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U.S. CodeTitle 17Chapter 2— Copyright Ownership and Transfer

17 U.S.C. § 203 (2026)

Termination of transfers and licenses granted by the author

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1979–2026 90citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 90 opinions since 1979, 25 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a)Conditions for Termination.—In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions:(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author’s termination interest. In the case of a grant executed by two or more authors of a joint work, termination of the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who executed it; if any of such authors is dead, the termination interest of any such author may be exercised as a unit by the person or persons who, under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of more than one-half of that author’s interest.(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and may be exercised, as follows:(A) The widow or widower owns the author’s entire termination interest unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in which case the widow or widower owns one-half of the author’s interest.(B) The author’s surviving children, and the surviving children of any dead child of the author, own the author’s entire termination interest unless there is a widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of the author’s interest is divided among them.(C) The rights of the author’s children and grandchildren are in all cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to the number of such author’s children represented; the share of the children of a dead child in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a majority of them.(D) In the event that the author’s widow or widower, children, and grandchildren are not living, the author’s executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee shall own the author’s entire termination interest.(3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.(4) The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing, signed by the number and proportion of owners of termination interests required under clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, or by their duly authorized agents, upon the grantee or the grantee’s successor in title.(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause (3) of this subsection, and the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that date. A copy of the notice shall be recorded in the Copyright Office before the effective date of termination, as a condition to its taking effect.(B) The notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.(5) Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.(b)Effect of Termination.—Upon the effective date of termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a), including those owners who did not join in signing the notice of termination under clause (4) of subsection (a), but with the following limitations:(1) A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.(2) The future rights that will revert upon termination of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a). The rights vest in the author, authors, and other persons named in, and in the proportionate shares provided by, clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a).(3) Subject to the provisions of clause (4) of this subsection, a further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is signed by the same number and proportion of the owners, in whom the right has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, as are required to terminate the grant under clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a). Such further grant or agreement is effective with respect to all of the persons in whom the right it covers has vested under clause (2) of this subsection, including those who did not join in signing it. If any person dies after rights under a terminated grant have vested in him or her, that person’s legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law represent him or her for purposes of this clause.(4) A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after the effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an agreement for such a further grant may be made between the persons provided by clause (3) of this subsection and the original grantee or such grantee’s successor in title, after the notice of termination has been served as provided by clause (4) of subsection (a).(5) Termination of a grant under this section affects only those rights covered by the grants that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.(6) Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant, if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect for the term of copyright provided by this title.(Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2569; Pub. L. 105–298, title I, § 103, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2829; Pub. L. 107–273, div. C, title III, § 13210(9), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1909.)Historical and Revision Noteshouse report no. 94–1476

The Problem in General. The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the present section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24 [section 24 of former title 17]) should be eliminated, and that the proposed law should substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers. A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved.

Scope of the Provision. Instead of being automatic, as is theoretically the case under the present renewal provision, the termination of a transfer or license under section 203 would require the serving of an advance notice within specified time limits and under specified conditions. However, although affirmative action is needed to effect a termination, the right to take this action cannot be waived in advance or contracted away. Under section 203(a) the right of termination would apply only to transfers and licenses executed after the effective date of the new statute [Jan. 1, 1978], and would have no retroactive effect.

The right of termination would be confined to inter vivos transfers or licenses executed by the author, and would not apply to transfers by the author’s successors in interest or to the author’s own bequests. The scope of the right would extend not only to any “transfer of copyright ownership,” as defined in section 101, but also to nonexclusive licenses. The right of termination would not apply to “works made for hire,” which is one of the principal reasons the definition of that term assumed importance in the development of the bill.

Who Can Terminate a Grant. Two issues emerged from the disputes over section 203 as to the persons empowered to terminate a grant: (1) the specific classes of beneficiaries in the case of joint works; and (2) whether anything less than unanimous consent of all those entitled to terminate should be required to make a termination effective. The bill to some extent reflects a compromise on these points, including a recognition of the dangers of one or more beneficiaries being induced to “hold out” and of unknown children or grandchildren being discovered later. The provision can be summarized as follows:

1. In the case of a work of joint authorship, where the grant was signed by two or more of the authors, majority action by those who signed the grant, or by their interests, would be required to terminate it.

