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U.S. CodeTitle 47Chapter 5— Wire or Radio CommunicationSubchapter I— General Provisions

47 U.S.C. § 152 (2026)

Application of chapter

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1938–2026 298citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 298 opinions since 1938, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (4 cases).

(a) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided; but it shall not apply to persons engaged in wire or radio communication or transmission in the Canal Zone, or to wire or radio communication or transmission wholly within the Canal Zone. The provisions of this chapter shall apply with respect to cable service, to all persons engaged within the United States in providing such service, and to the facilities of cable operators which relate to such service, as provided in subchapter V–A.(b) Except as provided in sections 223 through 227 of this title, inclusive, section 276 of this title, and section 332 of this title, and subject to the provisions of section 301 of this title and subchapter V–A, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier, or (2) any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely through physical connection with the facilities of another carrier not directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with such carrier, or (3) any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely through connection by radio, or by wire and radio, with facilities, located in an adjoining State or in Canada or Mexico (where they adjoin the State in which the carrier is doing business), of another carrier not directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with such carrier, or (4) any carrier to which clause (2) or clause (3) of this subsection would be applicable except for furnishing interstate mobile radio communication service or radio communication service to mobile stations on land vehicles in Canada or Mexico; except that sections 201 to 205 of this title shall, except as otherwise provided therein, apply to carriers described in clauses (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection.(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064; Proc. No. 2695, eff. July 4, 1946, 11 F.R. 7517, 60 Stat. 1352; Apr. 27, 1954, ch. 175, § 1, 68 Stat. 63; Pub. L. 95–234, § 5, Feb. 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 35; Pub. L. 98–549, § 3(a), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2801; Pub. L. 101–166, title V, § 521(2), Nov. 21, 1989, 103 Stat. 1193; Pub. L. 101–336, title IV, § 401(b)(1), July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 369; Pub. L. 102–243, § 3(b), Dec. 20, 1991, 105 Stat. 2401; Pub. L. 103–66, title VI, § 6002(b)(2)(B)(i), Aug. 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 396; Pub. L. 117–338, § 2(c), Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6156.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original “this Act”, meaning act June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, known as the Communications Act of 1934, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 609 of this title and Tables.

For definition of Canal Zone, referred to in subsec. (a), see section 3602(b) of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

Codification

Words “the Philippine Islands or” were omitted from this section on authority of Proc. No. 2695, issued pursuant to section 1394 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, which recognized the independence of the Philippine Islands as of July 4, 1946. Proc. No. 2695 is set out under section 1394 of Title 22.

Amendments

2023—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 117–338 inserted “section 276 of this title,” after “sections 223 through 227 of this title, inclusive,”.

1993—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103–66 inserted “and section 332 of this title,” after “inclusive,”.

1991—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102–243 substituted “Except as provided in sections 223 through 227 of this title, inclusive,” for “Except as provided in section 223 or 224 of this title”.

1990—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–336, which directed substitution of “sections 224 and 225” for “section 224”, could not be executed because of the intervening amendment by Pub. L. 101–166 which substituted “section 223 or 224” for “section 224”. See 1989 Amendment note below.

1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–166 substituted “section 223 or 224” for “section 224”.

1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–549, § 3(a)(1), inserted provision making this chapter applicable with respect to cable service, to all persons engaged within the United States in providing such service, and to the facilities of cable operators which relate to such service, as provided in subchapter V–A of this chapter.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–549, § 3(a)(2), inserted “and subchapter V–A” after “section 301 of this title”.

1978—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 95–234 substituted “Except as provided in section 224 of this title and subject” for “Subject”.

1954—Subsec. (b). Act Apr. 27, 1954, made it clear that intrastate communication service, whether by “wire or radio”, would not be subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction over charges, classifications, etc., and added cls. (3) and (4).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1989 Amendment

Pub. L. 101–166, title V, § 521(3), Nov. 21, 1989, 103 Stat. 1194, provided that: “The amendments made by this subsection [probably should be “section”, which amended this section and section 223 of this title] shall take effect 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 21, 1989].”

Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–549 effective 60 days after Oct. 30, 1984, except where otherwise expressly provided, see section 9(a) of Pub. L. 98–549, set out as a note under section 521 of this title.

