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N.J. Stat.Title 2C — The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice

N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2 (2026)

General requirements of culpability

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (retrieved May 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (retrieved May 2026) ACTIVE · 69 IN 5Y cited 1977–2026 158citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 158 opinions since 1977, 69 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b)(2) (52 cases).

a. Minimum requirements of culpability. Except as provided in subsection c.(3) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

b. Kinds of culpability defined.

(1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(3) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Recklessness," "with recklessness" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(4) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Negligently" or "negligence" when used in this code, shall refer to the standard set forth in this section and not to the standards applied in civil cases.

c. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements.

(1) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

(2) Substitutes for kinds of culpability. When the law provides that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability.

(3) Construction of statutes not stating culpability requirement. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section. This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside of this code.

d. Culpability as to illegality of conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the code so provides.

e. Culpability as determinant of grade of offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

The 20 cases that cite N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENFernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×cited by 264 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“The term “accidental,” the court explained, “is most often used to describe events that did not ‘occur [ ] as a result of anyone’s purposeful act.”
The case’s holding
A conviction for reckless conduct does not constitute a crime of violence under federal law because such offenses do not necessarily involve the intentional use of physical force.
Later courts cite it for
“the intentional use of force against the person or property of another” · 9 citing courts
2
GREENState of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, 108 A.3d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
cites § 2C:2-2 6×subsections: (c)(3) 3× (a) 2× (b)(2)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“Applying the dictates of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 2(c)(3)4, Judge Robert J.”
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor must charge the grand jury 'as to the elements of specific offenses.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState of New Jersey v. Victoria L. Majewski, 162 A.3d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
cites § 2C:2-2 4×subsections: (b)(1) (c) (c)(1) (c)(3)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“at 1-2 (emphasis added) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1)).] 9 A-2032-15T2 The footnote in the Model Charge relies upon the Criminal Code's general default provision governing culpability, N.”
Later courts cite it for
“because grand jury proceedings are entitled to a presumption of validity,' defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the prosecutor's conduct requires dismissal of the indictment.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Williams, 919 A.2d 90 (N.J. 2007).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×cited by 144 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“[II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:2-2, at 41-42 (1971).] Accordingly, when the State alleges criminal recklessness, it must demonstrate through legally competent proofs that defendant had knowledge…”
The case’s holding
A jury may consider a defendant's cover-up attempts as evidence of a guilty conscience to prove mental state when direct evidence is difficult to obtain.
Later courts cite it for
“limited to cases that replicate the circumstances in cofield .” · 9 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Osborne S. Maloney (068877), 77 A.3d 1147 (N.J. 2013).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“444, 458 (2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)). If the State’s theory is “that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is obligated to provide the jury with accurate and understandable jury instructions regarding accomplice liability even without a request by defense…”
The case’s holding
A judge is not obligated to instruct on accomplice liability when the prosecution theory accuses the defendant of being a principal and the defendant denies involvement in the crime.
Later courts cite it for
“an erroneous jury charge 'when the subject matter is fundamental and essential or is substantially material' is almost always considered prejudicial.” · 10 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Green, 197 A.3d 1136 (N.J. 2018).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×subsections: (b)(3)cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's two prior DWI convictions here.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must apply the Cofield test to determine whether the probative value of other-crimes evidence is outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice under Rule 404(b).
Later courts cite it for
“sensitive admissibility rulings regarding other-crimes evidence made pursuant to rule 404(b) are reversed 'only where there is a clear error of judgment.” · 6 citing courts
7
GREENState of New Jersey v. Jonathan Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×subsections: (b)(3)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).] 23 A-0632-14T3 Here, the sum of defendant's actions leading up to the victim's injury — including following the victim to his room, entering the room and demanding payment to avoid prosecution, and ripping the phone out of the wall — led to the victim…”
Later courts cite it for