2. There are three different situations in which the shares of joint authors, or of a dead author’s widow or widower, children, and grandchildren, must be divided under the statute: (1) The right to effect a termination; (2) the ownership of the terminated rights; and (3) the right to make further grants of reverted rights. The respective shares of the authors, and of a dead author’s widow or widower, children, and grandchildren, would be divided in exactly the same way in each of these situations. The terms “widow,” “widower,” and “children” are defined in section 101 in an effort to avoid problems and uncertainties that have arisen under the present renewal section.

3. The principle of per stirpes representation would also be applied in exactly the same way in all three situations. Take for example, a case where a dead author left a widow, two living children, and three grandchildren by a third child who is dead. The widow will own half of the reverted interests, the two children will each own 16⅔ percent, and the three grandchildren will each own a share of roughly 5½ percent. But who can exercise the right of termination? Obviously, since she owns 50 percent, the widow is an essential party, but suppose neither of the two surviving children is willing to join her in the termination; is it enough that she gets one of the children of the dead child to join, or can the dead child’s interest be exercised only by the action of a majority of his children? Consistent with the per stirpes principle, the interest of a dead child can be exercised only as a unit by majority action of his surviving children. Thus, even though the widow and one grandchild would own 55½ percent of the reverted copyright, they would have to be joined by another child or grandchild in order to effect a termination or a further transfer of reverted rights. This principle also applies where, for example, two joint authors executed a grant and one of them is dead; in order to effect a termination, the living author must be joined by a per stirpes majority of the dead author’s beneficiaries. The notice of termination may be signed by the specified owners of termination interests or by “their duly authorized agents,” which would include the legally appointed guardians or committees of persons incompetent to sign because of age or mental disability.

When a Grant Can be Terminated. Section 203 draws a distinction between the date when a termination becomes effective and the earlier date when the advance notice of termination is served. With respect to the ultimate effective date, section 203(a)(3) provides, as a general rule, that a grant may be terminated during the 5 years following the expiration of a period of 35 years from the execution of the grant. As an exception to this basic 35-year rule, the bill also provides that “if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the end of 35 years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of 40 years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.” This alternative method of computation is intended to cover cases where years elapse between the signing of a publication contract and the eventual publication of the work.

The effective date of termination, which must be stated in the advance notice, is required to fall within the 5 years following the end of the applicable 35- or 40-year period, but the advance notice itself must be served earlier. Under section 203(a)(4)(A), the notice must be served “not less than two or more than ten years” before the effective date stated in it.

As an example of how these time-limit requirements would operate in practice, we suggest two typical contract situations:

Case 1: Contract for theatrical production signed on September 2, 1987. Termination of grant can be made to take effect between September 2, 2022 (35 years from execution) and September 1, 2027 (end of 5 year termination period). Assuming that the author decides to terminate on September 1, 2022 (the earliest possible date) the advance notice must be filed between September 1, 2012, and September 1, 2020.

Case 2: Contract for book publication executed on April 10, 1980; book finally published on August 23, 1987. Since contract covers the right of publication, the 5-year termination period would begin on April 10, 2020 (40 years from execution) rather than April 10, 2015 (35 years from execution) or August 23, 2022 (35 years from publication). Assuming that the author decides to make the termination effective on January 1, 2024, the advance notice would have to be served between January 1, 2014, and January 1, 2022.

Effect of Termination. Section 203(b) makes clear that, unless effectively terminated within the applicable 5-year period, all rights covered by an existing grant will continue unchanged, and that rights under other Federal, State, or foreign laws are unaffected. However, assuming that a copyright transfer or license is terminated under section 203, who are bound by the termination and how are they affected?

Under the bill, termination means that ownership of the rights covered by the terminated grant reverts to everyone who owns termination interests on the date the notice of termination was served, whether they joined in signing the notice or not. In other words, if a person could have signed the notice, that person is bound by the action of the majority who did; the termination of the grant will be effective as to that person, and a proportionate share of the reverted rights automatically vests in that person. Ownership is divided proportionately on the same per stirpes basis as that provided for the right to effect termination under section 203(a) and, since the reverted rights vest on the date notice is served, the heirs of a dead beneficiary would inherit his or her share.

