42 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2026Constitutional Speedy-Trial Analysis In determining whether a defendant has suffered a constitutional speedy-trial violation, “we balance four factors: ‘the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the accused's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the accused as a result of the delay.’” Jones, 2021-Ohio-3359 , ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 2025Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-532 ; Taylor at ¶ 38 . {¶75} To trigger a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a “presumptively prejudicial” delay. | 8 | 25 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). {¶ 37} “[T]he length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 2025Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “ ‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’ ” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). | 5 | 16 |
State v. Hartgreen2 sentences2026Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). {¶ 37} “[T]he length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 2025Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “ ‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’ ” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2026Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). {¶ 37} “[T]he length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ 2025Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “ ‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’ ” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Knottgreen2 sentences2025Therefore, Barker’s four factor test serves as a guide for trial courts evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. {¶21} While constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights coexist in the speedy trial right space, when evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, the focus is on the prejudice of the delay and the analysis is not constrained by the statutory timeline. “‘[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional provisions are coextensive, the constitutional guarantees may be found to be broader than speedy trial statutes in some circumstances.’” (Bracketed text in original.) State v 2025See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-1009, ¶ 22-23 (3d Dist.); see also State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.) (“Only if the defendant's case is not tried within that 14-day grace period are the defendant's criminal charges to be dismissed with prejudice.”). {¶74} In addition to arguing a statutory speedy trial violation, Appellant raises a constitutional speedy trial violation. | 2 | 2 |
State v. O'Briengreen2 sentences2025Therefore, Barker’s four factor test serves as a guide for trial courts evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. {¶21} While constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights coexist in the speedy trial right space, when evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, the focus is on the prejudice of the delay and the analysis is not constrained by the statutory timeline. “‘[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional provisions are coextensive, the constitutional guarantees may be found to be broader than speedy trial statutes in some circumstances.’” (Bracketed text in original.) State v 2012See State v. O’Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9 , 516 N.E.2d 218 , (“constitutional guarantees may be found to be broader than speedy trial statutes in some circumstances”); State v. Sedlak, Portage App. No. 2010–P–0036, 2011-Ohio-870 , at ¶32 (Trapp, J., concurring) (there may be a constitutional speedy trial violation even if no statutory violation occurred). {¶ 6} Here, appellant’s pro se motion raised statutory speedy trial grounds. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Trummergreen2 sentences2024See Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139 , 140 (1963)(requiring affirmative action on the part of the accused before a constitutional speedy trial challenge may be made); State v. Trummer, 114 Ohio App.3d 456, 470-471 (applying Partsch and requiring affirmative action on the part of the accused before a statutory speedy trial challenge may be made); Bishop, supra, at ¶ 16 (because constitutional and statutory rights are not “self- executing” rights, trial court had no obligation or duty to sua sponte dismiss charges on speedy trial grounds). 2003Partsch v. Haskins (1963), 175 Ohio St. 139 , 140 , 191 N.E.2d 922 (requiring affirmative action on the part of the accused before a constitutional speedy trial challenge may be made); State v. Trummer (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 456 , 470-71 , 683 N.E.2d 392 (applying Partsch and requiring affirmative action on the part of the accused before a statutory speedy trial challenge may be made). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2015Greene No. 2013-CA-1, 2013-Ohio-4077, ¶ 5 (“Johnson’s argument here is that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by not advising him of a constitutional speedy-trial violation.”); State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 55 , 388 N.E.2d 745 (1979) (distinguishing “constitutional violations which go to factual guilt from constitutional violations which pertain to the validity of the statute relied upon by the state to convict the defendant” and concluding that “those constitutional violations which -3- {¶ 5} To pre 2013Pachay said nothing about whether a guilty plea waives a constitutional speedy-trial claim. [Cite as State v. Johnson, 2013-Ohio-4077 .] {¶ 5} Although there is support for the proposition that a guilty plea waives both statutory and constitutional speedy-trial claims,4 this court has recognized a potential exception when a speedy-trial claim is raised in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Leegreen1 sentence2026Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (1972). “‘The factors include: (1) the length of the delay “between accusation and trial”; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion, if any, of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.’” State v. Hart, 2022-Ohio-4550, ¶ 90 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Wagner, 2021-Ohio-1671, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). {¶ 37} “[T]he length of the delay is a particularly important factor as it ‘is to some extent a triggering mechanism.’” State v. Lee, 2024-Ohio-1802, ¶ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keatongreen1 sentence2025See State v. McCain, 2016-Ohio-4992, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.); State v. Keaton, 2017-Ohio-7036, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-5196, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. Bailey, 2005-Ohio- 5506, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.); State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-6895 , ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). {¶38} The trial court appropriately weighed Goodgame’s four-month delay in asserting his speedy trial right slightly against his contention of a constitutional speedy trial claim, and in favor of the State’s argument against one. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-1009, ¶ 22-23 (3d Dist.); see also State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.) (“Only if the defendant's case is not tried within that 14-day grace period are the defendant's criminal charges to be dismissed with prejudice.”). {¶74} In addition to arguing a statutory speedy trial violation, Appellant raises a constitutional speedy trial violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Slatergreen1 sentence2025State v. Slater, 2023-Ohio-608, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). {¶28} This court notes that from the time of arrest to the date the change of plea was entered was 428 days. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adams (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2025“The length of delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year in length.” Lee, 2024-Ohio- 1802 at ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing Doggett 505 U.S. at 652, fn. 1 ; accord Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 at ¶ 90. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCaingreen1 sentence2025See State v. McCain, 2016-Ohio-4992, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.); State v. Keaton, 2017-Ohio-7036, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-5196, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. Bailey, 2005-Ohio- 5506, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.); State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-6895 , ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). {¶38} The trial court appropriately weighed Goodgame’s four-month delay in asserting his speedy trial right slightly against his contention of a constitutional speedy trial claim, and in favor of the State’s argument against one. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2025See State v. McCain, 2016-Ohio-4992, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.); State v. Keaton, 2017-Ohio-7036, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); State v. Jackson, 2016-Ohio-5196, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. Bailey, 2005-Ohio- 5506, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.); State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-6895 , ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). {¶38} The trial court appropriately weighed Goodgame’s four-month delay in asserting his speedy trial right slightly against his contention of a constitutional speedy trial claim, and in favor of the State’s argument against one. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watsongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Watson, 2018-Ohio-4971 , 126 N.E.3d 289 (1st Dist.), and State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. 2021See, e.g., State v. Watson, 2018-Ohio-4971 , 126 N.E.3d 289 (1st Dist.), and State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watsongreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Watson, 2013-Ohio-5603 at ¶ 26 ; Glass, 2011- Ohio-6287 at ¶ 19. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2023Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-532 ; State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7017 , 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 38 . {¶102} To trigger a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a “presumptively prejudicial” delay. 2019We agree with the state that "[a]s to [those] new charges, Defendant cannot meet the threshold burden as the delay was only 9 months * * *." Appellee's Brief at 15-16. {¶ 66} The roughly nine-month period from the time of the second indictment to the time Mr. Graham entered his plea is not "presumptively prejudicial." See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 33 , 2002-Ohio-7017 ("The fact that appellant was brought to trial within a year of the murders can hardly allow the delay to be characterized as 'presumptively prejudicial,' a label that ordinarily triggers a constitutional speedy tr | 4 | 2019–2025 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2023Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-532 ; State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7017 , 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 38 . {¶102} To trigger a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a “presumptively prejudicial” delay. 2023Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-532 ; State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7017 , 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 38 . {¶102} To trigger a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a “presumptively prejudicial” delay. | 3 | 2019–2023 |
State v. Selvage
green
