exclusionary rule in Illinois

2023I, § 6), whereas the exclusionary rule and its good-faith exception are nonconstitutional doctrines (see Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 62 ; People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) - 11 - 190691, ¶ 117 (Coghlan, J., specially concurring)).

2021See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-22 (1984). ¶ 113 And a third employment of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule occurs when the police conduct a warrantless search under an objectively reasonable belief that their actions were sanctioned by “binding appellate precedent” in existence at the time, even though that precedent is later overruled or limited.

2020Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).

2019As this court recognized in Burns: “The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is an outgrowth of the exclusionary rule providing that ‘the fourth amendment violation is deemed the “poisonous tree,” and any evidence obtained by exploiting that violation is subject to suppression as the “fruit” of that poisonous tree.’ ” Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 47 (quoting People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 33 ). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’

2022“Because the ‘sole purpose’ of the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the fourth amendment, however, its applicability requires some degree of police culpability, and ‘the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-37 ).

2022“Because the ‘sole purpose’ of the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the fourth amendment, however, its applicability requires some degree of police culpability, and ‘the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-37 ).

2024Id. ¶ 17; United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 348 (1974) (“the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved”). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ” United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 ). ¶ 47 While the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment in criminal trials, it “has never been i

2024As such, the rule has been limited to situations where “the deterrent purpose[] is ‘thought most efficaciously served.’ ” People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 62 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). ¶ 101 The State’s counter to the exclusionary rule is the good faith exception, which is a “judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when police acted with an objectively reasonable good- faith belief that their conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated

2021“This exception [to the exclusionary rule] permits evidence, that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial, to be admitted where the State can show that such evidence would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” (Internal quotation - 10 - marks omitted.) People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227-28 , 860 N.E.2d 178, 209 (2006). ¶ 41 Price testified he arrested defendant for driving 115 miles per hour in a 70-mile- per-hour zone.

2021“This exception [to the exclusionary rule] permits evidence, that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial, to be admitted where the State can show that such evidence would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” (Internal quotation - 10 - marks omitted.) People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227-28 , 860 N.E.2d 178, 209 (2006). ¶ 41 Price testified he arrested defendant for driving 115 miles per hour in a 70-mile- per-hour zone.

2019We specifically note that defendant’s pro se handwritten motion to suppress was properly formatted, raised legitimate claims, and cited proper legal authority for his claims, including the exclusionary rule set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.

2018We specifically note that defendant's pro se handwritten motion to suppress was properly formatted, raised legitimate claims, and cited proper legal authority for his claims, including the exclusionary rule set forth in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the fourth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend.

2022People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). ¶ 27 To the extent that the State raises the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we find that the exception does not apply here. ¶ 28 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides that “[w]here the particular circumstances of a case show that police acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence, there is no illicit conduct to deter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24.

2021Our supreme court declined to follow the holding in Krull because the Krull good-faith exception “does not comport with article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 70, 74 (rejecting the Krull good-faith rule as creating a “grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation,” during which constitutional rights of Illinois citizens could be violated with impunity, and holding the exclusionary rule arising out of our state constitution “continues to afford the protection abrogated by Krull”).

2024Defendant contends that the firearm must be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule, particularly when arrests like his own have been the subject of heightened public scrutiny, citing to a report authored by the Department of Justice, which criticized the CPD’s foot pursuit practices which have since been modified. ¶ 98 The State responds that application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate where the State has met its burden in establishing that Gonzalez had been acting in good faith at the time of arrest. - 32 - No. 1-22-1594 The State argues that the exclusionary rule should only

2024Further, defendant continues, the State’s reliance on Wear is misplaced, as the case did not hold that hot pursuit was always authorized, regardless of the seriousness of the offense. ¶ 100 Although there is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed (LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 ), “[t]he prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.).

2017Also, the exclusionary rule would not stop “the wholesale harassment” by some police officers of minority groups, “particularly [blacks].” Id.

2017In Aguilar, our supreme court did not consider any aspect of other important areas of criminal law jurisprudence that interact with and relate to the actions of police officers charged with enforcement of valid gun laws and whether police officers have acted with “reasonable articulable suspicion” under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); 725 ILCS 5/107-4 (West 2010), or whether probable cause to arrest exists or whether the exclusionary rule bars introduction of a seized weapon at trial.

2009For example, in People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200 (1975), the court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings.

2008Ed. 2d at 373 , 107 S. Ct. at 1165 ), our supreme court has recognized that, “ ‘ “[d]espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” ’ ” Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 204 , quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 , 45 L.

2019We find that the facts stated in the complaint and the inferences to be draw therefrom were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. ¶ 70 As noted, “[d]ecisions involving the exclusionary rule and the Illinois Constitution’s article I, section 6, require that we carefully balance the legitimate aim of law enforcement against the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 245 .

2018We find that the facts stated in the complaint and the inferences to be draw therefrom were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable. ¶ 70 As noted, "[d]ecisions involving the exclusionary rule and the Illinois Constitution's article I, section 6, require that we carefully balance the legitimate aim of law enforcement against the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Tisler , 103 Ill. 2d at 245 , 82 Ill.Dec. 613 , 469 N.E.2d 147 .