Under clause (3) of subsection (b), majority action is required to make a further grant of reverted rights. A problem here, of course, is that years may have passed between the time the reverted rights vested and the time the new owners want to make a further transfer; people may have died and children may have been born in the interim. To deal with this problem, the bill looks back to the date of vesting; out of the group in whom rights vested on that date, it requires the further transfer or license to be signed by “the same number and proportion of the owners” (though not necessarily the same individuals) as were then required to terminate the grant under subsection (a). If some of those in whom the rights originally vested have died, their “legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law” may represent them for this purpose and, as in the case of the termination itself, any one of the minority who does not join in the further grant is nevertheless bound by it.

An important limitation on the rights of a copyright owner under a terminated grant is specified in section 203(b)(1). This clause provides that, notwithstanding a termination, a derivative work prepared earlier may “continue to be utilized” under the conditions of the terminated grant; the clause adds, however, that this privilege is not broad enough to permit the preparation of other derivative works. In other words, a film made from a play could continue to be licensed for performance after the motion picture contract had been terminated but any remake rights covered by the contract would be cut off. For this purpose, a motion picture would be considered as a “derivative work” with respect to every “preexisting work” incorporated in it, whether the preexisting work was created independently or was prepared expressly for the motion picture.

Section 203 would not prevent the parties to a transfer or license from voluntarily agreeing at any time to terminate an existing grant and negotiating a new one, thereby causing another 35-year period to start running. However, the bill seeks to avoid the situation that has arisen under the present renewal provision, in which third parties have bought up contingent future interests as a form of speculation. Section 203(b)(4) would make a further grant of rights that revert under a terminated grant valid “only if it is made after the effective date of the termination.” An exception, in the nature of a right of “first refusal,” would permit the original grantee or a successor of such grantee to negotiate a new agreement with the persons effecting the termination at any time after the notice of termination has been served.

Nothing contained in this section or elsewhere in this legislation is intended to extend the duration of any license, transfer or assignment made for a period of less than thirty-five years. If, for example, an agreement provides an earlier termination date or lesser duration, or if it allows the author the right of cancelling or terminating the agreement under certain circumstances, the duration is governed by the agreement. Likewise, nothing in this section or legislation is intended to change the existing state of the law of contracts concerning the circumstances in which an author may cancel or terminate a license, transfer, or assignment.

Section 203(b)(6) provides that, unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant, “if it does not provide otherwise,” continues for the term of copyright. This section means that, if the agreement does not contain provisions specifying its term or duration, and the author has not terminated the agreement under this section, the agreement continues for the term of the copyright, subject to any right of termination under circumstances which may be specified therein. If, however, an agreement does contain provisions governing its duration—for example, a term of fifty years—and the author has not exercised his or her right of termination under the statute, the agreement will continue according to its terms—in this example, for only fifty years. The quoted language is not to be construed as requiring agreements to reserve the right of termination.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2002—Subsec. (a)(2)(A) to (C). Pub. L. 107–273, in subpars. (A) to (C), substituted “The” for “the” and, in subpars. (A) and (B), substituted period for semicolon at end.

1998—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 105–298, § 103(1), struck out “by his widow or her widower and his or her children or grandchildren” after “exercised,” in introductory provisions.

Subsec. (a)(2)(D). Pub. L. 105–298, § 103(2), added subpar. (D).

