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K.S.A.Chapter 21

K.S.A. § 21-6620 (2026)

Sentencing of certain persons to mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25, 40 or 50 years or life without the possibility of parole; determination; evidence presented

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 21 IN 5Y cited 2014–2026 56citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 56 opinions since 2014, 21 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (e) (12 cases).

21-6620. Sentencing of certain persons to mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25, 40 or 50 years or life without the possibility of parole; determination; evidence presented. (a) (1) Except as provided in subsection (a)(2) and K.S.A. 21-6618 and 21-6622, and amendments thereto, if a defendant is convicted of the crime of capital murder and a sentence of death is not imposed pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6617(e), and amendments thereto, or requested pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6617(a) or (b), and amendments thereto, the defendant shall be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

(2) (A) Except as provided in subsection (a)(2)(B), a defendant convicted of attempt to commit the crime of capital murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment, and such 25 years' imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(B) The provisions of subsection (a)(2)(A) requiring the court to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years shall not apply if the court finds the defendant, because of the defendant's criminal history classification, would be subject to presumptive imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the sentencing range would exceed 300 months if the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime was imposed. In such case, the defendant is required to serve a mandatory minimum term equal to the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime pursuant to the sentencing range. The defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(b) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to the crime of murder in the first degree as described in K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2), and amendments thereto, committed on or after July 1, 2014.

(1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree as described in K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2), and amendments thereto, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment, and such 25 years' imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(2) The provisions of subsection (b)(1) requiring the court to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years shall not apply if the court finds the defendant, because of the defendant's criminal history classification, would be subject to presumptive imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the sentencing range would exceed 300 months if the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime was imposed. In such case, the defendant is required to serve a mandatory minimum term equal to the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime pursuant to the sentencing range. The defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(c) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to the crime of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder committed on or after July 1, 2014.

(1) (A) Except as provided in subsection (c)(1)(B), a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, unless the sentencing judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances, to impose the sentence specified in subsection (c)(2).

(B) The provisions of subsection (c)(1)(A) requiring the court to impose the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, shall not apply if the court finds the defendant, because of the defendant's criminal history classification, would be subject to presumptive imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the sentencing range would exceed 600 months if the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime was imposed. In such case, the defendant is required to serve a mandatory minimum term equal to the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime pursuant to the sentencing range. The defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(2) (A) If the sentencing judge does not impose the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, the judge shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons therefor, and, except as provided in subsection (c)(2)(B), the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment, and such 25 years' imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(B) The provisions of subsection (c)(2)(A) requiring the court to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years shall not apply if the court finds the defendant, because of the defendant's criminal history classification, would be subject to presumptive imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the sentencing range would exceed 300 months if the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime was imposed. In such case, the defendant is required to serve a mandatory minimum term equal to the sentence established for a severity level 1 crime pursuant to the sentencing range. The defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and such mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(d) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to the crime of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder committed on or after September 6, 2013, but prior to July 1, 2014.

(1) If a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder, upon reasonable notice by the prosecuting attorney, the court shall determine, in accordance with this subsection, whether the defendant shall be required to serve a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 50 years or sentenced as otherwise provided by law.

(2) The court shall conduct a separate proceeding following the determination of the defendant's guilt for the jury to determine whether one or more aggravating circumstances exist. Such proceeding shall be conducted by the court before a jury as soon as practicable. If any person who served on the trial jury is unable to serve on the jury for the proceeding, the court shall substitute an alternate juror who has been impaneled for the trial jury. If there are insufficient alternate jurors to replace trial jurors who are unable to serve at the proceeding, the court may conduct such proceeding before a jury which may have 12 or less jurors, but at no time less than six jurors. If the jury has been discharged prior to the proceeding, a new jury shall be impaneled. Any decision of the jury regarding the existence of an aggravating circumstance shall be beyond a reasonable doubt. Jury selection procedures, qualifications of jurors and grounds for exemption or challenge of prospective jurors in criminal trials shall be applicable to the selection of such jury. The jury at the proceeding may be waived in the manner provided by K.S.A. 22-3403, and amendments thereto, for waiver of a trial jury. If the jury at the proceeding has been waived, such proceeding shall be conducted by the court.

