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ILCSChapter 815Act 710

815 ILCS 710/12 (2026)

Arbitration; administrative proceedings; civil actions; determining good cause

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1994–2013 20citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 20 opinions since 1994. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (9 cases).

(815 ILCS 710/12) (from Ch. 121 1/2, par. 762)
    Sec. 12. Arbitration; administrative proceedings; civil actions; determining good cause.
    (a) The franchiser and franchisee may agree to submit a dispute involving Section 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.1, or 11 to arbitration. Any such proceeding shall be conducted under the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act by a 3 member panel composed of one member appointed by the franchisee and one member appointed by the franchiser who together shall choose the third member.
    An arbitration proceeding hereunder for a remedy under paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10) or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4 of this Act shall be commenced by written notice to the franchiser by the objecting franchisee within 30 days from the date the dealer received notice to cancel, terminate, modify or not extend or renew an existing franchise or selling agreement or refusal to honor succession to ownership or refusal to honor a sale or transfer or to grant or enter into the additional franchise or selling agreement, or to relocate an existing motor vehicle dealer; or within 60 days of the date the franchisee received notice in writing by the franchiser of its determination under any provision of Section 4 (other than paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10) or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4), 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.1, or 11 of this Act; however, if notice of the provision under which the determination has been made is not given by the franchiser, then the proceeding shall be commenced as provided by Section 14 of this Act.
    The franchiser and the franchisee shall appoint their respective arbitrators and they shall select the third arbitrator within 14 days of receipt of such notice by the franchiser. The arbitrators shall commence hearings within 60 days after all the arbitrators have been appointed and a decision shall be rendered within 30 days after completion of the hearing.
    During the pendency of the arbitration, any party may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction which shall have power to modify or stay the effective date of a proposed additional franchise or selling agreement, or the effective date of a proposed motor vehicle dealership relocation or the effective date of a cancellation, termination or modification or refusal to honor succession or refusal to allow a sale or transfer or extend the expiration date of a franchise or selling agreement pending a final determination of the issues raised in the arbitration hearing upon such terms as the court may determine. Any such modification or stay shall not be effective for more than 60 days unless extended by the court for good cause or unless the arbitration hearing is then in progress.
    (b) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute involving Section 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.1, or 11 of this Act to arbitration under subsection (a), then a proceeding before the Motor Vehicle Review Board as prescribed by subsection (c) or (d) of Section 12 and Section 29 of this Act for a remedy other than damages under paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10), or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4 of this Act shall be commenced upon receipt by the Motor Vehicle Review Board of a timely notice of protest or within 60 days of the date the franchisee received notice in writing by the franchiser of its determination under any provision of those Sections other than paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10), or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4 of this Act; however, if notice of the provision under which the determination has been made is not given by the franchiser, then the proceeding shall be commenced as provided by Section 14 of this Act.
    During the pendency of a proceeding under this Section, a party may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction that shall have power to modify or stay the effective date of a proposed additional franchise or selling agreement, or the effective date of a proposed motor vehicle dealership relocation, or the effective date of a cancellation, termination, or modification, or extend the expiration date of a franchise or selling agreement or refusal to honor succession to ownership or refusal to approve a sale or transfer pending a final determination of the issues raised in the hearing upon such terms as the court may determine. Any modification or stay shall not be effective for more than 60 days unless extended by the court for good cause or unless the hearing is then in progress.
    (c) In proceedings under (a) or (b), when determining whether good cause has been established for granting such proposed additional franchise or selling agreement, or for relocating an existing motor vehicle dealership, the arbitrators or Board shall consider all relevant circumstances in accordance with subsection (v) of Section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to:
        (1) whether the establishment of such additional
    
franchise or the relocation of such motor vehicle dealership is warranted by economic and marketing conditions including anticipated future changes;
        (2) the retail sales and service business transacted
    