“must determine only whether, 'based on the entirety of the evidence and after giving the state the benefit of all its favorable testimony and all the favorable inferences drawn a-3722-17t4 16 from that testimony, a reasonably jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Campfield, 61 A.3d 1258 (N.J. 2013).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 83 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“Accordingly, to aid the ultimate determination, the Code points expressly to the factors to be weighed in judgment: the nature and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him in acting.”
The case’s holding
A factual basis for a guilty plea exists if the defendant explicitly admits guilt or acknowledges facts constituting the essential elements of the crime.
Later courts cite it for
“the factual foundation may take one of two forms; defendant may either explicitly admit guilt with respect to the elements or may 'acknowledge . . . facts constituting the essential elements of the crime.” · 7 citing courts
9
GREENKamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740 (3d Cir. 2009).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×subsections: (b)(2)cited by 8 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2. “A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.”
10
GREENState v. Dixon, 787 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“POINT II [THE JUDGE] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN, CONTRARY TO N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(C), HE FAILED TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE LEVEL OF CULPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT CREATED A RISK OF DEATH OR INJURY TO ANY PERSON, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SECOND DEGREE OFFENSE *213…”
The case’s holding
Second-degree eluding requires a knowing mental state for the act of fleeing but not for the element that the flight creates a risk of death or injury.
Later courts cite it for
“except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENUnited States v. Troy Brasby, 61 F.4th 127 (3d Cir. 2023).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×subsections: (b)(3)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“38 The New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges and the New Jersey Practice Series on Criminal Law explain that the phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” is not part of the recklessness mens rea for aggravated assault: 38 N.J.…”
Later courts cite it for
“courts generally apply authority interpreting one provision to the other.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Rhett, 601 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1992).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“[II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission § 2C:2-2 commentary at 76 (1971).] Although an actor may be guilty of murder if he or she intended to kill or was practically certain that his or her actions would cause or would be…”
The case’s holding
A defendant is guilty of attempted murder only if they purposely intended to cause the specific result that is the necessary element of the underlying offense.
Later courts cite it for
“poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless -error analysis,” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Sewell, 603 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1992).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“95, § 2C:2-2. In addition, the Legislature in 1981 made significant changes in the gap-filler statute.”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions adopted from the Model Penal Code must be interpreted according to the intent of the Model Penal Code drafters.
Later courts cite it for
“each robbery is a separate crime, which entails a discrete theft from a single victim together with accompanying injury or force,” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENState of New Jersey v. Jerome L. Faucette, 108 A.3d 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“" See 33 A-6123-11T3 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(1); Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Liability for Another's Conduct" (1995).”
15
GREENNatalie Bellino v. Verizon Wireless, 86 A.3d 751 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×subsections: (a)(1)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“" N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)(1). Additionally, "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if 13 A-1132-12T4 he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”
Later courts cite it for
“a judge of compensation's factual findings are entitled to substantial deference.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENDeBlasio v. Groff (In re Groff), 301 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×subsections: (b)(2) (c)(3)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2). The question becomes whether the provisions of N.”
17
GREENSaudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D.N.J. 2005).
cites § 2C:2-2 2×subsections: (b)(3) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“criminal negligence from recklessness in the context of involuntary manslaughter and defining reckless as “a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross…”
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of unclean hands will deny equitable relief 'when the party seeking relief is guilty of fraud, unconscionable conduct, or bad faith directly related to the matter at issue that injures the other party and affects the balance of equities.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Ramsey, 1 A.3d 796 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“2d 21 (1992) (citing II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:2-2, at 41-42 (1971)) (noting "that recklessness resembles knowledge in that both involve a state of awareness: awareness in knowledge being…”
19
GREENState v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
cites § 2C:2-2 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“2d 688 (1997); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2. And where a sentence of over six months may be imposed, there is a traditional right of trial by jury.”
The case’s holding
A hate crime statute mandating an extended sentence based on a preponderance finding of racial bias does not violate due process.
Later courts cite it for
“greater and additional punishment,” · 1 citing court
20
GREENIn re Princeton Off. Park, L.P., 504 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).
cites § 2C:2-2 3×subsections: (b)(2)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 2C:2-2
“For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2 states, in pertinent part, as follows: § 2C:2-2.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197720012026