The 20 cases that cite 17 U.S.C. § 203 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENTD Bank NA v. Vernon Hill, II, 928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019).
cites § 203 4×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 203
“See 17 U.S.C. § 203 . This Court has not had occasion to expound on when a work falls within the scope of employment.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court may affirm a judgment on any basis supported by the record even if the reasoning departs from the district court's rationale.
Later courts cite it for
“we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it departs from the district court's rationale.” · 20 citing courts
2
GREENBaldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2015).
cites § 203 9×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 203
“See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203 , 304(c). Plaintiffs-appellants Gloria Coots Baldwin, Patricia Bergdahl, and Christine Palmitessa (“Plaintiffs”) represent Coots’s statutory heirs; since 2004, they have attempted to navigate this legal thicket and terminate rights in the Song held by…”
Holding on this section
A subsequent agreement executed after January 1, 1978, supersedes a prior grant and is subject to statutory termination rights under section 203.
Later courts cite it for
“a fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” · 18 citing courts
3
GREENHorror Inc. v. Miller, 15 F.4th 232 (2d Cir. 2021).
cites § 203 4×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 203
“See 17 U.S.C. § 203 . If Miller was Manny’s employee when he wrote the screenplay, then it is a “work made for hire” under the Act; Manny, not Miller, owns the screenplay; and Miller’s notice is of no effect.”
The case’s holding
Common law agency factors govern whether a creator is an employee for work made for hire purposes regardless of labor law definitions or union membership status.
Later courts cite it for
“to present a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the record must contain contradictory evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” · 33 citing courts
4
GREENRay Charles Found. v. Raenee Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2015).
cites § 203 11×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 203
“17 U.S.C. §§ 203 , 304(c), 304(d). The provisions were designed to “safeguard! ] authors against unremunera-tive transfers .”
The case’s holding
A party whose own royalty income would be extinguished by copyright termination asserts its own legal interest, not a third party's, and has statutory and Article III standing to challenge termination notices.
Later courts cite it for
“courts have treated the limitation on third-party standing as a prudential principle that requires plaintiffs to assert their own legal rights.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENMills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
cites § 203 8×cited by 143 cases
Where it cites § 203
“The twin citations here and elsewhere refer to the derivative-works exception that is now codified at § 304(c)(6)(A) and refer to a similar derivative-works exception that is now codified at 17 U. S. C. § 203 (b)(1). We have examined the development of both sections for purposes…”
The case’s holding
A derivative work prepared under the authority of a grant may continue to be utilized under the terms of that grant after the termination of the copyright interest.
Later courts cite it for
“in construing a federal statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” · 22 citing courts
6
GREENIsaac Donald Everly v. Patrice Everly, 958 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2020).
cites § 203 6×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 203
“5Because the grant at issue occurred “on or after January 1, 1978,” this termination was issued pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a) rather than § 304(c).”
The case’s holding
A copyright authorship claim accrues only when a putative author's status is expressly repudiated by another author rather than through mere transfers of ownership rights.
Later courts cite it for
“but, for phil to have any right to termination, he must be an 'author' of cathy's clown.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENPeretti v. Authentic Brands Grp., LLC, 33 F.4th 131 (2d Cir. 2022).
cites § 203 10×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 203
“In 2014, Appellant Valentina Peretti Acuti, one of Hugo Peretti’s daughters, and the late June Peretti, Hugo’s widow, served a Notice of Termination on Authentic Brands purporting to terminate the 1983 Assignment under 17 U.S.C. § 203 , which 3 provides a limited right to…”
Later courts cite it for
“for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, this court assumes all facts alleged in the complaint to be true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENHorror Inc. v. Miller, 335 F. Supp. 3d 273 (D. Conn. 2018).
cites § 203 9×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 203
“] On January 26, 2016, Miller served a termination notice (the "First Termination Notice") pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a) on Paramount Pictures Corporation, Sean S.”
Later courts cite it for
“screenplay, certain musical compositions, and other literary and cinematographic materials.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENStewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
cites § 203 4×cited by 315 cases
Where it cites § 203
“Finding further support in the legislative history of the 1909 Act and rejecting the Rohauer court's reliance on the equities and the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, 17 U. S. C. §§ 203 (b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A), the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners received from…”
The case’s holding
A motion picture infringes a copyright if it uses the unique setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events from a protected literary work.
Later courts cite it for
“in general, fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works.” · 15 citing courts
10
GREENClare Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
cites § 203 4×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 203
“provide that termination of a grant may be effected ‘notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,’ ... [section 304 does not apply[ ] because this is a post-1978 agreement, and § 203 does not apply[ ] because the grant in question was not made by the author” (quoting 17 U.”
The case’s holding
Statutory termination rights under the Copyright Act do not apply to copyright grants executed after January 1, 1978.
Later courts cite it for
“to 'safeguard authors against unremunerative transfers' and improve the 'bargaining position of the authors' by giving them a second chance to negotiate more advantageous grants in their works after the works had been sufficiently 'exploited' to determine their 'value.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENNew York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