by the objecting motor vehicle dealer or dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchise or the relocated motor vehicle dealership during the 5 year period immediately preceding such notice as compared to the business available to them;
        (3) the investment necessarily made and obligations
    
incurred by the objecting motor vehicle dealer or dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchise or the relocated motor vehicle dealership to perform their obligations under existing franchises or selling agreements; and, the manufacturer shall give reasonable credit for sales of factory repurchase vehicles purchased by the objecting motor vehicle dealer or dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with the place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchise or the relocated motor vehicle dealership, or the additional motor vehicle dealership or other facility limited to the sale of factory repurchase or late model vehicles, at manufacturer authorized or sponsored auctions in determining performance of obligations under existing franchises or selling agreements relating to total new vehicle sales;
        (4) the permanency of the investment of the objecting
    
motor vehicle dealer or dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchise or the relocated motor vehicle dealership;
        (5) whether it is beneficial or injurious to the
    
public welfare for an additional franchise or relocated motor vehicle dealership to be established;
        (6) whether the objecting motor vehicle dealer or
    
dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchisee or relocated motor vehicle dealership are providing adequate competition and convenient consumer care for the motor vehicles of the same line make owned or operated in the area to be served by the additional franchise or relocated motor vehicle dealership;
        (7) whether the objecting motor vehicle dealer or
    
dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchisee or the relocated motor vehicle dealership have adequate motor vehicle sales and service facilities, equipment, vehicle parts and qualified personnel to reasonably provide for the needs of the customer; provided, however, that good cause shall not be shown solely by a desire for further market penetration;
        (8) whether the establishment of an additional
    
franchise or the relocation of a motor vehicle dealership would be in the public interest;
        (9) whether there has been a material breach by a
    
motor vehicle dealer of the existing franchise agreement which creates a substantially detrimental effect upon the distribution of the franchiser's motor vehicles in the affected motor vehicle dealer's relevant market area or fraudulent claims for warranty work, insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature;
        (10) the effect of an additional franchise or
    
relocated motor vehicle dealership upon the existing motor vehicle dealers of the same line make in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchisee or relocated motor vehicle dealership; and
        (11) whether the manufacturer has given reasonable
    
credit to the objecting motor vehicle dealer or dealers and other motor vehicle dealers of the same line make with a place of business in the relevant market area to be served by the additional franchise or relocated motor vehicle dealership or additional motor vehicle dealership or other facility limited to the sale of factory repurchase or late model vehicles, for retail sales of factory repurchase vehicles purchased by the motor vehicle dealer or dealers at manufacturer authorized or sponsored auctions.
    (d) In proceedings under subsection (a) or (b), when determining whether good cause has been established for cancelling, terminating, refusing to extend or renew, or changing or modifying the obligations of the motor vehicle dealer as a condition to offering a renewal, replacement, or succeeding franchise or selling agreement, the arbitrators or Board shall consider all relevant circumstances in accordance with subsection (v) of Section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to:
        (1) The amount of retail sales transacted by the
    
franchisee during a 5-year period immediately before the date of the notice of proposed action as compared to the business available to the franchisee.
        (2) The investment necessarily made and obligations
    
incurred by the franchisee to perform its part of the franchise.
        (3) The permanency of the franchisee's investment.
        (4) Whether it is injurious to the public interest
    
for the franchise to be cancelled or terminated or not extended or modified, or the business of the franchise disrupted.
        (5) Whether the franchisee has adequate motor vehicle
    
sales and service facilities, equipment, vehicle parts, and service personnel to reasonably provide for the need of the customers for the same line make of motor vehicles handled by the franchisee.
        (6) Whether the franchisee fails to fulfill the
    
warranty obligations of the manufacturer required to be performed by the franchisee.
        (7) The extent and materiality of the franchisee's
    
failure to comply with the terms of the franchise and the reasonableness and fairness of those terms.
        (8) Whether the owners of the franchise had actual
    
knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which cancellation or termination, failure to extend or renew, or changing or modification of the obligations of the franchisee as a condition to offering a renewal, replacement, or succeeding franchise or selling agreement.
        (9) The extent to which local market factors in the
    
dealer's market area presented by the dealer impacted the dealer's performance.
    (e) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10), or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4 of this Act, then a proceeding for a remedy other than damages may be commenced by the objecting franchisee in the circuit court of the county in which the objecting franchisee has its principal place of business, within 60 days of the date the franchisee received notice in writing by the franchiser of its determination under any provision of this Act other than paragraph (6) of subsection (d) or paragraph (6), (8), (10), or (11) of subsection (e) of Section 4 of this Act; however, if notice of the provision under which the determination has been made is not given by the franchiser, then the proceeding shall be commenced as provided by Section 14 of this Act.
    (f) The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 92nd General Assembly (i) apply only to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date and (ii) are intended to provide only an additional venue for dispute resolution without changing any substantive rights under this Act.
(Source: P.A. 100-308, eff. 8-24-17.)

    
The 20 cases that cite 815 ILCS 710/12 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 38×subsections: (c)(7) 8× (c) 6× (c)(1) 5× (c)(3) 4×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“Section 12(c) provides that, in considering whether "good cause" has been established for granting a proposed additional franchise, the Board shall consider "all relevant circumstances" in accordance with subsection (v) of section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to, 11…”
The case’s holding
Courts defer to an administrative agency's construction of a statute when there is reasonable debate regarding its meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“legislative intent is best determined from the language of the statute itself .” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENGen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 24×subsections: (c) 14× (c)(7) 6× (c)(8) (c)(11)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“The Review Board determines whether good cause exists under section 12(c) of the Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 2000)). 815 ILCS 710/4(e)(8) (West 2000).”
The case’s holding
Under the Franchise Act, good cause for adding a dealership is a balancing test considering all relevant circumstances, and the statute is constitutional.
3
GREENFields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 12×subsections: (c) 4× (c)(5) 4× (c)(8) 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 1992). THE PARTIES Docket No.”
The case’s holding
An attempted delegation of legislative or administrative decision-making power to the judiciary is invalid (holding invalid attempted delegation of legislative or administrative decisionmaking to the judiciary).
Later courts cite it for
“the authority to determine public interest is vested in the legislature and cannot permissibly be delegated to the judiciary.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 2×cited by 611 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“815 ILCS 710/12 (West 2000). The provisions of section 12 are not at issue in this appeal.”
The case’s holding
A statutory limitations period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction except in cases involving administrative review.
Later courts cite it for
“a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” · 81 citing courts
5
GREENClark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 4×subsections: (a) 2× (e) 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). More specifically, section 12(e) of the Franchise Act limits direct action in the circuit court as follows: "(e) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under…”
Later courts cite it for
“the franchise act clearly provides that disputes involving section 4 of the franchise act 'may' be submitted to arbitration under section 12(a) or otherwise 'shall' be commenced by the review board under section 12(b).” · 1 citing court
6
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, 959 N.E.2d 1133.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 2×subsections: (d) (e)cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“” 815 ILCS 710/12(d) (West 2010). ¶ 33 Section 2(v), referred to in section 12(d), defines “good cause” as “facts establishing commercial reasonableness in lawful or privileged competition and business practices as defined at common law.”
7
GREENFord Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 788 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 3×subsections: (a) (b) (d)(4)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“762(a), (b); 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2000). The question is whether the mediation clause in the Agreement merely supplements the protections afforded by the Act or constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the motor vehicle dealer’s rights in violation of the Act.”
The case’s holding
A franchisor lacks good cause to terminate a dealer agreement where it fails to show commercial reasonableness under the implied covenant of good faith, a mixed fact-law question.
8
GREENYakubinis v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 847 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 3×subsections: (c) 3×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“violates the Act if it relocates a motor vehicle dealership into the relevant market area of an existing franchise of the same line without good cause and that upon the filing of a protest by the existing franchisee, the Board shall conduct a hearing to determine whether good…”
