243 (2017). For note discussing Georgia corporate income tax in light of commerce clause immunity, see 10 Ga. B.J. 172 (1947). For note discussing the relationship of federal and state regulation of insurance, in light of In the Matter of American Hospital and Life Insurance Co., C.C.H. Trade Reg. Rep. 25,954 (FTC, April 24, 1956), see 5 J. of Pub. L. 494 (1956). For notes on amenability of dependents of servicemen and non-military employees to court-martial overseas, see 9 J. of Pub. L. 252 (1960). For note discussing the scope of federal police power under the commerce clause, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 359 (1970). For note discussing the constitutional implications of higher nonresident tuition fees charged by state universities, see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 86 (1971). For note discussing the doctrine of federal preemption in the allocation of powers between the nation and the states, see 22 J. of Pub. L. 391 (1973). For note, "Oil Spills - State Prevention and the Possibility of Pre-emption," see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 559 (1973). For note discussing the twenty-first amendment limitation on state's power to regulate alcoholic beverages, in light of United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 93 S. Ct. 2183, 37 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 336 (1973). For note discussing the commerce power and its relation to the tenth amendment in light of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976), see 25 Emory L.J. 937 (1976). For note discussing whether there is a freedom of scientific inquiry such that privately sponsored scientific research is beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, discussed in the context of recombinant dioxyribose nucleic acid research, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 785 (1977). For note discussing "Interstate Commerce" jurisdictional test in Sherman Act cases, in light of McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 100 S. Ct. 502, 62 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1980), see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 714 (1981). For note, "Conditioning Access to the Public Forum on the Purchase of Insurance," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1983). For note, "United States v. Stanley: Salt in a Serviceman's Wounds," see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 1013 (1988). For note on the licensed-foundry defense in patent infringement cases, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 621 (1995). For note on solid waste disposal, flow control ordinances and regulations, see 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1227 (1998). For note, "United States v. Odom: The Eleventh Circuit Substantially Affects Federal Criminal Law Through Its Constitutional Analysis of the Jurisdictional Element of Section 844(i)," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 1735 (2002). For article introducing symposium on war powers under the constitution, see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 931 (2003). For article, "Constitution, Foreign Affairs and Presidential War-Making: A Response to Professor Powell," see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 947 (2003). For article, "Structuralism and the War Power: The Army, Navy and Militia Clauses," see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1021 (2003). For article, "A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs," see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1059 (2003). For note, "DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: The Supreme Court Hits the Brakes on Determining the Constitutionality of Investment Incentives Given by States to Corporate America," see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 1411 (2007). For note, "Rethinking the Role and Regulation of Private Military Companies: What the United States and United Kingdom Can Learn from Shared Experiences in the War on Terror," see 39 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 445 (2011). For note, "Foreign States are Foreign States: Why Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due Process Clause," see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 913 (2011). For note, "A Pharmaceutical Park Place: Why the Supreme Court Should Modify the Scope of the Patent Test for Reverse Payment Deals," see 20 J. Intell. Prop. L. 315 (2013). For comment discussing state immunity from federal taxation in light of Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 980, 82 L. Ed. 1448 (1938), Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938), and Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U.S. 218, 58 S. Ct. 539, 82 L. Ed. 758 (1938), see 1 Ga. B.J. 43 (1938). For comment on Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 980, 82 L. Ed. 1448 (1938), denying immunity from federal taxation to football tickets sold by University of Georgia, see 1 Ga. B.J. 46 (1939). For comment concerning constitutionally permissible government competition with private industry, in light of Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543 (1939), see 1 Ga. B.J. 56 (1939). For comment on Herbert v. State, 60 Ga. App. 633, 4 S.E.2d 843 (1939), see 2 Ga. B.J. 55 (1940). For comment regarding constitutionality of tax for the purpose of maintaining post roads levied on vehicles in interstate commerce, in light of Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. Ed. 495 (1939), see 2 Ga. B.J. 75 (1940). For comment regarding constitutionality of sales tax imposed on receipts of sales of coal previously transported in interstate commerce, in light of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 (1940), see 2 Ga. B.J. 80 (1940). For comment on Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 61 S. Ct. 334, 85 L. Ed. 275 (1940), holding state licensing tax on foreign retailers violates commerce clause, see 3 Ga. B.J. 74 (1941). For comment on Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), upholding constitutionality of exclusion of Japanese-Americans from military arms, see 7 Ga. B.J. 364 (1945). For comment on Beard v. Alexandria, 69 F. Supp. 722, (W.D. La. 1947), upholding constitutionality of ordinance prohibiting peddlers, hawkers, or itinerant merchants from going upon private residences to solicit orders or sell goods, see 10 Ga. B.J. 116 (1947). For comment discussing constitutionality of nondiscriminatory tax on motor carriers engaged solely in interstate commerce, in light of Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 68 S. Ct. 167, 92 L. Ed. 99 (1947), see 10 Ga. B.J. 381 (1948). For comment on United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948), holding federal regulation of all retail sales is constitutional where product has once moved in interstate commerce, see 10 Ga. B.J. 484 (1948). For comment on Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), holding playing of baseball games in "organized baseball" constitutes interstate commerce, see 12 Ga. B.J. 100 (1949). For comment discussing constitutionality of state taxation of interstate motor carriers, in light of Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 70 S. Ct. 806, 94 L. Ed. 1053 (1950), see 13 Ga. B.J. 364 (1951). For comment on Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S. Ct. 295, 95 L. Ed. 329 (1951), holding unconstitutional five-mile limit placed on pasteurization of milk, see 13 Ga. B.J. 480 (1951). For comment discussing state regulation of interstate natural gas pipelines, in light of Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71 S. Ct. 215, 95 L. Ed. 190 (1950), see 13 Ga. B.J. 488 (1951). For comment on Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S. Ct. 920, 95 L. Ed. 1233 (1951), upholding constitutionality of "Green River" ordinances, see 14 Ga. B.J. 258 (1951). For comment on immunity of judicial sale held by trustee in bankruptcy from taxation by state, in light of California State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909, 72 S. Ct. 302, 96 L. Ed. 680 (1952), see 1 J. of Pub. L. 504 (1952). For comment on Specter Motor Serv. Co. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. Ed. 573 (1951), holding Connecticut Corporation Tax Act of 1935 violative of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, see 14 Ga. B.J. 371 (1952). For comment on Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953), holding that a statute providing for the confinement of an accused found to be mentally incompetent until such time as the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial is valid under the constitutional provision relating to "incidental powers," see 16 Ga. B.J. 236 (1953). For comment on Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 75 S. Ct. 191, 99 L. Ed. 68 (1954), holding the Federal Motor Carrier Act does not allow the state to suspend or revoke the right of interstate carriers for violations of state highway regulation, see 17 Ga. B.J. 403 (1955). For comment on United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S. Ct. 1, 100 L. Ed. 8 (1955), holding necessary and proper clause does not permit subjection of ex-servicemen to trial by court-martial, see 7 Mercer L. Rev. 385 (1956). For comment discussing revocation of citizenship for concealment of a material fact, see 18 Ga. B.J. 506 (1956). For comment concerning state taxation of federal property, in light of Offutt Hous. Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 76 S. Ct. 814, 100 L. Ed. 1151 (1956), see 19 Ga. B.J. 247 (1956). For comment on Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957), and Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 76 S. Ct. 886, 100 L. Ed. 1342 (1956), as to military authority overseas over dependents of servicemen, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 540 (1957). For comment on Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S. Ct. 1325, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1469 (1957), upholding the enjoining under a New York statute of distribution of certain obscene books, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 548 (1957). For comment on Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956), see 19 Ga. B.J. 550 (1957). For comment on West Point Whsle. Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 38 Ala. App. 444, 87 So. 2d 661 (1956), see 20 Ga. B.J. 403 (1958). For comment on Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959), applying discrimination test for state taxation affecting interstate commerce, see 10 Mercer L. Rev. 327 (1959). For comment on Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959), upholding constitutionality of state net income tax levied on revenues of foreign corporation derived from interstate commerce where tax is "fairly apportioned," see 22 Ga. B.J. 107 (1959). For comment discussing constitutionality of legislation requiring employees to pay dues to railway union in order to maintain employment, in light of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S. Ct. 1784, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1961), see 24 Ga. B.J. 432 (1962). For comment discussing taxpayer standing to challenge federal spending, in light of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968), see 17 J. of Pub. L. 419 (1968). For comment on National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 87 S. Ct. 1389, 18 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1967), as to constitutionality of imposing state use taxes on out of state mail order form, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 257 (1968). For comment on O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 291 (1969), as to limits of court-martial's jurisdiction to try serviceman, see 18 J. of Pub. L. 471 (1969). For comment discussing limits on the military's jurisdiction and the constitutional rights of servicemen in light of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1969), see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (1969). For comment on United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), as to implied power of the executive to sue, see 20 J. of Pub. L. 337 (1971). For comment on Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as to religious regulations at military academies, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 400 (1971). For comment on Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 1031, 99 S. Ct. 2155, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1979), as to whether a state acting in a proprietary capacity as an interstate seller is restricted by the commerce clause, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1086 (1979). For comment on the commerce clause and economic self-protection, see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 101 (1979). For comment on Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 65 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1980), regarding the constitutionality of the ten percent set aside for minority contractors, etc., see 29 Emory L.J. 1127 (1980). For comment, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Computer Programs and the Idea-Expression Distinction," see 34 Emory L.J. 741 (1985). For comment, "Commerce and Outer Space: A Legal Survey," see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 1551 (1986). For comment, "A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict," see 35 Emory L.J. 163 (1986). For comment, "Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis," see 36 Emory L.J. 285 (1987). For comment, "The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory as a Means of Judicial and Legislative Reform," see 38 Emory L.J. 237 (1989). For comment, "Reinforcing the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture," see 39 Emory L.J. 1261 (1990). For comment, "Copyright Protection for Computer Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?" see 39 Emory L.J. 1293 (1990). For comment, "Can Anyone Own a Piece of the Clock?: The Troublesome Application of Copyright Law to Works of Historical Fiction, Interpretation, and Theory," see 42 Emory L.J. 253 (1993). For comment on general copying for classroom use as fair use under the copyright law, see 46 Emory L.J. 1363 (1997). For comment, "Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act," see 47 Emory L.J. 819 (1998). For comment, "The Government's Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption," see 49 Emory L.J. 711 (2000). For comment, "Hegel's Secret: Personality and the Housemark Cases," see 52 Emory L.J. 515 (2003). For comment, "Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland: Reaffirming Ex parte Young and the Necessity of Finding Regulatory Hand-Back Schemes to a Gift or Gratuity," see 52 Emory L.J. 1519 (2003). For comment on the effect of Devlin v. Scardelletti and amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on class action "minimal diversity" concerns, see 52 Emory L.J. 1877 (2003). For comment, "Pay What You Like - No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses," see 58 Emory L.J. 1495 (2009). For comment, "Lawless by Design: Jurisdiction, Gender and Justice in Indian Country," see 59 Emory L.J. 1515 (2010). For comment, "Sparse Patient Protection for Research Tools: Expansion of the Safe Harbor has Changed the Rules," see 63 Emory L.J. 749 (2014). For comment, "Inherently Governmental: A Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons and Detention Centers," see 67 Emory L.J. 293 (2017).