One bar per year. Tallest: 21 cases in 2021. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.128N.J.133rd Cir.8Bankr. D.N.J.2D.N.J.2Va. Ct. App.29th Cir.1W.D. Pa.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 9 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)12 cases
State v. Osborne S. Maloney (068877), 77 A.3d 1147 (N.J. 2013).“444, 458 (2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)). If the State’s theory is “that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is obligated to provide the jury with accurate and understandable jury instructions regarding accomplice liability even without a request by defense…”
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, 108 A.3d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).“Applying the dictates of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2- 2(c)(3)4, Judge Robert J.”
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, No. A-5802-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 10, 2015).
State of New Jersey Vs. Telquan Adams State of New Jersey Vs. Mark Ruffin, Jr., No. A-5746-17T4/A-5796-17T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2019).
State of New Jersey v. A.J.W., No. A-3376-18T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2020).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(1)1 case
Natalie Bellino v. Verizon Wireless, 86 A.3d 751 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).“" N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)(1). Additionally, "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if 13 A-1132-12T4 he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”
(b)6 cases
State of New Jersey v. Robert Mostyn, No. A-4729-15T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 5, 2017).
State of New Jersey v. Stephen White, No. A-4322-17T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 13, 2020).
State of New Jersey v. Edgar Martinez, No. A-4143-17T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 2, 2020).
State of New Jersey v. O.D.C., No. A-0303-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 10, 2021).
State of New Jersey v. Allen M. Essner, No. A-2052-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 13, 2022).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(b)(1)50 cases
State of New Jersey v. Victoria L. Majewski, 162 A.3d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).“at 1-2 (emphasis added) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1)).] 9 A-2032-15T2 The footnote in the Model Charge relies upon the Criminal Code's general default provision governing culpability, N.”
Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 211 A.3d 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
T.M. v. R.M.W., 195 A.3d 152 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
State of New Jersey v. Endy Rolando Cruz Cruz, No. A-1301-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 15, 2024).
State of New Jersey v. Gilbert Fahnbulleh, No. A-0960-17T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 2019).
Showing the top 5 of 50. More in the list view →
(b)(2)52 cases
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, 108 A.3d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
Kamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740 (3d Cir. 2009).“N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2. “A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.”
DeBlasio v. Groff (In re Groff), 301 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003).“N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2). The question becomes whether the provisions of N.”
State of New Jersey v. Daniel A. Borjas, 94 A.3d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
In re Princeton Off. Park, L.P., 504 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).“For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2 states, in pertinent part, as follows: § 2C:2-2.”
Showing the top 5 of 52. More in the list view →
(b)(3)44 cases
State v. Green, 197 A.3d 1136 (N.J. 2018).“See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's two prior DWI convictions here.”
State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).“[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).] 23 A-0632-14T3 Here, the sum of defendant's actions leading up to the victim's injury — including following the victim to his room, entering the room and demanding payment to avoid prosecution, and ripping the phone out of the wall — led to the victim…”
United States v. Troy Brasby, 61 F.4th 127 (3d Cir. 2023).“38 The New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges and the New Jersey Practice Series on Criminal Law explain that the phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” is not part of the recklessness mens rea for aggravated assault: 38 N.J.…”
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 383 (D.N.J. 2005).“criminal negligence from recklessness in the context of involuntary manslaughter and defining reckless as “a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross…”
Adewale Idowu v. Attorney Gen. United States, 512 F. App'x 222 (3d Cir. 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 44. More in the list view →
(b)(4)2 cases
State of New Jersey v. Daquan Lapread, No. A-2138-16T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 18, 2018).
State of New Jersey v. Phillip T. Stolfa, No. A-0507-23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2024).
(c)5 cases
State of New Jersey v. Victoria L. Majewski, 162 A.3d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
State v. Wickliff, 875 A.2d 1009 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
State v. Hofford, 377 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
State of New Jersey v. S.B., No. A-1235-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 27, 2021).
State of New Jersey v. Julian Sanders, 252 A.3d 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021).
(c)(1)5 cases
State of New Jersey v. Victoria L. Majewski, 162 A.3d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
State of New Jersey v. Terri M. Gross, No. A-3010-14T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 15, 2017).
State of New Jersey v. Timothy J. Canfield, 269 A.3d 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2022).
State of New Jersey v. Rodney A. Gabriel, No. A-1066-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 13, 2024).
State of New Jersey v. W.Z., No. A-0611-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 26, 2024).
(c)(2)2 cases
State of New Jersey v. Edgar Martinez, No. A-4143-17T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 2, 2020).
State of New Jersey v. Natasha White, No. A-3707-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2024).
(c)(3)17 cases
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, 108 A.3d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).
State of New Jersey v. Victoria L. Majewski, 162 A.3d 1083 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
DeBlasio v. Groff (In re Groff), 301 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003).
State of New Jersey v. S.B., No. A-1235-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 27, 2021).
State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury, No. A-5802-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 10, 2015).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →
(d)2 cases
State of New Jersey v. Rodney A. Gabriel, No. A-1066-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 13, 2024).
State of New Jersey v. Timothy C. Aman, No. A-1029-15T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 23, 2017).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (retrieved May 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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