cites § 203 2×cited by 117 cases
Where it cites § 203
“, at 230 (noting author’s “inalienable termination right” trader current 17 U. S. C. §§203 , 302 (1994 ed. and Supp.”
The case’s holding
The privilege to reproduce contributions as part of a collective work does not extend to electronic databases that present articles as individually retrievable items isolated from their original context.
Later courts cite it for
“conversion of newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of articles to the databases in tasini did not represent a mere conversion of intact periodicals (or revisions of periodicals) from one medium to another.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 203 3×cited by 130 cases
Where it cites § 203
“Second, Rano argues that California law provides for the termination of a contract upon the material breach of the contract by the other party, and that Sipa’s alleged actions constituted material breaches of the licensing agreement, permitting him to terminate the agreement.”
The case’s holding
Federal copyright law preempts state law rules allowing the termination of indefinite licenses at will.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established that where the district 11 court relies solely on affidavits and discovery materials, the plaintiff need only establish 12 a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENEnnio Morricone Music v. Bixio Music Grp., 936 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019).
cites § 203 8×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 203
“Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 203 , which provides that an assignment may be terminated after 35 years.”
14
GREENArchie Comic Publications, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 258 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
cites § 203 3×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 203
“abrina and/or Cheryl Blossom properties, and/or any character or characters depicted therein, which challenges ACP’s ownership thereof, including without limitation, copyrights therein, premised on the assertion that defendant’s testator has and/or ever has had any rights…”
Later courts cite it for
“acp's 'check is accepted as full payment for all the undersigned's right, title and interest in and to the strip, copy, art, continuity, characters, story or manuscript entitled or 750 used in' the story identified on the check.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENRonald Louis Smith, Jr. v. Harry Wayne Casey, 741 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2014).
cites § 203 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 203
“The estate alleged infringement of Smith’s copyright in a musical composition entitled “Spank,” along with a claim for breach of contract and a claim seeking a declaration of the validity of copyright transfer terminations the estate filed under 17 U.S.C. § 203 . Concluding the…”
The case’s holding
An author who assigned copyright to a publisher for royalties is a beneficial owner who may sue for infringement on the publisher's registration of a non-work-for-hire copyright.
cites § 203 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 203
“17 U.S.C. § 203 . This right is nontransferable and can only be exercised by the author or his/her heirs.”
The case’s holding
A municipal business privilege tax on media receipts must be apportioned to reflect the intrastate component of the activity to satisfy the Commerce Clause.
Later courts cite it for
“while the statutory construction act is not expressly applicable to the construction of local ordinances, the principles contained therein are nevertheless useful.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENMarvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
cites § 203 1×cited by 184 cases
Where it cites § 203
“See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a). We have cautioned that "Section 203 and Section 304 are different provisions involving different rights.”
The case’s holding
Mailing termination notices required by federal statute does not alone constitute purposeful availment of a forum state's laws for the purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction.” · 30 citing courts
18
GREENHarry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
cites § 203 4×cited by 17 cases
The case’s holding
A grantee who licenses others to prepare derivative works before copyright termination may continue sharing royalties from them; the derivative works exception permits continued utilization under the grant.
Later courts cite it for
“any distinction between grantees who themselves make or own derivative works and those who license others to do so.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENClassic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
cites § 203 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 203
“” 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(5). In analyzing this close counterpart to § 304(c), the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but provides an inalienable termination right.”
Later courts cite it for
“because we can affirm on any ground supported by the record, we affirm the denial of attorneys' fees . . . .” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENDonna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, 777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015).
cites § 203 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 203
“6 The district court also held that 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(4) required DeVito to give Valli and Gaudio written notice before he could terminate their rights via the reversionary clause.”
The case’s holding
A co-owner of a copyright may sue third-party infringers without joining the other co-owners, a well-settled principle of copyright law.
Later courts cite it for
“the copyright statute forbids courts from inferring a transfer of copyright or a license from mere delivery of the material object in which the work is embodied.” · 3 citing courts

Show all 90 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197920022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2019. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
S.D.N.Y.182d Cir.149th Cir.1211th Cir.56th Cir.5M.D. Tenn.41st Cir.37th Cir.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 26 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)1 case
Everly v. Everly, No. 3:17-cv-01440 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 22, 2020).

Show all 90 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2569; Pub. L. 105–298, title I, § 103, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2829; Pub. L. 107–273, div. C, title III, § 13210(9), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1909.)
Amendment years (notes): 2002, 1998
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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