Effective Date of 1978 Amendment

Pub. L. 95–234, § 7, Feb. 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 36, provided that: “The amendments made by this Act [enacting section 224 of this title, amending this section and sections 503 and 504 of this title, repealing sections 510 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 609 of this title] shall take effect on the thirtieth day after the date of enactment of this Act [Feb. 21, 1978]; except that the provisions of sections 503(b) and 510 of the Communications Act of 1934 [sections 503(b) and 510 of this title], as in effect on such date of enactment, shall continue to constitute the applicable law with the respect to any act or omission which occurs prior to such thirtieth day.”

Implementation of Pub. L. 117–338

Pub. L. 117–338, § 3, Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6156, provided that:“(a)Rulemaking.—Not earlier than 18 months and not later than 24 months after the date of enactment of this Act [Jan. 5, 2023], the Federal Communications Commission shall promulgate any regulations necessary to implement this Act [see Short Title of 2023 Amendment note set out under section 609 of this title] and the amendments made by this Act.“(b)Use of Data.—In implementing this Act and the amendments made by this Act, including by promulgating regulations under subsection (a) and determining just and reasonable rates, the Federal Communications Commission—“(1) may use industry-wide average costs of telephone service and advanced communications services and the average costs of service of a communications service provider; and“(2) shall consider costs associated with any safety and security measures necessary to provide a service described in paragraph (1) and differences in the costs described in paragraph (1) by small, medium, or large facilities or other characteristics.”

Effect of Pub. L. 117–338 on Other Laws

Pub. L. 117–338, § 4, Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6157, provided that: “Nothing in this Act [see Short Title of 2023 Amendment note set out under section 609 of this title] shall be construed to modify or affect any Federal, State, or local law to require telephone service or advanced communications services at a State or local prison, jail, or detention facility or prohibit the implementation of any safety and security measures related to such services at such facilities.”

Applicability of Consent Decrees and Other Law

Pub. L. 104–104, title VI, § 601, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 143, provided that:“(a)Applicability of Amendments to Future Conduct.—“(1)AT&T consent decree.—Any conduct or activity that was, before the date of enactment of this Act [Feb. 8, 1996], subject to any restriction or obligation imposed by the AT&T Consent Decree shall, on and after such date, be subject to the restrictions and obligations imposed by the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.] as amended by this Act and shall not be subject to the restrictions and the obligations imposed by such Consent Decree.“(2)GTE consent decree.—Any conduct or activity that was, before the date of enactment of this Act, subject to any restriction or obligation imposed by the GTE Consent Decree shall, on and after such date, be subject to the restrictions and obligations imposed by the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by this Act and shall not be subject to the restrictions and the obligations imposed by such Consent Decree.“(3)McCaw consent decree.—Any conduct or activity that was, before the date of enactment of this Act, subject to any restriction or obligation imposed by the McCaw Consent Decree shall, on and after such date, be subject to the restrictions and obligations imposed by the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by this Act and subsection (d) of this section and shall not be subject to the restrictions and the obligations imposed by such Consent Decree.“(b)Antitrust Laws.—“(1)Savings clause.—Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), nothing in this Act [see Short Title of 1996 Amendment note set out under section 609 of this title] or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.“(2)Repeal.—

[Amended section 221 of this title.]

“(3)Clayton act.—

[Amended section 18 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.]