(3) In the proceeding, evidence may be presented concerning any matter relating to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-6624, and amendments thereto. Only such evidence of aggravating circumstances as the prosecuting attorney has made known to the defendant prior to the proceeding shall be admissible and no evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or of the state of Kansas shall be admissible. No testimony by the defendant at the time of the proceeding shall be admissible against the defendant at any subsequent criminal proceeding. At the conclusion of the evidentiary presentation, the court shall allow the parties a reasonable period of time in which to present oral argument.

(4) At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the proceeding, the court shall provide oral and written instructions to the jury to guide its deliberations. If the prosecuting attorney relies on K.S.A. 21-6624(a), and amendments thereto, as an aggravating circumstance, and the court finds that one or more of the defendant's prior convictions satisfy such subsection, the jury shall be instructed that a certified journal entry of a prior conviction is presumed to prove the existence of such prior conviction or convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

(5) If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-6624, and amendments thereto, exist, the jury shall designate, in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstances which it found. If, after a reasonable time for deliberation, the jury is unable to reach a unanimous sentencing decision, the court shall dismiss the jury and the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. In nonjury cases, the court shall designate, in writing, the specific circumstance or circumstances which the court found beyond a reasonable doubt.

(6) If one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-6624, and amendments thereto, are found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to this subsection, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, unless the sentencing judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances, to impose the sentence specified in this paragraph. If the sentencing judge does not impose the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment required by K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, the judge shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons therefor, and the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment, and such 25 years' imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence shall be permitted.

(e) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to the crime of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder committed prior to September 6, 2013.

(1) If a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder, upon reasonable notice by the prosecuting attorney, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding in accordance with this subsection to determine whether the defendant shall be required to serve a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 40 years or for crimes committed on and after July 1, 1999, a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 50 years or sentenced as otherwise provided by law.

(2) The sentencing proceeding shall be conducted by the court before a jury as soon as practicable. If the trial jury has been discharged prior to sentencing, a new jury shall be impaneled. Any decision to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 40 or 50 years shall be by a unanimous jury. Jury selection procedures, qualifications of jurors and grounds for exemption or challenge of prospective jurors in criminal trials shall be applicable to the selection of such jury. The jury at the sentencing proceeding may be waived in the manner provided by K.S.A. 22-3403, and amendments thereto, for waiver of a trial jury. If the jury at the sentencing proceeding has been waived, such proceeding shall be conducted by the court.

(3) In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented concerning any matter that the court deems relevant to the question of sentence and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-6624, and amendments thereto, or for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2011, K.S.A. 21-4636, prior to its repeal, and any mitigating circumstances. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. Only such evidence of aggravating circumstances as the prosecuting attorney has made known to the defendant prior to the sentencing proceeding shall be admissible and no evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or of the state of Kansas shall be admissible. Only such evidence of mitigating circumstances subject to discovery pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3212, and amendments thereto, that the defendant has made known to the prosecuting attorney prior to the sentencing proceeding shall be admissible. No testimony by the defendant at the time of sentencing shall be admissible against the defendant at any subsequent criminal proceeding. At the conclusion of the evidentiary presentation, the court shall allow the parties a reasonable period of time in which to present oral argument.

(4) At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the sentencing proceeding, the court shall provide oral and written instructions to the jury to guide its deliberations. If the prosecuting attorney relies on K.S.A. 21-6624(a), and amendments thereto, or for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2011, K.S.A. 21-4636(a), prior to its repeal, as an aggravating circumstance, and the court finds that one or more of the defendant's prior convictions satisfy such subsection, the jury shall be instructed that a certified journal entry of a prior conviction is presumed to prove the existence of such prior conviction or convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

(5) If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-6624, and amendments thereto, or for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2011, K.S.A. 21-4636, prior to its repeal, exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. The sentencing jury shall designate, in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstances which it found. The trier of fact may make the findings required by this subsection for the purpose of determining whether to sentence a defendant pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6623, and amendments thereto, notwithstanding contrary findings made by the jury or court pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6617(e), and amendments thereto, for the purpose of determining whether to sentence such defendant to death. If, after a reasonable time for deliberation, the jury is unable to reach a unanimous sentencing decision, the court shall dismiss the jury and the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. In nonjury cases, the court shall designate in writing the specific circumstance or circumstances which the court found beyond a reasonable doubt.

