OPINION OF THE COURT

May a member of the bar who is a plaintiff class representative in a class action proceeding under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designate as his counsel a member or employee of his law firm? This is the question presented in the appeal at No. 75-1849 from an order denying appellant’s motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel. Also raised, at No. 75-1673, is the issue whether the district court erred in certifying the class. F.R.Civ.P.[*1087] 23(a), (c). We answer the first question in the negative; we do not reach the second, for want of an appealable order.

Mitchell A. Kramer and David C. Harrison, then law partners, purchased as joint tenants 50 shares of Scientific Control Corp. stock on January 6, 1969. They sold the stock one month later at a net loss of $438.13. During the summer of 1971, after Kramer and Harrison had dissolved their partnership, Kramer received a four-page questionnaire from the Securities and Exchange Commission requesting information on the transaction in Scientific Control stock. Kramer did not answer the SEC inquiry. Instead, after communicating with Harrison and receiving his permission, Kramer filed suit,^[1] naming himself and Harrison as plaintiffs. The complaint named as defendants Scientific Control Corp. and certain officers and directors; H. L. Federman & Co., an underwriting firm; and Arthur Andersen & Co., the certified public accounting firm and appellant herein. Robert M. Britton, then an associate in Kramer’s office, signed the complaint. Britton later moved to dismiss as to several named defendants, to add several defendants, and to amend the complaint; still later, he moved for a class action determination. Shortly before Britton left the employ of Kramer in July 1972, he withdrew as counsel and Steven Kapustin, then replacing Britton as an associate but now a partner of Kramer, entered his appearance.

On October 1, 1974, the district court granted plaintiffs’ deferred motion for a determination that the action proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. 64 F.R.D. 558 (E.D.Pa.1974). On April 17, 1975, the district court denied a motion for reconsideration of its class action certification or, in the alternative, for a certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 67 F.R.D. 98 (E.D.Pa. 1975). The appeal at No. 75-1673 followed; appellees have moved to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Two months later, on June 20, 1975, appellant moved the district court, inter alia, to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel because “[tjhere exists an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the representation by Kramer & Salus [the firm in which Kapustin is now a partner] of the named plaintiffs and the members of the class purported to be represented by the named plaintiffs; 2. The Code of Professional Responsibility bars such representation . .” Appendix at 272a. The district court, treating the motion as one for reargument or reconsideration of its April 17th order and, as such, untimely, denied the motion. Ibid. at 277a. Appellant then noticed the appeal at No. 75-1849.

I.

As we recently stated: “[T]his court has taken a strong position that a class certification decision, per se, is not an appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 2460, 32 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972). To qualify for interlocutory review in this circuit a class certification decision must be attended by special factors which take it outside the ambit of the general rule. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 152, 42 L.Ed.2d 125 (1974).” Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1976). We will review class action certification decisions if the parties satisfy two conditions precedent, neither of which may be expected absent special circumstances — an order by the district court judge and permission from this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 Harv. L.Rev. 607 (1975). Here, appellant met neither of the conditions. Accordingly, we will grant appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal at No. 75-1673.

[*1088] The appeal at No. 75-1849 stands on a different footing. Where a serious question of impropriety arises in the context of a motion to disqualify an attorney from proceeding to trial, this court has invoked the collateral rule of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Accordingly, we have held that district court orders denying such motions may be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1975); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 983 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. Singer Co., 509 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1971) (sur. motion to dismiss appeal).^[2] We believe that the questions presented in the appeal at No. 75-1849 are “ ‘too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred’”. Ibid, at 751. We hold, therefore, that the order denying the motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel qualifies for immediate review.

II.

Having established our appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to disqualify, we now properly turn to the question of the scope of our appellate review. It has been said that a district court’s decision to grant or deny such a motion may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See Kroungold v. Triester, supra, 521 F.2d at 765 & n.2. Recently, however, we observed that in many contexts disqualification motions present purely legal issues, subject to full appellate review. American Roller Co. v. Budinger, supra, 513 F.2d at 985 n.3. Once again, this possible discrepancy need not detain us here. As previously rehearsed, page 1087 supra, in this case the district court treated the motion to disqualify counsel as a motion to reconsider the class action certification decision. The issue on certifying plaintiffs as class representatives — whether they would “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”, F.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), when their counsel was an employee (and later a partner) in Kramer’s firm— was related, but not identical, to the issue posed by the disqualification motion. Reducing the distinction to its bare essentials, the former issue relates to who may serve as class representative, while the latter relates to who may serve as counsel. The trial court failed to perceive the difference and consequently erred.

III.

