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Wis. Stat.Chapter 766 — Property Rights of Married Persons; Marital Property

Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (2026)

Classification of property of spouses

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1986–2025 63citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 63 opinions since 1986, 10 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (8 cases).

766.31766.31 Classification of property of spouses.
766.31(1)(1) General. All property of spouses is marital property except that which is classified otherwise by this chapter and that which is described in sub. (8).
766.31(2)(2) Presumption. All property of spouses is presumed to be marital property.
766.31(3)(3) Spouse’s interest in marital property. Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property, subject to all of the following:
766.31(3)(a)(a) Terminable interest in deferred employment benefit plan. As provided in s. 766.62 (5), the marital property interest of the nonemployee spouse in a deferred employment benefit plan or in assets in an individual retirement account that are traceable to the rollover of a deferred employment benefit plan terminates at the death of the nonemployee spouse if he or she predeceases the employee spouse.
766.31(3)(b)(b) Division based on aggregate value at death.
766.31(3)(b)1.1. Spouses may provide in a marital property agreement that at the death of a spouse some or all of their marital property will be divided based on aggregate value rather than divided item by item. However, at the death of a spouse, a marital property agreement is not necessary for a division of marital property that is not item by item.
766.31(3)(b)2.2. The surviving spouse and the successor in interest to the decedent’s share of marital property may enter into an agreement providing that some or all of the marital property in which each has an interest will be divided based on aggregate value rather than divided item by item.
766.31(3)(b)3.3. The surviving spouse and a distributee who is a successor in interest to all or part of the decedent’s one-half interest in marital property may petition the court to approve an exchange of interests in the marital property authorized under subd. 1. or 2., but court approval of the exchange is not required for the agreement under subd. 1. or 2. to be effective. If the court approves the exchange, the surviving spouse and the distributee shall exchange their respective interests in 2 or more items of marital property and distribute the items in a manner to conform with the exchange. The exchange shall:
766.31(3)(b)3.a.a. Occur before the final distribution of the assets under the governing instrument;
766.31(3)(b)3.b.b. Be composed of items which are fairly representative of the appreciation and depreciation that has occurred since the date of death;
766.31(3)(b)3.c.c. Be composed of items having a fair market value at the time of exchange equal to what would have been distributed had no exchange request been made, including any money used in the exchange; and
766.31(3)(b)3.d.d. Be reported with a written description of each item, its basis and its fair market value at the time of exchange in the manner prescribed by the department of revenue.
766.31(4)(4) Classification of income. Except as provided under subs. (7) (a), (7p) and (10), income earned or accrued by a spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during marriage and after the determination date is marital property.
766.31(5)(5) Transfer to a trust. The transfer of property to a trust does not by itself change the classification of the property.
766.31(6)(6) Property owned at determination date.
766.31(6)(a)(a) Date of marriage same as determination date. If the date of marriage is the same as the determination date, the property owned at the determination date is individual property of the owning spouse.
766.31(6)(b)(b) Date of marriage prior to determination date. If the date of marriage precedes the determination date, the property owned at the determination date is not classified by this chapter but is subject to all of the following:
766.31(6)(b)1.1. Subsections (8) and (9) govern property owned at the time of marriage.
766.31(6)(b)2.2. Subsections (8) and (9) govern property acquired while the spouses were married but before the determination date if the property would have been individual property had it been acquired after the determination date.
766.31(6)(b)3.3. Subsections (8) and (9) and s. 861.02 govern property acquired while the spouses were married but before the determination date if the property would have been marital property had it been acquired after the determination date.
766.31(7)(7) Individual property after determination date. Property acquired by a spouse during marriage and after the determination date is individual property if acquired by any of the following means:
766.31(7)(a)(a) By gift during lifetime or by a disposition at death by a 3rd person to that spouse and not to both spouses. A distribution of principal or income from a trust created by a 3rd person to one spouse is the individual property of that spouse unless the trust provides otherwise.