(f) The amendments to subsection (e) by chapter 1 of the 2013 Session Laws of Kansas (Special Session):

(1) Establish a procedural rule for sentencing proceedings, and as such shall be construed and applied retroactively to all crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act, except as provided further in this subsection; (2) shall not apply to cases in which the defendant's conviction and sentence were final prior to June 17, 2013, unless the conviction or sentence has been vacated in a collateral proceeding, including, but not limited to, K.S.A. 22-3504 or 60-1507, and amendments thereto; and (3) shall apply only in sentencing proceedings otherwise authorized by law.

(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (h), for all cases on appeal on or after September 6, 2013, if a sentence imposed under this section, prior to amendment by chapter 1 of the 2013 Session Laws of Kansas (Special Session), or under K.S.A. 21-4635, prior to its repeal, is vacated for any reason other than sufficiency of the evidence as to all aggravating circumstances, resentencing shall be required under this section, as amended by chapter 1 of the 2013 Session Laws of Kansas (Special Session), unless the prosecuting attorney chooses not to pursue such a sentence.

(h) In the event any sentence imposed under this section is held to be unconstitutional, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced shall cause such person to be brought before the court and shall sentence such person to the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided by law.

(i) If any provision or provisions of this section or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this section which can be given effect without the invalid provision or provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.

