Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010 (2025)

Definitions

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Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.
(1) "Contract" or "real estate contract" means any written agreement for the sale of real property in which legal title to the property is retained by the seller as security for payment of the purchase price. "Contract" or "real estate contract" does not include earnest money agreements and options to purchase.
(2) "Cure the default" or "cure" means to perform the obligations under the contract which are described in the notice of intent to forfeit and which are in default, to pay the costs and attorneys' fees prescribed in the contract, and, subject to RCW 61.30.090(1), to make all payments of money required of the purchaser by the contract which first become due after the notice of intent to forfeit is given and are due when cure is tendered.
(3) "Declaration of forfeiture" means the notice described in RCW 61.30.070(2).
(4) "Forfeit" or "forfeiture" means to cancel the purchaser's rights under a real estate contract and to terminate all right, title, and interest in the property of the purchaser and of persons claiming by or through the purchaser, all to the extent provided in this chapter, because of a breach of one or more of the purchaser's obligations under the contract. A judicial foreclosure of a real estate contract as a mortgage shall not be considered a forfeiture under this chapter.
(5) "Notice of intent to forfeit" means the notice described in RCW 61.30.070(1).
(6) "Property" means that portion of the real property which is the subject of a real estate contract, legal title to which has not been conveyed to the purchaser.
(7) "Purchaser" means the person denominated in a real estate contract as the purchaser of the property or an interest therein or, if applicable, the purchaser's successors or assigns in interest to all or any part of the property, whether by voluntary or involuntary transfer or transfer by operation of law. If the purchaser's interest in the property is subject to a proceeding in probate, a receivership, a guardianship, or a proceeding under the federal bankruptcy laws, "purchaser" means the personal representative, the receiver, the guardian, the trustee in bankruptcy, or the debtor in possession, as applicable. However, "purchaser" does not include an assignee or any other person whose only interest or claim is in the nature of a lien or other security interest.
(8) "Required notices" means the notice of intent to forfeit and the declaration of forfeiture.
(9) "Seller" means the person denominated in a real estate contract as the seller of the property or an interest therein or, if applicable, the seller's successors or assigns in interest to all or any part of the property or the contract, whether by voluntary or involuntary transfer or transfer by operation of law. If the seller's interest in the property is subject to a proceeding in probate, a receivership, a guardianship, or a proceeding under the federal bankruptcy laws, "seller" means the personal representative, the receiver, the guardian, the trustee in bankruptcy, or the debtor in possession, as applicable. However, "seller" does not include an assignee or any other person whose only interest or claim is in the nature of a lien or other security interest and does not include an assignee who has not been conveyed legal title to any portion of the property.
(10) "Time for cure" means the time provided in RCW 61.30.070(1)(e) as it may be extended as provided in this chapter or any longer period agreed to by the seller.
[ 1988 c 86 s 1; 1985 c 237 s 1.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2023 · leading case: Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 6× “RCW 61.30.010(7) extends the definition *454 of "purchaser" to include a personal representative in a probate proceeding.”
Pardee v. Jolly, 182 P.3d 967 (Wash. 2008). “" RCW 61.30.010(1). A lease with an option to purchase involves a lease for a certain period of time and an option for the lessee to purchase the property from the lessor.”
Pardee v. Jolly, 163 Wash. 2d 558 (2008). “” RCW 61.30.010(1). A lease with an option to purchase involves a lease for a certain period of time and an option for the lessee to purchase the property from the lessor.”
In re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988). · cites it 2× “RCW 61.30.010(1) provides the following definition: “Contract” or “real estate contract” means any written agreement for the sale of real property in which legal title to the property is retained by the seller as security for payment of the purchase price.”
Tomlinson v. Clarke, 825 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1992). “8 RCW 61.30.010(1). See generally 2 Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook ch.”
State v. Wooten, 312 P.3d 41 (Wash. 2013). “*896 ¶14 The terms of this particular real estate contract show Wooten possessed “[some]thing less than exclusive ownership” under RCW 9A.”
Galladora v. Richter, 764 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “Here, the act provides for a 90-day period during which the purchaser may cure a default, RCW 61.30.010(2); former RCW 61.30.070(1)(e).”
Schoneman v. Wilson, 785 P.2d 845 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). “This conclusion was based on the court's reasoning that the Legislature could not have intended the act to reinstate contracts that had long been abandoned and forgotten about by the parties. We concur in the trial court's reasoning.”
Kofmehl v. Steelman, 816 P.2d 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “Wilson argue the issue is whether the court abused its discretion in failing to grant specific performance.”
Powell v. Moss, 754 P.2d 697 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “RCW 61.30.010(2) provides that one may cure default by paying the obligations under the contract, including "the costs and attorneys' fees prescribed in the contract".”
Lanzce G. Douglass, Inc., V. Dept. Of Revenue, No. 57108-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2023). · cites it 4× “at 17. We disagree. It is true that in a real estate contract, the seller retains the legal title to the property “as security for payment of the purchase price.”
Arnold v. Moore, 980 P.2d 291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 5× “I RCW 61.30.010(7) defines the term “purchaser.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010(1): 8 cases
Pardee v. Jolly, 182 P.3d 967 (Wash. 2008). “" RCW 61.30.010(1). A lease with an option to purchase involves a lease for a certain period of time and an option for the lessee to purchase the property from the lessor.”
Pardee v. Jolly, 163 Wash. 2d 558 (2008). “” RCW 61.30.010(1). A lease with an option to purchase involves a lease for a certain period of time and an option for the lessee to purchase the property from the lessor.”
In re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988). “RCW 61.30.010(1) provides the following definition: “Contract” or “real estate contract” means any written agreement for the sale of real property in which legal title to the property is retained by the seller as security for payment of the purchase price.”
Tomlinson v. Clarke, 825 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1992). “8 RCW 61.30.010(1). See generally 2 Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook ch.”
State v. Wooten, 312 P.3d 41 (Wash. 2013). “*896 ¶14 The terms of this particular real estate contract show Wooten possessed “[some]thing less than exclusive ownership” under RCW 9A.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010(2): 2 cases
Galladora v. Richter, 764 P.2d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “Here, the act provides for a 90-day period during which the purchaser may cure a default, RCW 61.30.010(2); former RCW 61.30.070(1)(e).”
Powell v. Moss, 754 P.2d 697 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “RCW 61.30.010(2) provides that one may cure default by paying the obligations under the contract, including "the costs and attorneys' fees prescribed in the contract".”
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010(4): 1 case
Schoneman v. Wilson, 785 P.2d 845 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). “This conclusion was based on the court's reasoning that the Legislature could not have intended the act to reinstate contracts that had long been abandoned and forgotten about by the parties. We concur in the trial court's reasoning.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010(7): 2 cases
Schultz v. Werelius, 803 P.2d 1334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “RCW 61.30.010(7) extends the definition *454 of "purchaser" to include a personal representative in a probate proceeding.”
Arnold v. Moore, 980 P.2d 291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “I RCW 61.30.010(7) defines the term “purchaser.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.010(8): 1 case
Kofmehl v. Steelman, 816 P.2d 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “Wilson argue the issue is whether the court abused its discretion in failing to grant specific performance.”
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