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22 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cosco v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 (Wyo. 1972). 1996In this appeal, we find that Rule 48 was not violated and further that appellant has failed to allege factors to be considered in an evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim as set forth in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972). | 4 | 6 |
Rhodes v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is well established: To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [ 2020 WY 136 ] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15 , 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2017), and 2022The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is well established: To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [ 2020 WY 136 ] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15 , 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2017), and | 2 | 4 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2023A constitutional speedy trial analysis requires we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Vlahos, 2022 WY 129, ¶ 51 , 518 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Cotney v. State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 503 P.3d 58 , 66 (Wyo. 2022)). 2023A constitutional speedy trial analysis requires we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Vlahos, 2022 WY 129, ¶ 51 , 518 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Cotney v. State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 503 P.3d 58 , 66 (Wyo. 2022)). | 1 | 10 |
Berry v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31 , 93 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo.2004). 2013See Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31 , 93 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo.2004). | 1 | 3 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences1996As we stated in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Wyo.1996), W.R.Cr.P. 48 does not fully cover the concerns which may be raised by a constitutional speedy trial claim. 1996As we stated' in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Wyo.1996), W.R.Cr.P. 48 does not fully cover the concerns which may be raised by a constitutional speedy trial claim. | 1 | 3 |
Webb v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is well established: To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [ 2020 WY 136 ] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15 , 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2017), and 2022The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is well established: To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [ 2020 WY 136 ] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15 , 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2017), and | 1 | 2 |
Bradley Ross Fairbourn v. The State of Wyominggreen2 sentences2023No Barker factor is dispositive, and they must be considered “together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances.” Id. (quoting Fairbourn v. State, 2020 WY 73, ¶ 42 , 465 P.3d 413, 425 (Wyo. 2020)). 1. 2023No Barker factor is dispositive, and they must be considered “together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances.” Id. (quoting Fairbourn v. State, 2020 WY 73, ¶ 42 , 465 P.3d 413, 425 (Wyo. 2020)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Warner v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The purpose of this .analysis is to determine “ “whether, the delay in. bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the. right of the accused to a fair trial.’ ” Rhodes, ¶ 17, 348 P.3d at 411 (quoting Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10 , 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001)). 2017The purpose of this .analysis is to determine “ “whether, the delay in. bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the. right of the accused to a fair trial.’ ” Rhodes, ¶ 17, 348 P.3d at 411 (quoting Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10 , 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Wehr v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Lafferty, ¶ 60, 374 P.3d at 1254 ; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 , 94 S.Ct. 188,189 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) (emphasizing that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation); Wehr, 841 P.2d at 114 (“[A]l-though an affirmative showing of prejudice is not absolutely required to demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, prejudice is a Very important faetor[.]’ ”). [¶38] Before analyzing the substance of this factor, we must first briefly discuss which party generally bears the burden of showing prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
Byron Nelson Griggs v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶ 68 , 367 P.3d 1108, 1130 (Wyo. 2016). 2016See Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶ 68 , 367 P.3d 1108, 1130 (Wyo. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Strandlien v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 5 , 156 P.3d at 989-90 (review of appellant's claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation notwithstanding failure on the part of the appellant to raise the issue below); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (holding that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial does not waive that right; instead, a "defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right"). 3 . 2011See Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 5 , 156 P.3d at 989-90 (review of appellant's claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation notwithstanding failure on the part of the appellant to raise the issue below); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (holding that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial does not waive that right; instead, a "defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right"). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Fortner v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In addition, the district court found no evidence of improper prosecutorial motive underlying the 24-year charging, as required under Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wyo.1992), and denied Appellant's due process claim. [¶17] Appellant's trial commenced as scheduled on March 13 and concluded on March 24, 2006. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Id. [T13] We begin by calculating the time between defendant's arraignment and trial, excluding the time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 1 Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, 5 , 17 P.3d 715, 15 (Wyo.2001). 2001Id. [T13] We begin by calculating the time between defendant's arraignment and trial, excluding the time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 1 Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, 5 , 17 P.3d 715, 15 (Wyo.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Although we have stated that no specific length of delay automatically creates a constitutional speedy trial violation, Caton, 709 P.2d at 1264 , we have also said: [W]hen the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, which requires "inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). 1989Although we have stated that no specific length of delay automatically creates a constitutional speedy trial violation, Caton, 709 P.2d at 1264 , we have also said: [W]hen the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, which requires “inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo.1979) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Phillip D. Cotney v. The State of Wyoming