766.31(7)(b)(b) Except as provided in s. 766.625 (2) (b) 1., in exchange for or with the proceeds of other individual property of the spouse.
766.31(7)(c)(c) From appreciation of the spouse’s individual property except to the extent that the appreciation is classified as marital property under s. 766.63.
766.31(7)(d)(d) By a decree, marital property agreement or reclassification under sub. (10) designating it as the individual property of the spouse.
766.31(7)(e)(e) As a recovery for damage to property under s. 766.70, except as specifically provided otherwise in a decree or marital property agreement.
766.31(7)(f)(f) As a recovery for personal injury except for the amount of that recovery attributable to expenses paid or otherwise satisfied from marital property and except for the amount attributable to loss of income during marriage.
766.31(7)(g)(g) By classification under s. 766.625 (2), designating an account and the digital property in an account, including the content of electronic communications, as defined in s. 711.03 (6), as the individual property of the holding spouse.
766.31(7m)(7m) Personal injury damages; lost earnings. To the extent that marital property includes damages for loss of future income arising from a personal injury claim of a surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive as individual property that portion of the award that represents an income substitute after the death of the other spouse.
766.31(7p)(7p) Unilateral statement. Income attributable to all or specified property other than marital property, with respect to which a spouse has executed under s. 766.59 a statement unilaterally designating that income as his or her individual property, is individual property.
766.31(8)(8) Rights in property acquired before determination date. Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, the enactment of this chapter does not alter the classification and ownership rights of property acquired before the determination date or the classification and ownership rights of property acquired after the determination date in exchange for or with the proceeds of property acquired before the determination date.
766.31(9)(9) Treatment of property acquired before the determination date. Except as provided otherwise in this chapter and except to the extent that it would affect the spouse’s ownership rights in the property existing before the determination date, during marriage the interest of a spouse in property owned immediately before the determination date is treated as if it were individual property.
766.31(10)(10) Reclassification. Spouses may reclassify their property by gift, conveyance, as defined in s. 706.01 (4), signed by both spouses, marital property agreement, written consent under s. 766.61 (3) (e) or unilateral statement under s. 766.59 and, if the property is a security, as defined in s. 705.21 (11), by an instrument, signed by both spouses, which conveys an interest in the security. If a spouse gives property to the other spouse and intends at the time the gift is made that the property be the individual property of the donee spouse, the income from the property is the individual property of the donee spouse unless a contrary intent of the donor spouse regarding the classification of income is established.
766.31 NoteNOTE: 1991 Wis. Act 301 contains legislative council notes.
766.31 AnnotationApplying marital property presumptions and tracing principles. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 170 Wis. 2d 240, 487 N.W.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1992).
766.31 AnnotationThe marital property law does not reduce a non-negligent mother’s wrongful death recovery for the father’s contributory negligence in their child’s death. Smith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 192 Wis. 2d 322, 531 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1995).
766.31 AnnotationA quitclaim deed of a married couple’s homestead from one spouse to the other is not valid to alienate the grantor’s interest in the property in any way that would eliminate either spouse’s contractual obligations under a mortgage containing a valid dragnet clause. Schmidt v. Waukesha State Bank, 204 Wis. 2d 426, 555 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1850.
766.31 AnnotationThe termination under sub. (3) of a marital property interest in pension benefits did not prevent the application of the equitable principle that a murderer should not profit from the crime. The trial court acted properly in imposing a constructive trust on the decedent’s marital property interest in the murderer’s pension benefits. Hackl v. Hackl, 231 Wis. 2d 43, 604 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0499.
766.31 AnnotationIrreconcilable Differences: Income From Separate Property Under Divorce Law and Under Wisconsin’s Marital Property Act. Bascom. 70 MLR 41 (1986).
766.31 AnnotationThe effects of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act on trusts: Whose property is it? Kusky. WBB Mar. 1985.