- Congress has power to enact a law to become effective when certain conditions come into existence and may delegate to an administrative officer the authority to determine, in accordance with the standard laid down by Congress, when the conditions have come into existence. Or, Congress may declare a policy and fix a definite standard by which the administrator is to be controlled and authorize him to make subordinate rules for the administration of the Act. Congress cannot, however, permit the administrator to determine what the law shall be. Payne v. Griffin, 51 F. Supp. 588 (M.D. Ga. 1943).
- The Constitution grants Congress the authority to make all laws necessary to effectuate its authority. However, this authority is not unchecked. Congress may pass only those laws which are consistent with the limits contained within the Constitution. United States v. Hill, 750 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
- Congress clearly has the authority to establish and prescribe by law those defenses that are available to the defendants accused of federal criminal conduct. United States v. Hill, 750 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
- The necessary and proper clause of this section, along with U.S. Const., art. I, sec. IV, empowers Congress to regulate mixed federal-state elections, even if the federal candidate is unopposed. United States v. McCranie, 169 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1999).
Cited in City of Waycross v. Bell, 169 Ga. 57, 149 S.E. 641 (1929); In re Moore, 42 F.2d 475 (N.D. Ga. 1930); Citizens' & S. Nat'l Bank v. City of Atlanta, 46 F.2d 88 (N.D. Ga. 1931); Richardson v. Johnson Furn. Co., 176 Ga. 28, 166 S.E. 662 (1932); In re Glover Casket Co., 1 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ga. 1932); Richmire v. Legg, 3 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1933); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Nash Loan Co., 179 Ga. 52, 175 S.E. 247 (1934); Rollins v. Legg, 179 Ga. 85, 175 S.E. 382 (1934); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935); Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ga. 1935); Dean v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 193 Ga. 401, 18 S.E.2d 756 (1942); Derrick v. City Council, 138 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1943); Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Sykes v. Sanford, 150 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Goodman v. Hearn, 153 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1946); Benton v. Callaway, 165 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1948); Brown v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1948); Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949); Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950); Williams v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 208 Ga. 659, 68 S.E.2d 705 (1952); Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953); United States v. Denmark, 119 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Ga. 1953); Bisson v. Howard, 224 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1955); Looper v. Georgia, S. & Fla. Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957); Smith v. UMW, 180 F. Supp. 796 (M.D. Ga. 1958); Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. v. Williams, 214 Ga. 803, 108 S.E.2d 314 (1959); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brower, 102 Ga. App. 462, 116 S.E.2d 679 (1960); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga. 1964); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Undercofler, 220 Ga. 553, 140 S.E.2d 269 (1965); Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 224 Ga. 728, 164 S.E.2d 559 (1968); Gilstrap v. United States, 389 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1968); Cross v. State, 122 Ga. App. 208, 176 S.E.2d 517 (1970); DeKalb County v. Empire Distribs., Inc., 229 Ga. 497, 192 S.E.2d 346 (1972); United States v. Crow, Pope & Land Enters., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1976); DeKalb Cablevision Corp. v. Press Ass'n, 141 Ga. App. 1, 232 S.E.2d 353 (1977); Fred Whitaker Co. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 551 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1977); General Fin. Corp. v. Garner, 556 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 439 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1977); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 240 Ga. 743, 242 S.E.2d 69 (1978); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Keenan Co. v. Pamlico, Inc., 245 Ga. 842, 268 S.E.2d 334 (1980); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 515 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Joyner v. Golden Dome Inv. Co., 7 Bankr. 596 (M.D. Ga. 1980); United States v. Yeatts, 639 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1981); Windfaire, Inc. v. Busbee, 523 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Ga. 1981); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1982); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ga. 1982); McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Chemical Bank v. Grigsby's World of Carpet, Inc. (In re WWG Indus., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Geowaste of Ga., Inc. v. Tanner, 875 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
- Spending clause statutes may authorize monetary awards for intentional violations. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 117 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1992).
- Sections 462 and 463 of 31 U.S.C., providing for discharge, by payment in legal tender, of obligations for payment in gold or any particular coin or currency, or in money of the United States measured thereby, of the then standard weight and fineness, are not unconstitutional as in violation of this section, as the exercise of a power not delegated to Congress, nor in violation of the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 5 or amend. 10. Smith v. Bukofzer, 180 Ga. 585, 180 S.E. 358 (1935).
- Congress has the authority under the spending clause to impose conditions that attach by the terms of the statute involved upon the receipt of federal funds offered under a federal act. Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1213, 104 S. Ct. 3582, 82 L. Ed. 2d 880 (1984).
- The immunity implied from dual sovereignty recognized by Constitution does not extend to business enterprises conducted by states for gain. Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 58 S. Ct. 980, 82 L. Ed. 1448 (1938), overruled on other grounds, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985).
- Congress bears the responsibility for establishing rules of taxation, and as long as Congress has acted within its constitutional powers, the judiciary cannot use its broad powers to frustrate specific statutory language. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).
- A federal statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary and capricious as to violate due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 5. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).
Unconstitutionality of tax measure derives neither from unequal imposition nor from unequal incidence, but rather from that special instance where the law is so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).
Within constitutional limitations, there is no equity in tax law. Fears v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 518 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).
- Interstate commerce consists of intercourse and traffic between citizens or inhabitants of different states, and includes the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. American Mills Co. v. Doyal, 46 Ga. App. 236, 167 S.E. 312 (1933).
- Where interstate commerce is affected, it is not a question of whether the affecting cause is a transaction in interstate or intrastate commerce, or an intrastate process, or intrastate understanding or combination, but rather a question of whether the cause really and substantially affects interstate commerce. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ga. 1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1934).
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that if manufacturer had minimum contacts with Georgia sufficient to support personal jurisdiction on a stream of commerce theory. Maxwell Chase Techs., L.L.C. v. KMB Produce, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
- In determining what does and does not constitute commerce, the circumstances, continuance, and extent of the transaction in question may be considered, and no court has ever attempted to lay down a definite and unvarying formula by which the problem may be solved. Commerce is not a technical, legal conception, but rather a practical one, drawn from the course of business. The exigencies of trade determine what is essential to the business or process of interstate commerce in that trade. Interstate commerce is increased and enlarged with each additional degree and development of transportation and communication. Fleming v. Alterman, 38 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
Passage of a person from one state to another is interstate commerce within meaning of Constitution, and enactment by Congress of statute making it a federal offense to do so for purpose of escaping prosecution for a crime, is within the power of Congress. Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
Federal commerce power encompasses the movement in interstate commerce of persons as well as commodities. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966).
- A state cannot authorize activity which violates the commerce clause; thus, if the Georgia statute enabling authorities to enter into agreements for exclusive rights with respect to solid waste disposal is interpreted to exclude competition from the solid waste disposal market, then it would conflict with the commerce clause, and, accordingly, conduct of authorities pursuant to the statute would not be entitled to state action immunity. Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
If the contract is for sale of article and for its delivery to buyer in another state, transaction is one of interstate commerce. American Mills Co. v. Doyal, 46 Ga. App. 236, 167 S.E. 312 (1933).
Manufacturing alone, within a single state, is not commerce and the fact that the things manufactured are to be shipped or used in interstate commerce does not make their production a part thereof. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ga. 1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1934).
One who ships interstate is unquestionably engaged in commerce, and one whose business is to all practical purposes exclusively the receipt and distribution of such shipments by wholesale and in such manner as to produce a constant and continuous recurrence thereof is as much a part thereof by the day-in and day-out receipt and distribution of such goods as one who ships them. Each activity is a part of the whole of commerce among the several states, and the whole includes the parts. Fleming v. Alterman, 38 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
Question of whether there is subsequent interstate shipment furnishes one test of interstate commerce, but does not supply a definite and unvarying standard which may be applied to all transactions to measure and define their interstate or intrastate character. Of necessity, each transaction and business must be determined in the light of all surrounding circumstances. Fleming v. Alterman, 38 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
If transportation has acquired an interstate character it continues at least until the load reaches the point where the parties originally intended that the movement should finally end. Fleming v. Alterman, 38 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
Commerce in tobacco is overwhelmingly interstate and foreign. Mulford v. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ga. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
- A nationwide business is not deprived of its interstate character merely because it is built upon sales contracts which are local in nature. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944) (decided under prior law).
