good faith exception in Illinois

2026A court should not suppress evidence seized in good faith, and such an occurrence happens when “pursuant to a search warrant *** which *** is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors *** and contains no material misrepresentation *** and the officer believed the warrant to be valid.” Id. ¶ 63 (citing 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(2)(i) (West 2008)). ¶ 92 There are four situations where suppression of evidence is appropriate; relevant here is that the good-faith exception “would not apply if a warrant was ‘based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render offi

2024“Thus, in determining whether the good-faith exception applies, a court must ask ‘the objectively reasonable question [of] whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that [the conduct] was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.’ ” Leflore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984).

2024Thus, we cannot find that the good-faith exception applies here, as it is meant only to be a refuge for “objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 . ¶ 104 In sum, we conclude that the firearm recovered from defendant was obtained pursuant to an unlawful search, and as such conclude on these facts that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was in error.

2022Thus, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment will not be excluded if the police conducted the search “ ‘in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.’ ” Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 56 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 232 ).

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. - 25 - 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once the defendant has shown a fourth amendme

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ, dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once t

2022People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). ¶ 27 To the extent that the State raises the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we find that the exception does not apply here. ¶ 28 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule provides that “[w]here the particular circumstances of a case show that police acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence, there is no illicit conduct to deter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24.

2020See People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶¶ 29-31 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011)); see also People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 49 ; cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996) (finding the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule where an officer relied on a statute later declared unconstitutional was not recognized in Illinois as it was in violation of the Illinois Constitution). ¶ 62 In LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , our supreme court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained as a result of warrantless placement by police of a global position

2019In response, primarily relying on our supreme court's decision in People v. Carrera , 203 Ill. 2d 1 , 270 Ill.Dec. 440 , 783 N.E.2d 15 (2002), the defendant argues that the circuit court's judgment should be affirmed because the good-faith exception is inapplicable.

2019In response, primarily relying on our supreme court’s decision in People v. Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 (2002), the defendant argues that the circuit court’s judgment should be affirmed because the good-faith exception is inapplicable.

2010People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 305 , 642 N.E.2d 1235 (1994) (“The purely legal question of whether the good-faith exception applies under these facts is a question of law which we review de novo”).

2010People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 305 , 642 N.E.2d 1235 (1994) (“The purely legal question of whether the good-faith exception applies under these facts is a question of law which we review de novo”).

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requirement

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requiremen

2020See People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶¶ 29-31 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011)); see also People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 49 ; cf. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996) (finding the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule where an officer relied on a statute later declared unconstitutional was not recognized in Illinois as it was in violation of the Illinois Constitution). ¶ 62 In LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , our supreme court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained as a result of warrantless placement by police of a global position

2019Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 24 (finding that, similar to Burns and Whitaker, United States Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Court already ruled that a dog sniff of the front door of a residence was a fourth amendment search, and therefore, police could not rely on -7- the good faith exception); Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 68 (holding that the good faith exception does not apply because there was no binding precedent authorizing officers’ conduct except for a Fourth District case prohibiting the conduct); see also Whitaker, 820 F.3d at 854-55 (ruling that “no appellate decision specifi

2023It seems unlikely, for instance, that he made a chain-mail bikini for Jane Doe when she was five. ¶ 40 Second, a police officer “may reasonably rely on precedents from *** federal circuits for purposes of the good-faith exception.” People v. Potts, 2021 IL App (1st) 161219 , ¶ 117 (citing People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 54).

2021See People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 24 . -4- ¶ 18 Logically, we first should consider the question of retroactivity because the good-faith exception would presuppose the applicability of Carpenter.

2016Our supreme court subsequently adopted the Leon good-faith exception in People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477 (1984). ¶ 19 Following Leon, the Supreme Court in Krull extended the good-faith exception to encompass the situation wherein an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches, which is ultimately found to violate the fourth amendment.

2014Defendant responds that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, since the affidavit in this case was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). -17- No. 1-12-2573 ¶ 38 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987), the United States Supreme Court noted that the Court had held in Leon that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by

2024As such, the rule has been limited to situations where “the deterrent purpose[] is ‘thought most efficaciously served.’ ” People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 62 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). ¶ 101 The State’s counter to the exclusionary rule is the good faith exception, which is a “judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when police acted with an objectively reasonable good- faith belief that their conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated

2021See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is *** inadmissible in a state court”); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (rule created to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty’ ” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (rule meant to deter “disregard of constitutional requirements”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (rule meant “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights”). ¶ 156 So if an officer deliberately evades a fourth amendment requiremen

2021See United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014).

2021See United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014).

2014App. 3d 273, 281 (1998), the Supreme Court in Leon listed four situations in which the good-faith exception did not apply: “ ‘(1) where the judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth [citation]; (2) where the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role ***; (3) where the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable [citation]; and (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that t

2014Defendant responds that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, since the affidavit in this case was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). -17- No. 1-12-2573 ¶ 38 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987), the United States Supreme Court noted that the Court had held in Leon that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by

2015Id. ¶ 26 In contrast, the supreme court refused to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule where a statute was declared unconstitutional because it violated the single subject rule, explaining that to do so would be to resurrect the amendment in question and provide a grace period during which Illinois citizens would have been subject to extraterritorial arrests without proper authorization.