History: L. 2010, ch. 136, § 260; L. 2011, ch. 30, § 70; L. 2013, ch. 1, § 1 (Special Session); L. 2014, ch. 114, § 4; L. 2017, ch. 92, § 1; July 1.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 21-6620 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 1161 (Kan. 2016).
cites § 21-6620 14×subsections: (e)(5) 3× (c) 2× (e) 2× (f) 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“Amendments to K.S.A. 21-6620 in 2013 changed the procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence for premeditated first-degree murder.”
The case’s holding
Premeditation may be inferred from the nature of the weapon, lack of provocation, defendant's conduct, and threats made before or during the killing.
Later courts cite it for
“premeditation can be inferred from other circumstances including: (1) the nature of the weapon used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing, (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence, or (5) dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Gulley, 505 P.3d 354 (Kan. 2022).
cites § 21-6620 14×subsections: (c)(1)(B) 11× (c)(1)(A)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“21-6620 and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6623. These statutes generally require the district court to sentence a defendant convicted of premeditated first-degree murder to life imprisonment without parole for 50 years unless there are substantial and compelling reasons to depart to the…”
3
GREENState v. Holt, 336 P.3d 312 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 7×subsections: (e) 3×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. The State also argues the evidence was sufficient to establish the aggravating factor relied on by the sentencing judge.”
The case’s holding
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor emphasizes facts that are not relevant to proving the charged crime (State v. Holt).
Later courts cite it for
“an appellate court examines the errors in the context of the record as a whole considering how the trial judge dealt with the errors as they arose . . . ; the nature and number of errors committed and their interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the evidence.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Soto, 322 P.3d 334 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 5×subsections: (e)cited by 104 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Soto responds that retroactive application of the amended statute would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, while the State disagrees and argues the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated because the new statute does…”
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment requires that any fact used to increase a mandatory minimum sentence be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“because it permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 7 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Nguyen, 372 P.3d 1142 (Kan. 2016).
cites § 21-6620 5×subsections: (b)(1) 3×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“21-5402, and amendments thereto, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence.”
Later courts cite it for
“k.s.a. 2015 supp. 21-6806c 6 formerly codified as k.s.a. 21-4706(c) does not give district courts discretion to depart from a life sentence for felony murder.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Logsdon, 371 P.3d 836 (Kan. 2016).
cites § 21-6620 2×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“At the State’s request, the district court imposed a hard 50 life sentence, pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620. Analysis Our review is limited to the issues raised by Logsdon, which we have reordered for purposes of our analysis, as follows: (1) Does sufficient evidence…”
The case’s holding
An exception does not apply to the erroneous admission of evidence if there is no timely or specific objection.
Later courts cite it for
“a failure to adequately brief an issue results in abandonment or waiver.” · 7 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Roeder, 336 P.3d 831 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 3×subsections: (e)cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“The reason given for that advisory opinion was that “[subjection (e) of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 suggests the State would be precluded from pursuing a hard 50 sentence if this court had vacated Soto’s sentence for lack of sufficient evidence to support the aggravating…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor's improper comment or argument is prejudicial even if the error is extemporaneous and made under the stress of rebutting defense counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor's improper comment or argument can be prejudicial, even if the error was extemporaneous and made under the stress of rebutting arguments made by defense counsel.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Garcia-Garcia, 441 P.3d 52 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-6620 2×subsections: (a)(2)(A) 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620(a)(2)(A). This court has direct appellate jurisdiction over convictions of all life sentence and off-grid offenses, except those under Jessica's Law.”
The case’s holding
A jurisdictional question may be raised at any time and may be raised sua sponte by the appellate court.
Later courts cite it for
“a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time and may also be raised sua sponte by the appellate court.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Sprague, 362 P.3d 828 (Kan. 2015).
cites § 21-6620 2×subsections: (e)cited by 121 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“The State encourages this court to address whether the new hard 50 statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied under subsection (£).”
The case’s holding
The open-the-door rule does not insulate a prosecutor from a finding of misconduct (State v. Sprague).
Later courts cite it for
“a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” · 3 citing courts
10
REDWilliams v. State, 476 P.3d 805 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 21-6620 6×subsections: (b) (d) (e) (f)cited by 5 cases
Reversed in part by Williams v. State (2021): the Supreme Court of Kansas's own opinion in this case ("The Court of Appeals is reversed and the district court's decision denying the motion is affirmed.").
Where it cites § 21-6620