Radio broadcasting or communications are all interstate; this is so although such broadcasting may be intended for intrastate transmissions only. Radio broadcasting is an instrumentality of interstate commerce and subject to regulation under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Carroll, 78 Ga. App. 292, 50 S.E.2d 808 (1948), aff'd, 338 U.S. 586, 70 S. Ct. 370, 94 L. Ed. 363 (1950).
- Although radio broadcasting is truly an interstate proposition, and an operator of radio broadcasting station is an operator of public utility and thus subject to regulation as any other public utility engaged in interstate transactions would be under the authority given Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, its private transactions, not affected with a public interest and not connected with its operation as an interstate public utility, are not subject to regulation and control by Federal Communications Commission under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), or any other governmental agency empowered to regulate interstate transactions of a public utility; matters of private concern and contracts affecting private rights, which do not have as their subject matter the rights conferred by a license or do not substantially affect such rights, are not within the scope of the commission's power to regulate and control, in the public interest, broadcasting by radio stations and licenses to such stations. Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Carroll, 78 Ga. App. 292, 50 S.E.2d 808 (1948), aff'd, 338 U.S. 586, 70 S. Ct. 370, 94 L. Ed. 363 (1950).
- Because witnesses testified that upon presenting themselves for service no inquiry was made as to their place of residence, and because the restaurant had several large signs on two important business route portions of federal highways, and because the restaurant itself was situated on a main business route, a federal interstate highway, and because it was clear beyond any question that a very substantial part of the dollar value of the food and other products served or sold by the restaurant originated outside of the state and thus had moved in commerce, the restaurant was engaged in interstate commerce. Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964), appeal dismissed sub nom. Maddox v. Willis, 382 U.S. 18, 86 S. Ct. 72, 15 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1965).
- Not only may transactions be commerce though noncommercial, but they may also be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and information. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944) (decided under prior law).
- The acquisition of firearms by convicted felons and persons under indictment for felonies, although arguably intrastate activity, imposes a sufficient burden upon interstate commerce to be a proper subject for federal regulation. United States v. Nelson, 458 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1972).
- Federal statute prohibiting anyone convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing or receiving a firearm did not violate the commerce clause. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
Organizations affecting commerce may not escape coverage of social legislation by showing that they were created for fraternal or religious purposes. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972).
- Power of Congress over interstate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the Constitution. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941); Drake v. Hirsch, 40 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964).
Power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. It extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster, and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
Power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the power granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964); Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964), appeal dismissed sub nom. Maddox v. Willis, 382 U.S. 18, 86 S. Ct. 72, 15 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1965).
Commerce clause gives exclusive power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in area of taxation nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct restrictions or impositions by the states. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959);(decided under prior law).
- Regulations of commerce by Congress, including those of persons carrying it on and the instrumentalities used in it, although they may fall within field of ordinary police power, such as laws regulating employers' liability, hours of service of employees, safety appliances on equipment, and the like, will override police regulations of state when in conflict with them, because of the supremacy of the federal Constitution and laws, although in the absence of congressional legislation such state regulation would stand. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
Where Congress assumes regulation and control of interstate commerce its power is supreme and any state regulations to the contrary are of no effect. Tucker v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 40 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
If interstate and intrastate commerce are served by same instrumentalities of common carrier, and it appears that a state regulation applied directly to intrastate business may in fact burden interstate commerce, such state regulation must yield to the federal power to assure adequate interstate service. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 63 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
Commerce clause is restricted by its terms to the control of interstate commerce. Montgomery & Atlanta Freight Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 175 Ga. 826, 166 S.E. 200 (1932).
Whatever affects interstate commerce in a substantial and direct way may be regulated by Congress, regardless of whether the affecting cause is a transaction in intrastate process or agreement. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ga. 1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1934).
Congress has power to regulate transactions in and affecting interstate commerce by removing discriminations against and burdens upon it and by measures to foster and promote its growth and insure its safety. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ga. 1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1934).
- Commerce means something more than traffic; it is intercourse, and the power committed to Congress to regulate commerce is exercised by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
- Any rule which is intended to foster, protect, and conserve commerce, or to prevent the flow of commerce from working harm to the people of the nation, is within the competence of Congress. Within these limits, the exercise of the power, the grant being unlimited in its terms, may lawfully extend to the absolute prohibition of such commerce, and, a fortiori, to limitation of the amount of a given commodity which may be transported in such commerce. The motive of Congress in exerting the power is irrelevant to the validity of the legislation. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
If regulation of interstate commerce of any kind is needed, Congress, not the states, must furnish it; and it may be of any kind not prohibited by other constitutional provisions. Mulford v. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ga. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
Federal power over intrastate railroad tracks and agencies. Congress's preemption of state regulatory authority over intrastate railroad tracks and agencies is a valid exercise of its authority to regulate under the commerce clause. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 944 F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
Intrastate rates may be controlled by Congress when so involved with interstate commerce as to make it necessary. Mulford v. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ga. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
Within its sphere, the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is in its nature a police power, to be exerted for the public good and in any way, not prohibited, which Congress deems calculated to achieve the desired regulatory effect. This may involve affecting or controlling what would usually pertain to the state police power. Mulford v. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ga. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
- While agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and the like, are in themselves local activities, the regulation of which generally belongs to the states and not to Congress, and sales made within the state are not intended at the time to result in removing the goods from the state, it may not be maintained that such intrinsically local matters do not under some circumstances become so interwoven with interstate and foreign commerce as to render it necessary and proper for Congress to affect to control them in order to regulate the interstate and foreign commerce which springs from them. The power of Congress to regulate such commerce is paramount and very broad. Mulford v. Smith, 24 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ga. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
Motive and purpose of regulation of interstate commerce are matters for legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
Congress can regulate traffic though it consists of intangibles. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944) (decided under prior law).
- The execution by Congress of its power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that effective control of interstate commerce by Congress incidentally controls intrastate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 63 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
No sort of trade can be carried on to which this power does not extend. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964).
Authority of the federal government over interstate commerce does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964).
Determinative test of the exercise of power by Congress under the commerce clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is commerce which concerns more states than one and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964).
Tenth amendment does not operate upon a valid exercise of power delegated to Congress by the commerce clause. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
Direct regulation of interstate carriage, including regulation of the persons carrying and their vehicles, is vested in federal government. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
- The power of the United States over its waters capable of use as interstate highways stems from the authority to regulate commerce among the several states delegated to Congress under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 3. Such power extends to the entire bed of the stream and includes lands below the ordinary high-water mark. Federal jurisdiction over such waters embraces the whole surface of bodies of water subject to tidal action no matter how shallow or obstructed. A common sense view permits no distinction upon the ground of navigability between the shallows and depths of navigable waters. United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
- Congressional power to legislate in furtherance of the elimination of racial discrimination is derived from the thirteenth amendment, the power over interstate commerce, the power under the fourteenth amendment, and the power under the fifteenth amendment. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826, 94 S. Ct. 131, 38 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1973).
- Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare, even though the states have not sought to regulate their use. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to a county is not an unconstitutional exercise of power under the commerce clause. Prickett v. DeKalb County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
Congress lacks transcendent legislative authority with regard to labor relations; its authority to prescribe labor-management ordinances derives from its power over interstate commerce. Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
- A statutory scheme requiring disclosure by creditors of credit information expressed in a uniform manner, as well as disclosure of the actual annual interest rate to the debtor, is within the power granted to Congress under the commerce clause. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furn. Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
Commerce power is subject to the due process clause of the fifth amendment. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
There is no requirement of national uniformity when Congress exercises its power under the commerce clause. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
- Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the commerce clause. Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027, 105 S. Ct. 1391, 84 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1985).
- Federal arson statute (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)) was within the regulatory authority of Congress. United States v. Chowdhury, 118 F.3d 742 (11th Cir. 1997).
Purely intrastate disputes do not fall within the commerce clause and therefore are not subject to the federal Lanham Act's regulation of service marks. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1983).
- The fact that a business uses its service mark in interstate commerce is sufficient to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction. There is no requirement that the business of an infringer be shown to be interstate as well. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1983).
State law that frustrates or conflicts with lawful objective of federal statute must yield to the federal authority. United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 656 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1981).
Mere privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is not derived from the state and cannot be conditioned by a state upon procuring a license or paying a tax. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
General police power and general taxing power are reserved to the state government, and these may usually be exercised without excepting persons and instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce, provided there is no discrimination against interstate commerce, and provided no direct and unreasonable burden is put upon it. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
State may license or refuse to license, may condition or charge for, the use of its improved roads, when they are turned from their common uses and purposes to the carrier's business, since an interstate carrier has no better right than any other to use the state's improved highways without its consent, or without paying for it. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
Certificate of public convenience and necessity, with a reasonable fee therefor, and an annual license fee for trucks, are legally demandable by state as a nondiscriminatory prerequisite for use of highways for carrier purposes, even though the commerce involved is wholly interstate. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
- In absence of action by Congress authorizing particular acts, complained of as negligence, or in prescribing degree of care and diligence to be exercised by railroad company in operating interstate trains at public crossings, it cannot be said that general duty to exercise ordinary care, imposed by law of state upon its citizens generally, constitutes an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce because persons engaged in interstate commerce incidentally come within purview of such general laws. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Benton, 43 Ga. App. 495, 159 S.E. 717 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 175 Ga. 491, 165 S.E. 593 (1932); Powell v. Smith, 70 Ga. App. 754, 29 S.E.2d 521 (1944).
