constitutional speedy trial claim in Illinois

2022Id. at 52 . ¶ 81 As set forth, when assessing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, the first consideration is the length of the delay.

2020See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 48 (2001) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)) - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180066-U (the factors to be considered in a constitutional speedy-trial claim include length of the delay; reasons for the delay; prejudice, if any, accruing to the defendant; and defendant’s assertion of the speedy-trial right).

2020See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 48 (2001) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)) - 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 180066-U (the factors to be considered in a constitutional speedy-trial claim include length of the delay; reasons for the delay; prejudice, if any, accruing to the defendant; and defendant’s assertion of the speedy-trial right).

2020Our supreme court has adopted the four-factor balancing test developed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), for evaluating a “reasonable” period and resolving a constitutional speedy trial claim.

2019This constitutional speedy-trial analysis follows Barker (adopted in Illinois in People v. Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d 177, 182 (1977)), and consists of four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons - 35 - 2019 IL App (2d) 170373-U for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her speedy-trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.

2015However, “the ultimate determination of whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial right has been violated is subject to de novo review.” Id. at 52 . ¶ 81 In assessing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, there are four factors that must be balanced in order to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the defendant’s assertion of the right; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.6 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; People v. Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d 177, 182 (1977).

2008Our supreme court has recognized the indistinct quality of this right by holding that “the constitutional right to a speedy trial ‘cannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of time, within which an accused must be given [a] trial.’ ” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 47-48 , 743 N.E.2d at 560 , quoting People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 316 , 265 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1970). “[Wjhenever a constitutional speedy-trial claim has been raised, ‘[t]he record in its totality must be examined to ascertain whether the defendant has enjoyed the right guaranteed by the constitution.’ ” Crane, 195 Ill. 2

2008Our supreme court has recognized the indistinct quality of this right by holding that “the constitutional right to a speedy trial ‘cannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of time, within which an accused must be given [a] trial.’ ” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 47-48 , 743 N.E.2d at 560 , quoting People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 316 , 265 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1970). “[Wjhenever a constitutional speedy-trial claim has been raised, ‘[t]he record in its totality must be examined to ascertain whether the defendant has enjoyed the right guaranteed by the constitution.’ ” Crane, 195 Ill. 2

2020People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 143 (2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

2020People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 143 (2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

2016App. 3d 980, 983 , 857 N.E.2d 288, 290 (2006) (the application of the speedy-trial statute to undisputed facts presents questions of law that are reviewed de novo); People v. Totzke, 2012 IL App (2d) 110823 , ¶ 17, 974 N.E.2d 408 (the determination of whether due process has been violated is a question of law that is reviewed de novo). ¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment Speedy-Trial Analysis ¶ 26 Having outlined the due-process and speedy-trial analyses at issue and the appropriate standards of review, we now address the State’s contention that the trial court erred in considering the period of delay be

2016App. 3d 980, 983 , 857 N.E.2d 288, 290 (2006) (the application of the speedy-trial statute to undisputed facts presents questions of law that are reviewed de novo); People v. Totzke, 2012 IL App (2d) 110823 , ¶ 17, 974 N.E.2d 408 (the determination of whether due process has been violated is a question of law that is reviewed de novo). ¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment Speedy-Trial Analysis ¶ 26 Having outlined the due-process and speedy-trial analyses at issue and the appropriate standards of review, we now address the State's contention that the trial court erred in considering the period of delay be

2022People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 250 (2005).

2014"Once the [Barker] factors have been considered, 'courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.' " Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 60 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 6 The State correctly points out in its reply brief that defendant cites the factors set out in People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 459 (1977), to establish a violation of speedy-trial rights.

2012Compare People v. Totzke, 2012 IL App (2d) 110823 , ¶ 17 (applying de novo review to ultimate determination of whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial right was violated), with People v. Kohler, 2012 IL App (2d) 100513, ¶ 16 (stating that a trial court’s ruling on a speedy-trial challenge is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

2010However, Crane also cites Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 115 , a statutory speedy-trial case, as here, which states that the trial court’s determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is entitled to much deference and should be sustained absent a clear showing that the trial court “abused its discretion,” and People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 550-51 (1989), quoting People v. Reynolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 107 (1982), which states that “ ‘[i]n resolving whether a delay is attributable to the defendant, much deference must be given to the trial court’s judgment.’ ” 3 Justice Simon dissent

2010However, Crane also cites Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 115 , a statutory speedy-trial case, as here, which states that the trial court’s determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is entitled to much deference and should be sustained absent a clear showing that the trial court “abused its discretion,” and People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 550-51 (1989), quoting People v. Reynolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 107 (1982), which states that “ ‘[i]n resolving whether a delay is attributable to the defendant, much deference must be given to the trial court’s judgment.’ ” 3 Justice Simon dissent