constitutional speedy trial claim in Colorado

2013See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 , 1364 (Colo.1993) (calculating delay for constitutional speedy trial analysis from the date of arrest to the "final resolution" of the corresponding charges); Glaser, 250 P.3d at 643 (in a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the calculation of the length of delay includes time accrued between mistrials). ¶ 47 While a two-year delay is presumptively prejudicial, Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (delays approaching one year are generally considered presumptively prejudicial), it is not necessarily

2006Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Colo.1993).

2025Indeed, it did no more than cite the relevant portions of the Federal and Colorado Constitutions and assert that counsel was adding the constitutional claim because section 18-1-405, the speedy trial statute, “implement[s] . . . the constitutional rights to a speedy trial.” ¶8 In a written order analyzing the constitutional speedy trial factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972), based on Merchant’s motion, the supplement, the existing record, and the People’s response, the court concluded that (1) the delay between Merchant’s arraignment and trial was “more than four and a

2007In People v. Whittiker, supra, we evaluated the defendant's claim of appellate delay under a four-factor test that is derived from the constitutional speedy trial test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 83 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2026Id. at 635 . “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional speedy trial right has been denied.” Id. (quoting People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 30 In evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, “[t]here is no established time period that automatically constitutes undue delay.” Id.

2026Id. at 635 . “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional speedy trial right has been denied.” Id. (quoting People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 30 In evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, “[t]here is no established time period that automatically constitutes undue delay.” Id.

2026Id. at 635 . “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional speedy trial right has been denied.” Id. (quoting People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 30 In evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, “[t]here is no established time period that automatically constitutes undue delay.” Id.

2026Id. at 635 . “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional speedy trial right has been denied.” Id. (quoting People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148, 154 (Colo. 1981)). ¶ 30 In evaluating a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, “[t]here is no established time period that automatically constitutes undue delay.” Id.

2003People v. Cass, 68 P.8d 587 (Colo.App.2002); People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo.App.2002).

2002See People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207 (Colo.App.2002)(a defendant eannot raise a constitutional speedy trial claim for the first time on appeal).

2025See People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[C]laims raised in [a] defendant’s postconviction motion, but not reasserted [on appeal], have been abandoned on appeal.”). 4 Merchant’s pro se claim regarding direct appeal counsel’s performance — specifically, the omission of a constitutional speedy trial claim on direct appeal — it did not include any additional argument on that claim at all. ¶4 Approximately six weeks later, Merchant filed a pro se “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,” in which he argued that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate and requested that

2013See Fears, 962 P.2d at 279 (defendant's constitutional right not violated by three-year delay between charge and trial). ¶ 48 Under the second factor of the constitutional test, Valles alleges that the period required for the prosecution's continuance to secure Cummings's live testimony constituted unjustified delay.

2013See United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758 , 764 (9th Cir.2008) (a defendant's requests for continuances may weigh against finding a constitutional speedy trial violation).

2003In summary, a voluntary guilty plea clearly waives all nonjurisdictional claims, subject to a narrow exception inapplicable here, see Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo.2001).