State has full power and authority to regulate and control business within its jurisdiction, unless such regulations and control conflict with terms of its own or the federal Constitution. Montgomery & Atlanta Freight Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 175 Ga. 826, 166 S.E. 200 (1932).
- Use of public highways by private intrastate and interstate motor carriers of goods may be conditioned by the state upon the carrier's obtaining a license, complying with reasonable regulations, paying a reasonable license fee and tax for expenses of highway administration, and maintenance and reconstruction of the highways covered by the license, and upon the filing of an insurance policy as security against injuries from carrier's negligent operations to persons and property other than passengers and property he carries. In the exercise of its right to demand compensation for special highway facilities it has provided, and of its power to regulate use of its highways in the interest of public safety, a state may properly treat motor vehicles as a special class, because of the special damage to the highways and special dangers to the public attending their operation. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 179 Ga. 431, 176 S.E. 487 (1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935).
- Provision of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 that motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers authorized to transact business in the state are deemed to provide the minimum coverage required by Georgia law when the insured is involved in an accident in Georgia is shielded from attack under the commerce clause by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 267 Ga. 134, 475 S.E.2d 619 (1996).
- The mere existence of congressional power, no conflict with its exercise being shown, does not deprive the states of their authority to safeguard their local interests by legislation which does not directly burden transactions in interstate or foreign commerce. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842, 81 L. Ed. 1210 (1937).
Absent congressional legislation on subject, state laws which are not regulations of commerce itself or its instrumentalities are not forbidden even though they affect interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
Appropriate local regulations adopted primarily to promote safety upon streets of municipality are not obnoxious to commerce clause where the indirect burden upon interstate commerce is not unreasonable. Lowe v. City Council, 45 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
- Local or internal commerce, not affecting other states and with which it is not necessary to interfere for purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government, may be controlled by local authorities; but if a city government may control the commerce that flows through it from outside state by such exactions as make the movement no longer profitable or possible, other states are affected and the general powers of the national government are circumscribed beyond the limits the Constitution allows. Lowe v. City Council, 45 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
- Provisions of municipal ordinance requiring operators of taxicabs to maintain office, telephone, and attendant on duty at all times within city is void as to taxicab owners residing outside state who are engaged in interstate business, because it conflicts with the commerce clause; but provisions of municipal ordinance dealing with prevention of cruising upon streets, proscribing use of one street, where traffic congests, for more than one block at a time, limiting number of passengers in one automobile, and requiring operator to drive with care and prudence in compliance with police regulations, are not directed at and do not discriminate against those engaged in interstate commerce. Local taxicabs and like vehicles operating intrastate are bound by them. Lowe v. City Council, 45 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
- Not all burdens upon commerce, but only undue or discriminatory ones, are forbidden. Graves v. City of Gainesville, 78 Ga. App. 186, 51 S.E.2d 58 (1948).
- A state consistently with the commerce clause cannot put a barrier around its borders to bar trade from other states and thus bring to naught the great constitutional purpose of the fathers in giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. Graves v. City of Gainesville, 78 Ga. App. 186, 51 S.E.2d 58 (1948).
The twenty-first amendment removes spirituous liquors and alcohol from protection of commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow the states to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent. Even in the absence of any protection under U.S. Const., amend. 21, the sovereign states in the exercise of their reserved police power may, without offending the commerce clause, adopt and enforce necessary laws and regulations to effectuate their own protection against illegal traffic and trade in such liquors. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949); Redwine v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 210 Ga. 769, 83 S.E.2d 16 (1954).
- If interstate and intrastate commerce are served by same instrumentalities of common carrier, and it appears that a state regulation applied directly to intrastate business may in fact burden interstate commerce, such state regulation must yield to the federal power to assure adequate interstate service. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 207 Ga. 675, 63 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
State may exercise power of eminent domain although interstate commerce may be indirectly or incidentally involved. Elberton S. Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645 (1955).
- Although Congress has the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, and while the courts have held that a state cannot impose undue burdens on interstate commerce, a state has an inherent and reserved right to regulate its local, domestic, and internal commerce, even though by so doing it may indirectly or incidentally affect interstate commerce. Elberton S. Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645 (1955); Southern Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 134 S.E.2d 12 (1963).
Commerce clause gives exclusive power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in area of taxation nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct restrictions or impositions by the states. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959);(decided under prior law).
Federal law excludes local regulation, even though the latter does no more than supplement the former. Complementary state regulations are as invalid as state regulations which conflict with the federal scheme. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 82 S. Ct. 327, 7 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1961).
- A state may exercise its power of eminent domain in acquiring necessary rights of way for state-aid roads although interstate commerce may be indirectly or incidentally involved, but a state cannot by an arbitrary, capricious, and unnecessary exercise of its power of eminent domain take and destroy property which a railway company is using for the purpose of carrying on interstate commerce. Southern Ry. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 219 Ga. 435, 134 S.E.2d 12 (1963).
- Commerce clause did not withdraw from the states the power to legislate with respect to their local concerns, even though such legislation may indirectly and incidentally affect interstate commerce and persons engaged in it. Southern Ry. v. Overnite Transp. Co., 223 Ga. 825, 158 S.E.2d 387 (1967).
- State statutes that only relate to or indirectly affect interstate commerce or cover matters not legislated on by Congress are not invalid as interfering with or burdening interstate commerce. Southern Ry. v. Overnite Transp. Co., 223 Ga. 825, 158 S.E.2d 387 (1967).
- The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "broad power in the state to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders, and highway hazards, even by use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce." General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 634, 54 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1977).
Georgia courts, though broadly construing the police power, have traditionally limited power of state to regulate private business under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 1. General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 634, 54 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1977).
- If a statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits. General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996, 98 S. Ct. 634, 54 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1977).
- State policy that suppliers of durable medical supplies have a valid business license and an in-state business location or be located within a fifty mile radius of the state boundary was violative of the interstate commerce clause. It discriminated against interstate commerce and was not the least burdensome means of accomplishing its stated purpose: reducing the administrative costs of the Medicaid program and protecting the citizens of Georgia. Nutritional Support Servs. v. Miller, 830 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
- Real estate broker licensure requirements, which are not uncommonly imposed by the states, generally withstand attack on the basis of the commerce clause; Supreme Court of Georgia does not find Georgia's invalid. Krizan v. Newman & Co., 246 Ga. 214, 271 S.E.2d 135 (1980).
O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-111 and40-2-112 discriminate against interstate commerce because they impose taxes on vehicles registered in certain states which are not imposed on vehicles registered in the State of Georgia. State v. Private Truck Council of Am., Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 371 S.E.2d 378 (1988).
- A state may not enforce licensing requirements that, though valid in the absence of federal regulation, give the state's licensing board a virtual power of review over the federal determination that a person is qualified to perform certain functions. United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 656 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1981).
- A city ordinance which placed a limit on the number of taxi permits to be issued and which limited the number of certificates of public necessity and convenience to be issued did not violate the commerce clause. Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Comm. v. City of Atlanta, 584 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
One-year Georgia residency requirement for holders of certificates of public necessity and convenience to operate taxicabs in Atlanta, Ga., City Code § 162-57(a)(3) violated the commerce clause because the city did not show that discrimination against non-residents was demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism; there was no relationship between the residency requirement and a valid government interest, and the requirement was economic protectionism which created an artificial barrier to commerce. Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
Association of taxicab owners had standing to challenge the constitutionality under the commerce clause of a one-year Georgia residency requirement for holders of certificates of public necessity and convenience (CPNC) to operate taxicabs in Atlanta, Ga., City Code § 162-57(a)(3) because the provision erected an existing impediment to the solicitation and eventual consummation of any sale or lease of a CPNC to a nonresident of Georgia; enforcement of § 162-57(a)(3) against them impacted their right to engage freely in those business activities currently authorized by the CPNCs issued to them under Atlanta, Ga., City Code ch. 162. Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
City ordinances which regulated the fares which licensed limousine service companies could charge for trips to and from an airport and prohibited the advertising of any fares that were not in compliance did not violate the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment. Executive Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986).
- A county's application of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16, which restricts transportation of refuse, to prohibit a waste management company from operating a landfill, which was owned by a municipality but located in the county, as a regional landfill, i.e., from receiving waste from outside the county and from outside the state, violated the company's constitutional commerce clause right to engage in interstate commerce without discriminatory intervention. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd in part, vacated on other grounds, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
County resolution preventing a waste management firm from importing waste of any kind into the county from other counties and other locations violated the commerce clause. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16, which permits Georgia counties to require an application for a permit from those who would bring across state or county boundaries garbage, trash, waste, or refuse for the purpose of dumping such at a publicly or privately owned dump, is constitutional. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
County ordinance regulating the transport of out-of-county waste into the county did not violate the commerce clause on its face. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 796 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
Landfill operator with solid waste handling permit was within the "zone of interests" protected by the commerce clause because its ability or inability to operate impacted the flow of interstate commerce. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 796 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
That out-of-state generators may be less trustworthy than in-state generators is an insufficient reason to burden interstate commerce in solid waste disposal since a load of in-state waste is no different from a load of out-of-state waste apart from origin. Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
The state failed to justify its requirements that one must obtain a special solid waste handling permit prior to engaging in out-of-state waste disposal; that an out-of-state waste handler must submit a waste analysis plan, through which the operator must obtain a representative sample from every load of out-of-state waste received and perform a detailed chemical and physical analysis on the sample; that out-of-state waste be accompanied by a manifest at all times that the waste is in the state of Georgia; that $10.00 per ton be charged as a fee on out-of-state waste; and that the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources be authorized to inspect at random any out-of-state generators that dispose of their waste in Georgia. Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
The statutory provisions and the rules that apply to the regulation of out-of-state waste, or "special solid waste," specifically former O.C.G.A. § 12-8-27 and Rule 391-3-4.10, in their entirety, and O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24 and Rule 391-3-4-.02, insofar as they require a permit for the handling of special solid waste, are unconstitutional burdens upon interstate commerce. Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (decided prior to repeal of § 12-8-27 by Ga. L. 1993, p. 399).