“(c)Federal, State, and Local Law.—“(1)No implied effect.—This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.“(2)State tax savings provision.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or supersession of, any State or local law pertaining to taxation, except as provided in sections 622 and 653(c) of the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. 542, 573(c)] and section 602 of this Act [set out as a note below].“(d)Commercial Mobile Service Joint Marketing.—Notwithstanding section 22.903 of the Commission’s regulations (47 C.F.R. 22.903) or any other Commission regulation, a Bell operating company or any other company may, except as provided in sections 271(e)(1) and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. 271(e)(1), 272] as amended by this Act as they relate to wireline service, jointly market and sell commercial mobile services in conjunction with telephone exchange service, exchange access, intraLATA telecommunications service, interLATA telecommunications service, and information services.“(e)Definitions.—As used in this section:“(1)AT&T consent decree.—The term ‘AT&T Consent Decree’ means the order entered August 24, 1982, in the antitrust action styled United States v. Western Electric, Civil Action No. 82–0192, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and includes any judgment or order with respect to such action entered on or after August 24, 1982.“(2)GTE consent decree.—The term ‘GTE Consent Decree’ means the order entered December 21, 1984, as restated January 11, 1985, in the action styled United States v. GTE Corp., Civil Action No. 83–1298, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and any judgment or order with respect to such action entered on or after December 21, 1984.“(3)McCaw consent decree.—The term ‘McCaw Consent Decree’ means the proposed consent decree filed on July 15, 1994, in the antitrust action styled United States v. AT&T Corp. and McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., Civil Action No. 94–01555, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Such term includes any stipulation that the parties will abide by the terms of such proposed consent decree until it is entered and any order entering such proposed consent decree.“(4)Antitrust laws.—The term ‘antitrust laws’ has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes the Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. 13 et seq.), commonly known as the Robinson-Patman Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition.”

Preemption of Local Taxation With Respect to Direct-to-Home Services

Pub. L. 104–104, title VI, § 602, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 144, provided that:“(a)Preemption.—A provider of direct-to-home satellite service shall be exempt from the collection or remittance, or both, of any tax or fee imposed by any local taxing jurisdiction on direct-to-home satellite service.“(b)Definitions.—For the purposes of this section—“(1)Direct-to-home satellite service.—The term ‘direct-to-home satellite service’ means only programming transmitted or broadcast by satellite directly to the subscribers’ premises without the use of ground receiving or distribution equipment, except at the subscribers’ premises or in the uplink process to the satellite.“(2)Provider of direct-to-home satellite service.—For purposes of this section, a ‘provider of direct-to-home satellite service’ means a person who transmits, broadcasts, sells, or distributes direct-to-home satellite service.“(3)Local taxing jurisdiction.—The term ‘local taxing jurisdiction’ means any municipality, city, county, township, parish, transportation district, or assessment jurisdiction, or any other local jurisdiction in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States with the authority to impose a tax or fee, but does not include a State.“(4)State.—The term ‘State’ means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States.“(5)Tax or fee.—The terms ‘tax’ and ‘fee’ mean any local sales tax, local use tax, local intangible tax, local income tax, business license tax, utility tax, privilege tax, gross receipts tax, excise tax, franchise fees, local telecommunications tax, or any other tax, license, or fee that is imposed for the privilege of doing business, regulating, or raising revenue for a local taxing jurisdiction.“(c)Preservation of State Authority.—This section shall not be construed to prevent taxation of a provider of direct-to-home satellite service by a State or to prevent a local taxing jurisdiction from receiving revenue derived from a tax or fee imposed and collected by a State.”