9
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck v. Sterling Truck, 959 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. 2011).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 2×subsections: (d) (e)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“" 815 ILCS 710/12(d) (West 2010). ¶ 33 Section 2(v), referred to in section 12(d), defines "good cause" as "facts establishing commercial reasonableness in lawful or privileged competition and business *1143 practices as defined at common law.”
The case’s holding
Circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over good-cause determinations under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, which must first be adjudicated by the Motor Vehicle Review Board.
Later courts cite it for
“to determine the legislature's intent, the court may properly consider not just the statute's language, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved. the intent of the legislature 'can be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck Sales v. Sterling Truck Corp., 943 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2010).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 3×subsections: (a) (d) (e)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“, dissenting), citing 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). Section 12(e) limits direct action to the circuit court, in part, as follows: “If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under paragraph (6) of…”
Later courts cite it for
“issues as to whether good cause existed to cancel or terminate a franchise or the refusal to extend the franchise are matters best left to the arbitrator or the review board under section 12(d) of the franchise act and not the judiciary.” · 2 citing courts
11
NO FLAGGen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 19×subsections: (c)(7) 4× (c) 3× (c)(1) 3× (c)(3) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“Section 12(c) provides that, in considering whether “good cause” has been established for granting a proposed additional franchise, the Board shall consider “all relevant circumstances” in accordance with subsection (v) of section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to, 11…”
12
GREENIn re Application of the Park Dist. of La Grange, 2013 IL App (1st) 110334, 998 N.E.2d 659.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 1×subsections: (c)cited by 1 caseunpublished
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“at 465 (quoting 815 ILCS 710/12(c) 24 1-11-0334 (West 1992)).”
13
GREENIn re Application of the Park Dist. of La Grange, 2013 IL App (1st) 110334.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 1×subsections: (c)cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“at 465 (quoting 815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 1992)). ¶ 63 Objector argues that the Act similarly delegates legislative authority to the trial court and, therefore, is unconstitutional.”
14
NO FLAGGen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 4-04-0735 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Oct. 3, 2005).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 12×subsections: (c) 7× (c)(7) 3× (c)(8) (c)(11)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“The Review Board determines whether good cause exists under section 12(c) of the Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 2000)). 815 ILCS 710/4(e)(8) (West 2000).”
15
GREENFord Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 1-01-2475 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 28, 2003).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 3×subsections: (a) (b) (d)(4)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“762(a), (b); 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2000). The question is whether the mediation clause in the Agreement merely supplements the protections afforded by the Act, or constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the motor vehicle dealer's rights in violation of the Act.”
16
GREENYakubinis v. Yamaha Motors Corp, U.S.A, No. 1-05-1752, 1-05-1772 cons. Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 16, 2006).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 3×subsections: (c) 3×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“violates the Act if it relocates a motor vehicle dealership into the relevant market area of an existing franchise of the same line without good cause and that upon the filing of a protest by the existing franchisee, the Board shall conduct a hearing to determine whether good…”
17
GREENClark Investments v. Airstream, No. 3-09-0260 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 23, 2010).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 2×subsections: (a) (e)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). More specifically, section 12(e) of the Franchise Act limits direct action in the circuit court as follows: "(e) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under…”
18
NO FLAGBelleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 90340 Rel (Ill. Mar. 15, 2002).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“815 ILCS 710/12 (West 2000). The provisions of section 12 are not at issue in this appeal.”
19
NEUTRALScholl's v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 957 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“¶ 9 Scholl's requested a hearing under sections 12 (815 ILCS 710/12 (West 2008)) and 29 (815 ILCS 710/29 (West 2008)) of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act.”
cites § 815 ILCS 710/12 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/12
“¶9 Scholl’s requested a hearing under sections 12 (815 ILCS 710/12 (West 2008)) and 29 (815 ILCS 710/29 (West 2008)) of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420032013