The 20 cases that cite Wis. Stat. § 766.31 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, 945 N.W.2d 645.
cites § 766.31 12×subsections: (7)(f) (7m)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“2d 397, ¶19 ; Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (3).10 2. Application ¶48 By application of marital property law, the circuit court had the authority to exercise its discretion and impose restitution for income lost as a result of the spouses of Muth's victims missing work due to Muth's…”
The case’s holding
A civil settlement does not bar criminal restitution; it reduces the restitution amount only if the defendant proves the victim would receive a double recovery of special damages.
Later courts cite it for
“look for reasons to sustain a circuit court's discretionary decision.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENIn Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 766.31 14×subsections: (8) 5× (1) 4× (4) 2× (6) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“The basic presumption favoring a marital property classification may be rebutted by demonstrating that the time (e.”
3
GREENUnited States v. Wahlen, 459 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
cites § 766.31 12×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (2). Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property.”
4
GREENSteinmann v. Steinmann, 2008 WI 43, 749 N.W.2d 145.
cites § 766.31 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“63 (1) (mixing separate and marital property in some cases "reclassifies the other property to marital property unless the component of the mixed property which is not marital property can be traced") with Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (10) (explicitly allowing automatic reclassification…”
The case’s holding
Separate property transferred into joint ownership becomes part of the marital estate subject to division, even if it was originally inherited property generally deemed indivisible.
Later courts cite it for
“once property is transferred from separate property to joint ownership, the property becomes part of the marital estate subject to division even if it is inherited property generally deemed indivisible.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENEst. of Kobylski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 766.31 10×subsections: (10) 4× (1) 2× (2) 2× (6) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“Section 766.31(1) and (2), Stats. Likewise, any property determined not to be marital property is presumed to be deferred marital property and may be subject to a surviving spouse's elective rights under sec.”
The case’s holding
The marital estate is entitled to reimbursement for improvements to separate property measured by the enhanced value of the property when the nonmarital component is traceable.
Later courts cite it for
“property taxes, utilities, insurance and other household expenses” · 1 citing court
6
GREENMarriage of Poindexter v. Poindexter, 419 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. 1988).
cites § 766.31 6×subsections: (8) 4× (9) 2×cited by 31 cases
The case’s holding
A circuit court may order a percentage-based maintenance award only when unusual circumstances warrant a deviation from a fixed sum and the award remains responsive to statutory factors.
Later courts cite it for
“when modifying maintenance awards, the circuit court must consider the same factors governing the original determination of maintenance set forth in sec. 767.26, stats.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENGerczak v. Est. of Gerczak, 2005 WI App 168, 702 N.W.2d 72.
cites § 766.31 10×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (1). All property of spouses is also presumed to be marital property; each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property.”
8
GREENFarrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
cites § 766.31 2×cited by 380 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“The relevant Wisconsin statutes, enacted when the State adopted substantial parts of the Uniform Marital Property Act, provide that "[a]ll property of spouses is presumed to be marital property," Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (2) (1989-1990), and "[e]ach spouse has a present undivided…”
The case’s holding
A debtor must have an interest in the property before the lien attaches to avoid the lien under section 522(f).
Later courts cite it for
“ordinarily, liens and other secured interests survive bankruptcy.” · 31 citing courts
9
GREENIn re Est. of Hackl v. Hackl, 604 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 766.31 12×subsections: (3) 12×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“" Bradley claims the circuit court erred by failing to follow §§ 766.31(3) and 766.62(5), Stats., which, according to Bradley, establish that Diane's interest in his pension terminated at her death.”
10
GREENJournal Sentinel, Inc. v. Schultz, 2001 WI App 260, 638 N.W.2d 76.
cites § 766.31 8×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“With regard to the classification of John's wages, Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (4) provides that, subject to a *798 few exceptions, "income earned or accrued by a spouse .”
Later courts cite it for
“it is in the context of that first suit and not in the garnishment suit that those claims should be asserted.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENKrueger v. Rodenberg, 527 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 766.31 9×subsections: (9) 6× (8) 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“Additionally, § 766.31(8), STATS., states that, in general, passage of the Act "does not alter the .”
