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6 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2017–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2021To determine whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation occurred, we consider “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 398, ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 2020State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391 , 398 ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “[T]he length of the delay is the least important 4 STATE v. COTA Decision of the Court [factor], while the prejudice to defendant is the most significant.” State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139-40 (1997). ¶12 The State concedes the nearly three-and-a-half-year delay between the original indictment and trial, is “presumptive[ly] prejudice[ial],” triggering Barker. | 3 | 4 |
State of Arizona v. Steven John Parkergreen2 sentences2021To determine whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation occurred, we consider “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 398, ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 2020State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391 , 398 ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “[T]he length of the delay is the least important 4 STATE v. COTA Decision of the Court [factor], while the prejudice to defendant is the most significant.” State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139-40 (1997). ¶12 The State concedes the nearly three-and-a-half-year delay between the original indictment and trial, is “presumptive[ly] prejudice[ial],” triggering Barker. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Spreitzgreen2 sentences2020State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391 , 398 ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “[T]he length of the delay is the least important 4 STATE v. COTA Decision of the Court [factor], while the prejudice to defendant is the most significant.” State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 139-40 (1997). ¶12 The State concedes the nearly three-and-a-half-year delay between the original indictment and trial, is “presumptive[ly] prejudice[ial],” triggering Barker. 2017Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 139– 40. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wassenaargreen1 sentence2024See State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 571, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (including prejudice as the most important of four factors for a constitutional speedy trial violation). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leegreen1 sentence2023Berger, 111 Ariz. at 339 ; see also State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 556 (1996) (“[T]he violation of a procedural rule designed to safeguard a constitutional right is not necessarily the same thing as a violation of the right itself.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vaskogreen1 sentence2021But prejudice for Rule 8 purposes requires Day to show “that his defense [was] harmed by the delay,” Vasko, 193 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 22 , and Day has neither alleged nor proven any such harm. ¶12 Day’s assertion of a constitutional speedy trial violation is similarly unavailing. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burkettgreen1 sentence2020Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see State v. Burkett, 179 Ariz. 109, 114 (App. 1993) (holding that the Barker factors apply equally to a speedy trial claim under the Arizona Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Paynegreen1 sentence2020See State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013). 2 STATE v. TORRANCE Decision of the Court determine whether a constitutional speedy trial violation occurred: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant demanded a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lukezicgreen1 sentence2017When analyzing a potential constitutional speedy trial violation, courts consider “1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether the defendant has demanded a speedy trial; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 69 (1984) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Berger v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2023Berger, 111 Ariz. at 339 ; see also State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 556 (1996) (“[T]he violation of a procedural rule designed to safeguard a constitutional right is not necessarily the same thing as a violation of the right itself.”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.