The 20 cases that cite 47 U.S.C. § 152 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAt&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
cites § 152 12×cited by 543 cases
Where it cites § 152
“The Court of Appeals found support for its holdings in 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b) (§ 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934), which, it said, creates a presumption in favor of preserving state authority over intrastate communications.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission possesses rulemaking authority to implement the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including matters affecting intrastate telecommunications services.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no doubt . . . that if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance with federal policy they may bring it to heel.” · 18 citing courts
2
GREENDirectv, Inc. v. Mark Treesh, 487 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2007).
cites § 152 3×cited by 1,399 cases
Where it cites § 152
“144 (a)(1996) (reprinted at 47 U.S.C. § 152 , historical and statutory notes).”
The case’s holding
A court must construe a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true when evaluating a motion to dismiss.
Later courts cite it for
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” · 486 citing courts
3
GREENMozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
cites § 152 6×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 152
“Impossibility Exception Section 152 of the Communications Act provides, as relevant here, that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to * * * regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service…”
The case’s holding
An agency's classification of broadband internet access as an information service is reasonable if the service includes integrated information-processing capabilities like DNS and caching.
Later courts cite it for
“it would be wholly premature to pass on the preemptive effect, under conflict or other recognized preemption principles, of the remaining portions of the 2018 order.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENBell Atl. Maryland, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001).
cites § 152 10×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 152
“A Under the Federal Communications Act of 1934, telephone service was treated as a natural monopoly, and regulatory responsibility was divided between the FCC, which regulated interstate, long-distance service, and State public service commissions, which regulated intra-state…”
The case’s holding
A state does not waive Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by participating in a federal regulatory scheme unless Congress clearly and unequivocally conditions that participation on a waiver.
Later courts cite it for
“just because a private citizen's federal suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against state officials does not mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under an exception to the eleventh amendment protection.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 152 10×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 152
“17 The Commission thus sought to bring the pre-emption of two-way intrastate, non-video communications within the 47 U.S.C. § 152 (a) 18 grant of jurisdiction over activities “ancillary to broadcasting,” which had been recognized in United States v.”
The case’s holding
An entity may be a common carrier for specific activities if it holds itself out to serve the public indifferently regardless of its prior legal status.
Later courts cite it for
“since it is clearly possible for a given entity to carry on many types of activities, it is at least logical to conclude that one may be a common carrier with regard to some activities but not others.” · 11 citing courts
6
GREENVerizon v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
cites § 152 6×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 152
“” 47 U.S.C. § 152 (a). One of the Commission’s early efforts occurred in 1980, when it adopted what is known as the Computer II regime.”
The case’s holding
An agency cannot impose regulations that constitute per se common carrier obligations if it has classified the regulated entities as exempt from common carrier treatment.
Later courts cite it for
“determine whether the commission's actions were 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENDirect Commc'ns Cedar Valley, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014).
cites § 152 5×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 152
““And,” they argue, “since local rate setting is exclusively the province of state commissions under the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152 (b), the Order unlawfully usurps a power reserved to the states.”
The case’s holding
An argument not raised in a reply brief cannot be used to rebut an opposing party's argument (7 of 14).
Later courts cite it for
“the arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires an agency to provide an adequate explanation to justify treating similarly situated parties differently.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENHooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 152 8×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 152
“See 47 USC § 152 (a) (limiting the Communications Act to interstate and foreign communications).”
The case’s holding
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act provides a private cause of action and confers jurisdiction on state courts without requiring express state enabling legislation (finding no clear authority to the contrary).
Later courts cite it for
“a jury question remains regarding the caller's status as an independent contractor” · 1 citing court
9
GREENUnited States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
cites § 152 6×cited by 450 cases
Where it cites § 152
“" 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a). The Commission's responsibilities are no more narrow: it is required to endeavor to "make available.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction to regulate cable television systems under the Communications Act of 1934 (because cable is analogous to broadcasting services).
Later courts cite it for
“reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.” · 36 citing courts
10
GREENCity of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
cites § 152 2×cited by 444 cases
Where it cites § 152
“143 , note following 47 U. S. C. § 152 . 354 F. 3d, at 1099-1100.”
The case’s holding
Section 1983 claims are barred where a specific statute provides an expedited judicial review scheme and limited remedies for the same subject matter.
Later courts cite it for
“the provision of an express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under 1983.” · 33 citing courts
cites § 152 2×cited by 402 cases
Where it cites § 152
“143 , 47 U. S. C. § 152 , note. This bars a finding of implied immunity.”
The case’s holding
A claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.
Later courts cite it for
“as a general matter, the sherman act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” · 40 citing courts
12
GREENPuerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 553 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1977).
cites § 152 7×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 152
“See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152 (b), 221(b). Finally, PRTC claims that since the FCC’s policy of fostering maximum interconnection of PBX equipment and like facilities springs from a desire to enhance competition, a policy which PRTC considers to be alien to the regulatory scheme of the…”
The case’s holding
Federal jurisdiction under the Communications Act over interconnection terms governing interstate access displaces state authority under the intrastate exemption, despite a state monopoly directive.
13
cites § 152 4×cited by 123 cases
Where it cites § 152
“Because we conclude that the agency *418 erred in prohibiting the states from imposing additional eligibility requirements, we do not reach the states’ jurisdictional challenges.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission cannot prohibit states from imposing additional eligibility requirements on carriers seeking federal universal service support.
Later courts cite it for
“states have a sovereign interest in 'the power to create and enforce a legal code.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENCredit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
cites § 152 4×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 152
“II A Sometimes regulatory statutes explicitly state whether they preclude application of the antitrust laws.”
The case’s holding
Federal securities laws implicitly preclude antitrust claims for conduct squarely within the heartland of securities regulations where active agency oversight creates a risk of conflicting standards.
Later courts cite it for
“may vary from statute to statute, depending upon the relation between the antitrust laws and the regulatory program set forth in the particular statute, and the relation of the specific conduct at issue to both sets of laws.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENUnited States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
cites § 152 7×cited by 105 cases
Where it cites § 152
“1064 , as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a), which provides in pertinent part: "The provisions of this [Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio .”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission has statutory authority to require cable operators to originate local programming as a regulation reasonably ancillary to its television broadcasting responsibilities.
Later courts cite it for
“further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services.” · 9 citing courts
16
GREENFarina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010).
cites § 152 2×cited by 181 cases
Where it cites § 152
“56 , 143 (codified as Note to 47 U.S.C. § 152 ) (stating that the TCA “shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided”); 47 U.”
The case’s holding
Federal Communications Commission regulations preempt state law claims that require cell phones to meet safety standards more stringent than federal radio frequency emission limits.
Later courts cite it for
“conflict preemption nullifies state law inasmuch as it conflicts with federal law, either where compliance with both laws is impossible or where state law erects an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress.” · 15 citing courts
cites § 152 1×cited by 1,900 cases
Where it cites § 152
“3d 279 , 304 (2001) (citing 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b), and Md. Pub. Util.”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of ex parte young applies if the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining whether the doctrine of ex parte young avoids an eleventh amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” · 256 citing courts
18
GREENFrank H. Boomer v. At & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002).
cites § 152 2×cited by 154 cases
Where it cites § 152
“11 Finally, Boomer cites to the historical notes to 47 U.S.C. § 152 which provide: “This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.”
The case’s holding
An argument is waived if a party fails to support a position with legal analysis or citations.
Later courts cite it for
“a federal law may preempt a state law expressly, impliedly through the doctrine of conflict preemption, or through the doctrine of field (also known as complete) preemption.” · 6 citing courts
19
cites § 152 2×cited by 571 cases
Where it cites § 152
“See 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b); National Assn. of Regulatory Utility Commr's v.”
The case’s holding
An agency's interpretation of a statute receives no deference if it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.
Later courts cite it for
“an agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear.” · 24 citing courts
20
GREENGlobal TelLink v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 866 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
cites § 152 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 152
“*403 The FCC, however, “is generally forbidden from entering the field of intrastate communication service, which remains the province of the states.”
The case’s holding
The FCC lacks statutory authority to cap intrastate inmate calling rates because such regulatory power remains reserved to the states under the Communications Act.
Later courts cite it for
“if agreeing to pay site commissions is a condition precedent to ics providers offering their services, those commissions are related to the provision of ics.” · 2 citing courts