Later courts cite it for
“it would make little sense in this case to rule ... that a marital property interest can be created by the mere payment of taxes or other maintenance expenses.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENDay v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, 798 N.W.2d 199.
cites § 766.31 2×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“See Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (l)-(3) (providing that all spousal property is, or *616 is presumed to be, marital property and that, generally, each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in the marital property); Wis.”
The case’s holding
A claim falls within a policy's initial grant of coverage if the underlying incident involves bodily injury.
Later courts cite it for
“the insured bears the burden of showing an initial grant of coverage, and if that burden is met the burden shifts to the insurer to show that an exclusion nevertheless precludes coverage.” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENJohnson v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 430 (N.C. 1986).
cites § 766.31 2×subsections: (7)(f)cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“1986) (“community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court .”
The case’s holding
Courts must use an analytic approach to classify personal injury awards by determining whether the recovery is intended to replace separate or marital property.
Later courts cite it for
“the analytic approach asks what the award was intended to replace . ...” · 3 citing courts
cites § 766.31 3×subsections: (8) 2× (2)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“§ 766.31(2) (1987-88). This general rule, however, is qualified by the exception for “predetermination date” property: Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, the enactment of this chapter does not alter the classification and ownership rights of property acquired before…”
Later courts cite it for
“furnish public notice of the secured party's interest in the collateral, thereby protecting third persons against the secret or undisclosed lien.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENSmith ex rel. Schoone v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 531 N.W.2d 376 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 766.31 2×subsections: (1)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“" Thus, his contention is that because § 766.31 does not otherwise classify recovery by parents for wrongful death actions, such recovery is marital property.”
The case’s holding
An independent concurrent cause must provide a basis for a cause of action in itself without requiring the occurrence of the excluded risk to make it actionable.
Later courts cite it for
“must provide the basis for a cause of action in and of itself and must not require the occurrence of the excluded risk to make it actionable.” · 6 citing courts
16
GREENIn re Sweitzer, 111 B.R. 792 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
cites § 766.31 3×subsections: (4) 2× (3)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“*800 § 766.31(3) (1987), which states that “Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property .”
Later courts cite it for
“wjhether or not a creditor holds a community claim will be determined by state law.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENIn re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
cites § 766.31 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“Wis.Stat. § 766.31. Since the parties remained married for over a year after the Act became effective, it is likely that improvements or mortgage payments during the year were made with marital property and that Mrs.”
Later courts cite it for
“unnecessary for a finding of value to be made at this time.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENIn re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999).
cites § 766.31 2×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“The entire lien was necessarily avoided to preserve the debtor’s exempt asset.”
Later courts cite it for
“the discharge injunction covers after-acquired community property, but the statute makes no mention of community property that was owned before the bankruptcy and passes through the bankruptcy estate as exempt property. . . . any nonexempt community property would be liquidated and distributed, and all that passes out of the estate is exempt community property. exempt property, with exceptions not applicable here, is not available for recovery for discharged debts. 11 u.s.c. 522 (c).” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENIn re Page, 171 B.R. 349 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1994).
cites § 766.31 2×subsections: (1) (4)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“The check is “marital property” according to Wisconsin Statutes § 766.31(1). See also Wis. Stats. § 766.31(4).”
Later courts cite it for
“all interests of a debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as of the commencement of a case.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENMatter of Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
cites § 766.31 2×subsections: (3) (4)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 766.31
“§ 766.31(3); and since CCC has conceded it is making no claim against Elna nor Debra, their right to payments is not part of a mutual obligation, and their claimed interest equal to one half of the proceeds cannot be set off.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1988. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation. 2 undated cases are not charted.

By court
Wis. Ct. App.24Bankr. E.D. Wis.12Bankr. W.D. Wis.11Wis.4E.D. Wis.37th Cir.1Bankr. M.D. Fla.1Bankr. D. Kan.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 11 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)8 cases
In Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).“The basic presumption favoring a marital property classification may be rebutted by demonstrating that the time (e.”