“Bottom line, in the event the district court finds it necessary to vacate Williams' original sentence because it was unconstitutionally disproportionate, the court must comply with the statutory directives set forth in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6620(e), (f), (g), and (h) when…”
11
GREENState v. Grable, 498 P.3d 737 (Kan. 2021).
cites § 21-6620 6×subsections: (c)(1)(A) 4× (c)(1)(B) (c)(2)(A)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“21-6620(c)(1)(A) generally directs a district court to order a person convicted of premeditated first-degree murder to serve a sentence of life with a mandatory minimum 50-year term of imprisonment before parole eligibility.”
12
GREENState v. Johnson, 441 P.3d 1036 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 21-6620 1×subsections: (b)(1)cited by 147 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“Here, Johnson questions whether the postrelease term failed to conform to the applicable statutory provision or was ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it was to be served.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to impose restitution after a sentence is pronounced unless the court explicitly bifurcates the proceeding or enters an order of continuance.
Later courts cite it for
“certain issues, such as subject matter jurisdiction or an illegal sentence, can be raised at any time regardless of whether the issue was presented to the district court.” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Killings, 340 P.3d 1186 (Kan. 2015).
cites § 21-6620 3×subsections: (e) 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“3d 1046 (2014), we refrain from addressing whether the amended hard 50 sentencing statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, should be applied retroactively to Killings because such a question is not yet ripe for appeal.”
The case’s holding
Any fact increasing a mandatory minimum sentence must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“is analytically and functionally identical to the requirements under the confrontation clause and the due process clause of the federal constitution that a criminal defendant be present at any critical stage of the proceedings.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Hilt, 322 P.3d 367 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 2×subsections: (e)cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“(The statute was later recodified, with no substantive change, at K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620[b]; but we will continue to refer to it as K.”
The case’s holding
Any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor may use analogies, similes, allusions, and other rhetorical devices in an attempt to bring order to the facts presented at trial, place them in a meaningful context, and construct the whole of a case. within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Hopkins, 537 P.3d 845 (Kan. 2023).
cites § 21-6620 2×subsections: (c) (c)(1)cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“Hopkins asserts the district court committed an error of law in denying his departure motion, because though K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6620(c){1)(A) requires a "review of mitigating circumstances," the district court instead impermissibly weighed aggravating circumstances against…”
The case’s holding
A defendant is entitled to jail time credit for all time spent in custody while their case is pending disposition.
Later courts cite it for
“under the obvious and plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature, a defendant shall be awarded jail time credit for all time spent in custody pending the disposition of his or her case.” · 14 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Lloyd, 325 P.3d 1125 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Lloyd, unsurprisingly, argues against that, claiming retroactive application would violate tire constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing scheme that allows a judge to find aggravating factors to increase a mandatory minimum sentence violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Later courts cite it for
“(a) the nature of the weapon used; (b) the lack of provocation; (c) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (d) the defendant's threats and declarations before and during the occurrence; and (e) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState v. Willis, 475 P.3d 324 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 21-6620 3×subsections: (c)(1)(A) 3×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“A district court cannot improperly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances contrary to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6620(c)(1)(A) and State v.”
Later courts cite it for
“under the invited error doctrine, a litigant may not invite error and then complain of that same error on appeal.” · 4 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Espinoza, 462 P.3d 159 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 21-6620 3×subsections: (b)(1) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“The district court denied this request, finding Espinoza's hard 25 sentence constitutional: 2 "As both parties have acknowledged, the statute K.S.A. 21-6620 provides that the Court should not make any suspension, modification, or reduction of the sentence.”
Later courts cite it for
“a factual record is required for any meaningful appellate review.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENState v. Astorga, 324 P.3d 1046 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 21-6620 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“1 (Special Session); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Consequently, the State contends the district court must resentence Astorga under the amended hard 50 statute.”
The case’s holding
A jury must find the aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a judge finding them by a preponderance of the evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Becker, 459 P.3d 173 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 21-6620 1×subsections: (c)(2)(A)cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 21-6620
“Defendants such as Becker sentenced under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6620(c)(2)(A) "shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court lacks the authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“a sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence.” · 2 citing courts

