17 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansasgreen2 sentences2021See Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas, 307 Kan. 616, 626 , 413 P.3d 432 (2018) ('We generally presume "the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation."'). 2021See Patterson v. Cowley County, Kansas, 307 Kan. 616, 626 , 413 P.3d 432 (2018) ('We generally presume "the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation."'). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sotogreen2 sentences2014See Soto, 299 Kan. at 129 . 2014Soto, 299 Kan. at 129 . | 1 | 2 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2008Noting that the “Sixth Amendment . . . speaks of denial of rights to ‘any person,’ not denial of rights to ‘any adult person,’ ” the dissenting justices discerned no difference between allowing juveniles the right to a jury trial and the previously granted rights to notice, counsel, protection against self-incrimination, confrontation, and conviction under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 403 U.S. at 560-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 2008Noting that the "Sixth Amendment . . . speaks of denial of rights to `any person,' not denial of rights to `any adult person,'" the dissenting justices discerned no difference between allowing juveniles the right to a jury trial and the previously granted rights to notice, counsel, protection against self-incrimination, confrontation, and conviction under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 403 U.S. at 560-61 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 (Douglas, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hiltgreen2 sentences2017Because the judge, rather than the jury, found the four aggravating factors existed, and did so on a preponderance-of-the- evidence rather than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, Hilt's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted in Alleyne, was violated." 299 Kan. at 203 . 2017Furthermore, we concluded that Hilt was not one of the rare cases where a hard 50 Alleyne error can be declared harmless. 299 Kan. at 204-05 ("[W]e cannot say on the 7 record before us that (1) proof of the aggravators was so overwhelming that their existence was certainly established, and (2) no rational factfinder would decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigators advanced by Hilt outweighed the State's aggravators."). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of B.D.-Y.green1 sentence2010See 286 Kan. 686 , Syl. ¶ 2. | 1 | 1 |
O'Dell v. Netherlandgreen2 sentences2001Ed.2d 799 (1963), to illustrate type of rule within watershed exception); Levan, at 278 (‘Shifting an element of the offense from jury to judge and utilizing a preponderance rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not implicate fundamental fairness or relate to the accuracy of the conviction or sentence.’); see *877 also O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 167 , 117 S. Ct. 1969 , 138 L. 2001Ed.2d 799 (1963), to illustrate type of rule within watershed exception); Levan, at 278 (‘Shifting an element of the offense from jury to judge and utilizing a preponderance rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not implicate fundamental fairness or relate to the accuracy of the conviction or sentence.’); see *877 also O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 167 , 117 S. Ct. 1969 , 138 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2026The Kansas Supreme Court has long held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard need not be defined, because "[n]o definition or explanation can make any clearer what is meant by the phrase 'reasonable doubt' than that which is imparted by the words themselves." State v. Wilson, 281 Kan. 277 , Syl. ¶ 4, 130 P.3d 48 (2006). 2026The Kansas Supreme Court has long held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard need not be defined, because "[n]o definition or explanation can make any clearer what is meant by the phrase 'reasonable doubt' than that which is imparted by the words themselves." State v. Wilson, 281 Kan. 277 , Syl. ¶ 4, 130 P.3d 48 (2006). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Adoption of C.L.
green
1 sentence2024In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. 1268 , 1278, 427 P.3d 951 (2018). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2022The State's argument on this point is confusing, but it seems to assert the district court applied a beyond a reasonable doubt standard presumably because the district court cited a case—State v. Johnson, 310 Kan. 835 , 450 P.3d 790 (2019)—that dealt with the sufficiency of evidence at a jury trial to establish which version of the criminal threat offense the defendant committed. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. King
green
2 sentences2010King, 288 Kan. at 351 , 204 P.3d 585 ; Ruff, 252 Kan. at 634 , 847 P.2d 1258 . 2010King, 288 Kan. at 351 , 204 P.3d 585 ; Ruff, 252 Kan. at 634 , 847 P.2d 1258 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Ruff
green
2 sentences2010King, 288 Kan. at 351 , 204 P.3d 585 ; Ruff, 252 Kan. at 634 , 847 P.2d 1258 . 2010King, 288 Kan. at 351 , 204 P.3d 585 ; Ruff, 252 Kan. at 634 , 847 P.2d 1258 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Cody
green
2 sentences2008On this issue, we finally point to the decision of State v. Cody, 272 Kan. 564 , 35 P.3d 800 (2001), where Cody pled guilty to criminal charges, and the court imposed an upward departure sentence based on Cody’s admissions, rather than based on facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. 2008On this issue, we finally point to the decision of State v. Cody, 272 Kan. 564 , 35 P.3d 800 (2001), where Cody pled guilty to criminal charges, and the court imposed an upward departure sentence based on Cody’s admissions, rather than based on facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lambrix v. Singletary
green
2 sentences2001Ed.2d 351 (1997) (defendant’s right to advise capital sentencing jury about parole eligibility not watershed rule); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539-40 , 117 S. Ct. 1517 , 137 L. 2001Ed.2d 351 (1997) (defendant’s right to advise capital sentencing jury about parole eligibility not watershed rule); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539-40 , 117 S. Ct. 1517 , 137 L. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Spain
green
2 sentences2001“When the legislature eliminated the jury from the determination, it removed the express standard of proof.” State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 711 , 953 P.2d 1004 (1998). 2001“When the legislature eliminated the jury from the determination, it removed the express standard of proof.” State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 711 , 953 P.2d 1004 (1998). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Victor v. Nebraska
green
2 sentences1996Ed. 2d 583, 590 , 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stated: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor held that a definition of reasonable doubt almost identical to the definition in this case did not violate due process. 1996The Court reasoned that other words and phrases in the definition itself helped to define the troublesome phrases of “moral evidence” and “moral certainty,” 511 U.S. at 10-17 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Walker
green
1 sentence1993Willis discusses Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , and highlights the fact that the Court determined that “[a]ny statute that prevents the sentencer from giving independent mitigating weight to such considerations is ‘unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’ 438 U.S. at 605 .” Willis believes that the jury was effectively precluded from considering mitigating factors by the use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. *132 We rejected a similar contention in State v. Walker, 252 Kan. at 307 , and do so here. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1993Willis discusses Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , and highlights the fact that the Court determined that “[a]ny statute that prevents the sentencer from giving independent mitigating weight to such considerations is ‘unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’ 438 U.S. at 605 .” Willis believes that the jury was effectively precluded from considering mitigating factors by the use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. *132 We rejected a similar contention in State v. Walker, 252 Kan. at 307 , and do so here. 1993Willis discusses Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , and highlights the fact that the Court determined that “[a]ny statute that prevents the sentencer from giving independent mitigating weight to such considerations is ‘unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’ 438 U.S. at 605 .” Willis believes that the jury was effectively precluded from considering mitigating factors by the use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. *132 We rejected a similar contention in State v. Walker, 252 Kan. at 307 , and do so here. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.