Est. of Kobylski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).“Section 766.31(1) and (2), Stats. Likewise, any property determined not to be marital property is presumed to be deferred marital property and may be subject to a surviving spouse's elective rights under sec.”
Smith ex rel. Schoone v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 531 N.W.2d 376 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).“" Thus, his contention is that because § 766.31 does not otherwise classify recovery by parents for wrongful death actions, such recovery is marital property.”
In re Page, 171 B.R. 349 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1994).“The check is “marital property” according to Wisconsin Statutes § 766.31(1). See also Wis. Stats. § 766.31(4).”
In re Pfalzgraf, 236 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999).
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(2)6 cases
Est. of Kobylski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Van Kylen (In re Van Kylen), 98 B.R. 455 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989).“§ 766.31(2) (1987-88). This general rule, however, is qualified by the exception for “predetermination date” property: Except as provided otherwise in this chapter, the enactment of this chapter does not alter the classification and ownership rights of property acquired before…”
In re Marriage of Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 432 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
Gardner v. Gardner, 499 N.W.2d 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
In re Czerneski, 330 B.R. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
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(3)8 cases
In re Est. of Hackl v. Hackl, 604 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).“" Bradley claims the circuit court erred by failing to follow §§ 766.31(3) and 766.62(5), Stats., which, according to Bradley, establish that Diane's interest in his pension terminated at her death.”
In re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999).“The entire lien was necessarily avoided to preserve the debtor’s exempt asset.”
Matter of Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).“§ 766.31(3); and since CCC has conceded it is making no claim against Elna nor Debra, their right to payments is not part of a mutual obligation, and their claimed interest equal to one half of the proceeds cannot be set off.”
In re Sweitzer, 111 B.R. 792 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).“*800 § 766.31(3) (1987), which states that “Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property .”
Bille v. Zuraff, 543 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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(4)6 cases
In Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
In re Sweitzer, 111 B.R. 792 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
Park Bank-West v. Mueller, 444 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
In re Page, 171 B.R. 349 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1994).
Matter of Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
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(6)2 cases
Est. of Kobylski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
In Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
(7)(a)4 cases
In re Czerneski, 330 B.R. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
Smith v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 545 B.R. 249 (E.D. Wis. 2016).
Nancy A. Scobie v. Patrick S. Scobie, No. 2020AP001937 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2023).
In Matter of Est. of Moccero, 483 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
(7)(d)1 case
Gral v. Est. of Margolis (In re Gral), 572 B.R. 709 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017).
(7)(f)3 cases
State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, 945 N.W.2d 645.“2d 397, ¶19 ; Wis. Stat. § 766.31 (3).10 2. Application ¶48 By application of marital property law, the circuit court had the authority to exercise its discretion and impose restitution for income lost as a result of the spouses of Muth's victims missing work due to Muth's…”
Johnson v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 430 (N.C. 1986).“1986) (“community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court .”
Tim J. Fruit v. Bonnie J. Fruit, 953 N.W.2d 119 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).
(7m)1 case
State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, 945 N.W.2d 645.
(8)5 cases
Marriage of Poindexter v. Poindexter, 419 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. 1988).
In Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
Krueger v. Rodenberg, 527 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).“Additionally, § 766.31(8), STATS., states that, in general, passage of the Act "does not alter the .”
Amara Gerger v. Yajaira Vanessa Avila Gerger, No. 2021AP001647 (Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2023).
(9)3 cases
Krueger v. Rodenberg, 527 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
Marriage of Poindexter v. Poindexter, 419 N.W.2d 223 (Wis. 1988).
In Matter of Est. of Lloyd, 487 N.W.2d 644 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
(10)6 cases
Est. of Kobylski v. Hellstern, 503 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
Schmidt v. Waukesha State Bank, 555 N.W.2d 655 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
Reichel v. Jung, 2000 WI App 151, 616 N.W.2d 118.
Gral v. Est. of Margolis (In re Gral), 572 B.R. 709 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017).
Nancy A. Scobie v. Patrick S. Scobie, No. 2020AP001937 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2023).
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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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