Out-of-county operator had standing to challenge county ordinance on landfills because the ordinance regulated out-of-county waste brought into the county. Mullis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Bibb County, 822 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
Landfill operator whose landfill was permitted as a landfill not regulated by a county ordinance but who had obtained special authorization from the state to accept various other types of waste, some of which was defined by the county ordinance, had standing to challenge the ordinance. Mullis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Bibb County, 822 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
County ordinance treating differently in-county waste from out-of-county waste was subject to strict scrutiny, requiring lower court reconsideration on the issue of facial invalidity. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 814 F. Supp. 83 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
- County ordinance regulating waste imported into county was unconstitutional under the commerce clause, since it treated waste coming from outside the county differently from waste originating inside the county, and the county failed to meet its burden of showing that there was some reason, apart from county of origin, to treat out-of-county waste differently from in-county waste. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 828 F. Supp. 52 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 43 F.3d 677 (11th Cir. 1994).
County policy limiting the origin of waste to within 150 miles of the county was violative of the commerce clause, despite the county's assertion that the limitation was necessary to preserve the capacity of its waste facility. The county failed to give any reason why its objectives could not be accomplished without discriminating against other counties. GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1993).
- Statutory provisions regulating the issuance of permits and containing transportation restrictions pertaining to biomedical waste thermal treatment facilities were deemed unconstitutional as a violation of the commerce clause. Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- A county's one-landfill policy under its solid waste management plan was not economic protectionism violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, because laws favoring local government could be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism; the county had concerns regarding, inter alia, the costs and financing of more than one landfill. R&J Murray, LLC v. Murray County, 282 Ga. 740, 653 S.E.2d 720 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1053, 128 S. Ct. 2476, 171 L. Ed. 2d 767 (2008).
Georgia "anti-takeover" statute enjoyed a presumption of validity under the supremacy and interstate commerce clauses, where it could not be established with the required degree of legal certainty that the statute denied hostile tender offers for Georgia corporations a meaningful opportunity to succeed. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
- Where commodity imported into state has come to rest and become part of common mass of property in state, a nondiscriminatory tax by state upon it, or upon its sale or use, is valid. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929).
Gasoline imported by distributor from another state but used in conduct of its business loses its interstate character and may be subjected to an excise tax consistently with commerce clause, although it remains in original packages in which it is imported. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929).
Mere privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is not derived from the state and cannot be conditioned by a state upon procuring a license or paying a tax. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
- The state may license or refuse to license, may condition or charge for, the use of its improved roads, when they are turned from their common uses and purposes to the carrier's business, since interstate carrier has no better right than any other to use the state's improved highways without its consent, or without paying for it. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
Certificate of public convenience and necessity, with a reasonable fee therefor, and an annual license fee for trucks, are legally demandable by state as a nondiscriminatory prerequisite for use of highways for carrier purposes, even though the commerce involved is wholly interstate. Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931).
- It is a burden on interstate commerce for a state to tax proceeds of interstate commerce, and a tax by a state upon the gross receipts of goods sold in interstate commerce is a tax on interstate commerce and is contrary to U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl.3. American Mills Co. v. Doyal, 46 Ga. App. 236, 167 S.E. 312 (1933).
- Highways are public property and users of them, although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, are subject to regulation by state to ensure safety and convenience and conservation of the highways, and may be required to contribute to their cost and upkeep. Common carriers for hire, who make the highways their place of business, may properly be charged an extra tax for such use. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 179 Ga. 431, 176 S.E. 487 (1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935).
To sustain a charge by the state for the use of or privilege of using its roads for interstate transportation, it must affirmatively appear that the charge is exacted as compensation or to pay the cost of policing its highways. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. Ed. 495 (1939).
- While state may not tax privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, it may impose upon motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce a charge, as compensation for use of public highways, which is a fair contribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining them and of regulating the traffic thereon. As such a tax is a direct burden on interstate commerce, it cannot be sustained unless it appears, in some way, that it is levied only as compensation for use of the highways or to defray the expense of regulating motor traffic. This may be indicated by the nature of the imposition, such as a mileage tax directly proportioned to highway use, by the express allocation of the proceeds of the tax to highway purposes, or otherwise. Where it is shown that the tax is so imposed, it will be sustained, unless the taxpayer shows that it bears no reasonable relation to the privilege of using the highways or is discriminatory; but the mere fact that the tax falls upon one who uses the highway is not enough to give it presumptive validity. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 179 Ga. 431, 176 S.E. 487 (1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935).
- State regulation providing that, before operating over state highways, common motor carrier shall apply for and obtain certificate or permit from state commission and shall pay an extra tax for maintenance and repair of the highways and for administration and enforcement of the laws governing their use, is constitutional though applied to carriers engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. That the tax so exacted is not all used for maintenance and repair of the highways, but some of it for defraying expenses of the commission for administration and enforcement and some for other purposes, is no concern of the taxpayer, it being assessed for a proper purpose and not unreasonable in amount. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 179 Ga. 431, 176 S.E. 487 (1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. Ed. 1439 (1935).
- Fact that sources of tax imposed on corporation organized under laws of Delaware and domesticated under laws of Georgia incidentally involve interstate commerce transactions in computing the taxable net income of taxpayer does not contravene the commerce clause. Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S.E. 563 (1935), aff'd, 182 Ga. 568, 186 S.E. 558 (1936).
- Business of radio broadcasting of programs, some originating in other states and transmitted to broadcasting station in this state by wire, and others originating locally, to listeners in this state and other states, is interstate commerce, and is of such a nature that the business of broadcasting such programs to listeners in this state cannot be discontinued without withdrawing the broadcasting of such programs from listeners in other states. A municipal tax on privilege of operating or the business of operating a radio broadcasting station of the nature described is invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. City of Atlanta v. Southern Broadcasting Co., 184 Ga. 9, 190 S.E. 594 (1937).
State has power to tax income of its resident and domestic corporations derived from transactions both within and without state, where there is no discrimination against interstate commerce either in the admeasurement of the tax or in the means adopted for the enforcing of it. State Revenue Comm'n v. Edgar Bros. Co., 185 Ga. 216, 194 S.E. 505 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 626, 58 S. Ct. 761, 82 L. Ed. 1088 (1938).
- As to nonresidents, income tax may be levied upon income received from property within state, and fact that it may require activities of skill and management outside state to bring the income to fruition does not, by reason of the commerce clause, deprive the taxing state of jurisdiction to tax income which arises within its borders, as to nonresidents doing business in a state and whose business is of a unitary character, a tax may be levied based upon the entire net income, but apportioned to that part of the net income attributable to business done in the taxing state, where the enforcement of such tax is left to the ordinary means of collecting taxes. State Revenue Comm'n v. Edgar Bros. Co., 185 Ga. 216, 194 S.E. 505 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 626, 58 S. Ct. 761, 82 L. Ed. 1088 (1938).
- Former Code 1933, Ch. 92-29 (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 10, T. 48), which imposes a maintenance tax on the operation of motor buses, trucks, and trailers upon the public roads of this state, in addition to any and all other taxes, licenses, or registration fees required, for the privilege of using the highways of the state, the entire amount of the tax to be allocated for the construction and maintenance of public highways, is not violative of the commerce clause nor does it violate the privileges and immunities clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Dixie-Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 186 Ga. 228, 197 S.E. 887 (1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. Ed. 495 (1939).
It is elementary that state may not impose a tax on privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. Ed. 495 (1939).
- If a state at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. Ed. 495 (1939).
- Cigarette tax levied not upon the privilege of receiving cigarettes in this state, but rather upon the privilege of retaining, keeping, holding, or possessing them for personal use after they have been received, acquired, or brought into this state, is not violative of the commerce clause. Head v. Cigarette Sales Co., 188 Ga. 452, 4 S.E.2d 203 (1939).
- An excise tax provision whose purpose and effect is simple economic protectionism is virtually per se invalid under the commerce clause. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1991), aff'd, 263 Ga. 609, 437 S.E.2d 782 (1993).
- Commerce clause does not exempt either tangible or intangible property from nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax by state, nor would it matter that the same intangibles might also be subject to taxation in state of company's domicile. Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942), later appeal, 201 Ga. 84, 38 S.E.2d 786 (1946).
Commerce clause does not exempt either tangible or intangible property from nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax by municipality. Parke, Davis & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 200 Ga. 296, 36 S.E.2d 773 (1946).
- A state, in levying a general income tax upon gains and profits of domestic corporation, may include in the computation the net income derived from transactions in interstate commerce without contravening the commerce clause, where there is no discrimination against interstate commerce either in the admeasurement of the tax or in the means adopted for enforcing it. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Cook, 198 Ga. 457, 31 S.E.2d 728 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 681, 65 S. Ct. 436, 89 L. Ed. 552 (1945).