2 sentences2019He does not differentiate between the constitutional speedy trial rights that he claims; at least for purposes of this case, then, we approach any such (unargued) differentiation with caution (notwithstanding one potential aspect in which the Ohio right appears broader than its federal counterpart, a distinction that we conclude ultimately is not determinative here as discussed below). {¶ 54} We note further that although the state tells us that "Defendant did not raise a constitutional speedy trial claim in his motion or in the proceedings below," Appellee's Brief at 14, that characterization 2008The trial court further sentenced Barnes to four years of community controlled sanctions and ordered her to make restitution of $1,267 but stayed the order pending her appeal. {¶ 12} Barnes appeals, raising the following single assignment of error: {¶ 13} "The trial court erred when it failed to grant the appellant's motion to dismiss on the speedy trial violations." Standard of Review {¶ 14} Ohio courts differ as to the governing standard of review regarding a challenge of a constitutional speedy trial violation. {¶ 15} Relying on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Selvage , 80 Ohi | 3 | 2008–2019 |
United States v. Marion
green
2 sentences2025Notwithstanding, the United States PAGE 9 OF 18 Case No. 2024-L-043 Supreme Court has held that a constitutional speedy trial claim does not apply to the “period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused[.]” U.S. MacDonald, 456 U.S.1, 6 (1982), citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 . 2008The speedy trial guarantee under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply until "arrest, indictment, or other official accusation." Doggett , supra; United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307 , 313 (recognizing that the speedy trial guarantee under the federal constitution has no applicability to preindictment delays); see, also, State v. Davis , 7th Dist. | 2 | 2008–2025 |
State v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences2018Clark No. 08CA0050, 2011-Ohio-4285, ¶ 72 , citing Barker at 530 ; see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). 2013Clark No. 08CA0050, 2011-Ohio-4285, ¶72 , citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). | 2 | 2013–2018 |
State v. Triplett
green
2 sentences2008In applying this test, Ohio courts focus primarily on four factors: "(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason the government assigns to justify the delay, (3) the defendant's responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant." State v. Triplett , 78 Ohio St.3d 566 , 568 , 1997-Ohio-182 , citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 -532 . {¶ 16} We review a trial court's judgment of an alleged constitutional speedy trial violation under an abuse of discretion standard. 2003State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566 , 1997-Ohio-182 . | 2 | 2003–2008 |
State v. Triplett
green
2 sentences2008In applying this test, Ohio courts focus primarily on four factors: "(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason the government assigns to justify the delay, (3) the defendant's responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant." State v. Triplett , 78 Ohio St.3d 566 , 568 , 1997-Ohio-182 , citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 -532 . {¶ 16} We review a trial court's judgment of an alleged constitutional speedy trial violation under an abuse of discretion standard. 2003State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566 , 1997-Ohio-182 . | 2 | 2003–2008 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Lovasco
green
2 sentences2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ... 2025The Supreme Court has further explained: Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48 , 52 L.E.2d 752 (1977), or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending. ... | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Adams
green
1 sentence2025Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d at 68 ; State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 32 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Long (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2023State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179 , 2020-Ohio- 5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15 ; see also, e.g., State v. Miller, 8th Dist. 2023State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179 , 2020-Ohio- 5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15 ; see also, e.g., State v. Miller, 8th Dist. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2015Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2015Greene No. 2013-CA-1, 2013-Ohio-4077, ¶ 5 (“Johnson’s argument here is that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by not advising him of a constitutional speedy-trial violation.”); State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 55 , 388 N.E.2d 745 (1979) (distinguishing “constitutional violations which go to factual guilt from constitutional violations which pertain to the validity of the statute relied upon by the state to convict the defendant” and concluding that “those constitutional violations which -3- {¶ 5} To pre 2015Greene No. 2013-CA-1, 2013-Ohio-4077, ¶ 5 (“Johnson’s argument here is that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by not advising him of a constitutional speedy-trial violation.”); State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 55 , 388 N.E.2d 745 (1979) (distinguishing “constitutional violations which go to factual guilt from constitutional violations which pertain to the validity of the statute relied upon by the state to convict the defendant” and concluding that “those constitutional violations which -3- {¶ 5} To pre | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Bolling, Unpublished Decision (5-21-2005) green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Larlham, 2007-P-0019 (11-16-2007) green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.