Fourth Amendment violation in Illinois

2024Thus, the State had no opportunity to argue that Carpenter’s stop passed constitutional muster under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (recognizing that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”) or otherwise offer evidence that police did not racially profile Carpenter when they pulled him over.

2024See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); - 25 - No. 1-16-1219 United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once the defendant has shown a

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. - 25 - No. 1-16-1219 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once the defendant has shown a

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021Moreover, we remain mindful that the touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis “is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).

2021Per Officer Duran’s testimony, this merely strengthened the probable cause to search the glove and arguably lent validity to the officers’ actions via the plain view doctrine. 6 See Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 31 (noting, for the plain view doctrine, the officers must be lawfully in a position to view the object; the object’s incriminating character must be immediately apparent; and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the object). ¶ 36 The touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis “is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental inva

2021Per Officer Duran’s testimony, this merely strengthened the probable cause to search the glove and arguably lent validity to the officers’ actions via the plain view doctrine. 6 See Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 31 (noting, for the plain view doctrine, the officers must be lawfully in a position to view the object; the object’s incriminating character must be immediately apparent; and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the object). ¶ 36 The touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis “is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental inva

2021Indeed, courts have held that when it’s obvious as to what’s inside a container, such as when police officers have knowledge of the container’s contents, the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy, and its contents are considered to be in “plain view.” People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 279 (2005). ¶ 36 The touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis “is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 268 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (19

2024Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (“the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons”); LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 (“[t]he mere fact of a fourth amendment violation does not mean that exclusion necessarily follows”).

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021See id. at 487 ; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Wong Sun doctrine applies as well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession.”).

2021See id. at 487 ; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Wong Sun doctrine applies as well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession.”).

2010Ed. 2d at 699-700 , 104 S. Ct. at 3421 (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence [allows] reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making [the choice between addressing whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred and whether the good-faith exception applies]”); People v. Bohan, 158 Ill.

2010Ed. 2d at 699-700 , 104 S. Ct. at 3421 (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence [allows] reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making [the choice between addressing whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred and whether the good-faith exception applies]”); People v. Bohan, 158 Ill.

2008See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 230 , citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 E2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting premise that questioning by a police officer that is unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop is itself a fourth amendment violation).

2008See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 230 , citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting premise that questioning by a police officer that is unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop is itself a fourth amendment violation).

2025“Under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, a fourth amendment violation is the poisonous tree, and any evidence obtained as a result of that violation is the fruit.” Id. (citing People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 33 ). ¶ 32 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the two-part standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996).

2025“Under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, a fourth amendment violation is the poisonous tree, and any evidence obtained as a result of that violation is the fruit.” Id. (citing People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 33 ). ¶ 33 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, under the two-part standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 , (1996).

2018People v. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d 530 , 544, 306 Ill.Dec. 94 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) ; People v. Smith , 2016 IL App (3d) 140648 , ¶ 28, 403 Ill.Dec. 707 , 54 N.E.3d 848 . ¶ 22 For purposes of the fourth amendment analysis, a person is considered seized when a law enforcement officer, " ' "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." ' " Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d at 550 , 306 Ill.Dec. 94 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (quoting Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429 , 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 8

2018People v. Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d 530 , 544, 306 Ill.Dec. 94 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) ; People v. Smith , 2016 IL App (3d) 140648 , ¶ 28, 403 Ill.Dec. 707 , 54 N.E.3d 848 . ¶ 22 For purposes of the fourth amendment analysis, a person is considered seized when a law enforcement officer, " ' "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." ' " Luedemann , 222 Ill.2d at 550 , 306 Ill.Dec. 94 , 857 N.E.2d 187 (quoting Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429 , 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n.16, 8

2022Under this doctrine, “evidence challenged for a fourth amendment violation is admissible if the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstances.” Id. ¶ 37. “ ‘The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions.’ ” Id. (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016)).

2019Utah v. Strieff , 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016).

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021Moreover, we remain mindful that the touchstone of a fourth amendment analysis “is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).

2020The “touchstone” of the fourth amendment analysis is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular seizure depends not -5- only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.” (Emphases in original.) Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

2000Therefore, although defendant may have produced the evidence voluntarily under the fifth amendment, “the Fourth Amendment issue remains.” Brown, 422 US. at 601-02, 45 L.