2020Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).

2019Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).

2025The United States Supreme Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply, emphasizing that “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Id. at 144 .

2021People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). ¶ 111 When the police act with an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct was lawful, the exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale “loses much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2015See Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 227 (exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that prospectively protects fourth-amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (exclusionary rule is a deterrent safeguard without which the fourth amendment would be reduced to a form of words); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is to compel respect for a constitutional guaranty in the only effective way available, by removing the incentive to disregard the constitution).

2015See Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 227 (exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that prospectively protects fourth-amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (exclusionary rule is a deterrent safeguard without which the fourth amendment would be reduced to a form of words); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is to compel respect for a constitutional guaranty in the only effective way available, by removing the incentive to disregard the constitution).

2025Where an insurer relies upon an exclusionary clause to deny coverage, “its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured.” International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill.

2022We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion. ¶ 32 “ ‘[W]here an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured.’ ” Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161785, ¶ 38 (quoting International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill.

2026There are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the inevitable-discovery doctrine, which permits the admission of otherwise illegally obtained evidence if the State proves “by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). ¶ 119 Defendant argues that the State forfeits any argument that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies.

2018See Sutherland , 223 Ill. 2d at 227-28, 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 ("[The inevitable-discovery] exception [to the exclusionary rule] permits evidence, that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial, to be admitted where the State can show that such evidence 'would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.' " (quoting Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) ) ). ¶ 115 Unlike in our previous analysis concerning defendant's clothing, Catton here did have the requisite exigent circumstances necessary to have defe

2019LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 29, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 . ¶ 27 In People v. Carrera , 203 Ill. 2d 1 , 11, 270 Ill.Dec. 440 , 783 N.E.2d 15 (2002), a majority of our supreme court held that "Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority." The defendant cites this holding as supportive of the circuit court's judgment in the present case.

2019LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 29, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 . ¶ 27 In People v. Carrera , 203 Ill. 2d 1 , 11, 270 Ill.Dec. 440 , 783 N.E.2d 15 (2002), a majority of our supreme court held that "Illinois law is settled that the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority." The defendant cites this holding as supportive of the circuit court's judgment in the present case.

2022“Generally, courts will not admit evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.” People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 47 . 2 The “prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 28 However, “[t]here is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial. [Citation.]” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 .

2022“Generally, courts will not admit evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.” People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 47 . 2 The “prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 28 However, “[t]here is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial. [Citation.]” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 22 .

2024Id. ¶ 17; United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 348 (1974) (“the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved”). “[T]he ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ” United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 ). ¶ 47 While the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment in criminal trials, it “has never been i

2024Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 (“In the complex and turbulent history of the [exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.”) Since Janis was decided, the Court has rejected every attempt to apply the exclusionary rule in matters other than criminal trials.

2023“A court must construe the policy as a whole and take into account the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d at 456 . ¶ 54 “If an insurer relies on an exclusionary clause to deny coverage, it must be clear and free from doubt that the exclusionary clause applies.” Leighton Legal Group, LLC, 2018 IL App (4th) 170548 , ¶ 37.

2022See Pekin Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 2d at 459-62 ; see also Core Construction Services of Illinois, Inc., 2019 IL App (4th) 180411, ¶ 26 (explaining when a trial court may look beyond the underlying complaint and what the court may look at). ¶ 15 “If an insurer relies on an exclusionary clause to deny coverage” and refuses its duty to defend its insured, as Farmers does here, then “it must be clear and free from doubt that the exclusionary clause applies.” Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (4th) 170548, ¶ 37 .

2022Id. ¶ 27 We briefly review the exclusionary rule. “[E]vidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest may be subject to the exclusionary rule and inadmissible.” People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 92 (2010) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963)).

2021In one sense, the exclusionary rule is broad in that it “extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.” Id. ¶ 69 For example, it may extend to confessions obtained in the home after an unreasonable entry, as it did in Wong Sun itself.

2016Id.; see also Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 ; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984). ¶ 27 The Supreme Court has consistently declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.

2009When the Supreme Court denied extending the exclusionary rule in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 82 L.

2014Defendant responds that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, since the affidavit in this case was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). ¶ 38 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987), the United States Supreme Court noted that the Court had held in Leon that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistra

2014Defendant responds that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, since the affidavit in this case was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). -17- No. 1-12-2573 ¶ 38 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987), the United States Supreme Court noted that the Court had held in Leon that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

1996This exclusionary rule has always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute (see Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N.E. 728 (adopting the reasoning in Weeks for purposes of our state exclusionary rule); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 , 34 S.Ct. at 345 , 58 L.Ed, at 656 (making it clear that the federal exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting under "legislative * * * sanction")), so long as that statute purported to authorize an unconstitutional search or seizure (see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627

2019Id. at 907 (“[W]e prefer to rest our holding here on the construction of the statute that we have put forth rather than on the application of the exclusionary rule as such.”).

2018Id. at 907 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717 ("[W]e prefer to rest our holding here on the construction of the statute that we have put forth rather than on the application of the exclusionary rule as such.").