- State is not precluded by commerce clause from imposing merchant's tax upon nonresident manufacturing corporation which has selected a city of that state as a distributing point, and has secured a local transfer company to take charge of its products when shipped to that point, assort them, store them in warehouse, and make delivery in original packages to customers of manufacturer, either as expressly directed by it, or under general directions in favor of its recognized and approved customers whose names are furnished to transfer company, since, under such circumstances, the goods, when stored in warehouse, are no longer in transit but have reached their destination and are held in the state for sale. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Cook, 198 Ga. 457, 31 S.E.2d 728 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 681, 65 S. Ct. 436, 89 L. Ed. 552 (1945).
- Before any part of income received by corporations having property or doing business in state can lawfully escape Georgia tax law, it must appear that such part was derived from property owned or business done outside state. Income derived by corporation from unsolicited orders received by it from outside state cannot, under the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause, be taxed elsewhere than in state. State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Ga. 316, 104 S.E.2d 574 (1958).
Commerce clause gives exclusive power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in area of taxation nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct restrictions or impositions by the states. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959);(decided under prior law).
Tax on net income from interstate commerce, as distinguished from tax on privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, does not conflict with commerce clause. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S. Ct. 357, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959);(decided under prior law).
Former Code 1933, § 92-3101 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 7, T. 48) does not offend the due process clause or the commerce clause. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Oxford, 216 Ga. 316, 116 S.E.2d 293 (1960).
Taxation of an airline sale of food places no burden on interstate commerce such as would offend commerce clause if it is merely a tax due to a local transaction, the sale of the meal. Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines, 221 Ga. 824, 147 S.E.2d 436 (1966).
No state can tax the privilege of doing interstate business, as that is within the protection of the commerce clause and subject to the power of Congress; but the mere fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has come into owner's possession as a result of interstate commerce does not diminish the protection which he may draw from a state to the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear his fair share. Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 168 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
- It is not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just share of state tax burdens, merely because an incidental or consequential effect of the tax is an increase in the cost of doing the business. Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 168 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Chattanooga Glass Co. v. Strickland, 244 Ga. 603, 261 S.E.2d 599 (1979).
Taxation by states of property shipped interstate, before its movement begins or after it ends, is not forbidden by U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 3. Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 168 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
- Things acquired or transported in interstate commerce may be subjected, when once they are at rest, to a nondiscriminatory state tax upon use or enjoyment. Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 168 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
- A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if, by the practical operation of a tax, the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society. The sole constitutional test is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return. Independent Publishing Co. v. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 168 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
Nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes do not interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the states. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1976).
- The participation fee provided for in O.C.G.A. § 12-13-10 does not constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, in violation of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, and art. VI. Luke v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 270 Ga. 647, 513 S.E.2d 728 (1999).
- A tax on privilege of using items of tangible personal property after they have come to rest in a state and commerce is at an end, is not a tax on the operators of interstate commerce. Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Chilivis, 237 Ga. 479, 228 S.E.2d 866 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1081, 97 S. Ct. 1086, 51 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1977).
- A statute creating special districts for the purpose of implementing a hotel/motel tax did not violate the commerce clause. Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
To establish that charge levied against interstate carrier imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, the complaining party must show that the charge: (1) discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce; (2) is imposed on the privilege of doing interstate business as distinguished from being imposed for the use of facilities provided by the state; or (3) exceeds fair compensation to the state. Southern Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
- In determining whether charges for lease of space at city airport are excessive in comparison with government benefit conferred and hence constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, one must focus on amount of charge rather than its formula. If amount of charge levied on interstate carrier is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, it does not impose an impermissible burden upon interstate commerce. Southern Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
Taxation of interstate commerce does not per se violate commerce clause principles. Chattanooga Glass Co. v. Strickland, 244 Ga. 603, 261 S.E.2d 599 (1979).
- Since the bus company submitted evidence that some of its buses had acquired a tax situs in a state other than Georgia, the United States Constitution's commerce clause required that Georgia's ad valorem tax on property engaged in interstate commerce, such as the bus company's buses, be apportioned; accordingly, the bus company was entitled to have the ad valorem tax assessed on its bus fleet apportioned. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Harmon Bros. Charter Serv., 261 Ga. App. 534, 583 S.E.2d 179 (2003).
Mint has no power to mint coins unless it has been authorized to do so by Congress. Mesaros v. United States, 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Requirement that wrecker services accept checks and credit cards does not violate U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII since the regulation does not require a wrecker service to accept something other than legal tender to discharge a debt. Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 384 S.E.2d 631 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S. Ct. 1297, 108 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
A city code section which makes it unlawful for a wrecker service to refuse to accept checks and major credit cards is constitutional, and is not ultra vires the home rule powers conferred by O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a). Upton v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
- Since both Congress and the courts have found federal reserve notes to be legal tender, the court found the check given to homebuyer by a mortgage company was backed by and redeemable in federal reserve notes, coins and lawful money of the United States. Strickland v. A Mtg. Co., 179 Bankr. 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
- The Constitution of the United States vests authority in Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States, and the power of Congress is paramount in matters relating to this subject. Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1949).
Under the bankruptcy power Congress has authority to impair obligation of contracts, but may do so only when property is not, contrary to the fifth amendment, taken without due process of law. In re Philibosian, 19 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
The impairment or modification of contract rights under the bankruptcy power granted under clause 4 is not prohibited by the fifth amendment. In re Bullington, 80 Bankr. 590 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 89 Bankr. 1010 (M.D. Ga. 1988), 878 F.2d 354 (11th Cir. 1989).
Although the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to establish bankruptcy laws, Art. I, Sec. VIII, cl. 4, that power is subject to the fifth amendment, which proscribes taking private property for public use without just compensation. GMAC v. Johnson, 145 Bankr. 108 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 165 Bankr. 524 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
- An unsecured note is property whose value rests wholly in the debtor's obligation to pay it and in the right to seize his property to satisfy a judgment on the note. The holder may be deprived of his property by a process of bankruptcy resulting in the bankrupt's discharge without any payment, and due process of law is not lacking. In re Philibosian, 19 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
- It is not clear that to deprive a secured creditor of his security through bankruptcy deprives him of property any more than to deprive the unsecured creditor of his debt does, or that the process of bankruptcy is any less a due process of law in the one case than in the other. The true reason why bankruptcy may not nullify a security is not the fifth amendment but the fact that it never has. It lies in the limitations inherent in the bankruptcy power. In re Philibosian, 19 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
- To delay realization on a security, especially when the security is ample and secured creditor will realize his debt in full or at least the full present value of the security with compensation for the delay, and there are good reasons for the delay, all adjudged by a court, is not unprecedented or unreasonable and is within bankruptcy power. In re Philibosian, 19 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1937).
- Although it is true that the exercise of the power to draft laws on the subject of bankruptcies is subject to the strictures of the fifth amendment, the appropriate use of that power by Congress will not be found unconstitutional simply because it upsets previously settled expectations. Joyner v. Golden Dome Inv. Co., 7 Bankr. 596 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
- Congress has the power to create bankruptcy jurisdiction over the administration of decedents' estates. Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 850, 102 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1989).
That the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "debtor" excludes decedents' estates does not mean that such exclusion applies in the context of a proceeding ancillary to a foreign proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304. Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 850, 102 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1989).
- The power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy throughout the country includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property. Caruthers v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 87 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
- The Constitution of the United States empowered Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States," and laws enacted by Congress pursuant to this grant of authority are supreme to those of the states. Bankruptcy provisions allowing the opportunity to cure and reinstate accelerated debts and bankruptcy provisions governing the payment of secured creditors' attorney's fees are no exception to the supremacy clause. In re Centre Court Apts., Ltd., 85 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
No district or bankruptcy court has any exercisable jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases, matters, or proceedings after December 24, 1982, and a district court cannot confer jurisdiction on a bankruptcy court by adoption of an emergency rule. Williamson v. General Fin. Co., 28 Bankr. 276 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983).
- Non-Article III bankruptcy judges cannot constitutionally be vested with jurisdictional power to decide state common-law claims brought pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act and related only peripherally to a bankruptcy case adjudicated under federal law. Pettigrew v. Kutak, Rock & Huie, 30 Bankr. 989 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
Production to which the protection of copyright may be accorded is the property of the author and not of the United States, but the copyright is the creature of federal statutes passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress by U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 8. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 52 S. Ct. 546, 76 L. Ed. 1010 (1932).
Copyrights are not to be deemed instrumentalities of federal government and hence immune from state taxation. The mere fact that a copyright is property derived from a grant by the United States is insufficient to support the claim of exemption from state taxation. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 52 S. Ct. 546, 76 L. Ed. 1010 (1932).
Generally, right to copyright works of science and the arts is obtained from Constitution of United States. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
United States Congress has preempted field as to statutory copyrights. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
Patent rights exist only by virtue of federal statute. Monumental Properties of Ga., Inc. v. Frontier Disposal, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 35, 282 S.E.2d 660 (1981).
Trademark registration that has achieved incontestable status under 15 U.S.C. § 1065 is still subject to attack based on functionality. Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 1999).