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2011. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ill. App. Ct.13Ill.7
By subsection
(a)5 cases
Clark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010).“815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). More specifically, section 12(e) of the Franchise Act limits direct action in the circuit court as follows: "(e) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under…”
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 788 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).“762(a), (b); 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2000). The question is whether the mediation clause in the Agreement merely supplements the protections afforded by the Act or constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the motor vehicle dealer’s rights in violation of the Act.”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales v. Sterling Truck Corp., 943 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2010).“, dissenting), citing 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). Section 12(e) limits direct action to the circuit court, in part, as follows: “If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under paragraph (6) of…”
Clark Investments v. Airstream, No. 3-09-0260 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 23, 2010).“815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2008). More specifically, section 12(e) of the Franchise Act limits direct action in the circuit court as follows: "(e) If the franchiser and the franchisee have not agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, and the dispute did not arise under…”
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 1-01-2475 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 28, 2003).“762(a), (b); 815 ILCS 710/12(a), (b) (West 2000). The question is whether the mediation clause in the Agreement merely supplements the protections afforded by the Act, or constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the motor vehicle dealer's rights in violation of the Act.”
(b)2 cases
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 788 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 1-01-2475 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 28, 2003).
(c)9 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).“The Review Board determines whether good cause exists under section 12(c) of the Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 2000)). 815 ILCS 710/4(e)(8) (West 2000).”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., 862 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. 2007).“Section 12(c) provides that, in considering whether "good cause" has been established for granting a proposed additional franchise, the Board shall consider "all relevant circumstances" in accordance with subsection (v) of section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to, 11…”
Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994).“815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 1992). THE PARTIES Docket No.”
Yakubinis v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 847 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006).“violates the Act if it relocates a motor vehicle dealership into the relevant market area of an existing franchise of the same line without good cause and that upon the filing of a protest by the existing franchisee, the Board shall conduct a hearing to determine whether good…”
In re Application of the Park Dist. of La Grange, 2013 IL App (1st) 110334, 998 N.E.2d 659.“at 465 (quoting 815 ILCS 710/12(c) 24 1-11-0334 (West 1992)).”
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(c)(1)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).“Section 12(c) provides that, in considering whether “good cause” has been established for granting a proposed additional franchise, the Board shall consider “all relevant circumstances” in accordance with subsection (v) of section 2 of this Act, including but not limited to, 11…”
(c)(2)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(3)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(5)3 cases
Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(6)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(7)4 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 4-04-0735 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Oct. 3, 2005).“The Review Board determines whether good cause exists under section 12(c) of the Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/12(c) (West 2000)). 815 ILCS 710/4(e)(8) (West 2000).”
(c)(8)3 cases
Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 4-04-0735 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Oct. 3, 2005).
(c)(9)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(10)2 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
(c)(11)4 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 4-04-0735 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Oct. 3, 2005).
(d)3 cases
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, 959 N.E.2d 1133.“” 815 ILCS 710/12(d) (West 2010). ¶ 33 Section 2(v), referred to in section 12(d), defines “good cause” as “facts establishing commercial reasonableness in lawful or privileged competition and business practices as defined at common law.”
Crossroads Ford Truck v. Sterling Truck, 959 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. 2011).“" 815 ILCS 710/12(d) (West 2010). ¶ 33 Section 2(v), referred to in section 12(d), defines "good cause" as "facts establishing commercial reasonableness in lawful or privileged competition and business *1143 practices as defined at common law.”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales v. Sterling Truck Corp., 943 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2010).
(d)(4)2 cases
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 788 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 1-01-2475 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Mar. 28, 2003).
(e)5 cases
Clark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010).
Crossroads Ford Truck v. Sterling Truck, 959 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. 2011).
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales v. Sterling Truck Corp., 943 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2010).
Clark Investments v. Airstream, No. 3-09-0260 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 23, 2010).
(e)(8)1 case
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
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