Show all 56 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
201420202026

One bar per year. Tallest: 9 cases in 2014. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan.48Kan. Ct. App.510th Cir.1D. Kan.1Tenn.1
By subsection
(a)(2)1 case
State v. Kirtdoll, No. 121909 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2021).
(a)(2)(A)1 case
State v. Garcia-Garcia, 441 P.3d 52 (Kan. 2019).“K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620(a)(2)(A). This court has direct appellate jurisdiction over convictions of all life sentence and off-grid offenses, except those under Jessica's Law.”
(b)2 cases
Williams v. State, 476 P.3d 805 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).“Bottom line, in the event the district court finds it necessary to vacate Williams' original sentence because it was unconstitutionally disproportionate, the court must comply with the statutory directives set forth in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6620(e), (f), (g), and (h) when…”
State v. Mitchell, 539 P.3d 218 (Kan. 2023).
(b)(1)5 cases
State v. Nguyen, 372 P.3d 1142 (Kan. 2016).“21-5402, and amendments thereto, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence.”
State v. Johnson, 441 P.3d 1036 (Kan. 2019).“Here, Johnson questions whether the postrelease term failed to conform to the applicable statutory provision or was ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it was to be served.”
State v. Espinoza, 462 P.3d 159 (Kan. 2020).“The district court denied this request, finding Espinoza's hard 25 sentence constitutional: 2 "As both parties have acknowledged, the statute K.S.A. 21-6620 provides that the Court should not make any suspension, modification, or reduction of the sentence.”
Love (ID 52574) v. Schnurr, No. 5:22-cv-03276 (D. Kan. June 30, 2023).
In re I.H., 589 P.3d 80 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
(b)(2)5 cases
State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544 (Kan. 2014).
State v. Mitchell, 539 P.3d 218 (Kan. 2023).
State v. Gatewood, 582 P.3d 534 (Kan. 2026).
State v. Kirtdoll, No. 121909 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2021).
State v. Gwyn, 487 P.3d 769 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(6)2 cases
State v. McLinn, 409 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2018).
State v. McLinn, 409 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2018).
(c)7 cases
State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 1161 (Kan. 2016).“Amendments to K.S.A. 21-6620 in 2013 changed the procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence for premeditated first-degree murder.”
State v. Hopkins, 537 P.3d 845 (Kan. 2023).“Hopkins asserts the district court committed an error of law in denying his departure motion, because though K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6620(c){1)(A) requires a "review of mitigating circumstances," the district court instead impermissibly weighed aggravating circumstances against…”
State v. Blevins, 485 P.3d 1175 (Kan. 2021).
State v. Galloway, 518 P.3d 399 (Kan. 2022).
State v. DeAnda, 324 P.3d 1115 (Kan. 2014).
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(c)(1)2 cases
State v. Hopkins, 537 P.3d 845 (Kan. 2023).
State v. Robinson, No. 113684 (Kan. May 26, 2017).
(c)(1)(A)9 cases
State v. Willis, 475 P.3d 324 (Kan. 2020).“A district court cannot improperly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances contrary to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6620(c)(1)(A) and State v.”
State v. Grable, 498 P.3d 737 (Kan. 2021).“21-6620(c)(1)(A) generally directs a district court to order a person convicted of premeditated first-degree murder to serve a sentence of life with a mandatory minimum 50-year term of imprisonment before parole eligibility.”
State v. Gulley, 505 P.3d 354 (Kan. 2022).“21-6620 and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6623. These statutes generally require the district court to sentence a defendant convicted of premeditated first-degree murder to life imprisonment without parole for 50 years unless there are substantial and compelling reasons to depart to the…”
State v. Boswell, 499 P.3d 1122 (Kan. 2021).
State v. McNabb, 478 P.3d 769 (Kan. 2021).
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(c)(1)(B)2 cases
State v. Gulley, 505 P.3d 354 (Kan. 2022).
State v. Grable, 498 P.3d 737 (Kan. 2021).
(c)(2)1 case
State v. Z.M., 555 P.3d 190 (Kan. 2024).
(c)(2)(A)4 cases
State v. Becker, 459 P.3d 173 (Kan. 2020).“Defendants such as Becker sentenced under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6620(c)(2)(A) "shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years' imprisonment.”
State v. Grable, 498 P.3d 737 (Kan. 2021).
State v. Boswell, 499 P.3d 1122 (Kan. 2021).
State v. Zongker, 555 P.3d 698 (Kan. 2024).
(d)2 cases
Williams v. State, 476 P.3d 805 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Robinson, No. 113684 (Kan. May 26, 2017).
(d)(2)1 case
State v. Brown, No. 114350 (Kan. May 12, 2017).
(d)(6)1 case
State v. McLinn, 409 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2018).
(e)12 cases
State v. Holt, 336 P.3d 312 (Kan. 2014).“See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. The State also argues the evidence was sufficient to establish the aggravating factor relied on by the sentencing judge.”
State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 1161 (Kan. 2016).
State v. Killings, 340 P.3d 1186 (Kan. 2015).“3d 1046 (2014), we refrain from addressing whether the amended hard 50 sentencing statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, should be applied retroactively to Killings because such a question is not yet ripe for appeal.”
State v. Sprague, 362 P.3d 828 (Kan. 2015).“The State encourages this court to address whether the new hard 50 statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied under subsection (£).”
State v. Soto, 322 P.3d 334 (Kan. 2014).“See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620. Soto responds that retroactive application of the amended statute would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, while the State disagrees and argues the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated because the new statute does…”
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(e)(1)1 case
State v. Hilt, 406 P.3d 905 (Kan. 2017).
(e)(3)1 case
State v. Lloyd, 423 P.3d 517 (Kan. 2018).
(e)(5)1 case
State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 1161 (Kan. 2016).
(f)3 cases
State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 1161 (Kan. 2016).
Williams v. State, 476 P.3d 805 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Amos, 406 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2017).

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