General ideas (theme, plot, etc.) are in public domain and cannot be copyrighted. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
In literary works, it is not the novelty but the originality of the wording that is protected by copyright. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
Test of pirating, infringement, or literary larceny concerns originality and whether the production is the result of independent labor or copying others. Similarities, historical facts, and incidental details which are necessary to the environment or setting of an action are not material of which copyrightable originality consists. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
If access to the work is admitted, then inquiry as to infringement concerns what, if anything, defendant appropriated. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
At common law, author has property right in the unpublished manuscript and can obtain redress against anyone who deprives the author of it by infringement or against anyone who obtains a copy and endeavors to realize a profit by its publication through plagiarism or otherwise. Cartin v. Boles, 155 Ga. App. 248, 270 S.E.2d 799 (1980).
Property right in unpatented product is only exclusive until it becomes property of public by being placed on the market. Monumental Properties of Ga., Inc. v. Frontier Disposal, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 35, 282 S.E.2d 660 (1981).
Charge on "common law patent" is erroneous statement of law. Monumental Properties of Ga., Inc. v. Frontier Disposal, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 35, 282 S.E.2d 660 (1981).
- Infringement of a copyright may be found where the similarity relates to matter which constitutes a substantial portion of the copyright holder's work - i.e., matter which is of value to the copyright holder. United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986).
Copyright in a compilation does not prohibit the copying of pre-existing material that is in the compilation. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).
- The enforcement of the copyright statute by a television station against a business which videotaped its news broadcasts and sold the tapes to the subjects of the news reports did not violate the copyright clause. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1867, 85 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1985).
Typical television newscast may be copyrightable in its entirety as a compilation only. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).
- Any injunction that would prevent the copying of a cable television network's newscasts "in any part" would be inconsistent with the federal Copyright Act, particularly its fair use provisions, and both the copyright clause and the first amendment to the Constitution. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).
- Under the war-making power conferred by Constitution, Congress is empowered to adopt any means which it may deem necessary to contribute to the success of the undertaking. From this it follows that Congress is authorized to grant allotments, bounties, pensions, and other rewards in return for military service, and may prescribe, as a condition upon which this compensation shall be given, a provision that the federal compensation for military service shall be exempt from all taxation, including state taxation. Rucker v. Merck, 172 Ga. 793, 159 S.E. 501 (1931).
In exercise of its exclusive prerogative to wage war, federal government cannot be interfered with by state legislation. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932).
Even though power of state to tax generally is supreme, that power may not be used to hamper, hinder, annoy, harass, and impede the federal government in the exercise of its unlimited power to carry on war. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932).
- Where Congress enacts legislation declaring that certain compensation for war veterans shall be exempt from all taxation, Congress is acting within its war powers and the exemption applies to state taxation, including taxation of property purchased by veterans with funds declared tax exempt by Congress. City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 175 Ga. 201, 165 S.E. 270 (1932).
Lack of formal declaration of war by Congress is without legal effect on validity of court martial jurisdiction during such undeclared war. Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Although trial by military tribunal deprives one of trial by jury and other constitutional rights, it is not unconstitutional. Military jurisdiction, however, is restricted to the narrowest limits consistent with the power granted Congress in U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 14. Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Lack of formal declaration of war by Congress is without legal effect on validity of court martial jurisdiction during such undeclared war. Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Only within narrow limits and where first amendment rights are involved will federal courts enjoin state or military prosecution. Torres v. Connor, 329 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
- Express authority of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 14 to make rules for government and regulation of land and naval forces is a grant of purely legislative power, and is the prime source of the establishment of the system of military justice. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 1505, 47 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1976).
- U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17, properly construed, does not altogether deny a soldier the right enjoyed by others of changing his domicile from one state to another because he is stationed on a government reservation. He should not unnecessarily be thus discriminated against and limited in matters not connected with his status as a soldier. Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 379, 170 S.E. 245 (1933).
Exclusive legislation has been construed to mean exclusive jurisdiction in the sense of exclusive sovereignty. Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).
- This court rejects in toto all argument of counsel that U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17 imposes or was intended to impose any duty whatever upon any state legislature to act. Its sole intent and meaning are to define the jurisdiction that will result if and when a state legislature by a valid law cedes jurisdiction or consents to purchase. Power does not lie in the federal government to invest the Legislature of Georgia with authority to legislate for this sovereign state, and any attempt to do so, whether by constitutional provision, congressional Act, or judicial decision, would utterly fail. No such attempt has been made by either the Constitution or Congress, and this court does not construe any court decision to constitute such an attempt. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).
- U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17 declares that when cession or consent by a state legislature has been given, exclusive legislative power vests in the United States. This court believes the sounder reasoning to the conclusion would be that no legislature, without express constitutional power, can surrender the state's sovereignty. Therefore, the attempt to surrender it is effective only to the extent of allowing the United States to own and use the land free from state interference by taxes or otherwise. Individuals, however, cannot be given such privileges. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).
United States penitentiary is "needful building" within meaning of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17. Gainey v. United States, 324 F.2d 731 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 842, 83 S. Ct. 1897, 10 L. Ed. 1062 (1963).
- Where lands are acquired by the United States within the limits of a state in any way other than by purchase with state's consent, the United States will hold the lands subject to this qualification: that if forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected upon such lands for the uses of the federal government, such buildings and their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Brittain v. Reid, 220 Ga. 794, 141 S.E.2d 903 (1965).
- The federal government may, without consent of the state, acquire land within a state by condemnation or purchase, but without state consent the United States does not obtain the benefits of U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17 and its possession is that of an ordinary proprietor. DeKalb County v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).
- It is illegal under the laws of this state to transport gambling devices within this state in intrastate commerce; however, this state does not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the transportation of gambling devices in interstate commerce. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 113.
- Any reasonable safety inspection standards which this state might wish to impose upon interstate busses registered in this state would be permissible under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 3 of this section. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-33.
- Imposition of use tax upon "cost price," as defined by paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 48-8-2, does not violate commerce clause, as it treats taxpayers printing own material out-of-state and taxpayers printing own material within the state equally. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-93.
U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17 gives to Congress the exclusive right of legislation over property or areas within jurisdiction of state where the consent of the legislature of the state is given. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 49.
- The only authority of the state which has power to consent to acquisition of property within state by federal government so as to deprive state of jurisdiction over same is the General Assembly. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 49.
Building safety counsel has no right or duty to inspect: (a) properties of the federal government such as military reservations; or (b) properties, such as war housing projects, owned by the government but leased to private persons for nongovernmental uses. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 394.
- Under U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cls. 17 and 18, the United States may gain exclusive jurisdiction over lands acquired within a state either by purchase with the consent of the state legislature or by cession of jurisdiction by the state legislature to the United States and acceptance of the cession by Congress. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 8; 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 496.
- The state legislature, in its Act consenting to purchase by the United States or ceding jurisdiction to the United States, may reserve such authority over the ceded territory as will not be incompatible with the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the United States. Reservations of the right to serve process and to resume full jurisdiction if the United States ceases to own the land are not incompatible with the federal requirements. Regulating public utilities in any ceded territory is not incompatible with U.S. Const., art. I, sec. VIII, cl. 17, and the Act effectively cedes jurisdiction over lands used by the Department of Defense. The reservation of the right to administer the criminal laws of the state over such area or the reservation of civil and criminal jurisdiction over persons and citizens within ceded territory, however, is incompatible with the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 8.
- Fort Stewart remains in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and the Juvenile Court of Liberty County does not have jurisdiction over juveniles who have allegedly committed delinquent acts on the military base. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-10.
- Power of Congress to exclude commodities from transportation in interstate commerce because of the conditions under which they are produced, 3 A.L.R. 658.
Limitation of time for deportation of alien, 8 A.L.R. 1286.
Transportation by private means as affecting character of transaction as interstate commerce, 10 A.L.R. 512.
Power of federal government over intrastate rates, 22 A.L.R. 1100.
Applicability of state Anti-trust Act to interstate transaction, 24 A.L.R. 787.
Amusement or educational enterprise as interstate commerce, 26 A.L.R. 359; 47 A.L.R. 782.
Interference with operation of plant producing goods destined for shipment out of state as restraint of trade or commerce among the states within inhibition of Sherman Anti-trust Act, 28 A.L.R. 1015; 128 A.L.R. 1075.
Subsequent dealing, by seller, with property sold conditionally in interstate commerce, as taking it out of the protection of the interstate commerce clause, 30 A.L.R. 417.
Power of federal authorities to discontinue a branch, wholly within the state, of an interstate railroad or interurban system, 30 A.L.R. 439.
Power of state to tax debts due from United States under contracts other than loans, 30 A.L.R. 1462.
Right to inventions as between employer and employee, 32 A.L.R. 1037; 44 A.L.R. 593; 85 A.L.R. 1512; 153 A.L.R. 983; 61 A.L.R.2d 356.
Implied promise of employer to pay royalty for use of patented article invented by employee, 32 A.L.R. 1045.
State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause, 36 A.L.R. 1110; 38 A.L.R. 291; 47 A.L.R. 230; 49 A.L.R. 1203; 62 A.L.R. 52; 85 A.L.R. 1136; 109 A.L.R. 1245; 135 A.L.R. 1358.
Trademark or tradename as asset in case of bankruptcy, insolvency, or assignment for benefit of creditors, 44 A.L.R. 706.
Statute or ordinance in relation to advertising as interference with interstate commerce, 48 A.L.R. 563; 57 A.L.R. 105; 115 A.L.R. 952.
Refusal or failure of consignee to accept goods as terminating interstate shipment, 48 A.L.R. 956.
License tax or fee on automobiles as affected by interstate commerce clause, 52 A.L.R. 533; 115 A.L.R. 1105.
Power of state to tax royalties from patents, 55 A.L.R. 931.
Mill-in-transit operations or similar interruptions of movement in interstate commerce as affecting state power of taxation, 60 A.L.R. 398.