We take as our starting point Lord Herschell’s remark to Sir George Jessel: “[IJmportant as it was that people should get justice, it was even more important that they should be made to feel and see that they were getting it.”^[3] From this has emerged what may be described as an axiomatic norm, if not a legal doctrine or conception,^[4] viz., that the appearance of conduct associated with institutions of the law be as important as the conduct itself. Indeed, this notion is at least an implicit predicate of the Code of Professional Responsibility,^[5] drafted by the American Bar Association and implemented by the courts, in-[*1089] eluding the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,^[6] to govern behavior of attorneys. The importance of this notion cannot be gainsaid. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which Local Rule 11 in the district court made applicable to counsel, declares: “[A] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” Canon 9 is case law in this court: “[A] court may disqualify an attorney for not only acting improperly but also for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety.” Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986, 93 S.Ct. 2271, 36 L.Ed.2d 964 (1973).

These considerations form the backdrop to our approach in this appeal. Thus, we are not concerned with (a) factual determinations whether Kramer was the de facto attorney in these proceedings or whether it was variously Britton or Kapustin; or (b) the quality of the professional services rendered by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff class; or (c) the motivations of Kramer as a plaintiff, as a class representative, or as an attorney-employer or attorney-partner of the attorney who formally appeared for the plaintiffs. In the view we take, we may assume that Kramer is not and was never the attorney in fact, that the professional representation rendered variously by Brit-ton and Kapustin is of the highest caliber, and that Kramer’s interest in these proceedings is limited to his role as a named plaintiff and member of the class. With these assumptions we proceed.

IV.

In the federal courts, the right of parties to “plead and conduct their own cases”^[7] has been protected by statute since the beginning of our nation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2530, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 569 (1975). Indeed, in the criminal context, one has a constitutional right to represent himself. Ibid, at 836, 95 5. Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582. Thus, we take it as settled that any plaintiff qua plaintiff — including Kramer were he not also a class representative — may represent himself pro se.

Appellees do not appear to contest seriously that, in the circumstances of this case, it would have been improper for Kramer, the class representative, to designate himself as counsel for the class. In his deposition, Kramer stated that he would not accept any portion of a court-awarded attorneys’ fee derived from this ease “[b]ecause I thought that as a plaintiff in the purported class action case I could not benefit from the case other than as a member of the class, and could not benefit differently from other members of the class.” App. at 77a. We agree.

The very nature of this litigation — a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for money damages— suggests the possibility that success, either by verdict and judgment or by settlement, would result also in a court-awarded attorneys’ fee from the fund created for the benefit of the class. Federal courts have long recognized “the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to recover his costs, including his attorneys’ fees, from the fund or property itself or directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621, 44 L.Ed.2d 141, 153 (1975); see, e. g., Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). See generally 7A C.[*1090] Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1803 (1972); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1597 (1974).^[8] We have subscribed to these general views. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973); see SEC v. Aberdeen Securities Co., 526 F.2d 603, 607 (3d Cir. 1975).

Thus, Kramer acted wisely in the position articulated in deposition. Clearly he perceived that he could be accused of a conflict of interest were he to anticipate a share of the potential court-awarded attorneys’ fee in addition to his recovery as a member of the class.

Appellee Kramer also demonstrated an awareness of fealty to the spirit of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.” Given the possible conflict of interest^[9] between the class member plaintiff qua plaintiff and the class member plaintiff qua counsel, under circumstances in which an equitable fund may be created from which an attorneys’ fee may be awarded,^[10] we agree that a plaintiff class representative could not, with complete fidelity to Canon 9, serve as class counsel.

Appellees argue that Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874, 93 S.Ct. 120, 34 L.Ed.2d 126 (1972), and Kaban v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 1870, 26 L.Ed.2d 290 (1970), can be read as holding to the contrary. We disagree. The challenge raised in this appeal, see page 1088 supra, was not presented to the court in those cases. Thus it cannot be said that we have considered, adjudicated and set forth a holding regarding the duality problem.^[11]

Having concluded that the attorney-plaintiff class representative may not also serve as counsel for the class in cases such as this, we must now consider the effect of Canon 9 on the situation in which the partner (or employee) of the attorney class representative is chosen as counsel.

V.

Historically, members of this nation’s bar both have formed cutting edges and have wielded shields in zealous efforts to vindicate and protect interests of all kinds — individual, public, and social; economic, political, cultural, and personal. As private attorneys general and frequently in class action contexts, they have guided litigation insisting that legislative mandates be obeyed, administrative regulations respected, and constitutional guarantees observed. Often their intense advocacy has generated controversy in both the private and public sectors. Often issues they probe are sensitive, provocative and disputatious. Recently, however, critics have challenged the altruism of some class action lawyers and charged that the paramount motivation for[*1091] such litigation was counsel’s desire to generate substantial fees. The cynic’s argument may have a certain validity. But that validity need not serve as the basis for our every rule; nor does it detract from, nor should we lose sight of, the fundamental laudatory purposes of the class action device:

Its historical purpose was to alleviate the burden on the court and its facilities in cases where a claim was common to a large number of persons. ... Its use in claims for damages is justified where the public policy considerations of efficient court administration outweigh the potential prejudice to persons in interest who are not parties to the proceedings, but who may nevertheless become legally bound by an adjudication as if they were in fact parties litigant.