green
1 sentence2023A constitutional speedy trial analysis requires we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Vlahos, 2022 WY 129, ¶ 51 , 518 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Cotney v. State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 503 P.3d 58 , 66 (Wyo. 2022)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Eduardo Vlahos v. The State of Wyoming
green
2 sentences2023A constitutional speedy trial analysis requires we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Vlahos, 2022 WY 129, ¶ 51 , 518 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Cotney v. State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 503 P.3d 58 , 66 (Wyo. 2022)). 2023A constitutional speedy trial analysis requires we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Vlahos, 2022 WY 129, ¶ 51 , 518 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Cotney v. State, 2022 WY 17, ¶ 19 , 503 P.3d 58 , 66 (Wyo. 2022)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ronald Wayne Crebs III v. The State of Wyoming
green
1 sentence2022The standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim is well established: To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we look to the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): “‘(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.’” Crebs [v. State], [ 2020 WY 136 ] ¶ 14, 474 P.3d [1136,] 1142 [(Wyo. 2020)] (quoting Webb v. State, 2017 WY 108, ¶ 15 , 401 P.3d 914, 921-22 (Wyo. 2017), and | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Moore v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2016Lafferty, ¶ 60, 374 P.3d at 1254 ; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 , 94 S.Ct. 188,189 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) (emphasizing that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation); Wehr, 841 P.2d at 114 (“[A]l-though an affirmative showing of prejudice is not absolutely required to demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, prejudice is a Very important faetor[.]’ ”). [¶38] Before analyzing the substance of this factor, we must first briefly discuss which party generally bears the burden of showing prejudice. 2016Lafferty, ¶ 60, 374 P.3d at 1254 ; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 , 94 S.Ct. 188,189 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) (emphasizing that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation); Wehr, 841 P.2d at 114 (“[A]l-though an affirmative showing of prejudice is not absolutely required to demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, prejudice is a Very important faetor[.]’ ”). [¶38] Before analyzing the substance of this factor, we must first briefly discuss which party generally bears the burden of showing prejudice. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jeffery Allen Lafferty v. State
green
1 sentence2016Lafferty, ¶ 60, 374 P.3d at 1254 ; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 , 94 S.Ct. 188,189 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) (emphasizing that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation); Wehr, 841 P.2d at 114 (“[A]l-though an affirmative showing of prejudice is not absolutely required to demonstrate a violation of the right to a speedy trial, prejudice is a Very important faetor[.]’ ”). [¶38] Before analyzing the substance of this factor, we must first briefly discuss which party generally bears the burden of showing prejudice. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Campbell v. State
green
1 sentence2001Id. [T13] We begin by calculating the time between defendant's arraignment and trial, excluding the time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 1 Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, 5 , 17 P.3d 715, 15 (Wyo.2001). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McCloud v. Gowan
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 1370-71 (citing Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 , 93 S.Ct. 2164 , 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Neal v. Howard Johnson, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 1370-71 (citing Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 , 93 S.Ct. 2164 , 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Harvey v. State
green
2 sentences1992Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1989) (Harvey I). 1992Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1989) ( Harvey I ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Eugene Difrancesco, United States of America v. Eugene Difrancesco
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev'd on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. Gonzalo Gonzalez green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Caton v. State
green
2 sentences1989Although we have stated that no specific length of delay automatically creates a constitutional speedy trial violation, Caton, 709 P.2d at 1264 , we have also said: [W]hen the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, which requires "inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). 1989Although we have stated that no specific length of delay automatically creates a constitutional speedy trial violation, Caton, 709 P.2d at 1264 , we have also said: [W]hen the delay is so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, which requires “inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 460 (Wyo.1979) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Institute
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev'd on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev'd on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Allen v. McCurry
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev'd on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. DiFrancesco
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Tatum v. National Bank of Commerce green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Scott v. United States
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 1989United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994 , 102 S.Ct. 2279 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1979), cert. granted 444 U.S. 1070 , 100 S.Ct. 1012 , 62 L.Ed.2d 751 , rev’d on other grounds 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.