Breaking continuity of passage or shipment as affecting its interstate character, 60 A.L.R. 1465; 155 A.L.R. 936.
Validity and construction of statute creating Federal Trade Commission, 68 A.L.R. 847; 79 A.L.R. 1200.
Constitutionality of statutes relating to grading, packing, or branding of farm products, 73 A.L.R. 1445.
Rules of federal courts or those of state court as applicable in action for tort against carrier arising out of interstate transportation of persons, 76 A.L.R. 428.
Constitutionality of statute relating to taxation of state banks or stock therein as affected by inapplicability of statute to national banks or national bank stock, 82 A.L.R. 874; 83 A.L.R. 1441.
Legal aspects of radio communication and broadcasting, 82 A.L.R. 1106; 89 A.L.R. 420; 104 A.L.R. 872; 124 A.L.R. 982; 171 A.L.R. 765.
Requirement of license for practice of medicine or surgery as affected by interstate commerce clause of federal constitution, 82 A.L.R. 1388.
Attachment or garnishment as interference with foreign or interstate commerce, 85 A.L.R. 1395.
Governmental powers in peacetime emergency, 86 A.L.R. 1539; 88 A.L.R. 1519; 96 A.L.R. 312; 96 A.L.R. 826.
State income tax on resident in respect of income earned outside the state, 87 A.L.R. 380.
Telegraphic or telephonic message between points in same state routed via points out of state as interstate commerce, 87 A.L.R. 1333.
Conflict of Laws, § 11 -- Judgment, § 374 -- warrant of attorney to confess judgment -- validity and effect, 89 A.L.R. 1495.
Enumeration in constitutional provision of subjects of tax as exclusive of power of legislature to add other subjects, 100 A.L.R. 859.
Validity, effect, and enforceability of provision of bonds, coupons, or other obligations of municipal or political body or of statute or ordinance under which they are issued, that they will be accepted in payment of taxes, 100 A.L.R. 1339.
Constitutionality of statute permitting payment of taxes in instalments, 101 A.L.R. 1335.
Assumption of jurisdiction by court as violation of commerce clause, 104 A.L.R. 1075.
State statute or ordinance prohibiting or regulating transportation of intoxicating liquor as interference with interstate commerce, 110 A.L.R. 931; 138 A.L.R. 1150.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes relating to highway transportation of automobiles for purposes of sale, 110 A.L.R. 622.
Constitutionality of chain store tax, 112 A.L.R. 305.
Encouragement or promotion of industry not in nature of public utility, carried on by private enterprise, as public purpose for which tax may be imposed or public money appropriated, 112 A.L.R. 571.
Applicability of state statutes or municipal regulations to contracts for performance of work on land owned or leased by the Federal Government, 115 A.L.R. 371; 127 A.L.R. 827.
Tax as unlawful discrimination against interstate commerce by reason of possibility of taxation in other states, 117 A.L.R. 444.
Right of manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to control resale price, 125 A.L.R. 1335.
Public regulation of dry cleaning and dyeing establishments, 128 A.L.R. 678.
State taxation of livestock as affected by federal constitutional or statutory provisions relating to imports, exports, or interstate commerce, 130 A.L.R. 969.
Adoption by or under authority of state statute without specific enactment or reenactment of prospective federal legislation or federal administrative rules as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, 133 A.L.R. 401.
Judicial decisions involving ASCAP, 136 A.L.R. 1438.
Constitutionality and construction of Emergency Price Control Act as relating to rent, 148 A.L.R. 1403; 149 A.L.R. 1467; 150 A.L.R. 1462; 151 A.L.R. 1465; 152 A.L.R. 1462; 153 A.L.R. 1434; 154 A.L.R. 1460; 155 A.L.R. 1461; 156 A.L.R. 1459; 157 A.L.R. 1457; 158 A.L.R. 1464.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of Emergency Price Control Act, 148 A.L.R. 1429; 149 A.L.R. 1472; 150 A.L.R. 1470; 151 A.L.R. 1469; 152 A.L.R. 1472; 153 A.L.R. 1444; 154 A.L.R. 1468; 155 A.L.R. 1467; 156 A.L.R. 1467; 157 A.L.R. 1463; 158 A.L.R. 1474.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute or ordinance imposing license fee or tax upon automobiles or trailers used for habitation, 150 A.L.R. 853.
Selective Training and Service Acts, 150 A.L.R. 1420; 151 A.L.R. 1456; 152 A.L.R. 1452; 153 A.L.R. 1422; 154 A.L.R. 1448; 155 A.L.R. 1452; 156 A.L.R. 1450; 157 A.L.R. 1450; 158 A.L.R. 1450.
Collateral business activities incident to, or in aid of, interstate transportation, as related to interstate commerce, 152 A.L.R. 1078.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of federal statute relating to power of national bank to engage in trust business, 153 A.L.R. 410.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of general use tax or other compensating tax designed to complement state sales tax, 153 A.L.R. 609.
Privilege tax in respect of business involving continuous passage and repassage over state lines of laundry or other articles for use and the return of same or similar articles to user, 153 A.L.R. 830.
Judicial decisions involving rationing, 153 A.L.R. 1453; 155 A.L.R. 1475; 156 A.L.R. 1475; 157 A.L.R. 1472; 158 A.L.R. 1489.
State tax in connection with transportation or distribution of oil or gas through pipe lines as affected by commerce clause, 154 A.L.R. 623.
License or excise tax on merchandise brokers or persons performing similar functions as affected by commerce clause, 155 A.L.R. 239.
Statute or ordinance requiring solicitor to obtain license, imposing tax or fee, as contrary to commerce clause as applied to solicitor of orders for goods to be subsequently shipped in interstate commerce, 162 A.L.R. 857.
Immunity of state and its agencies from federal taxation as affected by the governmental or nongovernmental character of the particular functions involved, 163 A.L.R. 542.
Decision of United States Supreme Court that insurance is interstate commerce as affecting state statutes relating to foreign insurance companies, 164 A.L.R. 500.
Jurisdiction of state court over actions involving patents, 167 A.L.R. 1114.
Break in transit in interstate commerce as affecting immunity of goods from local taxation, 171 A.L.R. 283.
State tax on or in respect of goods shipped in interstate commerce to consignee for sale on consignor's account without previous sale or order for purchase, 4 A.L.R.2d 244.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute respecting sale, assignment, or transfer of retail instalment contracts, 10 A.L.R.2d 447.
Loading or unloading interstate freight in performance of obligation resting upon one other than interstate carrier as interstate commerce as regards local taxation, 10 A.L.R.2d 651.
Subjecting radio broadcasting business to local taxation as burden on commerce, 11 A.L.R.2d 986.
State law or state court decisions as governing, or as rule of decision in federal court, in passing upon question as to what property passes to trustee in bankruptcy under § 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 A.L.R.2d 839.
Application and effect of "shop right rule" or license giving employer limited rights in employees' inventions and discoveries, 61 A.L.R.2d 356.
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of state tax on, or measured by, income of foreign corporation, 67 A.L.R.2d 1322.
Apportionment and computation of profits for which copyright infringer is liable, 2 A.L.R.3d 1211.
Prospective assignment of renewal rights in copyright, 2 A.L.R.3d 1403.
What constitutes uttering and passing counterfeit obligation or other security of the United States, with intent to defraud, under 18 USC § 472, 3 A.L.R.3d 1051.
Common-law copyright in the spoken word, 32 A.L.R.3d 618.
Literary property in lectures, 38 A.L.R.3d 779.
Validity of municipal ordinance imposing income tax or license upon nonresident in taxing jurisdiction (commuter tax), 48 A.L.R.3d 343.
Validity, construction, and effect of state franchising statute, 67 A.L.R.3d 1299.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring return deposits on soft drink or similar containers, 73 A.L.R.3d 1105.
When does statute of limitations begin to run against action for wrongful appropriation of literary property or idea, 79 A.L.R.3d 820.
Validity of state or local regulation dealing with resale of tickets to theatrical or sporting events, 81 A.L.R.3d 655.
Construction, application, and operation of state "retaliatory" statutes imposing special taxes or fees on foreign insurers doing business within the state, 30 A.L.R.4th 873.
Construction and effect of provision of employment contract giving employer right to inventions made by employee, 66 A.L.R.4th 1135.
Workers' compensation: recovery for home service provided by spouse, 67 A.L.R.4th 765.
Validity of state statutes and administrative regulations regulating internet communications under commerce clause and First Amendment of federal constitution, 98 A.L.R.5th 167.
Constitutionality of state bankruptcy-specific exemptions under supremacy clause and bankruptcy clause of U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 and Art. I, § 8, cl. 4), 77 A.L.R.6th 273.
Determination whether exaction for property development constitutes compensable taking, 8 A.L.R.7th 7.
Award of attorneys' fees pursuant to § 615(e)(4) of the Education of the Handicapped Act (20 USCS § 1415(e)(4), as amended by the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 500.
Copyright protection for private letters, 87 A.L.R. Fed. 871.
What constitutes a "compilation" subject to copyright protection - modern cases, 88 A.L.R. Fed. 151.
Excuse of omission of copyright notice under 17 USCS § 405, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 336.
Interest on award of damages and profits for federal copyright infringement, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 839.
Burden and sufficiency of proof under "first sale" doctrine in prosecution for copyright infringement, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 101.
Review by federal civil courts of court-martial convictions - modern status, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 472.
Construction and application by U.S. Supreme Court of Necessary and Proper Clause of U.S. Constitution - U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 161.