2015Id. -5- ¶ 26 In contrast, the supreme court refused to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule where a statute was declared unconstitutional because it violated the single subject rule, explaining that to do so would be to resurrect the amendment in question and provide a grace period during which Illinois citizens would have been subject to extraterritorial arrests without proper authorization.

2017People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶¶ 20, 22 (conviction of Aggravated Unlawful Use of Weapon, after stipulation to earlier conviction under statute later declared unconstitutional in Aguilar, subject to nullification on collateral attack). ¶ 55 Accordingly, we find the void ab initio doctrine precludes applying the good faith doctrine. ¶ 56 Terry Stop ¶ 57 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer does not violate the fourth amendment when he or she conducts a brief, investigatory stop of a person based on a reasonable, articulable suspic

2017People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶¶ 20, 22 (conviction of AUUW, after stipulation to earlier conviction under statute later declared unconstitutional in Aguilar, subject to nullification on collateral attack). ¶ 55 Accordingly, we find the void ab initio doctrine precludes applying the good-faith doctrine. -15- 1-14-2019 ¶ 56 Terry Stop ¶ 57 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer does not violate the fourth amendment when he or she conducts a brief, investigatory stop of a person based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of crimina

2023Potts, 2021 IL App (1st) 161219 , ¶¶ 108-131; People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 288 (1987) (new constitutional rulings apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987); see also United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward,” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 25 In short, the good-faith exception, not general principles of retroactivity and/or collateral review, ultimately determines whether petitioner would be entitled to a remedy. -7

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ, dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once t

2023See United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019). ¶ 24 And we recently applied the good-faith exception in a case that was pending on direct review when the Carpenter decision was issued; as a result, we denied the defendant’s request for a suppression remedy, even though Carpenter applied and thus rendered the warrantless collection of his CSLI illegal.

2021See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368-69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ, dissenting) (exclusionary rule renders new fourth amendment decisions purely prospective, in that they do not even apply to the parties before the Court); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying Carpenter relief, on remand, based on good-faith exception); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (Carpenter is “controlling going forward” but does not afford relief to defendant whose CSLI was collected beforehand). ¶ 109 Once t

2008Ultimately, the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a settlement agreement complies with the Contribution Act’s good-faith requirement (Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 191 ), and we will uphold the trial court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion (Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 135 ; Yoder v. Ferguson, 381 Ill.

2008Ultimately, the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a settlement agreement complies with the Contribution Act’s good-faith requirement (Dubina, 197 Ill. 2d at 191 ), and we will uphold the trial court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion (Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 135 ; Yoder v. Ferguson, 381 Ill.

2010Ed. 2d at 699-700 , 104 S. Ct. at 3421 ("Fourth Amendment 12 No. 1-06-3696 jurisprudence [allows] reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making [the choice between addressing whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred and whether the good- faith exception applies]"); People v. Bohan, 158 Ill.

2010Ed. 2d at 699-700 , 104 S. Ct. at 3421 (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence [allows] reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making [the choice between addressing whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred and whether the good-faith exception applies]”); People v. Bohan, 158 Ill.

2021See United States - 29 - v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (police act of monitoring location-tracking signal from beeper in car was not search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 713 (1984) (installing beeper not “search” if owner consents, though property is later transferred to third party subjected to surveillance). ¶ 123 Even though Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-11 , later distinguished those cases and emphasized the physical trespass associated with the GPS device installation, Knotts and Karo were the most applicable Supreme Court decisions at the time, and neither case gave the poli

2021See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (police act of monitoring location-tracking signal from beeper in car was not search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 713 (1984) (installing beeper not “search” if owner consents, though property is later transferred to third party subjected to surveillance). ¶ 123 Even though Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-11 , later distinguished those cases and emphasized the physical trespass associated with the GPS device installation, Knotts and Karo were the most applicable Supreme Court decisions at the time, and neither case gave the police in L

2021See United States - 29 - v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (police act of monitoring location-tracking signal from beeper in car was not search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 713 (1984) (installing beeper not “search” if owner consents, though property is later transferred to third party subjected to surveillance). ¶ 123 Even though Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-11 , later distinguished those cases and emphasized the physical trespass associated with the GPS device installation, Knotts and Karo were the most applicable Supreme Court decisions at the time, and neither case gave the poli

2021See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (police act of monitoring location-tracking signal from beeper in car was not search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 713 (1984) (installing beeper not “search” if owner consents, though property is later transferred to third party subjected to surveillance). ¶ 123 Even though Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-11 , later distinguished those cases and emphasized the physical trespass associated with the GPS device installation, Knotts and Karo were the most applicable Supreme Court decisions at the time, and neither case gave the police in L

2019The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when “police acted with an ‘ “objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful,” ’ or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). ¶ 36 This “

2018The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule providing that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights will not be suppressed when "police acted with an " 'objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct [was] lawful,' " or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence." People v. LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 24, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 (quoting United States v. Katzin , 769 F.3d 163 , 171 (2014), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quo