Also influencing the general acceptance of class actions has been recognition of the fact that the collective or accumulative technique of this device makes possible an effective assertion of many claims which otherwise would not be enforced, for economic or practical reasons, were it not for the joinder procedure. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 are a restatement and reinforcement of public policy, mutually expressed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, its advisory committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court, and the Congress, which candidly facilitate and encourage the use of class actions.

Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).

Thus, a class action is a special type of legal proceeding. Our inquiry becomes necessary only because an attorneys’ fee may emanate from an equitable fund, creating a possible conflict between the interests of the plaintiff class members represented by Kramer and the interest of Kramer’s partner Kapustin^[12] in maximizing his award as attorney for the class.

Appellees suggest that, in this case, there are adequate safeguards against professional impropriety: “(1) Both plaintiffs have stated that they receive no portion of any attorney’s fee that is awarded in this ease; (2) No close association exists between plaintiff Harrison and the counsel to the class as they have never been professionally associated; (3) Both plaintiffs, although attorneys, have stated that their role in this litigation is limited to that of a party plaintiff.” Appellees’ Brief at 23.^[13]

Whatever effectiveness such disclaimers might have in defending against an accusation of professional impropriety lodged against Kramer or Harrison, they do not meet the criticism that retention of Britton and later Kapustin contravened the appearance of propriety. And it is the appearance, not the fact, of impropriety which Canon 9 is designed to eliminate.

As Ethical Consideration 9-2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cautions in part, “[o]n occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical.” Laymen generally understand basic partnership attributes. The word “partner” has a meaning among the laity 14 that does not vary substantially from its juris[*1092] prudential ramifications.^[15] Implicit in the term is a sharing of profits and losses. Esoteric internal protections in writing or under oath, insulating the plaintiff-attorney partner from participating in a fee, can hardly dissipate the lay notion that action by one partner is action for the partnership. Accordingly, we cannot agree that an appearance of an improper conflict of interest inherent in one partner’s dual role as class representative and as class counsel vanishes when his partner is substituted as class counsel. To argue as appellees do is to argue against reality, against the vagaries of human nature, and against widely-held public impressions of the legal profession. Thus, if one concludes, as we do, that an appearance of impropriety, at a minimum, ensues when an attorney class representative also serves as counsel for a class that may benefit from an equitable fund, substituting a partner as counsel will not suffice as an antidote. If we are to provide force and vigor to Canon 9, a prophylactic rule prohibiting appointment of a partner as counsel is mandated in such circumstances. What we have said concerning substitution of a partner of the attorney-class representative applies equally to substitution of an attorney-employee or office associate as counsel.

Finally, appellees argue that disqualification of Kapustin at this late date would deprive the class of the familiarity with the case he developed during its pend-ency. Subsumed in this argument is the contention that appellant dallied unnecessarily in presenting its disqualification motion to the district court. On this record, we are unpersuaded by either claim.^[16] The motion to disqualify was filed within two months of the denial of reconsideration of the class action certification decision. Defendants certainly could not be faulted for litigating the class certification first. Had they won on that score, the action might have gone forward as an individual action, in which case the disqualification issue might never have surfaced. See pages 1089-1090 supra. Concomitantly, we cannot accept the proposition that disqualifying Kapustin now will work an undue hardship on the class. The district court, which has supervised the progress of this case — slow though it may have been — , has stated that “[t]he issue of liability is not complex and should not consume too much trial time.” 67 F.R.D. 98, 102 (denying[*1093] motion to reconsider class certification). That being so, it follows logically that it should not require new counsel an inordinate amount of time to become sufficiently familiar with the case to proceed to trial.

VI.

As we have observed previously in a constitutional context, “although the right to counsel is absolute, there is no absolute right to a particular counsel.” United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 964, 25 L.Ed.2d 127 (1970). We have concluded that vindication of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the following rule: no member of the bar either maintaining an employment relationship, including a partnership or professional corporation, or sharing office or suite space with an attorney class representative during the preparation or pendency of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action may serve as counsel to the class if the action might result in the creation of a fund from which an attorneys’ fee award would be appropriate.

The appeal at No. 75-1673 will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In the appeal at No. 75-1849, the order of the district court denying the motion for disqualification of appellees’ counsel will be reversed and the proceedings remanded.