2000Therefore, although defendant may have produced the evidence voluntarily under the fifth amendment, "the Fourth Amendment issue remains." Brown , 422 U.S. at 601-02 , 45 L.

2019Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340 , 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). ¶ 36 "The fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine is an outgrowth of the exclusionary rule providing that 'the fourth amendment violation is deemed the "poisonous tree," and any evidence obtained by exploiting that violation is subject to suppression as the "fruit" of that poisonous tree.' " People v. Burns , 2016 IL 118973 , ¶ 47, 401 Ill.Dec. 468 , 50 N.E.3d 610 (quoting People v. Henderson , 2013 IL 114040 , ¶ 33, 370 Ill.Dec. 804 , 989 N.E.2d 192 ).

2019Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340 , 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). ¶ 36 "The fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine is an outgrowth of the exclusionary rule providing that 'the fourth amendment violation is deemed the "poisonous tree," and any evidence obtained by exploiting that violation is subject to suppression as the "fruit" of that poisonous tree.' " People v. Burns , 2016 IL 118973 , ¶ 47, 401 Ill.Dec. 468 , 50 N.E.3d 610 (quoting People v. Henderson , 2013 IL 114040 , ¶ 33, 370 Ill.Dec. 804 , 989 N.E.2d 192 ).

1989Cruz’ identity was not discovered nor his cooperation obtained only as a result of an unlawful arrest; rather, “the victim’s identity was known long before there was any official misconduct, and [his] presence in court is thus not traceable to any Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. at 471-72 , 63 L.

1989Cruz’ identity was not discovered nor his cooperation obtained only as a result of an unlawful arrest; rather, “the victim’s identity was known long before there was any official misconduct, and [his] presence in court is thus not traceable to any Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. at 471-72 , 63 L.

2025The acts necessary to view the contents of the cabinet indicated that the contents were not plainly visible, and those acts constituted a warrantless -7- search. ¶ 19 A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ¶ 20 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).

1983The State courts accepted the fourth amendment test set out in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347 , 19 L.

2024However, “[t]here is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial[,]” and “[t]he mere fact of a fourth amendment violation does not mean that exclusion necessarily follows.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 .

2024Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (“the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons”); LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 (“[t]he mere fact of a fourth amendment violation does not mean that exclusion necessarily follows”).

2021Our supreme court stated: “It is a fundamental principle that a claim to suppress the product of a fourth amendment violation can be asserted ‘only by those whose rights were violated by the search or seizure itself.’ Since the defendant’s own rights were not violated, he may not vicariously seek suppression of evidence as a remedy for such a violation of another’s fourth amendment rights.” Id. at 226 .

2000Our supreme court in People v. James, 118 Ill. 2d 214, 226 , 514 N.E.2d 998 (1987), held that “[i]t is a fundamental principle that a claim to suppress the product of a fourth amendment violation can be asserted ‘only by those whose rights were violated by the search or seizure itself.’ ” As defendant asserts that his personal rights were violated, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, defendant has standing to move to suppress his statements.

2021See id. at 487 ; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Wong Sun doctrine applies as well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession.”).

2021See id. at 487 ; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“The Wong Sun doctrine applies as well when the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation is a confession.”).

2021Accordingly, “the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search [citation] have lessened application in this context.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 .

2021Accordingly, “the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search [citation] have lessened application in this context.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 .

2004Ed. 2d 497 , 509 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 1877 n.6 (1980) (the subjective intentions of a police officer are irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, except to the extent they have been communicated to the defendant).

2004Ed. 2d 497 , 509 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 1870 , 1877 n.6 (1980) (the subjective intentions of a police officer are irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, except to the extent they have been communicated to the defendant).

2006We may begin with the Supreme Court's statement that "[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' [citation], and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 86 L.

2006We may begin with the Supreme Court's statement that "[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' [citation], and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 , 86 L.

2005"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. at 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 98 . "`[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by *224 the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. at 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 98 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 178 (1978).

2005"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. at 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 98 . "`[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by *224 the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 , 116 S.Ct. at 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 98 , quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 178 (1978).