Show all 298 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
193819822026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 34 cases in 2002–2003. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.C. Cir.389th Cir.19SCOTUS182d Cir.168th Cir.164th Cir.1110th Cir.95th Cir.9

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 82 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)1 case
Bell Atl. v. MCI, No. 99-2459 (4th Cir. May 29, 2002).
(b)4 cases
Bell Atl. v. MCI, No. 99-2459 (4th Cir. May 29, 2002).
Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas & Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Allcomm Long Distance, Inc., No. 03-94-00408-CV (Tex. App.—Austin June 21, 1995).

Show all 298 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064; Proc. No. 2695, eff. July 4, 1946, 11 F.R. 7517, 60 Stat. 1352; Apr. 27, 1954, ch. 175, § 1, 68 Stat. 63; Pub. L. 95–234, § 5, Feb. 21, 1978, 92 Stat. 35; Pub. L. 98–549, § 3(a), Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2801; Pub. L. 101–166, title V, § 521(2), Nov. 21, 1989, 103 Stat. 1193; Pub. L. 101–336, title IV, § 401(b)(1), July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 369; Pub. L. 102–243, § 3(b), Dec. 20, 1991, 105 Stat. 2401; Pub. L. 103–66, title VI, § 6002(b)(2)(B)(i), Aug. 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 396; Pub. L. 117–338, § 2(c), Jan. 5, 2023, 136 Stat. 6156.)
Amendment years (notes): 2023, 1993, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1984, 1978, 1954
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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